🧵 1/16
Russian forces are revamping their assault tactics after experiencing failures with their current structure. The Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) are getting replaced with a new unit called the "Assault Unit" or "Assault Detachment", which I will discuss in this thread.
2/16
Based on a captured russian manual, the Assault Unit (or Detachment) is a battalion-sized force designed to perform assaults in fortified tree lines and urban environments. It is essentially a reinforced battalion with a specific focus on assault operations.
3/16 The Assault Detachment is customizable to mission requirements and consists of 2-3 assault companies, a command unit, an artillery support unit, and other groups: recon, tank, EW, AD, fire support, UAV, Medevac, flamethrowing, assault engineering, reserve, equipment recovery
4/16
Assault unit armament:
- Three T-72 tanks
- Two Zu-23, and 3 MANDAPS
- 12 man-portable flamethrowers
- Six SPGs (2S9),
- Six Towed artillery guns (D30)
- Two AGS-17
- Two Kord HMGs,
- Two ATGMs
- Two sniper pairs.
- BREM-L
5/16
The main unit of the assault detachment is an assault company consisting of a command unit, a UAV team, assault platoons, an artillery support platoon, a tank group, a reserve section, artillery support platoons, medevac section.
6/16
Assault company armament:
- Four BMP or BMD-2
- One T-72
- Two AGS-17,
- Two Kord HMG
- Two ATGM
- Two sniper pairs
- Two mortars - either 82 or 120 mm mortar
- One D30 or 2S9
7/16
The primary component of the combat formation is the assault platoon, which may consist of an advance party, safeguard, command group, and fire support platoon strengthened by additional firepower: AGS, mortar, D-30 gun, armored group, and evacuation squad.
8/16
An assault platoon comprises 12-15 members, divided into tactical groups of 3 people, and equipped based on mission requirements. A reserve section can supplement the platoon with additional firepower - machine gunner, assistant machine gunner, riflemen.
9/16
Main assault provisions:
• The pause between the assault and artillery fire on fortified positions should be no longer than one minute
• Using UAVs for reconnaissance is advised, but it is not recommended to use them for battle monitoring to avoid the loss of the UAV.
10/16
• Occupying abandoned trenches is prohibited because they may have been booby-trapped or could have been prepared as targets for artillery strikes.
• Assaulters cannot evacuate the wounded themselves; they must relay the wounded's coordinates to the evacuation team.
11/16
• The platoon commander controls mortar fire.
• The platoon/company commander decides on artillery targets, but only the unit commander can provide the air support.
• A recommended firing method for the AGS-17 is indirect fire, with a preferred firing range of 600-1700 m
12/16
During the assault, the armored group can act as a whole or be divided between platoons. The artillery support platoon's mortars are distributed between assault platoons, while the artillery gun reports directly to the commander.
13/16
• During the treeline assault, the platoon should move in a diamond formation
• During an assault, it is prohibited for an assault company or platoon to move through open spaces and they should instead move solely within the treeline.
14/16
The russians are transitioning from larger structures, such as BTGs, to smaller, more agile assault units. However, they still rely heavily on artillery support. It is uncertain if they have enough scarce weapons like 2S9, mortars, AGS, and ammo to equip all units.
15/16
This decision seems to be influenced by Wagner's advances in the Bakhmut area and the decreased availability of vehicles and weaponry since February 2022. Unlike BTG, assault detachments doesn’t seem to have a logistics or MLRS units in their structure.
16/16
In the upcoming part, which I will be publishing next week, I plan to expand on this topic further and discuss urban tactics and recommendations. I invite you to follow me to stay updated, as social media algorithms may not prioritize war-related content.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Over three days, Ukrainian long-range drone strikes have dealt a tangible logistical blow to a rail line linking the military and industrial hubs of Volgograd and Rostov-on-Don. Preliminary analysis points to the destruction of traction substations and fuel tanks. 🧵Thread:
2/ The strikes have repeatedly targeted infrastructure along the rail line, which serves both industry and the supply of Russian forces, including those in Donetsk and Luhansk. The pattern points to a deliberate and systematic effort to disrupt the route
3/ Video uploaded by residents of Orlovskiy shows the local traction substation "Dvoynaya", which powers the railway movement, engulfed in flames. We've geolocated the site and assess it's likely to remain temporarily out of service. Coordinates:
Units like K-2, Madyar’s Birds, the Lasar Group, and the 3rd Corps stand out as well-organized formations that, through leadership, organization, media savvy, and initiative, have delivered solid results often to the point where their unit presence can shift battlefield dynamics:
2/ For all their success, these units are just a small part of Ukraine’s forces. They can’t hold the whole frontline or make up for systemic flaws. Nurturing leaders takes time - they can’t be copied. To extrapolate personal skill into institutional strength , you need a system.
3/ The priority remains systemic reform: to build a military where all units, if not matching the elite few, at least operate within reach of their standards. The Ministry of Defense has made progress since late 2024, but Ukraine is still lagging behind where it needs to be
In June, Reuters reported that North Korea could deploy more troops to Russia as early as July or August to support its war in Ukraine, citing South Korea’s National Intelligence Service and lawmaker Lee Seong-kweun. With July coming to an end, it’s worth revisiting this
2/ According to earlier reports in June and July, an additional 25,000 - 30,000 troops could be deployed, a force roughly equivalent to a military corps. As of late July, there has been no confirmation or evidence of additional North Korean troops near the Ukrainian border.
3/ In exchange for supplying Russia with artillery shells and missiles, North Korea is likely receiving technical assistance on satellite launches and missile guidance systems, Lee Seong-kweun reported back in June, citing the NIS briefing.
Another Ukrainian drone strike inside Russia, likely targeting a railway traction substation in the Volgograd region. The strike caused a visible fire. Some reports mentioned a nearby oil refinery, but our analysis points to the substation. More details in the thread:
2/ NASA’s FIRMS system locates the fire in the area where the substation is located, marked by the red rectangle on the map. The governor of Volgograd also stated - due to falling drone debris, power supply to the railway’s network in the Oktyabrsky district has been disrupted
3/ The Zhutovo railway traction substation (110/35/27/10 kV) powers the electrified rail line between Volgograd and Kotelnikovo. Disabling it cuts power to electric trains, disrupting traffic along this important logistical route. But what makes it particularly important?
When it comes to the results of Ukrainian strikes deep inside Russia, one of the most asked questions is why Ukrainian drone strikes cause damage that often appears insufficient. The answer lies largely in engineering trade-offs: the balance between range and payload. Thread 🧵:
2/ Drones that fly far have to allocate a lot of their weight and space to fuel/batteries, which leaves less room for explosives. Long range also creates aerodynamic issues - to carry more fuel, drones needs to be bigger, which makes them heavier, slower, easier to intercept
3/ Advanced materials and engineering could help mitigate these limitations, but such solutions often dramatically increase costs and reduce scalability, which are critical factors in a war of attrition. And even high-end drones remain vulnerable to simple and cheap air defense
In the early morning of July 26th, multiple videos surfaced showing a UAV strike on the Russian "Signal" radio plant in Stavropol. Our team has conducted a preliminary BDA assessment and gathered key context on the facility’s role in Russia’s military production. 🧵Thread:
2/ The factory is located roughly 500 km from the area under Ukrainian control. The strike targeted one of its production facilities, around the 2nd and 3rd floor. The building appears to have avoided critical structural damage, though localized fires were reported
3/ The facility serves both military and civilian sectors. In recent decades, Signal has been involved in a range of defense and industrial projects. Notably, it supplied cathodic protection equipment for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran.