Post

Daniel Haqiqatjou

Feb 6, 2023 • 33 tweets • 15 min read • Read on X

Thread on Javad Hashmi

How the US gov funds native informants to spread Islamic reform online.

Jay Hashmi is a troll who is often in my replies crying about how I'm "scared" to debate him. I get about a dozen debate challenges per day from no name losers like Jay, but...

@mpac_national

...Jay is different because he was recently hired as a director at @mpac_national.

MPAC is a "Muslim" org with a long history working for the US gov to police, surveil, and entrap Muslims.

MPAC has worked closely with the FBI and DHS to implement CVE policies against Muslims.

What is CVE? It is the gov program developed post 9/11 used in numerous countries to target religious Muslims by characterizing them as "extremists" for things like growing a beard, being strict about not drinking, or believing that Islam is the only religion acceptable to God.

CVE was developed in Europe and the US but was exported internationally via UN Security Council Resolution 2178 which "requires governments to take action to counter violent extremism (CVE)."

Many human rights groups observe that CVE has been used to persecute Muslims post 9/11.

What you may not realize is that CVE is the program used by:

- Mukhabarat in Arab countries
- China to target Uighurs
- BJP to target Indian Muslims
- Israel to target Palestinians

The "Global War on Terror" is a global war on Islam and CVE is the policy behind it.

You can read more about CVE and how it is weaponized to attack and cripple the Muslim community in the US, UK, EU and the world:

CAGE: cage.ngo/portfolio-item…
Intercept: archive.ph/G7DDM
ACLU: aclu.org/sites/default/…

Now, I'm getting back to Jay.

Many Muslim orgs have directly worked with the US gov on CVE, hired CVE operatives, or received CVE grants.

MuslimSkeptic has several articles on this regarding orgs like Yaqeen Inst, ISPU, & more:

muslimskeptic.com/2020/04/20/yaq…

muslimskeptic.com/2020/04/20/yaq…

But, the worst offender is MPAC.

MPAC pretends to be a Muslim advocacy org while in reality working with the feds to surveil and entrap Muslims.

Here is a report on just how corrupt and sleazy MPAC is and how deep their lies and deception really go: ehsan.substack.com/p/mpacs-long-c…

MPAC was so thoroughly shamed for their involvement with CVE, they were forced to issue a disingenuous apology (that did nothing to fix all the damage theyve done): archive.ph/7cJJA

The admission of guilt was especially dishonest bc MPAC is back to working with the feds!

@SalamAlmarayati

.@SalamAlmarayati MPAC's president has been involved with the Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden admins. He was working with the US gov immediately after 9/11, advising the Bush admin on how best to fight "radical Islam."

archive.ph/NSa4l

archive.ph/gLYjp

What is amazing about Al-Marayati is that he was even working (quietly) with the Trump admin's Dept of Homeland Security. Most American Muslims, even the most morally bankrupt sell-outs, stayed clear of the Trump admin to save their reputation, but not Salam!

His work with DHS continued into the Biden admin.

In Sept 2022, Al-Marayati was appointed to the DHS Faith Based Security Advisory Council.

The Council includes hardcore Zionists, Hindutva-aligned Indians tied to RSS, and career shills and CVE veterans like Al-Marayati.

The uber-Zionist org Muslim-Jewish Advisory Council immediately celebrates the appointment of pro-Zionist CVE shills like Mohamed Magid and Talib Shareef, the other two "Muslims" on the council with Al-Marayati.

Now what does this Faith Based Council do exactly?

Jay and other shills working for the feds claim it is just about "protecting houses of worship."

But let's take a closer look...

The DHS website says that one of the main objectives is information sharing between feds and faith based orgs. What kind of information (i.e., surveillance) do faith based orgs share with the feds?

archive.ph/8T2hk

What "information sharing" between sell out imams and Muslim orgs involves is basically surveillance. Any Muslim that is "suspicious" or "too religious" or "extreme" gets reported to the FBI and DHS via Fusion Centers and other gov liaisons.

