Some people are interpreting the RAND paper that argues a long war is not in the US interest as a sign that the mood is changing in Washington, but Charap is very much out of synch with the blob and has been for years (unfortunately for everyone), so that's a serious misreading.
It's true that the mood is changing, but it's changing in the opposite direction, i. e. the US and its allies have clearly decided to increase their commitment to Ukraine. Whatever their intentions a long Western involvement is now more, not less, likely.
This is just cope on the pro-Russia side, but it makes no sense. The truth is that neither side has a realistic exit strategy and both are resorting to escalation as a default strategy in the hope that it will break the stalemate and somehow make a negotiated settlement possible.
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I think that, in some respects, the situation resembles what happened after NATO intervened against Serbia over Kosovo, but it's far more dangerous. It's about credibility, the logic of escalation and the collective action problem it creates. Let me explain what I mean. 1/n
In 1999, when NATO intervened against Serbia, Western leaders thought it would be over in a few days. But Milosevic didn't cave and eventually it started to look as though we'd have to launch a ground invasion to force him to do so. 2/n
Now, if you had told NATO leaders before the bombing started that a ground invasion would eventually be necessary, they would probably never have intervened, but once they had they would 100% have launched a ground invasion if they had been forced to for credibility reasons. 3/n
In theory the Russians have time, it's Ukraine that needs to take risk and recover territory to keep Western aid flowing, but amazingly it looks as though the Russians are going to try another huge offensive with poorly trained conscripts 🙃 nytimes.com/2023/01/28/us/…
They could wait for the Ukrainians behind heavily fortified and well-manned positions and discourage further aid from the West by stopping their offensive and inflicting heavy losses to them, but no they're going to return to the "hyper offensive", this is pure genius...
On top of that, not only did they demote Surovikin (who seems to be the only Russian commander so far with enough common sense to understand that), but they also fired the guy who organized the withdrawal from Kherson, one of the few Russian operations carried out competently.
Holy fucking shit, that Tyre Nichols video looks *really* bad, this is some Rodney King type of shit right there.
Does the Memphis Police Department have some kind of program to rehabilitate local criminals by hiring them immediately after they're out of prison or something?
When I first heard about that story, I thought people may not riot because all the officers were black, but after seeing the video I was like "nope, people are definitely gonna riot over this".
Si vous pensez que RT diffusait des fausses nouvelles, c'est déjà puni par la loi, mais encore faut-il le prouver et l'interdiction de diffusion vise à ne pas avoir à le faire. Il n'y a aucun argument en faveur de cette mesure qui ne s'appliquerait à tout un tas d'autres médias.
Par exemple, je suis assez stupéfait d'entendre autant de gens justifier cette décision en arguant que RT était hostile au gouvernement français, comme si le fait de critiquer le gouvernement était un motif valable de censure...
On me répondra que c'est différent car c'est une chaîne d'État, mais qu'est-ce que ça change ? Les États étrangers ont bien le droit de critiquer notre gouvernement et je ne vois pas pourquoi le gouvernement devrait décider à la place des gens s'ils veulent les écouter.
There is a possible world in which, after annexing Crimea in 2014, Putin doesn't support crazy people in Donbas and lets the rest of Ukraine go. MH17 is never shot down, the West eventually normalizes relations and even Ukraine ends up recognizing the annexation. There is no war.
Once you annex Crimea, you have a choice between letting the rest of Ukraine go or try to keep it subordinated and clash with the West. Minsk couldn't work given the prevailing attitude in Washington and the role of nationalism in Ukrainian political culture after Maidan.
Putin tried to have his cake and eat it, i. e. keep Ukraine subordinated while avoiding a full-scale war and a break with the West, but this couldn't work. The best he could have done was letting Ukraine join the EU with a CSDP opt-out and no NATO membership.
I wrote a post-scriptum to my previous essay on what's to expect next in Ukraine. Due to recent developments and some oversights I corrected, I've become less pessimistic about Ukraine's prospects, though I still think it will turn into a bloody stalemate. philippelemoine.substack.com/p/more-on-what…
First, I did the calculations about shell production more carefully, which led me to conclude that both sides would be more balanced in their ability to use artillery than I previously thought, though I still expect Russia to have a significant advantage.
However, I think the most important conclusion of this exercice is that both sides will have to reduce their consumption of ammunition considerably, which presumably will make it hard for either to conduct large offensives, thus reinforcing my prediction of a stalemate.