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More from @Beefeater_Fella

Beefeater

@Beefeater_Fella

Dec 16

On Russian Telegram today

Not enough food cards for everyone

Prices in Russian stores continue to grow and authorities in some regions are introducing food stamps. State Duma Committee Head on Financial Markets, Anatoly Aksakov proposed extending this to the entire country

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The cards for cheap fish introduced in Kamchatka are only available to WWII veterans, home front workers, children of war, concentration camp prisoners and disabled combat veterans. Pensioners and large families cannot take advantage of this support measure

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Meanwhile, the need for such assistance exists throughout the country. According to Rosstat, about 12 million people, or 8% of the population, live below the poverty line in Russia. Their income is less than 16 thousand rubles per month.

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Read 5 tweets

Beefeater

@Beefeater_Fella

Dec 13

Trending on Russian Telegram:

“The Russian economy will collapse in 2025” – analysts are frightened by a new chilling prophecy from The Economist magazine.

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Many believe that it is owned by a transnational elite that controls the course of history. In 1983, they predicted the collapse of the USSR. In 2000, the fall of the Twin Towers. The same with the high-profile events of recent years: from the SVO to the launch of Oreshnik.

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In the latest issue of the magazine: what is being hidden behind rumors about Nabiullina's resignation, why the dollar at 104 will seem like paradise already in January, and when will they start freezing citizens' bank accounts.

Read the full transcript: t.me/TheEconomist/2…

Read 5 tweets

Beefeater

@Beefeater_Fella

Oct 30

It’s time to suspend Hungarian membership rights for serious and persistent breaches of the principles of the European Union.
In this video, we explain the European Union Article 7 process, specifically in relation to Hungary.

You can watch the YouTube presentation of this thread here 👇

youtu.be/HiMyVOOvnj8

Back in January 2024, The European Commission announced that it would will not push forward Article 7, the so-called nuclear option, against Hungary over breaches of fundamental rights until there is a strong majority in favour among member states.

Article 7 has in fact already been invoked against Hungary, back in 2018. Breaches of EU Principles were defined and agreed upon with Hungary, with specific remedies for these breaches agreed to - together with a grading of the breaches and timelines for the remedies were agreed with Hungary as a pathway to the resumption of EU funding.

The problem is that while Victor Orban and his regime has not only failed to remedy the breaches, he has in fact doubled down on some of the breaches in areas such as the judiciary and immigration rules, with a limited number of breaches being remedied and partly remedied. It is the European Commission that is responsible for progressing the Article 7 to the sanction phase, with clear grounds to do so as Hungary has failed to remedy a substantial number of breaches agreed with Orban and his right wing regime in 2018.

The Commission’s position is one of ambivalence and inaction, they claim there is insufficient member state support to progress the Article 7 sanctions which could or should result in Hungary being muted and denied a vote in EU affairs. In January 2024, after notifying Hungary of their failure to remedy breaches - the Commission put out this statement:

"It's not possible for the Commission to take a decision in the process," Didier Reynders, the European Commissioner for Justice As recognised by Transparency International, “the past decade has seen sustained attacks on the EU’s fundamental values by one of its own member states.

For the past 13 years, Hungary’s government has launched a barrage of laws aimed to erode its democracy, all while continuing to benefit from EU funds, as well as enriching its cronies through widespread corruption.

There is well-documented evidence that it has privileged granting public contracts to its supporters, diverted EU funds to its associates, subdued the country’s judicial system, undermined media freedom and pluralism, demonised non-governmental groups and criminalised some of their activities, eroded academic freedoms, violated the rights of women, refugees, asylum seekers, LGBTQI+ people and other minorities.

In a scathing resolution voted in January, the European Parliament demanded Article 7 shift to second gear and conclude the "existence of a serious and persistent breach" of fundamental rights inside Hungary. But this new step, which has never been activated, requires a written proposal by the European Commission or one-third of member states.

Attacks on the rule of law in Hungary are systemic and deeply rooted. Not only do they threaten to unravel decades of democratic progress, but they also pose a direct threat to the European Union’s democratic legitimacy and access to the European Single Market. The EU cannot claim to be democratic if one of its own member states persists in violating the democratic values upon which the EU was founded.

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Next 👉 The EU’s response

The EU’s response to these developments has so far failed to deter Hungary from continuing to slide backwards into authoritarianism. Hungary has faced numerous Article 7(1) hearings in the Council of the EU and debates in the European Parliament, which have sought to establish that there is a risk of a “serious and persistent breach” of EU values in Hungary.

Yet no recommendation on this has been issued by the Council for five years and the process remains stuck. Hungary has also been the subject of multiple European Parliament resolutions and been harshly criticised by the European Commission in its various assessments and reports.

