Thread by @HenriVanhanen

In addition to the subtle movement regarding Finland's and Sweden's NATO ratification process, I recently travelled to both Türkiye and Hungary. Some reflections to what the overall situation looks like at the moment in the form of a thread. 🧵🇫🇮 🇸🇪 🇹🇷🇭🇺

1. While I stick to most of my earlier analysis from a January thread, some potentially relevant changes have taken place since. Mostly in terms of Türkiye, yet we shouldn't overlook the importance of Hungary either.

https://twitter.com/HenriVanhanen/status/1612351717873442816

2. The big debate at the moment is about Türkiye possibly splitting the ratification pace of Finland and Sweden; meaning that it could ratify Finland at this point but not Sweden. cnbc.com/2023/01/30/erd…

3. While this might seem as sudden, my understanding since Madrid has been that Ankara has had more issues with Stockholm than Helsinki. During my visit to Ankara, this position (and Erdogan's recent one) was echoed quite strongly too by many.

https://twitter.com/HenriVanhanen/status/1578315735557775360

4. Finland's official position has been that the primary goal is to become a full member of NATO at the same time as Sweden. This hasn't changed the message has become more open to other options as well; meaning that Finland might advance if greenlighted.

helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finlan…

5. A similar change of tone was heard from Stoltenberg at the NATO's MoD meeting. His previous stance on the importance of simultaneous NATO ratification became more open. Likely that he wouldn't give these type of statements without consulting others.
yle.fi/a/74-20017876

6. The changing dynamics are related to Türkiye. Ankara seems to be possibly favoring the ratification of Finland at this point but not Sweden. A message I heard in Ankara emphasized that it's up to Helsinki and Stockholm to coordinate if Finland wants to be ratified earlier.

7. This could be seen as Türkiye intentionally driving a wedge between Finland and Sweden but also as a move to relieve the pressure on Ankara to ratify both and counter accusations of appeasing Russia. Keeping Sweden in a limbo also enables the F16 debate to continue.

8. The way I read it, there's a possibility for 🇫🇮 to become ratified before the 🇹🇷 elections of May. However, the equation remains opaque and events like the earthquake bring uncertainty. Also, we know that last year Erdogan mislead his Finnish counterpart before the application

9. On Budapest, their parliament returns on the 27-28 of Feb. I gained the impression that there's no principled resistance towards Finland and Sweden in NATO; that their military contribution to the Alliance is understood and undisputed. As such, the issues lie elsewhere.

10. Hungary seems to hedge its position in order to maximize national interests, which are not always about sharing the solidarity burden with other Allies. Their complex 🇪🇺 & 🇷🇺 relationship and close coordination with 🇹🇷, all of this/the above is related to the ratifications.

11. As I read it, their parliament might not deal with the ratifications immediately in February or even March. More likely in April-May but by Vilnius is my understanding. The government seems to not have decided yet, when its in their interest to complete the process.

12. Also importantly, there's likely a close coordination between Ankara and Budapest on the schedule. Budapest says they don't want to be the last one so if see movement there, it could be a sign that we'll also see movement in Ankara. There's a connection to possibly follow.

13. To sum: at this point we're closing in on a critical point of event and negotiations as Vilnius approaches. Türkiye has increased the pressure especially in 🇫🇮 where there's a 80+% in favor of NATO and 50+% in favor of going by itself is possible and elections closing in.

14. It will likely be difficult for politicians to advocate waiting for the rafitication if it would be possible, considering the war too. Yet, there's every reason to be cautious of promises from Ankara and there's Budapest, who doesn't have a clear single reason for holding up.

15. I see this as a moment of careful and skillful diplomacy by all. Coordination is needed between Finland, Sweden, the US and NATO but also by and with Türkiye and Hungary. The next weeks and months will be very decisive. Cooler heads prevail as anything can happen now.

16. I still believe that Finland and Sweden will be members by the Vilnius Summit, even if Finland would be ratified slightly earlier. Ankara is likely looking at the terrorism legislation in Sweden (due June) and the F16's. Yet, we've been surprised before too.

Let's see. END

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