A lot more can be said about how the US gov uses orgs like MPAC to spy on and police Muslim religious beliefs. But let's move on to Jay's role in all this.

Jay started his new role at MPAC in Oct 2022. This was shortly after Al-Marayati's DHS appointment.

MPAC's current involvement with DHS and Jay's position as director raises many troubling questions.

The US gov and colonial states have a long history of using "native informants" like Marayati and Hashmi to advance liberal repression of Muslims.

See:

Hashmi fits *perfectly* the profile of what RAND calls the "modernists." These are "Muslim" reformers who are supported by the US gov to push Islamic reform and secularization onto the Muslim community.

See RAND's Civil Democratic Islam, pg 63

Notice how RAND emphasizes that modernists need to be supported in competing with fundamentalist/traditionalist Muslims.

This is why Jay is so eager to debate me and others. His employment at MPAC with its fed-backing enables this kind of work, pushing Islamic reform.

Some of the liberal heresy Hashmi pushes:

- Hadith cannot be relied upon
- Stories of the prophets in the Quran are all myths/legends
- Anyone who identifies as Muslim should be considered one, even if he worships idols and is a polytheist
- Islam accepts all religions as valid

What makes Hashmi more malicious than the average native informant is that he constantly accuses Muslims of being affiliated with ISIS or other terror groups in order to get them in trouble with feds.

For example, he has accused me of being "one step away" from suicide bombing.

@Farid_0v

He has accused prominent Muslims figures like @Farid_0v and @DrTalAbdulrazaq of being ISIS supporters or "one step away" from becoming ISIS.

When confronted for his dangerous rhetoric that endangers the lives of Muslims and their families, Hashmi either laughs it off or makes mealy-mouthed disingenuous half-apologies that he follows up with liking other ppl's tweets accusing the same Muslims of being ISIS.

But Hashmi's CVE work doesn't end there.

Recently he tried to implicate Deobandis as radicalizing Muslims extremists. He says that Deobandis inspire terror networks. Notice how he says that what inspires terror is religious dogmatism. This is straight from CVE, as we saw above.

Ironically, when it is convenient for him, Hashmi acknowledges that baselessly accusing people of being ISIS or Taliban supporters is "clear Islamophobia."

This is the doublespeak Hashmi engages in to dupe his few followers.

Hashmi claims that he is anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. Yet his actually statements and behavior as well as his employment with MPAC, a DHS-sponsored federal agency, tell a very different story.

Anyone can claim anything. But actions and affiliations don't lie.

Now, since Hashmi has begged to debate me on modernism, I have accepted. I agree to debate him on how modernism is pushed by native informants who work for liberal governments, as exemplified by MPAC and Hashmi.

https://twitter.com/Haqiqatjou/status/1622309396427546624?s=20&t=0eO_k4H_DZ_1BzGekfW5SQ

Hashmi claims that this topic is not relevant to Islamic modernism.

This shows Hashmi's deep ignorance of the historical and political dimensions of modernism and its weaponization against the Muslim community.

Hashmi wants to arbitrarily limit the scope of debate in order to avoid the most problematic aspects of his ideology and his work. He says if I do not accept his convenient limitations, I am "scared."

No, Jay. You are scared. I am happy to debate you on modernism in your work.

I have even offered Jay a second debate as consolation. If he debates me on native informants and MPAC's work for CVE and the feds, I will happily debate him on other aspects of modernism in a second debate.

Why doesn't Hashmi agree to this?

@SalamAlmarayati

Is it because he does not have permission from his handlers at DHS? Does his fed-funded salary not cover debates that blow his cover and the cover of his boss @SalamAlmarayati?

What kind of "information sharing" are you doing with DHS, Javad? Where is the transparency?

No Muslim should engage with this murtad shill until he agrees to be scrutinized by the Muslim community he has been deputized by the US gov to attack.

It is unethical to share a platform with someone who very well may be covertly reporting our community to the government.

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More from @Haqiqatjou

Daniel Haqiqatjou

@Haqiqatjou

Apr 11

THREAD: The first photos of Mecca are taken in the 1880s. Prior to this there are only drawings. These drawing only begin to proliferate in the 1600s.

You can see their evolution below:

Turkish 1600s (Ottoman)
fritware ceramic with underglaze painting

An Iznik pottery tile depicting the Ka'ba and the Masjid al-Haram, Mecca

Turkey, 1600s

Read 13 tweets

Daniel Haqiqatjou

@Haqiqatjou

Dec 27, 2023

THREAD: What is the connection between Rabbi Faris Hammadi & recently-arrested Zahack Tanvir?

Not only are they both rabid Zionists who enjoy mocking Palestinians (one example below), they're also good friends!

Saudi rulers did the right thing to arrest Zahack. But they need to investigate his connection to Rabbi Faris.

I'm trying to do my part by providing some useful leads for the ongoing investigation, as Zahack is prosecuted for his criminal activities.

See below.

Zahack comments on numerous posts of Rabbi Faris.

Rabbi Faris is basically the teacher of Zahack.

You can also see on most of these posts, Faris likes Zahack's reply.

Faris and Zahack are always on the same page. Here you can see them pretending like they have an anti-khawarij stance.

Read 10 tweets

Daniel Haqiqatjou

@Haqiqatjou

Dec 26, 2023

THREAD responding to @israel_advocacy.

Extremist Zionist Jews such as yourself are pathological liars with no conscience or principles (as everyone can see from Israel's behavior in Gaza).

That being said, if you want to question my claims about Judaism, why don't you engage with them in a direct fashion, rather than playing games?

----
First, I have claimed that Judaism and Jewish religious texts are filled with "hate and insults directed toward Jesus and his mother Mary."

In particular:

(1) the Talmud asserts that the Jews killed Jesus after a court session

(2) the Talmud asserts that this was a good Torah-compliant deed because Jesus was guilty of calling people to idolatry and practicing sorcery

(3) the Talmud asserts that Jesus has been punished with hell, where he is being tortured in a vat of feces

(4) the Talmud asserts that Jesus's mother Mary is a harlot guilty of fornication, and indicates that Jesus's putative virgin birth was actually a result of such fornication.

Do you dispute any of this? If so, which specific points do you dispute?

If you are having difficulty understanding things, let me provide a representative quote from the Talmud.

Consider Gittin 57a

"Onkelos then went and raised Jesus the Nazarene from the grave through necromancy. Onkelos said to him: Who is most important in that world where you are now? Jesus said to him: The Jewish people. Onkelos asked him: Should I then attach myself to them in this world? Jesus said to him: Their welfare you shall seek, their misfortune you shall not seek, for anyone who touches them is regarded as if he were touching the apple of his eye (see Zechariah 2:12).
Onkelos said to him: What is the punishment of that man, a euphemism for Jesus himself, in the next world? Jesus said to him: He is punished with boiling excrement. As the Master said: Anyone who mocks the words of the Sages will be sentenced to boiling excrement. And this was his sin, as he mocked the words of the Sages."

For an entire book on this topic, consult:

Princeton Professor Peter Schafer's "Jesus in the Talmud"

Second...sefaria.org/Gittin.57a.3-4…
press.princeton.edu/books/paperbac…

Second I have claimed that Judaism and Jewish texts "boast that Jews killed Jesus, and that this is justified as a good act."

I have mentioned this point above: "(1) the Talmud asserts that the Jews killed Jesus after a court session (2) the Talmud asserts that this was a good Torah-compliant deed because Jesus was guilty of calling people to idolatry and practicing sorcery"

Once again, do you dispute any of these points? If so, which ones?

Here I will add a representative Talmudic quote on the subject.