The repeated and systemic attacks of the Hungarian government on EU values have led to EU funds being frozen and to Hungary being subject to the EU’s rule of law conditionality mechanism.

In total, Hungary’s actions are under scrutiny by three separate instruments: the horizontal and thematic enabling conditions under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which enables access to Cohesion Policy funding; 27 super milestones under the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Fund, which include measures such as combating corruption and rule of law reforms; and the rule of law conditionality mechanism, which imposes measures to protect the EU budget against breaches of the rule of law.

While Hungary may have undertaken some cosmetic reforms to unblock its EU funds, analysis by our partners in Hungary shows that these fail to address the remedial measures and reforms required.

In fact, the Commission’s own latest assessment is that “despite regular exchanges with Hungary, the Commission considers that Hungary has not addressed the breaches of the principles of the rule of law that led to the adoption of measures by the Council in December 2022 under the budget conditionality mechanism.”

The Commission also determined that Hungary had failed to fulfil the conditions it had proposed and committed to remedy. These breaches are related to public procurement, public interest trusts, prosecutorial action, conflicts of interest and the fight against corruption.

The Commission itself, then, has tacitly recognised that Hungary has undertaken multiple breaches of the principles of the rule of law, and failed to address these adequately. This goes beyond the risk of a “serious and persistent breach” of EU values, as stipulated by Article 7(1).

This is why Article 7(2) proceedings must be initiated. Article 7(2) would mark the first step to determining the existence of such a serious and persistent breach of EU values, as opposed to the mere risk outlined in Article 7(1). Upon confirming such a breach, which has been evident to the European Parliament since at least 2018 —when the Article 7(1) procedure against Hungary was launched—the Member States would be able to proceed to the second step under Article 7(3), potentially resulting in the suspension of specific membership rights to Hungary, including voting rights in the Council.

The last European Council meeting in December once again showcased Hungary’s obstructionist behaviour, including blackmailing the institutions and threatening to veto decisions on key policies. A strong response from Member States, as well as the EU Institutions, to these actions that deliberately undermine the Union’s functioning is now more critical than ever.”

Again in June 2024, EU M E P’s voted overwhelmingly on a resolution calling for Article 7 to be completed against Hungary.

There were the obvious detractors from this vote, primarily from Spain

From Italy and Germany

And other mostly right wing parties, who have sought to rally on russian narratives around the illegal and genocidal war being conducted by Russia in Ukraine.

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Next 👉 What is Article 7 you ask..

What is Article 7 and why is it so important?

Firstly let’s have a quick run through on the ARTICLE 7 process.

‼️ Article 7.1 The preventative mechanism ‼️

In the event of a clear risk of serious breach of EU values, a proposal is made by either the European Parliament, the European Commission, or one-third of EU countries (not including the accused country).

👉 Next - the accused country can respond to the Council of the EU, which can issue recommendations to the country

👉 Next, the EU Parliament approves the recommendations by a two-thirds majority

👉 Next the EU Council votes, four-fifths of the council must decide there is a "clear risk of a serious breach" by the accused country

👉 Next, The Council will "regularly verify" country is still in breach.

👉 The next step is set out in Article 7.2, where a serious and persistent breach of EU values is evident.

👉 Next, a proposal is made by either one-third of EU countries or the European Commission

👉 Next a response is made by the accused country, "submitting its observations"

👉 Next, the EU Parliament must approve by a two-thirds majority

👉 Next, the EU Council must vote unanimously* that there is a "serious and persistent breach" by the accused country

👉 The final step is found under Article 7.3, known as the sanctioning mechanism

👉 THE COUNCIL VOTES (again) by a "qualified majority" to suspend rights of the accused country, including voting rights.

‼️ Next, The accused country remains bound to the principles of the European Union and still has to fulfill all its other duties. They are effectively muted from voting and a say in EU policy and actions. ‼️

Sanctioning Hungary for severe breaches of the principles of the European Union by Hungary under Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, allows for the possibility of suspending European Union (EU) membership rights (such as voting rights in the Council of the European Union).

If a country seriously and persistently breaches the principles on which the EU is founded as defined in Article2 of the Treaty on #EuropeanUnion (respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities). Nevertheless, that country’s membership obligations remain binding.

In accordance with Article 7, on the proposal of one third of EU Member States, or of the European Parliament or of the European Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of four fifths of its members, having obtained the Parliament’s consent, may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach of these fundamental principles by a Member State, and address appropriate recommendations to it.

