1/9 This thread includes additional details about the battle of Vuhledar and satellite imagery that helps to understand and visualize the situation better. I had to break this into several parts, so I can publish more imagery of russian losses later. Part 1
2/9 For the past two weeks, the enemy attempted to advance in multiple directions simultaneously, hoping to outflank defenders. The occupiers tried to advance from Pavlivka and Mykil's'ke, as well as west and east of them, assaulting with the forces of the 155th and 40th brigades
3/9 Battalions from the 36th and 72nd (russian motor rifle) brigades tried to advance alongside the 155th and 40th brigades but also failed. Special forces partially lost control when the commander of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade, colonel Sergey Polyakov was killed.
4/9 What makes the destruction of the 155th, and 40th brigades especially important? This is not commonly discussed, but on the battlefield, only a small percentage of people participate in the actual assault. Even many combat roles like artillery do not face their enemy directly
5/9 Not that many people are fit to be in the forward vanguard assault groups that face an enemy first. It takes a lot of experience, courage, or stimulants to attack and act effectively when you know that your chances to be killed or wounded in the assault are almost 90%.
6/9 The backbone of the 155th and 40th brigades consisted of sergeants and officers who were ready to execute any order - whether it was a risky frontal assault or execution of civilians in Bucha and Irpin, where the 155th brigade committed war crimes.
7/9 After staggering casualties of the VDV forces in the battle for Kyiv, it took them a year to restore assault capabilities partially, which we can see in the Kreminna area. It will take as long for marines to restore assault capacities, especially after a catastrophic failure
8/9 Ukraine achieved this success due to a combination of factors: good planning and selection of positions, the bravery of soldiers, intel, and smart utilization of scarce resources. But to project the Vuhledar experience on the whole war, we need much more ammo and weapons
9/9 I am planning to publish imagery of infamous armored vehicle columns in the coming weeks, so if you don't want to miss it, make sure to follow and retweet, as Twitter algorithms might not be in favor of war-related information.
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The Defence Intelligence of Ukraine has published new details about the Russian “Geran-3” UAV. The “U” series model is equipped with a Chinese Telefly JT80 turbojet engine, allowing it to reach speeds of 300–370 km/h and an estimated operational range of up to 1,000 km.
2/ The “Geran-3” reaches its maximum speed of up to 370 km/h mainly in areas covered by Ukrainian air defense and electronic warfare systems, in zones where interceptor UAVs are deployed, and during the terminal phase of flight as it descends toward its target.
3/ Electronic units are largely the same as in the gasoline-powered versions of the “Geran-2” UAV of the “Ы” series. It includes, in particular, the standard SADRA inertial navigation system, an air data computer (ADC), a power distribution unit (PDU), and other components
The dynamics of the battlefield have shifted even further in 2025. With manpower shortages and infiltration tactics, the frontline in some areas has become far less defined and certain. That’s one of the reasons I haven’t posted any tactical updates for a while:
2/ It has reached the point where even soldiers on both sides are uncertain about the frontline - at least beyond their own unit’s tactical area. As a result, sources once considered reliable for mappers are no longer as dependable.
3/ The fog of war is nothing new, of course, but in recent years people grew accustomed to accurate maps to the point of taking them for granted. Unfortunately, even I’ve noticed that many OSINT maps have become markedly less accurate lately.
Up to two-thirds (66%) of respondents in Russia believe it is time to move toward peace negotiations, a record high for this indicator. Only 27% say military action should continue, the lowest level. The figures come from the Levada Center, known for its methodological rigor:
2/ Fifty-eight percent of respondents say the war has affected them or their families. Among those “strongly” affected, common issues include the death of relatives or friends, family members participating in combat, injuries/disability, emotional distress, and economic hardship
3/ Higher support for negotiations among: women; young people under 24; rural residents; those who believe national affairs are going poorly; people who disapprove of Putin; those who rely on YouTube or non-state sources for information.
Two days after being conscripted into Russia's army, Maxim Suvorov signed a contract. Less than a month later, he fell on the battlefield - one of many casualties of Russia’s new practice of filling contract ranks with conscripts. A detailed case showcasing recruitment problems:
2/ Frontelligence Insight has previously reported on Russia’s struggle to meet recruitment targets with monetary bonuses, pushing the military to seek alternatives, including pressuring conscripts to sign contracts. The recent death of a conscript allowed us to trace his story
3/ Our investigation begins with an obituary posted on a local Russian social media group dedicated to fallen soldiers in various conflicts. According to the post, Maxim was conscripted on June 25 and signed a contract on June 27. To verify this, we sought additional evidence
Reminder: the account that posted a photo said to show Iryna Zarutska, with a BLM poster in the background, drew 18 million views. In May 2025, France’s defense and security secretariat tied this account to Storm-1516, a state-backed Russian disinfo group. But there’s more:
2/ According to a report by VIGINUM, the French agency for countering foreign digital interference and disinformation under the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, this unit is a Russian information manipulation set (IMS) linked to Russia’s intelligence (GRU)
3/ EclecticIQ, a Dutch cybersecurity and threat-intelligence firm, identified the LordBebo account as linked to the Storm-1516 disinformation unit in its report on disinformation campaigns. My team also looked into the matter and found a rather interesting pattern:
A recurring question is whether Russia categorizes AWOL cases as a way to conceal combat deaths in its official reports. The short answer is no. The longer answer is more complicated, and requires looking at how AWOL is treated within the Russian military system. 🧵Short thread:
2/ Most AWOL cases can escalate into actual criminal proceedings if all other measures to bring soldiers back fail. High rates of desertion or absence trigger investigations on record - problems that weigh more heavily on commanders and unit statistics than combat losses do
3/ Casualties themselves are rarely the main concern, provided objectives set by higher command are met. By contrast, desertion is seen as evidence of weak leadership and poor control over subordinates. KIA and MIA are regarded as an acceptable cost of war; AWOL is not.