Sanhedrin 43a

"The mishna teaches that a crier goes out before the condemned man. This indicates that it is only before him, i.e., while he is being led to his execution, that yes, the crier goes out, but from the outset, before the accused is convicted, he does not go out. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: On Passover Eve they hung the corpse of Jesus the Nazarene after they killed him by way of stoning. And a crier went out before him for forty days, publicly proclaiming: Jesus the Nazarene is going out to be stoned because he practiced sorcery, incited people to idol worship, and led the Jewish people astray. Anyone who knows of a reason to acquit him should come forward and teach it on his behalf. And the court did not find a reason to acquit him, and so they stoned him and hung his corpse on Passover eve."

sefaria.org/Sanhedrin.43a.…

Third, I have claimed that Judaism includes "a sacred command to kill all the world's Christians as idolaters (e.g. as described in Maimonides' Misneh Torah)."

As you know, Maimonides is perhaps the most famous rabbi in history. Moreover, the Misneh Torah (by Mainonides) and the Shulchan Aruch (by Josef Karo) are considered to be the most authoritative texts on Jewish law and the most authoritative interpretation of legal material in the Talmud.

In Mishneh Torah, Maimonides clearly and famously states that Jews have a religious obligation to wage war against "idolaters" across the world and kill them if they do not cease their idolatry. Futhermore, the dominant opinion among Jews has always been that Christianity (like Buddhism and Hinduism) are forms of idolatry.

Do you dispute any of these points? If so, which ones?

To jog your memory, let quote the relevant passage from Mishneh Torah

"We may not draw up a covenant with idolaters which will establish peace between them [and us] and yet allow them to worship idols, as [Deuteronomy 7:2] states: "Do not establish a covenant with them." Rather, they must renounce their [idol] worship or be slain. It is forbidden to have mercy upon them, as [Deuteronomy, ibid.] states: "Do not be gracious to them.""

You may also want to take a look at this notorious viral clip from Rabbi Yosef Mizrachi, where he makes the same point.

sefaria.org/Mishneh_Torah%…

Read 6 tweets

Daniel Haqiqatjou

@Haqiqatjou

Dec 6, 2023

THREAD:

Madkhali Government Funding Revealed:

The Case of Abu Khadeejah and Pro-Israel Muslims

As I’ve covered for over a year now, the Madkhalis are a deviant group that was created by Saudi and UAE intelligence to trick Muslims worldwide into thinking that Gulf policies, no matter how anti-Islamic, should never be criticized.

According to Madkhalis, if you or I criticize these countries for secularizing or for normalizing relations with Israel, our criticism constitutes “khuruj” and makes us heretics and terrorists who should be killed.

Madkhalis have been calling for my death for the past year now for this reason.

I have called the Madkhalis “agents.” The word “agent” can refer to someone who is literally on a pay-roll, but it can also refer to people who do the dirty work of the Gulf governments on a voluntary basis. Arguably, the latter are even more disgusting than the former because they work for free.

The Madkhalis have taken issue with me calling them “agents.” They have demanded that I provide proof that they are being paid by these governments.

Today, I am happy to publish some eye-opening information about the funding source of one prominent Madkhali in the UK: Abu Khadeejah (teacher and associate of ex-crackhead Shamsi).

Continue Reading:

How Saudi Funds Madkhali Speakers

An examination of official British records casts light on how the Saudi government funds its Madkhali agents in the West.

Here we examine the case of Abu Khadeejah – leader of the British Madkhalis and the teacher of Shamsi.

The basic funding arrangement can be described as follows.

British Madkhalis establish companies. The Saudi government provides investment money for these companies and has Saudi officials sit on the boards of these companies. Madkhalis are then hired to work for the companies.

For their work, Madkhalis take various benefits including salaries and shares. In this way, through the company, the Saudi government provides regular payments to its Madkhali agents – rewarding them for disseminating state propaganda.

Meanwhile, the Madkhali agents hide their relationship to the Saudi government. They claim that they are not taking money from the Saudi government. Rather they only admit to working for a company. In reality, these shell companies are mainly funded and controlled by Saudi officials.

We now present the case of Abu Khadeejah (i.e., Waheed Alam, also known as Abdul Wahid).

When we go to Abu Khadeejah’s professional profile on his LinkedIn page, we see the following.

archive.ph/PLTWK

Read 12 tweets

Daniel Haqiqatjou

@Haqiqatjou

Nov 20, 2023

To my knowledge, the most extensive explanation of how the Saudi government created the Madkhali movement can be found in a book published in 2011 by Harvard University Press.