Article354 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union lays down the voting procedures to be used by the main EU institutions when a Member State faces the application of Article 7. The country in question does not take part in the vote. It is not included in the calculation of the one third of countries required for the proposal or the four fifths required for the majority. Parliament’s consent requires a two-thirds majority.

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Next 👉 The mechanics of invoking Article 7

Read 11 tweets

Beefeater

@Beefeater_Fella

Oct 22

Cuba - a repeating lesson of what Communism offers to humanity. This story has relevancy both to the russian regime and Ukraine, read on to fond out how!

This is a lengthy thread - consider bookmarking the thread and listening to the audio narration at a convenient time for you. Ideal for commuting and bedtime listening! The link to the audio narration is found in the first reply to the last tweet in this thread.

Right let’s crack on!

You may have heard about the catastrophic power failures in Cuba over the past few weeks - this thread explains the context and background, and the inextricable Cuban links back to the Kremlin and the illegal war in Ukraine.

👉 Background:

The trade deal between Russia and Cuba, as part of the broader attempt by nations like Russia and China to build alternative power structures, poses significant implications for both regional and global geopolitics.

This partnership symbolizes Russia's effort to expand its influence into the Western Hemisphere, specifically just 90 miles from the United States, representing a strategic and symbolic challenge to U.S. dominance in the region.

This comes at a time when several Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, Mexico, and Brazil, are increasingly pursuing foreign policy agendas independent of U.S. influence, creating openings for powers like Russia to make inroads.

From a geopolitical perspective, Russia's deal with Cuba provides it with an economic and potentially political foothold close to U.S. territory, which could become a platform for further outreach to Latin America. Russia is likely hoping that by offering economic alternatives to countries suffering from U.S. sanctions or strained relations with the West, it can pull more nations into its sphere of influence.

Cuba, isolated by decades of U.S. sanctions, may view this deal as a lifeline to bypass U.S. economic restrictions and expand its trade options.

For Cuba, this alignment with Russia may come at significant cost. Economically, while Russia’s presence might bring short-term benefits, such as investments and access to Russian markets, it is unlikely to solve Cuba's deep-seated economic crisis.

The deal risks increasing inequalities on the island, especially as Russian officials and tourists gain privileged access to resources and property that ordinary Cubans cannot enjoy. This has the potential to stoke social discontent, which has already flared in recent years due to food shortages and power blackouts.

The 2021 protests in Cuba revealed the fragility of the regime and the growing frustration of the population with the government's inability to address economic hardship.

Furthermore, Cuba’s closer ties to Russia may complicate any future rapprochement with the United States and Europe. U.S. policy toward Cuba has oscillated between isolation and cautious engagement, with the Biden administration taking a more critical stance amid Cuba's political and economic crises.

The closer Cuba gets to Russia, the less likely the U.S. will be to consider lifting sanctions or easing restrictions, making it harder for Cuba to diversify its economic partners.

European nations, which might have considered deepening trade with Cuba under more favorable conditions, may also be deterred by Cuba’s alignment with Russia, given Europe’s own sanctions against Russia and its desire to limit Moscow’s global influence.

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Next 👉 Russian expansion into Cuba

Russia’s expansion into Cuba, however, reflects a broader trend of authoritarian regimes consolidating power and forming alliances that shield them from Western pressure.

By reinforcing one another, these nations are less incentivized to adhere to democratic norms or respect human rights, exacerbating global tensions between democratic and authoritarian powers.

While Russia gains a strategic outpost in Cuba, the Cuban regime benefits from an economic lifeline that reduces the pressure for domestic reforms. This creates a cycle where both nations are insulated from external demands for political liberalization, further entrenching authoritarianism.

Despite the potential economic gains from this deal, Cuba remains at a disadvantage. Russia, already facing economic strains due to sanctions and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, may not be able to fulfill its commitments or offer sustained support to Cuba.

This creates the risk that Cuba could be left without meaningful economic relief, while sacrificing potential improvements in relations with the West. The human cost for Cuba could be significant, as its population continues to suffer from a lack of basic necessities and an increasingly unequal society, while the government prioritizes foreign partnerships over domestic reforms.

In conclusion, while Russia's deal with Cuba strengthens both regimes in the short term, it also heightens geopolitical tensions and risks deepening social and economic inequalities within Cuba.

It challenges the U.S. and the West's ability to influence outcomes in the region and signals a broader trend of authoritarian powers working together to bypass Western sanctions and democratic pressures. The long-term stability of this relationship, however, remains uncertain, especially given the fragility of both Russia's and Cuba's economies.

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Next 👉 Cuba and Russia - the corrupt regime marriage:

👉 Cuba and Russia - the corrupt regime marriage:

Without covering a long and complex history of the Cuban and Russian relationship and their attempts to poke the side on the US, let’s fast forward to recent events.

