We discuss challenges in monitoring incidence of infections, the changing severity of infections, and the burden of infections including the number of hospitalisations and deaths. All of this information is valuable for risk assessment and consequent decision-making (2/14)
Now that laboratory testing has scaled back, and case reporting practices have changed, surveillance will perhaps move towards an approach similar to that for seasonal influenza. The tools used to track #COVID19 will have to be adapted accordingly (3/14)
Monitoring the effectiveness of #COVID19 vaccines is another important area for methodologic improvements. Now that most individuals have been infected at least once, unvaccinated individuals may no longer be the best reference group for these evaluations (4/14)
Monitoring the speed and degree of waning in protection is particularly important, because it informs recommendations over booster frequency. For example should older adults be recommended to receive vaccinations every 6 months, or every 12 months? (5/14)
We suggest that vaccine effectiveness estimates should be based on time since the last dose, rather than the number of doses received, now that there are so many different possible combinations of doses and vaccine types received (6/14)
Population immunity is a key determinant of epidemic risk, and depends on infection and vaccination histories in a population. One important area for future research is to identify a parsimonious description of population immunity against infection and severe disease … (7/14)
… without having to calibrate mathematical models to years of epidemic time series. More research is therefore needed to determine whether population immunity could be summarised with a few biomarkers, such as neutralising antibody titres or other immune markers (8/14)
Looking back, there is more to learn from the past 3 years so that we can improve the response to future pandemics. One particular area we need to prepare for is the use of non-pharmaceutical measures, and better understanding population responses to these measures (9/14)
Although policy-makers would prefer to implement the least disruptive but most effective measures to control transmission, identifying this optimal set of measures has proved challenging … (10/14)
Jointly analysing the mass of data collected about behaviours, perceptions, public health measures, and epidemic dynamics over the past 3 years across multiple continents could provide important insights on the interplay between behaviours and epidemics (11/14)
In conclusion, decades of research on epidemics have generated a range of surveillance systems, study designs, and methods with which to allow more accurate situational awareness and address common sources of error during epidemic risk assessments (12/14)
These approaches proved critical during the pandemic. Improving this toolbox through the development and deployment of new data collection protocols and methods, must remain a priority to effectively manage #COVID19 as the virus moves to endemicity and … (13/14)
… surveillance approaches change. This will also be important to strengthen preparations for future emerging pathogens. For more details on all of the above, see the full text linked below, authored together with @SCauchemez and @paolo_bosetti (14/14) science.org/doi/10.1126/sc…
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Brief thread on containment vs mitigation. Summary point - I hope there's a plan for intense mitigation measures in China in the next 1-2 months, as part of the transition to living-with-COVID
(1/9)
In pandemic preparedness plans, this type of figure is often used to illustrate some key concepts. I have labelled the relevant periods. A is pre-pandemic preparation. B is containment, some countries will skip this if containment ...
(2/9)
(source: nyas.org/ebriefings/202…)
...is judged to be infeasible. In the COVID pandemic, the best known term for containment is "Zero Covid". China has spent almost 3 years in period B in the figure above, and it worked well in preventing infections until recently, although at a high cost
(3/9)
We have a new preprint (not yet peer-reviewed) on residential clustering of COVID-19 in Hong Kong, and the efficiency of residential Compulsory Testing Notices and Restriction Testing Declarations ("ambush lockdowns") led by @BenYoun11984381 medrxiv.org/content/10.110…
(1/15)
(2/15) Residential clustering was a major feature of SARS in 2003 ... almost 20% of the 1755 SARS cases in Hong Kong resulted from one large super-spreading event in the Amoy Gardens housing estate in Kowloon edition.cnn.com/2013/02/21/wor…
(3/15) In contrast, we find that there is not much residential clustering of COVID-19 cases. One notable exception was the cluster of hundreds of Omicron BA.2 cases found in residents of three blocks in the Kwai Chung Estate at the start of our fifth wave academic.oup.com/cid/article/75…
It's not at all surprising that the detection of cases in arriving travelers has increased, because (1) there's no more pre-departure PCR and (2) there's no more 3-day hotel quarantine but testing still goes out to day 6 ... (1/5)
In the previous 3+4 system, with tests on 0/2/4/6, positivity with low Ct value on d4 was very unlikely (would have had to be a long incubation period or a within-hotel transmission), and d6 positives were mostly ppl who were infected on d3-4 with a short incubation period (2/5)
In the new 0+3 system, almost all cases identified on days 4 and 6 will have been infected /after/ arrival (there's a far far greater risk of infection in the community than in a quarantine hotel) and these post-arrival infections may be misclassified as "imported" cases (3/5)
A few brief suggestions of how to proceed. Public health measures, such as masks and avoiding crowds and larger gatherings, could be recommended (but not mandated) for people to reduce their risk of respiratory virus infection (including COVID and influenza) ... (1/6)
Healthcare settings and elderly homes should implement measures to minimise the frequency and impact of outbreaks of respiratory virus infections (including COVID and influenza), which could include staff masking and regular use of RATs by staff and patients/residents ... (2/6)
Schools and workplaces may decide to bring back some preventive measures if community activity rises again, but I think there's currently limited justification for control measures given the low level of community incidence and the low severity of infections that do occur (3/6)
New preprint (not yet peer reviewed) on our randomized trial of third doses in HK, where BNT162b2 (BioNTech/Fosun Pharma/Pfizer) and CoronaVac (Sinovac) are the two available vaccines. With @nancyleung_hk@gmleunghku@svalko3 and others. Short thread(1/14) medrxiv.org/content/10.110…
Among adults ≥18y who initially received two doses of CoronaVac, we randomized 101 to a CoronaVac booster (“CC-C”) and 118 to a BNT162b2 booster (“CC-B”). Among adults ≥18 who initially received BNT162b2, we randomized 118 to “BB-C” and 114 to “BB-B” (2/14)
The third doses were given at least 6 months after the second dose, and on average participants received the third dose about 7 months after their second dose (3/14)
Hong Kong update - exponential rise in BA.4 and/or BA.5 (probably BA.5) continues. BA.2 cases now stable and will probably be declining soon, looks like we've hit herd immunity to this subvariant for now ... (1/6)
Herd immunity to BA.2 under current public health measures has been reached by high incidence of BA.2 infections (providing strong long-lasting immunity against BA.2 re-infection) as well as transient protection against BA.2 infection from booster doses in some ppl ...(2/6)
...which is not long-lasting, thus BA.2 cases will not decline to zero in the short-term. There are continuous pool of newly susceptible ppl in the population as booster dose protection against /infection/ wears out. Booster protection against severe disease is maintained (3/6)