Prigozhin’s increasingly vitriolic war of words with the Russian MOD over ammo supplies suggests chickens are coming home to roost after he thought he was able to prosecute multiple vendettas 1/
Shoigu is an extremely deft political operator, and one of his defining characteristics is that you rarely see him working at it. He sets things up behind the scenes and then they seem just to happen. The very antithesis of Prigozhin’s bluster 2/
Is the MOD withholding ammo? Quite possibly, for all their denials, but in the context of growing ammo rationing, this is both unsurprising and justifiable. 3/
Along with the rotation of Wagner troops away from Bakhmut it sets scene for regulars to deliver Putin his first victory (however meaningless) for some time, after chewing up Wagner convict-mercs to get it. Prigozhin fumes but there isn’t much more he can do… 4/
As he’s dependent on the MOD for ammo and most fire support. Besides, he’s also losing ground politically and in the FSB’s crosshairs. He’s not doomed, just being taught a lesson and reminded he’s not a big beast. 5/
His volume operates on a bell curve: he’s loudest and most vitriolic when he’s winning or losing big. At present, he’s not winning. 6/end
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#Prigozhin of Wagner (in)fame and Girkin of #Strelkov nom de guerre, are at dagger’s drawn now, a feud beginning to seep into the media. A few observations 1/
Girkin has emerged as an unexpectedly trenchant critic of the conduct of the war (and even an occasional satirist). So long as he was slamming ‘Plywood Marshal’ Shoigu, Gerasimov and ‘Our Unique Strategic Advantage’ Putin, all was fine 2/ spectator.co.uk/article/putins…
He has, after all, a degree of protection because he does channel the views of a substantial fraction of the security apparatus, and the Kremlin appears to accept it’s safer to let him grumble than make him a martyr 3/ buzzsprout.com/1026985/109337…
For a reminder of Putin's amateurish and personalistic approach, assuming that everything can be fixed magically off-stage, see his berating Manturov for not conjuring an aero engine industry out of nowhere. Gerasimov take heed. 1/ bbc.com/news/world-eur…
This is Putin's approach - if things are not instantly fixed, it's not because of intractable structural issues, usually exacerbated by Kremlin incompetence and corruption, it's because someone isn't trying. Do better! 2/ clip.cafe/the-death-of-s…
Surovikin, one of the most able officers they have, not fixing the Russian military's flaws in 3 months (including issues above his pay grade like taming Wagner), not acceptable. 3/
Putin's decision to appoint Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov as new overall commander of Ukraine op is significant. A quick thread 1/
Is it a demotion for former joint commander Surovikin? Implicitly, yes, of course - even if being framed simply as a response to the increased 'status' of the op. 2/
What did Surovikin do wrong? Nothing, really (in context - this is not about his morality...). Yes, there were all kinds of reversals, including the recent Makiivka strike, but there is a limit to what one new commander can do in 3 months 3/
We've heard from the Ukrainians than the tempo of artillery attacks around Bakhmut has slackened, implying logistics issues +/or conservation of ammo, and this confirms it. 2/
That could simply because stocks are low or being conserved for another op, but the Wagner response speaks to the suspicion and tension between different forces in theatre 3/
So Kudrin has taken his 'internal escape route' from the Accounts Chamber to Yandex (or what will be left of it). A short thread 1/ rg.ru/2022/11/29/pre…
Kudrin has long been something of an anomaly an economic liberal who was once in Putin's inner circle yet who has been distanced from him over time. Nonetheless, Putin is loyal to his own. Kudrin no longer had traction, but did have a certain latitude denied others 2/
His trajectory, from 'Finance Minister of the Year 2010' to academe and then in 2018 to chair of the Accounts Chamber in part reflected the way he was Putin's, not Medvedev's man, but also the perceived needs of the time 3/
The Russian govt is very eager to squelch rumours of a 2nd wave of mobilisations, with good reason. A short threat 1/
The 1st wave shattered the implicit assumption (maybe even call it a tacit social compact) that Putin could have his war without it affecting most Russians (unless they were Dagestanis, Buryats, etc) 2/
It also seriously strained relations with the regional leaders who are now being expected to do the Kremlin's hard and unpopular work while, as usual, Putin his behind them. No one can openly complain, but the signs of dissatisfaction were clear 3/