I can't quite put my finger on it, but something doesn't smell right about this story. Makes me suspect a limited hangout with Hersh as the unwitting medium.
And not just a limited hangout, but one that fingers very particular people by name.
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People who are no doubt very unpopular in certain circles -- kingmaker circles who see the Biden jig is up, and are now maneuvering to position a successor to the role of national figurehead, along with an entirely "fresh team".
Then again, I have a vivid imagination ...
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Not only has AFU air defense been woefully crippled since the early days of this war, but its offensive air power has been effectively nonexistent.
The original inventory of Ukrainian Air Force fighter and attack aircraft is long-since destroyed.
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By and large, Russian aircraft fly where and when they will. Losses have been negligible. Close air support from both fixed-wing and rotary platforms is ubiquitous along the entire line of contact.
Conversely, the general rule for AFU aircraft is: You fly; you die.
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Iraq 1991 was all about seizing post-Soviet strategic dominance (and permanent bases) in the Gulf region; securing the petrodollar system, and greatly weakening the no-longer-useful Iraqi army the empire supported to fight against Iran.
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@oloos878787@SydneyFreedberg@HuntClancy@siberiancattt Iraq 2003 was about: 1) ostentatiously employing an iron fist against even more potent emerging threats to the global dollar system – in particular Iraq’s gambit to sell its oil for Euros and gold; 2) menace and contain a greatly strengthening Iran.
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@oloos878787@SydneyFreedberg@HuntClancy@siberiancattt The US-manufactured Syrian insurgency originally aspired to dispense with Assad, build pipelines from the Arab vassal states to the Mediterranean, and to kick the Russians out of their key strategic naval and air bases in Syria.
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The always impressive @witte_sergei treated us to a great thread yesterday, wherein he discusses the possibilities for the soon-to-come Russian winter offensive. I highly recommend it.
One unknown is the actual number of combat effectives (and accompanying equipment) Russia has in the theater at this time – and their current disposition.
My approximation would be ~500k currently uncommitted combat-capable troops in fully equipped battalions.
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This ~500k estimation assumes that only about half of the recent mobilization + volunteers (~400k total) is combat-ready today.
It was I that characterized Peter Zeihan as a clueless #EmpirePropagandist clown.
In any case, as I read your posts, it is evident to me that your perspective on this war has been substantially informed by the very same species of propaganda Zeihan echoes.
The western intel propaganda psyop that commenced before the conflict went hot in early 2022 has effectively inverted the truth of what has actually occurred. And its overriding success has been predicated upon establishing fallacious parameters for interpreting events.
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Foremost among those fallacious interpretive parameters has been the degree to which the conquest and retention of territory has been established as THE measure of military success. In relation to this, I strongly recommend my analysis from early July: