BREAKING: Using state-of-the-art techniques I learned from Hollywood movies, I was able to extract high-res images of #ChineseSpyBalloon and holy mackeral look what I found ...
In an alternate universe, Donald Trump is still president and watching him respond to The Balloon would be just simply … exquisite. The Last of Us wouldn’t stand a chance.
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The preference for labor is driven by really basic economic fundamentals - China’s persistent surplus of labor over capital, a state which, until urbanization reaches “fully developed East Asia levels” at a minimum, will continue to persist to some degree.
Interestingly, this labor surplus argument is probably a better way to argue that China needs less machinery relative to labor than developed economies - and support a key idea in the over-investment thesis that China is investing ahead of its stage of development.
However, it fails to do so given the focus on “investment as a % of GDP” as the headline KPI of the thesis.
“Investment” in that context does not distinguish between labor and capital (machinery) inputs. A lot of housing and infrastructure “investment” is labor.
... which is from NBS data that "covers only large-scale power plants with annual revenue of Yuan 20M" ... I suspect it excludes many solar projects, which tend to be below that 20M threshold
Moreover, to calculate capacity factor / efficiency, one should really use average installed capacity during the year, not EOY capacity.
This matters if capacity is growing quickly, as is the case in China.
This is mainly through FX intervention (direct and indirect), buoyed by a persistently low exchange rate. And as someone who has spent a third of my time living here the past decade, something I experience on a daily basis.
That said I am going to have to differ with @Brad_Setser on what explains the ongoing competitive advantage Taiwan has in semiconductor manufacturing
There’s a reasonable argument to be made that economies that skew socialist are in an advantaged position handle technology-induced disruption given their ideological bent towards distributive policies.
1/ One issue I have with the China over-investment hypothesis is how the household “class” often is conflated with “household consumption” and gov’t/business “class” (“elites”) often is conflated with “investment / gross capital formation”
2/ To refresh, the main crux of the hypothesis is that economic policy squeezes the household sector by subsidizing "investment" to an extreme degree. The main evidentiary support is low household consumption / high investment as a % of GDP.
3/ But they are not 1:1 relationships.
One is an imprecisely defined socio/economic/political class distinction and the other is a precisely defined (and sometimes arbitrary) macro-economic categorization used to calculate GDP through the expenditures approach.
So as investment mix shifted in favor of RE/infrastructure (starting in the early 2000s), simple math says ICOR is going to rise.
But ICOR rising in aggregate does necessarily equate to overall less efficient investment - must analyze ROI trends of each asset class individually.
The other implication, to directly address @audeldscire, is that as RE/infrastructure investment wanes relative to overall GCF, ICOR should decline again as lower ICOR (higher ROI) business investment mix rises.