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Russian forces are revamping their assault tactics after experiencing failures with their current structure. The Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) are getting replaced with a new unit called the "Assault Unit" or "Assault Detachment", which I will discuss in this thread.
2/16
Based on a captured russian manual, the Assault Unit (or Detachment) is a battalion-sized force designed to perform assaults in fortified tree lines and urban environments. It is essentially a reinforced battalion with a specific focus on assault operations.
3/16 The Assault Detachment is customizable to mission requirements and consists of 2-3 assault companies, a command unit, an artillery support unit, and other groups: recon, tank, EW, AD, fire support, UAV, Medevac, flamethrowing, assault engineering, reserve, equipment recovery
4/16
Assault unit armament:
- Three T-72 tanks
- Two Zu-23, and 3 MANDAPS
- 12 man-portable flamethrowers
- Six SPGs (2S9),
- Six Towed artillery guns (D30)
- Two AGS-17
- Two Kord HMGs,
- Two ATGMs
- Two sniper pairs.
- BREM-L
5/16
The main unit of the assault detachment is an assault company consisting of a command unit, a UAV team, assault platoons, an artillery support platoon, a tank group, a reserve section, artillery support platoons, medevac section.
6/16
Assault company armament:
- Four BMP or BMD-2
- One T-72
- Two AGS-17,
- Two Kord HMG
- Two ATGM
- Two sniper pairs
- Two mortars - either 82 or 120 mm mortar
- One D30 or 2S9
7/16
The primary component of the combat formation is the assault platoon, which may consist of an advance party, safeguard, command group, and fire support platoon strengthened by additional firepower: AGS, mortar, D-30 gun, armored group, and evacuation squad.
8/16
An assault platoon comprises 12-15 members, divided into tactical groups of 3 people, and equipped based on mission requirements. A reserve section can supplement the platoon with additional firepower - machine gunner, assistant machine gunner, riflemen.
9/16
Main assault provisions:
• The pause between the assault and artillery fire on fortified positions should be no longer than one minute
• Using UAVs for reconnaissance is advised, but it is not recommended to use them for battle monitoring to avoid the loss of the UAV.
10/16
• Occupying abandoned trenches is prohibited because they may have been booby-trapped or could have been prepared as targets for artillery strikes.
• Assaulters cannot evacuate the wounded themselves; they must relay the wounded's coordinates to the evacuation team.
11/16
• The platoon commander controls mortar fire.
• The platoon/company commander decides on artillery targets, but only the unit commander can provide the air support.
• A recommended firing method for the AGS-17 is indirect fire, with a preferred firing range of 600-1700 m
12/16
During the assault, the armored group can act as a whole or be divided between platoons. The artillery support platoon's mortars are distributed between assault platoons, while the artillery gun reports directly to the commander.
13/16
• During the treeline assault, the platoon should move in a diamond formation
• During an assault, it is prohibited for an assault company or platoon to move through open spaces and they should instead move solely within the treeline.
14/16
The russians are transitioning from larger structures, such as BTGs, to smaller, more agile assault units. However, they still rely heavily on artillery support. It is uncertain if they have enough scarce weapons like 2S9, mortars, AGS, and ammo to equip all units.
15/16
This decision seems to be influenced by Wagner's advances in the Bakhmut area and the decreased availability of vehicles and weaponry since February 2022. Unlike BTG, assault detachments doesn’t seem to have a logistics or MLRS units in their structure.
16/16
In the upcoming part, which I will be publishing next week, I plan to expand on this topic further and discuss urban tactics and recommendations. I invite you to follow me to stay updated, as social media algorithms may not prioritize war-related content.
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Frontelligence Insight conducted an initial Battle Damage Assessment of strikes on Belbek Airfield in Crimea on May 15th and 16th. This analysis is based on mid-resolution images taken on May 16th
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2/Three large scorch marks are visible in the central part of the airfield: two on the military jet apron and one in the fuel depot area. The exact diameter of these marks cannot be determined due to low resolution, but they appear to be approximately over 30m in size.
3/ The imagery from July 2023 confirms that the apron was used to host military jets. Due to the resolution limitations, we cannot determine whether any aircraft were hit or destroyed, nor can we assess the level of damage, but we can conclude that missiles did reach the apron.
There has been a controversy surrounding the situation in the northern area of Kharkiv Oblast, invaded on May 10th. One of the primary points of contention has been the alleged absence of fortifications. But is it so? 🧵Thread:
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2/ Given that many of these areas are now under Russian control, sharing some satellite images is appropriate. From these images, you can see fortified and communication trenches in areas near Krasne. Some of these are older Russian positions, while others were built in 2023
3/ While it's true that the placement of some of these trenches might appear unconventional at first glance, I refrain from making comments without knowledge of the defense plan for the area. Trenches can serve various purposes - distraction, communication, defenses, etc.
Overnight, Russian infantry, backed by armored vehicles, entered Kharkiv oblast from Belgorod area, using small tactical units. Frontelligence Insight had previously cautioned about this scenario. Here's what we know about it🧵:
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2/ The capture of border villages like Strilecha, Krasne, Pylne, and Borysivka isn't unexpected. It's an anticipated maneuver to divert Ukrainian resources from the main Russian offensive in Donbas. Considering manpower shortages, Ukraine will be forced to redeploy some personnel
3/ Many question how Russian forces crossed the border so quickly. The answer is simple — the border is a grey zone heavily surveilled and, hence doesn't have defensive structures. Instead, the defensive lines are positioned deeper within Ukrainian territory.
May 2nd updates on frontline developments from the Frontelligence Insight, including the information about a potential Russian offensive in the Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts
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2/ After successes in the Ocheretyne area, Russian forces now have slightly more than 10 kilometers of ground between them and the T0504 highway, which connects Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk. However, another potential threat is emerging from the northward-leading road.
3/ The Russian expansion into Arkhangel's'ke widens their range of possibilities and complicates Ukrainian efforts to establish a cohesive defensive system across such a broad area, particularly given the understaffing of many brigades.
Russian forces have gained tactically near Ocheretyne and Chasiv Yar, and have attempted a large assault towards Sivers'k. Frontelligence Insight provides a concise analysis of the current situation in this 🧵thread
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2/ According to on-the-ground reports, occasional Russian groups have temporarily crossed the canal at Chasiv Yar but didn't establish a bridgehead. A geolocated video by @giK1893 shows that Russians tried to set a position in the south of Chasiv Yar at the landbridge crossing
3/ Considering that Russians gathered superior means and forces in the area, it's a point of concern. It opens an opportunity to advance into the forest on the west side of the canal. If successful, this would provide them with the freedom to choose further assault directions.
Why have Russian forces advanced in multiple directions and what are the implications? What are the future prospects? Today's analysis by Frontelligence Insight centers on Chasiv Yar, Kurakhkove, and Ocheretyne
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2/ Ukrainian forces retreated from Ocheretyne and Solovyove. While the 115th brigade was blamed, the core issue is that many brigades are not in a condition to hold the enemy with disproportional advantage in personnel, artillery, vehicles, and air support along the frontline
3/ Our team has received reports of poor communication, coordination, and leadership. These problems are rooted in deeper systemic issues, like personnel shortages and challenges in preparing skilled officers for senior roles promptly and in holding them accountable