🧵 1/16
Russian forces are revamping their assault tactics after experiencing failures with their current structure. The Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) are getting replaced with a new unit called the "Assault Unit" or "Assault Detachment", which I will discuss in this thread.
2/16
Based on a captured russian manual, the Assault Unit (or Detachment) is a battalion-sized force designed to perform assaults in fortified tree lines and urban environments. It is essentially a reinforced battalion with a specific focus on assault operations.
3/16 The Assault Detachment is customizable to mission requirements and consists of 2-3 assault companies, a command unit, an artillery support unit, and other groups: recon, tank, EW, AD, fire support, UAV, Medevac, flamethrowing, assault engineering, reserve, equipment recovery
4/16
Assault unit armament:
- Three T-72 tanks
- Two Zu-23, and 3 MANDAPS
- 12 man-portable flamethrowers
- Six SPGs (2S9),
- Six Towed artillery guns (D30)
- Two AGS-17
- Two Kord HMGs,
- Two ATGMs
- Two sniper pairs.
- BREM-L
5/16
The main unit of the assault detachment is an assault company consisting of a command unit, a UAV team, assault platoons, an artillery support platoon, a tank group, a reserve section, artillery support platoons, medevac section.
6/16
Assault company armament:
- Four BMP or BMD-2
- One T-72
- Two AGS-17,
- Two Kord HMG
- Two ATGM
- Two sniper pairs
- Two mortars - either 82 or 120 mm mortar
- One D30 or 2S9
7/16
The primary component of the combat formation is the assault platoon, which may consist of an advance party, safeguard, command group, and fire support platoon strengthened by additional firepower: AGS, mortar, D-30 gun, armored group, and evacuation squad.
8/16
An assault platoon comprises 12-15 members, divided into tactical groups of 3 people, and equipped based on mission requirements. A reserve section can supplement the platoon with additional firepower - machine gunner, assistant machine gunner, riflemen.
9/16
Main assault provisions:
• The pause between the assault and artillery fire on fortified positions should be no longer than one minute
• Using UAVs for reconnaissance is advised, but it is not recommended to use them for battle monitoring to avoid the loss of the UAV.
10/16
• Occupying abandoned trenches is prohibited because they may have been booby-trapped or could have been prepared as targets for artillery strikes.
• Assaulters cannot evacuate the wounded themselves; they must relay the wounded's coordinates to the evacuation team.
11/16
• The platoon commander controls mortar fire.
• The platoon/company commander decides on artillery targets, but only the unit commander can provide the air support.
• A recommended firing method for the AGS-17 is indirect fire, with a preferred firing range of 600-1700 m
12/16
During the assault, the armored group can act as a whole or be divided between platoons. The artillery support platoon's mortars are distributed between assault platoons, while the artillery gun reports directly to the commander.
13/16
• During the treeline assault, the platoon should move in a diamond formation
• During an assault, it is prohibited for an assault company or platoon to move through open spaces and they should instead move solely within the treeline.
14/16
The russians are transitioning from larger structures, such as BTGs, to smaller, more agile assault units. However, they still rely heavily on artillery support. It is uncertain if they have enough scarce weapons like 2S9, mortars, AGS, and ammo to equip all units.
15/16
This decision seems to be influenced by Wagner's advances in the Bakhmut area and the decreased availability of vehicles and weaponry since February 2022. Unlike BTG, assault detachments doesn’t seem to have a logistics or MLRS units in their structure.
16/16
In the upcoming part, which I will be publishing next week, I plan to expand on this topic further and discuss urban tactics and recommendations. I invite you to follow me to stay updated, as social media algorithms may not prioritize war-related content.
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The latest satellite images show 3 major developments: a large Russian troop buildup in Bryansk Oblast, damage from recent drone strikes in Kyiv, and unusual military activities at Taiwan’s Wangan Airport.
