Russia is continuing their shellings of Ukrainian towns in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts. In addition, there are occasional rocket strikes on cities beyond the border towns and rare reports of airstrikes.
Many believe this shelling is training for artillery and mortar crews, although maybe the rocket strikes are on more important targets. These shellings frequently result in civilian casualties and deaths, particularly in Vovchansk.
There are also reports of civilians being wounded and killed by mines left by Russians during their retreat.
I have recently found very little news about the Kupyansk area beyond reports of shelling and rocket attacks.
Russia regularly shells Kupyansk itself with both artillery and missiles, unfortunately wounding or killing civilians. Dvorichna, Podoly, and other towns in the area are also regularly shelled, with civilian casualties.
Ukraine is attacking Kuzemivka with their tanks and armored vehicles, which implies their infantry have taken a foothold in the town and are seeking support from their heavier weapons.
There have been shelling reports of Kovalivka recently, which I cannot remember happening prior. If it had happened prior, it has been a long time since. Ukraine has long held the high ground southwest of this town, which overlooks the Zherebets River.
Shelling in this area could indicate that Russia is shelling this high ground or that Ukraine infringes on the settlement itself.
Russia has pushed Ukraine out of the forest strips immediately west of Chervonopopivka and may have pushed them back to the border of the Donetsk oblast a further 2.5km west. All in all, Ukraine has lost between 2km and 6km of control west of Chervonopopivka.
Furthermore, Russia is pushing west toward Yampolivka, but I am not aware of successful movement in this direction, merely attempts at such. Therefore, I have drawn a large 4.7km buffer area between Russian and Ukrainian control areas in this region.
Russia is also attacking Dibrova, but I do not think they control the town yet. Ukraine did not establish control over Dibrova before this, but they had some presence in the west. Kuzmyne, which is just east of Dibrova, is either a gray area or controlled by Russia.
Ukrainian assaults in this area have entirely stopped, and Russia is preparing an offensive in the Kreminna area.
Logically, any offensive in this area would aim to capture Lyman, exerting a lot of pressure on the northern side of Slovyansk. Russia would then attack Siversk to apply pressure from the east, and with the capture of Bakhmut, there would be pressure from the south.
Ukraine has been preparing for these attacks for some time, so we will see how things play out.
In the Siversk area, Russia continues its assaults on Bilohorivka and Spirne. Bilohorivka is a difficult town for Ukraine because Russian tanks easily cover the road that supplies it. Supply is an adventure.
In the Soledar area, Russia recently captured the tiny town of Sakko i Vantsetti, and now there is heavy fighting all around this town. To the east in Mykolaivka, north on the road to Fedorivka, and west near Vasyukivka.
From the Sol area of Soledar, Russia is pushing west on a vector toward Pryvillya and southwest on a vector toward Zaliznyanske. However, their progress is minimal.
Russia captured Blahodatne, west of Soledar, on the 28th. They are pushing south from there toward Krasna Hora, where they are attacking from the northwest, and toward Paraskoviivka, where they are attacking from the north.
Krasna Hora is particularly difficult, but the most recent reports say it is still in Ukrainian control.
Bakhmut area: The northern side of Bakhmut appears to have stabilized after getting reinforcements. There is still heavy fighting. The same is generally true of the eastern side of Bakhmut on Patrisa Lumumby street and the southeast of Bakhmut near the garbage dump.
South of Bakhmut, there is news that Russia pushed west from Opytne after failing to move north into the city. Separately, I have seen unconfirmed reports that Russia entered the Bakhmut cemetery west of Opytne. I await confirmation.
Ivanivske area: Russia is pushing up the canal toward the highway, and they have made some advances. I’ve also heard about small advances toward Ivanivske itself, although unable to find details. The area is currently under the control of Ukraine, but the situation is complicated
The Toretsk area: Russia is pushing from Zaitseve toward Druzhba, attempting to advance along the treelines perpendicular to the railway to get closer to the urban agglomeration of Toretsk.
The New York area is getting heavily shelled.
The Avdiivka area: Avdiivka itself is getting heavily shelled, and there are minor Russian attacks on the front of the city.
More significantly, Russia is attacking Vodyane, where they have taken significant casualties without much to show for it. We’re talking about dozens of armored vehicles lost to capture just half of a tiny town.
Ukraine has artillery, tanks, and anti-tank missile systems north of Vodyane. The terrain is very flat with long site lines, and when combined with scout drones, it is easy to identify and destroy Russian attacks from long distances.