The Book was written by Professor Stephane Lacroix. It is titled "Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia."

There is a key ten page section on the creation of Madkhali movement (p.211-221) with many details, names, and dates.

It explains how the Saudi government channeled money, positions, and patronage to Madkhalis. As a result, many money-driven figures from marginalized groups were drawn to join the movement. In other words, Madkhalism has always focused on recruiting on poor talentless unprincipled individuals who are willing to sell themselves to the state.

The book also explains how Madkhalis initiated the practice of monitoring all other religious Muslims to keep track of government critics - submitting regular reports on them to the secret police.

The book names key Madkhali figures, many of which came to be associated with the University of Madinah - which was transformed into a Madkhali propaganda center. These Madkhalis figures include Muhammad Aman al-Jami, Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali, Sulayman al-Ruhayli, Abd al-Salam al-Suhaymi, and Salih al-Suhaymi.

Although the book examines Madkhalism in Saudi Arabia, its insights are relevant to understanding Madkhalis in the West.

These are an online army of former hobos, crackheads, felons, failed rappers, and crossfit trainers, who work as government agents.

Like their counterparts in Saudi, they are poor talentless unprincipled individuals who are willing to sell themselves to the state. Anyone who has ever spoken with a Madkhali knows that they speak like rude low-IQ low class con artists and criminals.

The relevant section from the book is provided below. To post it on twitter I have had to omit footnotes in the text. (To access the footnote you must go to the original text).

Note: The author uses the other popular term for Madkhalis which is "Jamis."

(p.211)
The Jamis: Between Purism and Loyalty

The first and most effective of these countermovements is known as the Jami movement.

In the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, it
asserted itself as both an implacable opponent of the Sahwi opposition and an ardent defender of the royal family. It soon gave rise to a relatively organized network that extended its reach to most cities in the kingdom. The term “Jami,” which has become widespread, was first used by the Sahwis. It refers to Sheikh Muhammad Aman al-Jami, born in 1930, head of the Faculty of Hadith at the Islamic University of Medina and one of most vocal opponents of the Sahwi protest. As had been the case with “Sururi,” the use of “Jami” was intended to delegitimate the adversary by stigmatizing his foreign origin because al-Jami was from Ethiopia and immigrated to Saudi Arabia only when he was twenty. For lack of a more neutral term, however, the label “Jami” will be used here because the Jamis have refused to identify themselves other than by such unspecific qualifiers as “the salafis” or sometimes “the ulema of Medina,” because the most eminent among them were based there, mainly at the Islamic University. They were also recognizable because they sometimes added to their names the suffixes al-salafi or al-athari (from athar, tradition, that is, that of the Prophet and the pious ancestors), which the Sahwis deplored, arguing that only God could decide who was a proper salafi and who was not. Although al-Jami, despite himself, gave his name to the movement, its most emblematic figure was Sheikh Rabiʿ bin Hadi al-Madkhali.

Born in 1931, he taught until the late 1990s in the Faculty of Hadith at the Islamic University of Medina, which was chaired by al-Jami until his death in 1995. Although he was a student of al-Albani and had
briefly been close to the JSM [al-Jamaʿa al-Salafiyya
al-Muhtasiba] in the mid-1970s, al-Madkhali had
managed not to go to prison and thereafter had demonstrated exemplary loyalty to the regime. In the late 1980s he made a name in the Saudi religious field with a very controversial book, The Method Followed by the Prophets in Religious Preaching Contains Wisdom and Reason. Faithful to his Ahl al-Hadith beliefs, he explained that the priority in matters of daʿwa should be the purification of the creed.

He thus fiercely attacked the Pakistani ideologue Abu al-Aʿla Mawdudi, the founder of Jamaat-e Islami and a source of inspiration for Sayyid Qutb, for his concern with politics and his efforts to build an Islamic state in India “although the Indian people are ignorant of Islam and their religious practice is tainted with innovation and deviance.” In al-Madkhali’s view, Mawdudi’s priority should have been to correct
the creed of the Indians instead.

