Dara Massicot Profile picture
Jan 31 16 tweets 3 min read
I’m surprised this person is putting this number out there— 50% of Russian VDV (airborne) lost Feb-September 2022. Let’s walk though some numbers to see if a range of numbers can be found and what that might say of remaining VDV combat potential. (/1)
“Losing 50%” does not necessarily mean losing 50% of total VDV strength (45,000; IISS 2022). The VDV still uses conscripts, who are not to be sent to Ukraine. the VDV is made of around 30% conscripts, according to Russian numbers. varying by the unit. /2.
His 50% loss estimate is likely referring to a subset of officers and professional enlisted casualties —those deployed to Ukraine—a smaller number than the 45,000. We can estimate that number./3
As of 2015,the mix of the Russian VDV was 4,000 officers, 41,000 enlisted. Of those 41k, 52% were professional enlisted soldiers ~20,000. Russia had a 2020 goal of getting to 80% contractniki by 2020, or 32k. (Rand, appendix, p 146) rand.org/pubs/research_…
Did Russia achieve that number by 2020? No they changed it a little. In 2021, the spring draft brought in 6,000 VDV conscripts (KZ, April 21), 3,000 for fall 2021 (RG Oct 21), so 9K. VDV said 27,000 professional enlisted (RG Aug 21) and I assume a stable 4k officer billets /5
BBC’s Russian service is tracking military funerals in Russia. By January, the VDV lost the most of all services, 1,425. they caveat this number is probably low by 40-60%. If true that would put the number of VDV KIA around 2100 as of January. /6
Adding WIA to the count, conservatively at 3:1 ratio, that approaches anywhere from 4,200-6,300 WIA. All together that is a possible casualty range of 5,200- 8400 VDV (using BBC confirmations and caveat range), a conservative estimate or floor. /8
The rybar guy said 50% VDV loss. Assuming 100% vdv manning and 100% commitment at war start (which is very unlikely given the holes everywhere else), that would be 4k officers+ 27k = 31K. 50% would be 15.5k total casualties for a high-range but low confidence estimate. /9
When you assume incomplete manning or commitment at war start of those eligible for deployment, let’s say 80% based on other units in Russia, that then the number changes to 12,000 casualties using rybar guy. /10th
We don’t know what % of the VDV is committed to Ukraine at any time and we don’t know what he means by losses, or his credibility, so it’s not all that helpful. It’s one piece of info. /11
What can we learn from this? The Rybar guy says 50% VDV have been lost. BBC used methods to identify deaths of 4-7% of available VDV paratroopers. Those bbc numbers go up to 12-21% if one assumes a 3:1 wounded/killed ratio. /12
It’s difficult to get precise statistics from a country that has criminalized combat deaths for many years. At best, these sorts of data points can provide low to moderate assessments of casualties and combat potential. /13
The VDV has lost many vehicles and all or part of those vehicles crews, which is another method to estimate losses although not perfect either /14
The VDV is a heavily damaged force because it was misused in the beginning of the war. Some of its units stand accused of war crimes. /15
VDV casualties have likely slowed in the summer/fall, as they were withdrawn from western Kherson . Now they are being recommitted— at a much lower combat potential— for small Russian offensives on the front so numbers will likely go up. Russias once elite troops are damaged.end

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More from @MassDara

Jan 25
Interesting update on VDV commander Teplinsky’s rumored dismissal. So, the two commanders whose sector were not an operational dumpster fire (Surovikin and Teplinsky) and who stabilized areas under their command, have been shuffled once Gerasimov was placed in command /1
This update from the UK states that Teplinsky was on the ground for the Russian retrograde from Kherson city. That operation allowed Russia to preserve major components of the VDV who are now fighting in Donetsk and other areas. Losing them would have been a huge blow. /2
Gerasimov wants to work with experienced staff officers he likes. Ok makes sense but—it’s a war and he’s shuffled around his few competent senior battlefield commanders because why?? based on the fragments of evidence, it seems compliance to is the real selection factor /3
Read 7 tweets
Jan 23
I want to clarify a word I used recently to describe Gerasimov, because I don’t think it’s the most precise word I could have chosen. I called him incompetent. In a generalized sense he is not. He’s considered to be smart on military science and theory. *However** —
I don’t think he’s been an effective commander. Something went very wrong in the planning process for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and Gerasimov and Shoygu bear responsibility for that as senior commanders. There’s a lot we don’t know yet, so let me walk through a few scenarios:
Scenario 1: Prewar, Gerasimov designed the plan as it was, and believed it would work despite it resting on assumptions and departing from many principles he once advocated for. In this scenario, he would be incompetent as the plan was not sound.
Read 7 tweets
Jan 18
It’s hard to for me to fit 18 years of work on Russian military reforms in a few tweets. Shoygu’s announcements since December have been a little surreal to see. In most cases, the posture changes are returning to the past (pre-2010 era), not a step forward. /1
For example, recreating the Moscow & Leningrad Mil Districts (eliminating the Western MD) is a partial return to pre-2010 boundaries (below). It makes some sense for them to do this. They have redrawn boundaries a bit over the last 30 years, it happens. /2
I’m pointing out it is not a new idea, but a partial return to the old structures. The same can be said for returning brigades to divisions. Russians have found for the last 8+ years that the brigade does not give them firepower/maneuver they wanted so they made gradual changes/3
Read 13 tweets
Jan 17
New report from ⁦⁦⁦⁦⁦@olliecarroll⁩ from the aftermath of killed mobilized Russian troops at Makiivka. You can feel the weight of the Russian government on these families not to speak. As the intimidation was 9 years ago, so it remains /1 economist.com/europe/2023/01…
“His mother feels fortunate to have received his body whole.” /2
“Denis’s parents, who say the explosion was boosted by lorries full of munitions parked alongside the barracks”…

"The commanders blamed soldiers for giving away positions by mobile-phone use,” she said. “In fact, it’s a story of their criminal negligence.” /3
Read 7 tweets
Jan 14
The Russians continue to experiment with their missile launches. Today’s strikes on Ukraine feature something new: missiles fired on a looping ballistic trajectory from the north. Likely a tactic to defeat air defenses; only a few systems can do this. /1.From Reuters
If true(ballistic missile launched from north) warning times would be very short, explaining a siren lag. Looping ballistic trajectories are air defense defeat mechanisms that usually aren’t possible for older systems - probably meaning a newer system. Not Kalibr either… (/2
…leaving something like the Islander SS-26 SRBM, or it’s air launched version, the Kinzhal ALBM. I don’t have all the info so this view is caveated. Based on other things the Russians have done lately, there are now a few types of targeting experimentation, they are learning. /3
Read 4 tweets
Jan 12
Palace intrigue aside about yesterday’s Russia leadership news, there are a few issues of intent that remain concerning: the shifting tone of messaging on a long struggle,the possibility of creeping state mobilization to support the war, expanding commands to match bigger tasks…
Russia’s capabilities (manpower and materiel) are a limiting factor for their war in Ukraine—for now. It seems that their intent remains unchanged and the Kremlin seems willing to make more sacrifices. (/2)
I’m watching to see what other command changes take place. The changes (having CGS run the war) is not typical for how they managed previous recent conflicts, but these are unusual times. Interference at top levels is common, direct command is less common. /3
Read 5 tweets

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