A little note on the state of Ukrainian manpower, suggesting, yet again, that Ukrainian losses are far higher than reported in the west and have left Ukraine extremely depleted and thinly stretched.
Everything here comes from Ukrainian sources. (1)
Early this week, as the battle for Ugledar intensified, it was reported that Ukraine’s attacking efforts on the northern axis would be paused so that reserves could be transferred to Ugledar. Note, these axes are on opposite ends of the contact line. (2)
This indicates that Ukraine currently lacks both an accessible strategic reserve as well as operational reserves on the southern Donetsk axis. They had to pull troops from a different active axis to reinforce Ugledar. (3)
Additionally, in the last few days, Russian troops began advancing from Kreminna towards Lyman, indicating that this transfer of forces did in fact meaningfully denude Ukrainian combat power in the north. (4)
Additionally, it is known that Ukraine is holding what strategic reserves it has to accumulate forces for an attempted counteroffensive against the Crimean land bridge, but now UA sources claim that military police and border guards will be needed to flesh out this force. (5)
Meanwhile, Ukraine has famously gone to a total conscription regime covering all prime age males, amid widespread complaints of a failing mobilization program. (6)
The need to reinforce existing fronts is so high that they now claim that men are being fed directly to the front with minimal training. They are shoring up paper strength with replacements rather than rotating units out. (7)
Overall, we get a picture of a force that is stretched to the limit, with insufficient reserves - forcing them to shift units around among active sectors of front, while desperately attempting to create new units sui generis to launch counteroffensive. (8)
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The imagery of burned out Abrams will be fascinating though.
Ukraine will almost certainly try to throw these into a concentrated offensive somewhere, simply because they will have problems with maintenance and sustainment - pencil in a short lifespan for the vehicles and act accordingly.
I found a copy of this book at a used bookstore several years ago and just got around to reading it. Found it fascinating. Traces the way the Japanese military became progressively more brutal and rapacious. (1)
Prior to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, they were viewed as a very chivalrous and honorable military with strong standards of conduct towards civilians and prisoners. This book traces how they descended into the murderous force known from WW2. (2)
In particular, Edgerton identifies institutional shift that occurred in response to, and via, the occupation of China and attempts to beat the Chinese into submission via violence. (3)
Where might Russia commit forces on an offensive? Let's do a quick parsing of the situation and examine the possibilities.
(1/N)
Right now, the contact line is some 700 kilometers stretching from the Dnieper estuary in the south to northern Lugansk oblast. Troop concentrations and active combat are broadly present on four major axes. (Maps by me).
(2/N)
The Svatove axis is where Ukraine's Kharkov counteroffensive was stonewalled after crossing the Oskil river and struggling to break Lyman in a timely manner. Ukrainian efforts to continue the advance have been repeatedly defeated. (3/N)
Just scrolled through some of the posts from "Holodomor Memorial Day". Looks like the narrative consensus is really forming around a Russian-perpetrated "Ukrainian genocide". Really, shockingly bad history.
The Stalin biographer Stephen Kotkin is hardly a communist sympathizer - he's a very standard sort of academic neoliberal, but he doesn't give any credence to the idea that Stalin wanted to deliberately starve Ukrainians to death.
Famine death rates in Ukraine were not markedly higher than those in Soviet Kazakhstan or the Kuban and lower Volga. Kazakhstan was higher, actually. So even at a cursory glance, there isn't evidence that the famine was a deliberately engineered weapon targeted at Ukrainians.
The issue isn’t that Ukraine “attacked Poland”, it was clearly an accident. The issue is that we on Twitter we’re able to identify it as a Ukrainian S3000 almost instantly while the authorities and media spent a day spreading extremely dangerous lies.
This is one of the more insane things I've read lately. Compares Putin to Stalin on the grounds that they both acquired vacation homes on the Black Sea.
"Using military force to solve problems—something that seems almost anachronistic in the twenty-first century—is another tactic that Putin inherited from Stalin."
Who is to say Putin didn't learn this from George W Bush?
"Even more apparent is Putin’s recourse to Stalin’s legitimating narrative about Russia’s victory in World War II... Stalin sought to transform a tragedy in which some 20 million Russians were killed into a story of triumphant heroism."