All three have one thing in common - they were generated by AI. 🧵Thread:
2/ While those who regularly work with satellite imagery or OSINT can quickly tell that something is "off," the quality of AI-generated satellite images is improving fast. As the number of convincing fakes grows, I've put together a few recommendations to help avoid being misled
3/ In the case of the "Kyiv attack," it took just a single prompt on a free platform to generate the image. While it appears convincing at first glance, a closer look reveals clear geometric irregularities - distorted car shapes, and irregular windows and balconies on buildings
A drone attack is ongoing against Russian airbases with strategic bombers. While the full damage is still unclear, several videos show multiple bombers have been badly hit. Satellite images from yesterday confirm that Belaya hosts various Tu-95 models, Tu-22M3s, and Tu-160s
Satellite imagery of Olenya Airbase from May 26 at 09:50 UTC, shared by @avivector , shows the presence of 11 Tu-95MS (Bear-H), 5 An-12 (Cub), and 40 Tu-22M3 (Backfire-C) aircraft.
Another suspected target is Belaya Airbase. Satellite images from May 31, analysed by @avivector , show the presence of 7 Tu-160 (Blackjack), 6 Tu-95MS (Bear-H), 2 Il-78M (Midas), 6 An-26, 2 An-12, 39 Tu-22M3, and 30 MiG-31 aircraft.
Over the past few months, Russians have focused on disrupting Ukrainian logistics, using a mix of drones, including fiber-optic. Once EW is neutralized or forced to withdraw by fiber-optic drones, it clears the way for drones like the Molniya, which can fly over 20 km. Thread:
2/ Cutting off supply lines has made vehicle transport nearly impossible. In some cases, individual soldiers must walk more than 10 km at night to deliver basic supplies: an unsustainable way for supporting any sizable unit, or even rotating troops.
3/ Despite growing logistical problems, Ukrainian command has made bad choices to launch Russian-modelled assaults. The attempt to capture positions while already struggling to hold current ones, with fewer troops and less equipment, lead to predictably poor outcome
Through the Optics of War: An analysis of leaked confidential data from Russia’s military-industrial complex by Frontelligence Insight — from thermal scopes and laser anti-UAV programs to Chinese import schemes and production bottlenecks in the optoelectronic sector. 🧵Thread:
2/ Rostec is a state-owned conglomerate that includes much of Russia’s military-industrial complex. One of its key holdings, Shvabe, specializes in optical-electronic technologies for military and dual-use applications. The original files were obtained by the @256CyberAssault
3/ In February 2024, Polyus Scientific Research Institute, part of Shvabe Holding, was tasked with advancing laser technologies to counter UAVs. This includes developing materials like active elements under a program focused on high-power lasers, running through 2033.
How bad is Russia’s war chest? Has the country entered stagflation? Why does it fear falling oil prices, but not a crash? And how is the tariff war hurting Russia?
These questions — and more — are explored in a special interview with Russian economist Vladimir Milov.
🧵Thread:
2/ Tariff wars:
China’s economic slowdown has closed its market to many Russian products, hitting major industries hard. The China-focused Russian coal industry is struggling, and Russian non-energy and non-commodity exports are down by about a quarter compared to pre-2022 levels
3/ Tariff war will obviously exacerbate the Chinese slowdown. The slower Chinese growth, the less market for Russian goods. Share of China in the total Russian exports is as high as a third now - we're heavily dependent on this market and its well-being.
1/ The exhaustion of Russia’s vehicle fleet is becoming increasingly evident. The reduced use of armored vehicles and the growing reliance on civilian: including motorcycles, golf carts, and vans, continues to signal a degradation in Russian maneuvering capabilities.
2/ During the winter, outside of Kursk, Russia achieved mostly tactical gains, notably in Kharkiv Oblast, the Chasiv Yar area and Kurakhove–Velyka Novosilka axis. While these advances have been troubling for Ukraine, Russia has so far failed to capitalize on them strategically.
3/ Despite slow progress, Russia still retains the resources and capability to conduct active offensive operations through the summer and fall of 2025. However, as I noted in my analysis last year, the diminishing returns will determine whether Russia will continue this war