Thread by @ThreshedThought

There’s a lot of noise about the one year anniversary of the Russian ground invasion of Ukraine.

Let’s cut through some the chaff, and get to the heart of the matter.

What is going to happen?

There are lots of comments about big events on the anniversary.

Maybe - but I suspect these will mostly be symbolic.

The Russians are really stretched at the moment, and so don’t have much capacity to attack.

So the greatest moves on the anniversary are likely to be from Ukraine, but I wouldn’t count on it.

So, first things first:

The Russians have already started their spring offensive.

They are attacking on a broad front from Kremina-Svatove in the North, all the way down to Vuhledar in the south (in the three areas marked on the map).

(Rule number one of using military force - CONCENTRATION of effort).

It really pains me to see the Russians make such basic errors, again and again.

They are sending thousands of their troops needlessly to their deaths.

At some counts this is up to 800/day - let’s call it 20,000 month.

So assuming nothing happens - how long can Russian maintain this loss rate?

Here is a back of a fag packet calculation:

They started the war with 150k invasion force. In numerical terms, I reckon this entire number is dead, wounded or missing (at least).

They then mobilised 300k. Not all are in service yet, but let’s say that they are all gonna arrive.

(Rumours of another 500k mobilisation haven’t occurred).

So that’s 300k troops. Normally, when units suffer 30% destruction they are considered combat ineffective.

Let’s say that with some reorganisation the Russians can suffer a 50% loss rate before they start having critical bits of their forces collapsing.

So that’s 150k losses they can stomach. Or 7 1/2 months - which started in, say, November.

We’ve had three months, and so there are 4.5 months before they run out of manpower and bits of their forces start collapsing. So, some point over the summer.

Don’t @ me and pick apart the figures. They are illustrative.

And on the Ukrainian side?

Well it’s hard to know what their causalities are. Maybe 100k so far? Certainly lower than the Russians, if you look at the way the two sides use their military forces.

But there is something else going on with the Ukrainians. Equipment supplies. Massive amounts of equipment.

Whereas Russia has a declining equipment stockpile, NATO/the West has decided to ramp up supplies to Ukraine.

Witness the tanks and infantry fighting vehicles and longer range artillery announced in Jan

This will take some time to come online but potentially Ukraine could be fielding some of this by March/April.

And unlike the Russians they do concentrate their forces.

So once all of that equipment arrives, and by my count there is some like a mixed armoured/mech division minus (slightly less than a division), the Ukrainians can do a counterpunch.

A manoeuvre division is enough to do something worthwhile.

And so the war starts to resume its pattern:

- A long period of Russian throwing its troops pointlessly into Ukrainian defences (who retreat slowly inflicting damage on the Russians);
- And once the Russians are exhausted, the Ukrainians counterpunch.

Except that this year, the Ukrainians have to win.

They cannot let this drag on into 2024 - the year of the US presidential election.

Far too risky.

So we have another few weeks of attrition against the Russian attacks, and then a Ukrainian armoured offensive, probably in the south.

And they have to win. In 2023.

ENDS