(Continued)

As tension between the Sahwa and the government was increasing, al-Madkhali was one of the first ulema openly to criticize the Sahwi sheikhs in August 1990. He was soon joined in what became the Jami movement by other religious figures from the loyalist wing of the Ahl al-Hadith, in particular, Falih al-Harbi, a former member of the JSM who, unlike al- Madkhali, had spent time in Saudi jails, Farid alMaliki, Mahmud al- Haddad, and Ali Rida bin Ali Rida. For those
sheikhs whose worldview had developed in explicit opposition to the Sahwa, this was a perfectly natural position to adopt. After the loyalist Ahl al-Hadith had started being looked at favorably by the regime because of their stance during the Afghan jihad, it was also a way for them to complete their return to favor with the authorities.

In return, the Saudi government provided abundant support to the Jami movement, notably through the minister of the interior, Prince Nayef. The significant material and institutional resources it soon had at its disposal made it attractive to those who felt marginalized in the social arena or in the religious field. To many, Jamism became a strategy for social or religious ascent. A large number of those who
joined the movement were non-Saudi residents. The example of Usama ʿAtaya al-Filastani is instructive in this regard: born in a Palestinian refugee camp in Jordan, he was raised in Saudi Arabia, where his
father worked. By the conclusion of his secondary education in 1990, he was passionately interested in religion and wanted to enroll in the Islamic University of Medina, but he was refused admission because
non-Saudis living in the kingdom were barred from Saudi universities.

At the same time, he achieved a certain reputation among the ulema of his city, Rabigh. When he joined the Jamis, he finally secured the connections (wasita) he needed to enroll in the Islamic University in 1993. Ten years later he became one of the major figures in the Jami movement, where he demonstrated remarkable zeal, to judge from the titles of some of his works: The Strong Proofs of the Necessity to Defend the Saudi State and To Repel the Zionist Aggression against the Al Saʿud, the Family of Jihad and Mujahideen. In the interim he had adopted the name Abu ʿUmar al-ʿUtaybi, hoping by attaching himself to one of the major tribes on the peninsula, ʿUtayba, to conceal the signs of his social marginality.

Along with non- Saudi residents, the ranks of the Jamis contained many people from peripheral and socially marginalized regions of the kingdom. The Jazan region on the Yemeni border was particularly well represented, including, among the leading figures of the movement, ulema such as Rabiʿ al- Madkhali, Muhammad al-Madkhali, Zayd al-Madkhali (these three belonged to the same tribe), Ali al-Fuqaihi, and Ahmad al-Najmi. Coming from a region that traditionally did not produce major Wahhabi ulema, these figures were thereby claiming a place in the religious field. This strong presence in the Jami movement of figures from the Jazan region, inhabited by the Bani Yam tribe, earned it the nickname in some Sahwi circles of Bani Jam. The term was intended to be particularly injurious because the name Bani Yam had strong associations with the Ismaili branch of Shiism, which was still practiced by a significant number of its members.

Although individuals lacking in social capital initially dominated the Jami movement, over time growing numbers of peripheral ulema in search of increased status joined, regardless of their social origins.

Classic examples are Abd al-Aziz al-ʿAskar and Sulayman Aba al-Khayl, two ulema from Najd described as thoroughly marginal in the religious field before the Gulf War, who became hard-core Jamis in
the early 1990s. For instance, Abd al- Aziz al-ʿAskar is known for having called in one of his sermons for the execution of Salman al-ʿAwda and Safar al- Hawali and for having openly rejoiced at the execution of
Abdallah al- Hudayf. As a result of their zeal, they were appointed to high positions: al-ʿAskar became the chairman of the department of daʿwa at Imam University, while Aba al-Khayl was first given the
strategic position of dean of student aff airs at the university annex in the Qasim and then that of vice president. The Jami movement became so attractive that soon ulema active in the Sahwi opposition left
the protest to join it, including Abd al-Muhsin al-ʿUbaykan and ʿIsam al- Sinani, even though the latter had previously signed the Memorandum of Advice.