There is ongoing fighting in Pervomaiske, although I do not know the intensity of this fighting. Russia has not made any significant progress in several months.
The Marinka area: Russia appears to have halted its breakthrough attempts in Marinka. There is ongoing fighting, but Russia has shifted its focus south toward Pobjeda and Paraskoviivka.
Regarding Paraskoviivka, Russia has yet to approach the town. They are at least 3.5km away, but they are attempting to move in the direction of this town to bypass the defenses in Marinka and Novomykhailivka.
Like Vodyane, Ukraine has artillery, tanks, and anti-tank missile systems placed along this wide-open flat terrain, so any advance is difficult for Russian forces and often comes with heavy casualties.
The Vuhledar area: Russia is continuing its assault on the city. All of their assaults have failed thus far, and they are trying to alter their tactics.
Rather than sending in large assault forces, they are sending in smaller units, perhaps trying to learn from Wagner’s success near Bakhmut.
The weather around Vuhledar has been challenging, with low cloud cover, snow, and wind making it difficult to fly drones. Nevertheless, Russia still has large reserves and can continue attacking Vuhledar for an extended period.
As for the Zaporizhzhia area: There are small-scale attacks near Marfopil, attacking Hulyaipole. There are more significant attacks near Dorozhnyanka, again pushing toward Hulyaipole.
There are smaller-scale attacks near Kopani pushing toward Orikhiv and slightly stronger attacks near Nesterianka, again moving toward Orikhiv. There are artillery duels near Kopani.
There are small-scale attacks near Shcherbaky.
Yesterday, Russia complained about a Ukrainian raid across the Dnipro River south of Kherson, near Velykyi Potomkin Island. The result of the raid is unknown, but Russians claim they fired artillery into the area for several hours.
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Russians waving flags in Verkhnia Tersa, a lesser known highly pro-Ukrainian town in Zaporizhzhia. I remember reading the news story about the first civilian KIA in this town, and how shocking it was to them, in 2023 I think. Seeing the place like this now is sad.
Here is translated text from Al Ta about the situation in Ukraine. He is a Russian propagandist, a soviet anti-Putinist who views reviving the full Soviet Union (including Poland) as the primary number one goal of this war. He's also pretty honest about the situation. Its long. (racial slurs and whatnot are removed btw)
Preservation of one’s own forces and resources (including manpower).
On paper, everything looks neat and classical: we strike the enemy at its foundations and core, while we ourselves conserve strength and wait for the right moment for a decisive blow. But in reality, everything is both simpler and more complicated at the same time.
If you think through the basic principles of a classical war of attrition, then at the initial stage, when the enemy’s potential is being destroyed, when strikes are delivered against its economy, communications, and supply routes for raw materials and weapons, the side that holds the initiative should remain on the defensive, abandoning unimportant territories and максимально protecting its soldiers. This attrition is carried out through the remote destruction of the enemy’s potential.
Strictly speaking, the correct strategy in such a war should include:
1. Readiness for total and continuous mobilization.
We remember that this kind of war is one of mobilizing all the strength of the people. Total mobilization is necessary to achieve a manpower advantage, which should allow final military actions to be carried out quickly once the enemy’s ability to resist is completely broken. In addition, prolonged combat, even in a well-organized defense, still leads to losses, which are unavoidable. Therefore, there is a constant need to replenish the front with personnel.
2. Readiness for total destruction and the deaths of the enemy’s civilian population (and your own, if the enemy is not weaker than you).
It is extremely difficult, more likely impossible, to “delicately” destroy a country’s economic foundation. Therefore, a country that begins such a war must be prepared to act decisively and harshly. This is the price of survival.
3. Defense as the foundation of the first phase of such a war.
Preserving soldiers’ lives is the key to a future victorious offensive. It is physically impossible to conserve personnel while conducting offensive operations. Many are familiar with the standard ratios required for an attacking force to outnumber a defending one. Even taking into account more advanced and destructive weapons, the need for such a ratio remains, it will never be 1:1. In essence, the main function of troops (infantry supported by tanks, artillery, and aviation) in such a war is to occupy territories where the enemy can no longer resist. Frontal or stubborn assaults are not characteristic of a war of attrition.
4. Seizing territory in the initial and main stages of such a war is not the primary objective.
Territory should be taken either after the course of the war has been turned and the enemy’s ability to resist has been broken, or through the imposition of postwar conditions.
