1/9 This thread includes additional details about the battle of Vuhledar and satellite imagery that helps to understand and visualize the situation better. I had to break this into several parts, so I can publish more imagery of russian losses later. Part 1
2/9 For the past two weeks, the enemy attempted to advance in multiple directions simultaneously, hoping to outflank defenders. The occupiers tried to advance from Pavlivka and Mykil's'ke, as well as west and east of them, assaulting with the forces of the 155th and 40th brigades
3/9 Battalions from the 36th and 72nd (russian motor rifle) brigades tried to advance alongside the 155th and 40th brigades but also failed. Special forces partially lost control when the commander of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade, colonel Sergey Polyakov was killed.
4/9 What makes the destruction of the 155th, and 40th brigades especially important? This is not commonly discussed, but on the battlefield, only a small percentage of people participate in the actual assault. Even many combat roles like artillery do not face their enemy directly
5/9 Not that many people are fit to be in the forward vanguard assault groups that face an enemy first. It takes a lot of experience, courage, or stimulants to attack and act effectively when you know that your chances to be killed or wounded in the assault are almost 90%.
6/9 The backbone of the 155th and 40th brigades consisted of sergeants and officers who were ready to execute any order - whether it was a risky frontal assault or execution of civilians in Bucha and Irpin, where the 155th brigade committed war crimes.
7/9 After staggering casualties of the VDV forces in the battle for Kyiv, it took them a year to restore assault capabilities partially, which we can see in the Kreminna area. It will take as long for marines to restore assault capacities, especially after a catastrophic failure
8/9 Ukraine achieved this success due to a combination of factors: good planning and selection of positions, the bravery of soldiers, intel, and smart utilization of scarce resources. But to project the Vuhledar experience on the whole war, we need much more ammo and weapons
9/9 I am planning to publish imagery of infamous armored vehicle columns in the coming weeks, so if you don't want to miss it, make sure to follow and retweet, as Twitter algorithms might not be in favor of war-related information.
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So far, Ukraine’s stabilization measures around Pokrovsk look broadly promising. While many speculated that Kyiv might strike elsewhere, Ukrainian forces have instead pushed back Russian troops in an area where Moscow’s leadership had placed its biggest bet. 🧵Thread:
2/ With only days left before the fall season, the chances of Russia taking Pokrovsk by summer’s end are virtually nil. Amid the so-called “peace talks,” the lack of progress risks undermining Russia’s resolve to fight for “years”, as they like to boast
3/ That does not mean Russia will stop advancing. But if the political goal remains the takeover of Donbas, achieving it by the end of this year appears impossible.
Drones, ISR, communications, battlefield awareness, electronic warfare, and mobile anti-tank systems: North Korea appears to have taken notes from the battlefields of Kursk. Its latest propaganda video offers clues, Frontelligence Insight finds in its newest analysis. 🧵Thread:
2/ When North Korean forces arrived in Kursk in the latter half of 2024, they entered a war already deep into its “drone phase.” Adapting to this reality required three urgent adjustments: countermeasures, offensive drone tactics, and battlefield surveillance.
3/ In a 19-minute video released by Korean Central Television, an FPV drone team, a pilot and a co-pilot, is shown striking Ukrainian vehicles in Kursk Oblast. The wiring setup suggests a reconnaissance unit with quadcopters was likely operating from the same building.
Russian investigative outlet The Insider spoke with numerous volunteers supplying troops with equipment and donations and discovered an eye-opening situation: in recent months, the volunteer movement has plunged into crisis, with rising signs of fatigue and frustration. 🧵Thread:
2/ A significant share of supplies for the Russian army, from uniforms to thermal imagers and drones, has come from volunteers since the start of the full-scale invasion. One of them, Natalia from the Bryansk region, says that people used to donate an average of 500 to 1,000 rubles
3/ Now she must seek funding from businesses and the government, but gets no response. Another volunteer from Belgorod, Ruslan, said he quit the movement, noting that more and more people have no motivation to support the army.
China is reportedly ready to send peacekeepers to Ukraine, according to Welt am Sonntag, citing European diplomats. Meanwhile, Frontelligence Insight is releasing a list of Chinese companies involved in scaling Russia’s Shahed drone program. Here is the list:
/2 Despite its efforts to present itself as a geopolitical actor capable of peacemaking, Chinese companies help to scale Russia's military production. As the data show, most of these companies are either not sanctioned or face restrictions from only a limited number of countries
3/ There are serious inconsistencies in sanctions, undermining their effectiveness. To maximize impact, sanctions should be coordinated across multiple states with leverage over China, including the United States, the European Union, the Commonwealth realms, Japan, and others.
iStories recently reported that Russian recruitment was falling, citing federal budget data on sign-up bonuses. In reality, enlistment still runs above 30,000 a month, and the dip reflects changes in published data, not an actual slowdown 🧵There are a few nuances, though:
2/ They reported that several regions, including Irkutsk and Vladimir, are struggling with recruitment. That is true, and has been an issue in many areas, which helps explain the steady rise in sign-up bonuses. Some recruits even register in other regions to secure higher payouts
3/ Still, despite ever-higher bonuses, Russia has found ways to offset shortfalls by drawing from the freshly detained and pre-trial prisoners, while increasingly pressuring illegal migrants and conscripts into signing contracts.
News of Ukrainian missile production (Flamingo missile) is inspiring, both at home and abroad. Yet, unless the production site, which was opened for journalists, was staged for cameras, it is striking how many details were left exposed - enough to make geolocation possible.
2/ Equally concerning is the decision to show crew members’ faces and list their positions. In our past investigations, my team was able to identify Russian servicemen and intelligence officers using just one facial photo, tracing some even to their actual home addresses
3/ Revealing factory staff could enable local agents from locals to follow employees and, in turn, uncover the site almost certainly making it a target. The interior itself is highly distinctive, a skilled team could likely narrow its location to a handful of candidates.