1/9 This thread includes additional details about the battle of Vuhledar and satellite imagery that helps to understand and visualize the situation better. I had to break this into several parts, so I can publish more imagery of russian losses later. Part 1
2/9 For the past two weeks, the enemy attempted to advance in multiple directions simultaneously, hoping to outflank defenders. The occupiers tried to advance from Pavlivka and Mykil's'ke, as well as west and east of them, assaulting with the forces of the 155th and 40th brigades
3/9 Battalions from the 36th and 72nd (russian motor rifle) brigades tried to advance alongside the 155th and 40th brigades but also failed. Special forces partially lost control when the commander of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade, colonel Sergey Polyakov was killed.
4/9 What makes the destruction of the 155th, and 40th brigades especially important? This is not commonly discussed, but on the battlefield, only a small percentage of people participate in the actual assault. Even many combat roles like artillery do not face their enemy directly
5/9 Not that many people are fit to be in the forward vanguard assault groups that face an enemy first. It takes a lot of experience, courage, or stimulants to attack and act effectively when you know that your chances to be killed or wounded in the assault are almost 90%.
6/9 The backbone of the 155th and 40th brigades consisted of sergeants and officers who were ready to execute any order - whether it was a risky frontal assault or execution of civilians in Bucha and Irpin, where the 155th brigade committed war crimes.
7/9 After staggering casualties of the VDV forces in the battle for Kyiv, it took them a year to restore assault capabilities partially, which we can see in the Kreminna area. It will take as long for marines to restore assault capacities, especially after a catastrophic failure
8/9 Ukraine achieved this success due to a combination of factors: good planning and selection of positions, the bravery of soldiers, intel, and smart utilization of scarce resources. But to project the Vuhledar experience on the whole war, we need much more ammo and weapons
9/9 I am planning to publish imagery of infamous armored vehicle columns in the coming weeks, so if you don't want to miss it, make sure to follow and retweet, as Twitter algorithms might not be in favor of war-related information.
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As we approach a point marking the beginning of the war’s 5th year, it is time to discuss how we assess the war’s overall dynamics, strictly from a military standpoint. One method many analysts use is the pace of territory capture. However, this methodology has a serious issue🧵:
2/ Generally, this is not a bad method of analyzing battlefield dynamics, as the history of wars shows far more cases of states advancing along frontlines or into enemy territory before a war ends in their favor than the opposite. The devil, however, lies in the details
3/ Putting aside other domains of war, such as economics and socio-politics, battlefield dynamics are often judged by metrics like casualty rates and square kilometers of controlled territory. This can produce a distorted picture, a problem I informally term the “Sahara Fallacy”
The catastrophic situation of Russian forces trapped in Kupyansk, who continue to lose ground, together with a second consecutive year of failure to fully seize Pokrovsk, represents one of the more optimistic scenarios for 2025.
Thread:
2/ As war fatigue increasingly affects Russia, the prospect of enforcing a rapid, unfavorable capitulation of Ukraine through Washington, DC now appears even more remote, not not entirely excluded
3/ While Russia has used the negotiation process primarily to delay new sanctions and slow support for Kyiv, its economic situation continues to deteriorate, and tactical gains have failed to translate into strategic breakthroughs.
Information about a new modification of Russia’s Geran-2 drone has been published by Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence, including a detailed technical breakdown. According to the analysis, the Geran drone has been fitted with an R-60 air-to-air missile mounted on its fuselage:
2/ The missile, fitted with an APU-60-1MD (P-62-1MD) aircraft launcher, is mounted on a special bracket located on the upper front section of the Geran’s fuselage.
3/ The most likely employment of rocket involves transmitting images from the drone’s cameras to an operator via the modem. If a Ukrainian aircraft or helicopter enters the engagement zone, the operator sends a launch command to the missile’s control unit.
Analysis: New Data Suggests Russia Is Sustaining Mi-8 Output Despite Wartime Losses
According to non-public Russian procurement documents obtained and analyzed by the Frontelligence Insight team, current Mi-8 production appears sufficient to offset wartime losses. 🧵Thread:
2/ Since the Soviet era, more than 12,000 Mi-8 helicopters of all types have been produced. It’s a versatile military transport platform that can move troops, cargo, serve as a flying hospital or EW asset, and conduct attack missions with unguided rockets and 100–500 kg bombs.
3/ Correspondence between Aviafarm and ZOMZ the Defense Ministry and ZOMZ show a request for 40 IS-264A thermometers: 20 for Kazan and 20 for Ulan-Ude, where Mi-8s are produced.
Most know Kirill Dmitriev as the Russian president’s envoy. But to more than 200 investors in Ukraine, he is known for taking part in a Kyiv real estate project that ended in a fraud and criminal case. Using articles from 2011, I was able to find more details. 🧵Thread:
2/ The story begins in 2000s, when N. Lahuna and A. Dmitriev (Kirill Dmitriev’s father) planned the elite suburban “Olympic Park.” Construction was to be carried out by Traverz-Bud, a subsidiary of "Evropa", in which, according to "Argument," Kirill Dmitriev held a majority stake
3/ Based on court documents cited in the media, in 2011 (links at the end), a prosecutor’s audit found that construction of the properties, which under agreements with the developers of the “Olympic Park” was due to be completed by the end of 2008, has not been carried out
The Financial Times, a media outlet I respect and one of the few that consistently produces exceptional reporting on Ukraine, has released a new editorial opinion. Many, including myself, agree that changes are needed. However, I believe the timing is extremely problematic:
2/ The situation on the frontlines is currently very difficult. At the same time, Kyiv is facing external pressure from Washington, where many are echoing Kremlin-style “capitulation” narratives. In moments like these, the President must stand on solid ground.
3/ This is not about Zelensky personally - it is about the institution of the Presidency. Completely overhauling the government and appointing untested figures in the name of transparency could create a situation where we might end up with no state and government at all