5. Emphasis on firepower.
The enemy should be subjected to an overwhelming barrage of destructive force using every possible means. Everything available should be directed at the target. Naturally, this places emphasis on highly destructive weapons: artillery and aviation. The nature of the current war has also added UAVs (unmanned systems). We already see strike systems in the air and at sea, and soon ground systems will be added.
The goal is to inflict unacceptable losses on the enemy before you yourself suffer unacceptable losses. If you like, it resembles a boxing match: both sides exchange blows, but in the end the stronger one wins. At the same time, for every artillery shot fired at you, ten should be fired in return; for every drone launched, ten drones should respond. Only this way.
Yet, for example, by the results of March 2026, “so-called Ukraine” surpassed us in the number of drones launched at our territory.
Each of you can compare these principles with what is actually happening at the front. After all, “we haven’t even started yet,” if some leaders are to be believed.
I want to start by saying I don’t have access to official documents or meetings, so I’m piecing together their motivations based on what I observe and logical reasoning. Keep that in mind as you read on.
This year, Russia's goals are threefold. First, to capture the eastern bank of the Dnipro River. Second, to capture Kostyantynivka. Third, to capture Slovyansk.
Each of these goals has necessary steps. To capture the bank in Zaporizhzhia, you must first capture Orikhiv. To capture Slovyansk, you must first capture Lyman. You could argue that to capture Kostyantynivka, you must first capture Chasiv Yar.
These goals are very ambitious and, honestly, impossible to fully achieve. So let’s think of them as aspirations and focus instead on how close Russia might get to reaching them.
Ukraine launched several counterattacks in the Verbove and Ternove areas of Zaporizhzhia. They were quite successful, pushing Russia out of several settlements and possibly capturing some. This also threatened Russia’s main supply route to the west. Because of this, Russia has to do two things: divert resources from their main attack to stabilize the area and try to recapture this ground to keep pushing west toward Orikhiv. Meanwhile, Ukraine gains time to strengthen defenses, plan their strategy, and prepare for more counterattacks, something Russia worries about given their timeline.
This has already delayed Russia’s offensive by months, and it will take many more weeks for them to regain their previous position.
Recently, Russia tried an armored assault on Orikhiv, which failed badly (A). They also tried to advance through Mala Tokmachka (B) before, but that failed too. A direct attack on Orikhiv is unlikely to succeed without heavy losses, so Russia wants to avoid it unless they have no choice. Still, based on past experience, they might end up having to take the town this way.
The military analysis of Iran has been the absolute worst military analysis I have ever seen in my entire life.
There have been times where I listen to some "expert" where almost every word they say in the entire interview is factually wrong. Some of these people are so wrong that I feel like you could have a big box of words and reach in and draw them randomly and it be more factual.
To prove my point, I just asked a LLM to analyze the form of a normal military interview on cable news and using strictly randomly generated words and no access to the actual news please give me a report on what's going on in Ian (unironically, this is what LLMs are good at, probably, just lying about shit):::
From an operational standpoint, the expanding American strike corridor may complicate Iran’s layered coastal defenses, which could scatter missile batteries inland.
At the tactical level, the Iranian drone screen might disrupt a forward U.S. maneuver package, which could stall momentum along the maritime axis.
From the broader battlefield geometry, the concentrated American carrier posture may pressure Iran’s southern command network, which could trigger rapid repositioning of defensive units.
Right now on the ground, the reinforced Iranian coastal belt might absorb the initial U.S. probing attacks, which could slow the opening phase of the campaign.
The main thing that any educated person needs to keep in mind at all times is that realpolitik is fake and everyone who believes in it is typically universally wrong on every single word they ever say.
It is especially funny because realpolitik people are almost never experts in any domain, and they get their info from aggregators. And those aggregators know the realpolitik people use them, and as such present info in a way most likely to influence the realpolitik.
They end up just being unwitting amplifiers of misinformation.
Frankly I think the fastest way to end the war in Ukraine is not by sending tanks or by idiotic peace proposals. The fastest way is to set up factories across europe to produce 1000-2000 long range strike drones per day, and launch hundreds if not thousands of drones into Russia every single day until the country collapses. If they think sending 500 drones into Ukraine is a threat, see how they respond when 3000 drones fly into Russia.
With this many drones you can hammer every single factory, powerplant, substation, oil refinery, and mine in russia relentlessly.
Europe had a million drone program, to supply 1 million fpv drones. Fuck fpv drones. Have a 1 million drone program to supply 1 million strike drones. That's your million drones.