The origin story of UKG offers a rare opportunity to unpack various interesting dynamics to me both as an ex-M&A deal practitioner & HR industry participant:
✅ Public company M&A deal dynamics
✅ Public company M&A deal dynamics
✅ #HR & #HCM strategy/trends
Let's dive in!🧵
This🧵will include the following components to help guide how this "all-in-one" HCM was formed & the go-forward path
1⃣ Ultimate Software Refresher
2⃣ Kronos Refresher
3⃣ H&F Combo Mechanics
4⃣ UKG: The Combined Company
5⃣ What a Public UKG cloud look like
6⃣ Summary takeaways
1⃣ Ultimate Software Refresher
🟢 Founded in 1990
🟢 IPO'd in 1998
🟢 "All-in-one" HCM SaaS platform (UltiPro)
🟢 Payroll & HR *fulcrum*
🟢 Enterprise focus (>2.5K EEs)
🟢 ~6K customers (~50m EEs)
🟢 ~$1.5bn rev. & ~6K FTEs
🟢 LBO'd by H&F-led group in '20 (more to come)
2⃣ Kronos Refresher
🔴 Founded in 1997
🔴 IPO'd in 1992
🔴 Enterprise-grade time & attendance (incl.⏰) via Dimensions, Central & Ready
As a general rule of thumb, fund limited partners will want to avoid any "self-dealing" on marks during these downstream portfolio mergers
Hiring advisors to assist with valuation views (i.e. GS and MS) mitigates imbalance in negotiations
4⃣ UKG: The Combined Company
*Merger of Equals* transactions can sometimes leave a lot of ambiguity with respect to "identity"
Following a 6-month process of surveying employees & bringing in various consultants, the CombinedCo rebranded as *Ultimate Kronos Group* ("UKG")
4⃣ UKG: The Combined Company (cont'd)
The revamped GTM strategy was focused on 3 product families - Pro (large MNCs), Dimensions (large & mid-size orgs) & Ready (smaller orgs)
Operating model inclusive of free live training & dedicated imp. & continuous client service RMs
4⃣ UKG: The Combined Company (cont'd)
UKG weathered it's 1st major headwind as its Kronos Private Cloud fell victim to a ransomware attack in Dec of '21 leading to tumult from 2K+ customers who experienced major outages during what's typically most chaotic payroll period
4⃣ UKG: The Combined Company (cont'd)
Going forward, a key *equity story* point will be the progress of the product unification & simplification for enterprise & SMB
Kronos Private Cloud & on-premise UKG Workforce Central will be retired by Q4 '25 & Q1 '27, respectively
4⃣ UKG: The Combined Company (cont'd)
UKG is aligning to many emerging feature sets that are viewed by many to be "table-stakes" for a buyer - e.g. earned wage access / on-demand pay
Key point: UKG Wallet (by Payactiv) is effectively a response to $CDAY's Dayforce Wallet
4⃣ UKG: The Combined Company (cont'd)
Given legacy HR systems lack ability to support end-to-end workflows or processes, there has been an arms race to deliver *modern architecture* (esp. *low-code*)
Key point: FleX is effectively a response to $CDAY's Integration Studio
4⃣ UKG: The Combined Company (cont'd)
There are 2 main M&A philosophies, emblematic of Ultimate & Kronos, respectively
*Emerging tuck-ins* like GPTW & Quorbit to augment modern experience
*Installed base M&A* like Ascentis (w/ NOVAtime) to migrate to UKG's new offerings
5⃣ What a Public UKG cloud look like
Chris Todd has stated a goal of ~$5bn revenue & ~$1.5bn "cash operating earnings" (call it Adj. EBITDA) by FY25
If equity market conditions are OK (w/ initiatives far along), IMO this is an "IPO-able" business in 2H '24 (off '25 numbers)
5⃣ What a Public UKG cloud look like (cont'd)
Investors will look at "all-in-one" SaaS HCM peers (e.g. $PAYC, $PCTY, $PYCR) & sponsor-IPOs (e.g. $CWAN, $INST, $PSWC etc) but $CDAY will be THE primary comp
Leverage & M&A story could be limiting factors to "premium" valuation
5⃣ What a Public UKG cloud look like (cont'd)
Figuring out what a UKG IPO could look like is really a matter of "what you can believe"
If by 2H '24 there is good visibility to hitting those FY25 targets, we can *work backwards* to come up with an *illustrative* structure
5⃣ What a Public UKG cloud look like (cont'd)
Now we don't know what the cap structure (i.e. debt and cash on BS) will look like at the time of the IPO (i.e. 2H '24)
But let's just say the *goal* is to be at pro forma ~4.0x net leverage when *fully-distributed* to trade OK
5⃣ What a Public UKG cloud look like (cont'd)
Today, $CDAY trades at ~8.0x fwd. rev. & I think you can make a good argument UKG trades at a discount to $CDAY based on:
❓Lower (overall & sub rev.) growth %
❓Less robust public market "report card"
❓Complex *platform* story
5⃣ What a Public UKG cloud look like (cont'd)
~6x FY25 rev implies $30bn TEV & $25bn Mkt Cap *@ trading* (say 4.0x PF net lev. on $1.25bn LTM EBITDA)
Hard to model pre-IPO cash/debt @ 2H'24 given all the recaps but *I think* a $3-4bn IPO *should* cover de-levering w/ secondary
6⃣ Summary takeaways - Key Question
Could this kind of M&A-led transformation have been done in the public markets (i.e. $ULTI M&A-ing Kronos)?
My thought is yes possible but would have been VERY difficult for a variety of reasons (notably how to *manage the Street*)
6⃣ Summary takeaways - Things to Watch
Both $CDAY & UKG have taken major steps in the past years to outgrow their *fulcrums* (i.e. Payroll for $CDAY and Time / Workforce Management for UKG)
The race for $WDAY and $SAP renewal base & emerging suites will be interesting for sure
Link to first tweet below in🧵
Follow me @GlogauGordon for thoughts on M&A, SaaS and other public & private markets topics
From an M&A practitioner perspective, I can't help but to think there will be a newfound appreciation for the level of complexity involved in consummating these specific types of transactions in today's environment
Let me explain...🧵
Talks of a wave of "VC-backed consolidation" over the next 12-18 months have been pervasive in various Valley circles recently, and manifesting in the form of:
🤝 Buyers using '21 valuations opportunistically as "M&A currency"
🤝 "Roll-ups of last resort" for subscale players
There have been a number of "private-to-private" all-stock (or majority stock) combinations that have been consummated before
Two "success stories" that come to mind are 1) Seamless + Grubhub and 2) Elance + oDesk (now $UPWK)
But these deals have enormous underlying complexity
The term "hostile takeover" begets images of "raiders" dawning two-toned collared shirt & suspender combos, screaming into phones in a cigar-smoke-clouded mahogany rooms filled with dot matrix printer tear-sheets...
But, $EMR showed that companies too can also "go hostile"🧵
So yesterday, $EMR announced *a proposal* to acquire $NATI for $53.00 a share (~$7.6bn and 32% premium to last close)
$NATI is a $1.7bn electronic T&M business with 70% GMS, 35K customers across diverse end markets
Deal would advance $EMR's global automation focus & strategy
Why go "hostile"?
Well, in short, if as a buyer you're getting stonewalled by management & their Board, you can put the target "in play" by going directly to shareholders
$EMR made many attempts to engage with $NATI in private dating to 5/22 with no constructive engagement
Takeaways:
🤔Focus on "how it works" (rationale + mechanics)
🤔Ask yourself: "what do I get or give here?"
Example: how the $10bn $ADBE stock part of Figma deal *technically* works
Takeaway #2: "Read Between the Lines"
🤔Stop and ask "why did they do this?"
🤔Stop and ask "where's the risk?"
Examples (all co-dependent variables)
1⃣Deal Closing (i.e. why close on X date)
2⃣Termination (i.e. who's at risk of not closing)
3⃣Others (i.e. "go shop" in PE deals)