Wen-Ti Sung Profile picture
Feb 2 18 tweets 4 min read
How does Taiwan read the Australia-France 2+2 ministerial consultations joint statement?

Taiwan's official Central News Agency published a long analysis comparing 2021 and 2023 AUS-FRA joint statements. It notes 3 significant changes. A thread🧵

cna.com.tw/news/aopl/2023…
2/ The 2021 and 2023 texts' Taiwan portion:
3/ CNA notes the latest 2023 version makes three significant changes:

1. 2023 version uses a more forceful tone, and contains a prescription -- that it specifically says threat or use of force or coercion is not ok.
4/ See:

2021: "encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues."

2023: "called for the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues #through dialogue without the threat or use of force or coercion."
5/
2. New addition -- 2023 version takes a direct stance: that AUS and FRA "shared #opposition to unilateral changes to the status quo."

Whereas the 2021 version makes no such mention.
6/
The 2021 statement #encourges Beijing and Taipei to hold dialogue, but if things go south and unilateral change happened (e.g. war/coercion), AUS-FRA were a bit less clear on how they would feel, let alone do, about that.
7/
3. New addition -- 2023 statement promises that AUS-FRA want "deepening relations with Taiwan in the economic, scientific, trade, technological and cultural fields." Whereas the 2021 version made no such mention.
8/ Why the shift from passivity to more proactivity? One suppose at least 3 factors are behind it: new perceptions of
- lower cost,
- higher urgency, and
- higher importance.
9/
a. Many more countries' govts and legislatures are intensifying ties with Taiwan nowadays, and it’s becoming clearer that China can’t and won't torpedo relations with so many states at the same time over a single issue.
10/
b. Greater sense of urgency about Taiwan's security situation.

c. Awareness of greater stakes -- in Taiwan and a stable Taiwan Strait's importance to normal functioning of global supply chain and maritime commerce.
11/ In spite of these 3 new 'upgrades' that Taiwan's CNA highlighted in the 2023 AUS-FRA 2+2 joint statement... There is one arguable potential 'downgrade' from 2021 to 2023, and that is in 🇦🇺🇫🇷 support for Taiwan's participation in international organizations.
12/ Whereas the 2021 statement was a blanket statement supporting TW’s ‘meaningful participation’ in international organisations, presumably meaning all applicable IOs --- the 2023 statement only supports Taiwan for IOs "where statehood is not a prerequisite".
13/ i.e. they do not (at least ‘may not’) support TW’s meaningful participation in IOs where statehood is a prerequisite.

That is at least arguably a downgrade.

It’s further noteworthy ‘coz ‘meaningful participation’ can take many forms, some of which are pretty innocuous...
14/ E.g. participate in sub-national capacity or even in individual capacity.

For example, imagine if a Taiwanese medical school professors get seconded to TW’s health ministry for a few years, during which they attend the WHO’s or UN’s expert working groups -- not in their...
15/ not in their capacity as TW govt officials but as medical researchers – to exchange best practices & lessons learned from COVID management and post-epidemic public health landscape.

The 2021 AUS-FRA joint statement would support it. The 2023 statement may not.
16/ When drafting these statements, one imagines it’s often easier to stick with wording from last time (2021), 'coz whatever pushback one might have suffered b4 won’t come again, at least not with same intensity, ‘coz one’s merely ‘following precedent’, not ruffling new feathers
17/ So why does the 🇦🇺🇫🇷 2023 statement soften their language on support for TW’s int. engagement? One imagines they have a purpose. Whether that’s:
1) to induce a more positive atmosphere with China in the short-term (e.g. to facilitate Macron’s China visit or 🇦🇺🇨🇳thaw). OR
18/
2) maybe they are firming up on China in more substantive ways, so they think they can soften a bit on a symbolic issue so as to off-set it a bit (and not burn bridges with BJ too much)?

We’ll have to wait and see.

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It's clear Europe & Australia are gonna be at the center of Chinese diplomacy. And Taiwan is responding. /1🧵
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bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
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A short thread.🧵/1
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news.cn/politics/2023-…
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