1/9 This thread includes additional details about the battle of Vuhledar and satellite imagery that helps to understand and visualize the situation better. I had to break this into several parts, so I can publish more imagery of russian losses later. Part 1
2/9 For the past two weeks, the enemy attempted to advance in multiple directions simultaneously, hoping to outflank defenders. The occupiers tried to advance from Pavlivka and Mykil's'ke, as well as west and east of them, assaulting with the forces of the 155th and 40th brigades
3/9 Battalions from the 36th and 72nd (russian motor rifle) brigades tried to advance alongside the 155th and 40th brigades but also failed. Special forces partially lost control when the commander of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade, colonel Sergey Polyakov was killed.
4/9 What makes the destruction of the 155th, and 40th brigades especially important? This is not commonly discussed, but on the battlefield, only a small percentage of people participate in the actual assault. Even many combat roles like artillery do not face their enemy directly
5/9 Not that many people are fit to be in the forward vanguard assault groups that face an enemy first. It takes a lot of experience, courage, or stimulants to attack and act effectively when you know that your chances to be killed or wounded in the assault are almost 90%.
6/9 The backbone of the 155th and 40th brigades consisted of sergeants and officers who were ready to execute any order - whether it was a risky frontal assault or execution of civilians in Bucha and Irpin, where the 155th brigade committed war crimes.
7/9 After staggering casualties of the VDV forces in the battle for Kyiv, it took them a year to restore assault capabilities partially, which we can see in the Kreminna area. It will take as long for marines to restore assault capacities, especially after a catastrophic failure
8/9 Ukraine achieved this success due to a combination of factors: good planning and selection of positions, the bravery of soldiers, intel, and smart utilization of scarce resources. But to project the Vuhledar experience on the whole war, we need much more ammo and weapons
9/9 I am planning to publish imagery of infamous armored vehicle columns in the coming weeks, so if you don't want to miss it, make sure to follow and retweet, as Twitter algorithms might not be in favor of war-related information.
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The Financial Times recently published a report on Ukraine’s mobilization problems. While the article offers a broad and insightful overview, especially for those who are not familiar with the topic, I believe some additional context can help complete the picture:
2/ First, let's start with the fundamentals. One of the core underlying issues is timing. Nationwide mobilization efforts would have been most effective during the initial phase of the war. That window has closed, but that doesn't mean the situation can't be improved
3/ Second, while the Ukrainian government may have overused claims of insufficient Western aid to deflect criticism and maintain internal support, the point isn’t without merit. For example, the 2023 summer counteroffensive was pitched as a turning point to secure big aid package
A few observations drawn from insider insights, open-source data, information from russian internal documents, and conversations with senior officers, frontline soldiers, and volunteers - based on developments from Spring through Summer 2025. Thread🧵:
2/ Since early 2025, Russia's personnel losses have remained among the highest since the war began. But at the same time, Ukraine has faced a sharp rise in desertion and AWOL cases. The pace of Russian territorial advances is higher than during the same period in 2024.
3/ Each year follows a similar pattern: Russian forces form a pocket around a town, Ukraine cites manpower shortages and lack of aid, Russia takes heavy losses but advances, Ukraine inflates already high Russian casualty figures, while Moscow grossly downplays them
Penza Military Plant “Elektropribor”: Preliminary Damage Assessment
🧵Thread:
1/ In the early hours of August 2, Ukrainian UAVs struck multiple targets in Russia, including refineries and military-industrial sites. Here’s what’s known so far about the strike on Elektropribor
2/ First, we verified the strike by geolocating both the recording’s POV and the impact site. The location matches satellite imagery, confirming social media reports that the Elektropribor plant in Penza was targeted by a drone. Impact coordinates: 53.224696, 44.966005
3/ Elektropribor supplies a range of electronic products to both the Russian military and law enforcement: automated control systems, encrypted communications equipment, radar technology, and more. Construction of the targeted facility began around 2018.
What we know about today's ambush on Russian mercenaries in Mali.
🧵Thread: 1/ The attack likely took place on August 1st in the Mopti/Segou region, central Mali. At least 3 mercenaries were killed, though the actual toll is likely to be 4 KIA and 8 WIA from the African Corps:
2/ The perpetrators are JNIM, an Al-Qaeda branch in Sahel. There are currently no indicators suggesting Tuareg separatist involvement.
Equipment was damaged as well. In the video, our team identified what appears to be a Ural-4320 MTP-A2.1, delivered to Mali earlier this year
3/ In January 2025, our team documented hundreds of Russian vehicles moved to Mali via Guinea. Since then, at least two more shipments have followed. Based on visual comparison, we’re confident is the same Ural MTP - a mobile workshops that helps to recover and repair vehicles
Early Damage Assessment of Drone Attack on Penza Radio Plant - July 31, 2025
Preliminary analysis of imagery reveals multiple buildings suffered damage ranging from light to severe. One building appears likely to be completely inoperable. Frontelligence Insight reports. Thread:
2/ Based on high-resolution imagery, unavailable for public release due to license, our team concluded: at least one building sustained severe damage; another has signs of penetration and fire, a third likely suffered penetration but no fire; and a fourth appears lightly damaged
3/ Overall, this attack appears to have been more successful than several others on larger facilities, primarily due to the significant fire damage inflicted on at least one building. The strike’s depth is also notable - approximately 600 km from Ukrainian-controlled territory.
In July, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte claimed Russia produces 4 times more artillery ammo than the NATO. To assess this, RFE/RL and CIT analyzed data on Russian vs. NATO ammo production and concluded that the situation is not as nearly dramatic. Thread with key findings🧵:
2/ According to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Russia produced 250,000 152mm rounds in 2022, one million in 2023 and planned to produce 1.325 million in 2024. In practice, however, researchers note that Russia produced slightly more than 1.3 million 152mm rounds
3/ Ukrainian military intelligence offered a higher estimate. According to the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense, Russia produced a total of 2 million 152mm and 122mm artillery rounds in 2023 and planned to produce 2.7 million rounds in 2024