Starting in 1993, positions opened up by the dismissal of Sahwis were almost systematically offered to the new Jami converts. At the Islamic University of Medina, for example, the Sahwis Musa al-Qarni, Abd al-Aziz Qariʾ, and Jubran al-Jubran were replaced by the Jamis Tarahib al-Dawsari (author under the pseudonym Abu Ibrahim al-ʿAdnani of one of the most emblematic books of Jamism, Qutbism Is Fitna, So Learn How to Recognize It), Sulayman al-Ruhayli, and Abd al-Salam al-Suhaymi. In Haʾil the Jami Abdallah al-ʿUbaylan replaced a Sahwi at the head of the office of religious affairs. Many more such anecdotes were duly recorded in the publications of the CDLR and MIRA.

The discourse of the Jamis had two main foci: vehemently opposing the Sahwa and demonstrating intense loyalty to the Saudi royal family.

In their radical critique of the Sahwa, the Jamis relied heavily on the Ahl al-Hadith who made up the core of their movement and had the best-tried oppositional discourse to the Sahwa. As a result, their favorite target was the Sahwis’ creed. Identifying them with the Muslim Brotherhood, they reiterated al- Albani’s attacks on Sayyid Qutb, accused of adhering to the “heterodox” doctrine of the oneness of being, and they quoted over and over the remarks of leading Brothers who had shown indulgence or support toward the cult of saints.

Acknowledging implicitly that the orthodoxy of the creed of some Sahwis—who, like Safar al- Hawali, had dedicated entire books to denouncing the “deviations” of Sufi s and Ashʿarites— could not easily be questioned, the Jamis introduced a new distinction: these Sahwis might be salafis in terms of creed (ʿaqida), they explained, but their methodology (manhaj) was not orthodox. In other words, what
they believed might conform to what the pious ancestors believed, but the methods they used were blameworthy innovations (bidaʿ), so they were not true salafis.

Inspired by the Ahl al- Hadith, the Jami attacks on the Sahwis’ methodology targeted their interest in politics, which allegedly turned them away from ʿilm.The Jamis added to that a relatively new accusation, formulated for the first time by the former JSM member Muqbil al-Wadiʿi in The Way out of Fitna. The Sahwis, as always identified with the Muslim Brotherhood, were guilty of hizbiyya, which might be
translated as “factionalism,” designating organization in parties (singular hizb), which goes against the principle of unity inherent in salafi Islam. Jami critiques also aimed at Sahwi methods in the most technical sense: the whole infrastructure of the Sahwa, from the circles for the memorization of the Koran to the summer camps, as well as Islamic
chants and the use of theater, were denounced as reprehensible innovations.

At the same time, the Jamis constantly denounced the Sahwa’s alleged hostility to existing regimes. For these ulema, obedience to the government was an absolute obligation. This insistence led Muhammad Surur, mocking their eagerness to defend the Saudi royal family, to call them the “party of the rulers” (hizb al-wula). The Jamis added to this unfailing loyalty an unconditional respect for the ulema of the official religious institution, particularly for the Committee of Senior Ulema, whose fatwas, in their view, could not be subject to the slightest criticism.

Read 4 tweets

Daniel Haqiqatjou

@Haqiqatjou

May 23, 2023

THREAD: The Dawah Mafia has been pushing imams to sign onto their recent attempt to whitewash their LG-TVHD+ normalization with a statement called

"Navigating Differences"

I've been asked to explain the problems w/ this statement bc it seems ok.

It absolutely is NOT.

But...

before I explain the problems, we need to go back to another statement on LG-TV these imams forced onto the Muslim community back in 2016.

You know the last time I advised imams not to sign trash? It was when this garbage was going around in 2016.

archive.ph/exSrV

The pattern is the same, whether the 2016 statement or this new 2023 statement.

You have wolves in sheep's clothing (liberals dressed as imams) convincing traditional imams to ally with open liberals and to endorse pro-liberal values disguised as Islamic.

Read 16 tweets

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