“If you were to pick a company whose approach to automotive engineering ran directly counter to the software world’s ‘move fast and break things’ philosophy, then it would have to be Toyota. After all, this is a company whose strategic plans are measured in decades, not months.
But Toyota also can’t ignore the march toward the software-defined car and the extra revenue that will undoubtedly come from having a global fleet of connected, updatable and data-generating vehicles.”
So what is the Toyota strategy? The answer – what else? – is that it will take the same methodical approach to software as does for vehicle development and manufacturing. Toyota says it will “achieve TPS in software”, referring to its famed Toyota Production System
that mandates that production is stopped immediately a problem occurs, to prevent defective vehicles reaching the showrooms.
In terms of roll-out for the first car running #Toyota's #Arene vehicle operating system, Kuffner would only say it was global and would arrive “in the next few years”. Japanese newspaper Nikkei last year reported it would be 2025.
As for revenue, Toyota would be one of the biggest beneficiaries of shifting to a properly monetisable operating system, reckons banking firm UBS. “Among legacy OEMs, we consider GM, Mercedes-Benz, Toyota and Hyundai as best placed for the software era”, UBS wrote in a report 🤡
indicating the company could earn between 10% and 20% of its revenue by 2030 from software-enabled services such as semi-automated driving, full robotaxis and connected services.
Toyota’s chief digital officer Kuffner (ex Google robotics): “Toyota actually has the hardest challenge. We have hundreds of hardware variants, not a dozen”
Along with everyone else, Toyota wants to make its software “hardware independent”.
That is, you design one piece of software you can distribute to every new model. “If we do it well, we develop it once and then we can amortise development costs over hundreds of vehicles and millions of customers,” Kuffner said.
As to how Toyota will monetise its software, one clue was seen in recent announcement by Toyota’s Japanese Kinto leasing division that customers for the new Prius would get a discount on the lease if they promised to sign up to software updates.
The idea is that the average age of the leased cars would increase, but would still feel fresh because they would always have the latest software. The Prius isn’t running Arene but the launch does mark the first time Toyota has released a car with updatable safety systems.
“it’s really Mt.Fuji. That’s the size of the barrier we face”
- @james_kuffner, chief digital officer @Toyota
more interesting background stuff on Toyota’s cautious approach to software by @NickGibbs
this is a supremely weird (exhaust) pipe dream, @piers_ward of AutoCar.
“car makers are now looking at the 20- to 25-year ICE car, where lifetime carbon emissions could compare to an EV's on a more normal eight- to 10-year life cycle.
Refreshing existing cars solves all sorts of issues
and bottlenecks: no new lithium, steel or semiconductors - and, with the latest low-emission regulations making engines cleaner in the first place, long-life, low-carbon ICE cars are starting to look distinctly possible.” 🤯🤯
OMG I can’t even…
“In November last year, Monika Dernai, head of sustainability at @BMW, suggested that manufacturers could simply make cars last longer as a way of greatly reducing their lifetime carbon footprint. She elaborated by saying that BMW could move to designing cars
In its most important sales market, China, Volkswagen still makes most of its money from the sale of petrol and diesel vehicles. VW was able to increase its market share by 1.4 points to 19.4 % in 2022. In EVs, however, competitors such as Tesla or BYD are ahead in China,
who have more to offer than Volkswagen in terms of charging times and digital equipment.
"We are still concerned about Volkswagen's business in China," says Daniel Röska, analyst at service provider Bernstein. He calculates with a bad year for the German car company,
Sobering commentary about 🇩🇪 OEMs in Handelsblatt ⤵️
Gaps in their portfolio, poor voice assistants, exorbitant prices: VW, BMW and Mercedes are making expensive mistakes in China. Local brands are taking advantage of their weakness.
The Germans have perfected their business with luxury cars. In the world of combustion engines, they were "almost free of competition," says Jan Burgard, CEO of the Berylls Group consultancy. "In electric cars, they are now getting real competition in China from local suppliers"
Managers at domestic auto centers in Munich, Stuttgart and Wolfsburg are getting nervous. Developers at Mercedes, for example, have been systematically testing and disassembling top Chinese models such as the HiPhi X. The engineers' verdict: The Chinese are in some cases…
A few years ago, auto executives weren’t sure there would be enough buyers for plug-in electric models. Now, they worry they can’t build them fast enough, while they intensify a multibillion-dollar rush to accelerate timelines and bring factories online
🧵 wsj.com/articles/elect…
“With EVs, right now it’s like, ‘You build it, and they come,’ ” said Steven Center, operations chief for Kia Corp.’s U.S. business.
The pressure is on auto makers to grab EV market share early and narrow the gap with front-runner Tesla Inc. Executives from GM, Ford and VW have all said they believe they can pass Tesla.
🤡 🤡🤡
in 2016, Daimler’s then-CEO Zetsche ruled out investing in battery cell production for EVs (together with other German premium brands) citing a massive overcapacity in the market that has turned cells into a commodity 🤷♂️
"The dumbest thing we could do is to add to that overcapacity. Contrary to the expectation 4 or 6 years ago when everyone thought that the cells would be a rarity that could even be used as a tool of industrial policy,
there is de facto a massive overcapacity in the market today and cells have become a commodity,"
Daimler stopped communicating which suppliers produce cells for its (then current) plug-in hybrids because, it says, these providers are "interchangeable."
“as the industry goes ⚡️, that leadership position becomes as irrelevant as the skills of an Italian master tailor in the face of fast fashion mass-produced in overseas factories. In the modern age of mobility, it’s the 🔋& software that offers the added value, not the engine.”
The story of how Germany’s car industry ended up here is one of lost opportunity, resistance to change and obsession with past engineering triumphs. Even as the pride of Germany’s auto heritage helped drive innovation for decades, it fired another impulse — hubris.
For years, German engineers and CEOs talked down the prospects of alternatives to the engine, focusing instead on fine-tuning their heritage technology. While that strategy kept record profits flowing, the industry’s short-sightedness also sowed the seeds for its looming crisis.