A man that sounds a lot like Prigozhin is breaking all sorts of unwritten codes in Russia that are probably dangerous to do. Not least by putting this rant out there. He’s ranting because his ammo is cut back, criticizes MOD, and confirms he’s crossed many lines. /1
He’s angry that Wagner’s ammo has been cut, his contacts tell him he needs to apologize bc the issue is political.He pretends like he doesn’t know it means he has apologize to Shoygu/Gerasimov.he shades Shoygu’s daughter with the Dubai travel comment. dangerous and petty stuff.2/
Shoygu is not great at many core tasks of his job, like setting the force up for a successful war. But using the machinery in Moscow to slowly undercut his enemies, fueled by pettiness and decades of bureaucratic experience? That’s Shoygu’s sweet spot. /3
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Regarding drones entering Poland last night: the event is serious and requires a muscular response, otherwise Russian carelessness and provocations will continue. A brief thread on flight paths+ the behavior of Russia/Belarus since this event and what it reveals /1
Flight path: after the pink line (mine), Gerbera and other drones from two northern routes veer in multiple directions into Poland. Launch routes to the south continue to their targets. /2
This is what typical Russian launch patterns look like lately: drones skim the border of Belarus and drop in sometimes, and often they loop around cities. Compared to last night, the drones got choppy up top and some try to complete a loop but went wide into Poland /3
For the second time, Russia finds itself with few military options to support a critical partner in the Middle East. This thread explains Russia’s military options and limitations for supporting Iran before, during, and after this conflict. /1
Note: this thread doesn't delve into the political balancing Russia engages in across the Middle East, which informs their choices. Here, I address Russian military and defense base capacity and how it shapes options. /2
I didn't expect the Russian military to intervene last minute to head off IDF operations – there was no viable “dash to Tehran” type of scenario here for Russia. And, the cooperation treaty between Russia and Iran has no mutual defense clause. /3
It’s official- the new commander of the Russian ground forces is Mordvichev. Previously op group center commander (Donetsk front & longest in post as op group commander). It signals a few things about the next phase for the Russian army 🧵 /1
Mordvichev’s appointment to Ground Forces commander is a signal that the military intends to integrate experience from the war in Ukraine. This position is responsible for force posture/employment, training, readiness and other roles critical for reconstituting the army. /2
As the most experienced op group commander, he could have been placed into a higher command role as a deputy commander of the special military operation in Rostov, along with other senior generals like Kim or Rudskoi . The choice to put him in the GF role is telling …/3
Russia did not call off a large drone attack last night within ten minutes of the presidents’ call, and 100+ drones were launched last night from 1900 (when call ended) until after midnight Moscow time. We can step through this with basic timelines and calculations. /1
We know Shaheds speeds, launch sites thanks to various monitors, we know general routes, and what time they impacted cities last night. (Older image below for reference). /2
Ukraine said the attacks began at 1900, close to when the call ended, until 0200+. So some Shaheds were probably already airborne by 1800 Moscow time, but Russia continued to launch fresh waves up to 5-6 hours after the call ended. /3
On the operational impact of US aid suspension to Ukraine: frontline stability for the AFU rests on effective drone and artillery use. The timeline below is a gradual degradation and not off/on switch. The suspension will have other problems for soldier morale and operations. /1
Morale: Ukrainian forces are undermanned already, and this problem is unresolved. Desertions, recruiting, soldiers going AWOL for a few weeks to recover, are known problems. Suspension of aid and simultaneous rapprochement with Russia worsens these problems /2
Will to fight: Ukrainian forces continued to fight through wavering US support in 2024 when aid was paused in Congress for over six months. They are tough. Too soon to assess impact of this situation but there are negative potentials here and I will watch closely. /3
Pausing to reflect, I've now worked 20 years in DC. 20 years on the Russian military. 5 U.S. administrations and 4 Russian wars. What a time it has been. A brief thread of gratitude to those I've met on the way. /1
To friends and colleagues from the Pentagon and the shadows: as we said back then, if they made a movie about things we've seen with our own eyes, no one would believe it. Pacing the Pentagon courtyard at dawn and late night, windows all lit up, I was proud to be part of it. /2
To our 🇺🇸servicemen and women that I've met, from our most senior officers to our junior enlisted, it has always been one of my greatest privileges to support you, work with you, study with you, and understand the adventures and sacrifices of a military life. I'm proud of you. /3