In mid-May 2023, Cuban and Russian leaders released a new plan meant to aid the faltering economies of each country. Cuba is promising Russia preferential treatment in accessing Cuban property, markets, and labor, rarely given out to foreign actors within the borders of the island.

In a move almost unheard of for Cuba, the government promised Russia an exemption from its import taxes. It also has allowed Russian companies to use Cuban land for at least 30 years, which comes as Cuban citizens only have recently been given limited property rights.

These companies will have access to more land than Cuban private citizens and companies have had since 1959. They will have more favorable conditions of ownership with lower costs and fewer regulations. Cuba and Russia are looking into ways to expedite shipping between the nations, which is currently difficult. They aim to mirror maritime structures that Russian officials say existed between Cuba and the Soviet Union prior to the latter’s collapse.

Alongside these trade agreements, Russia is positioning Cuba as a resort nation for Russians looking to travel to the tropics. They are aiming to develop and advertise the poverty-ridden areas around Havana as a playground for tourists similar to the tourist villa of Varadero, inaccessible to most Cubans.

Cuba and Russia are moving to create a joint rum company, which would boost Cuba’s flagging rum exports. Russia is also providing financial resources and expertise to build a steel mill to aid lagging construction across the island.

Additionally, Russia is supplying more wheat and oil to Cuba, which has struggled to provide food and consistent energy supplies to even urban areas, especially to those lowest in income. As the island has been rocked by storms, citizens are repeatedly left without power for days.

Cuba recently has tightened its rationing system, including eliminating chicken allowances. Rationing has driven widespread discontent across the island and contributed to record emigration rates. Cuban officials hope these imports, and steel that may feed construction, may keep more people on the island.

While these moves seem to put Cuba on the path to greater self-reliance, they may put the small island nation under the grip of Russia as it aims to build a rival axis of power to the United States. The long-term infusion of resources into the island gives Russia the potential to withdraw these same resources.

If Cuba continues to grow more dependent on Russia, it will simultaneously have to grow more loyal to the superpower to maintain access to its goods. At most risk of economic pain are the Cubans who would be employed by these projects. Their employment comes at the whims of Russian leaders, whose choice of investment could change as global sanctions do.

If Russia, for any reason, chooses to pull its companies, tourists, or imports from the nation, the jobs from the “Rusmarket” will collapse. This Rusmarket is a market for various Russian goods planned for Cuba specifically. Governments from each nation hope that the implementation of the Rusmarket will spur development in each nation and fill the gap left by Cuba’s ailing rationing system.

These projects seem to promise the enrichment of Cuban government officials, as most of these projects will be state-owned or run on the Cuban side, such as imports of wheat to Alimport from Russia’s Prodintorg. These officials, however, are not at risk for poverty if these projects go south.

Average Cubans, who would provide the labor for these officials or rely on the goods from this deal, seem to be at the most individual risk.

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Next 👉

Read 14 tweets

Beefeater

@Beefeater_Fella

Oct 19

BRICS foundations are laid in economic and cultural rift sands. A collection of flawed alliances?

This thread is lengthy - why dont you consider listen to the Audio narration as a podcast on your device, ideal for computing and bedtime story time 😎 The link to the narration is found in the First Reply, to the Final Tweet in this thread.

What is BRICS?

The acronym BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) was coined in 2001 by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill to designate these four countries as attractive investment destinations, riding on a wave of enthusiasm about the prospects of emerging markets.

In 2006, the four countries’ foreign ministers met on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York to formalize the group known as BRIC. In 2009, the first summit of leaders took place, followed by annual meetings ever since. In 2010, the group was expanded to include South Africa—becoming BRICS.

The BRICS group was organized around the goal of enhancing consultation and coordination between the five major developing countries to change the current Western-led world order into a multipolar system where developing countries have more influence, commensurate with their shares of the global economy.

Despite the five members’ divergent economic trajectories in the years since—with China and India having grown impressively while the other three saw weak growth—the BRICS group has made significant progress.

However, the original logic that O’Neil asserted would bring the BRICS together—a common experience in sustained economic growth—hasn’t held. Brazil, Russia, and South Africa have fallen short of growth expectations, and while India has enjoyed stronger performance, it hasn’t kept pace with China.

Instead, the BRICS alliance has slowly evolved into a largely geopolitical coalition that aims to advance an agenda and approach to world affairs that is distinct from the Western-dominated G7.

Nowhere is that distinctive approach more obvious than with respect to Russia’s war with Ukraine. None of the BRICS has supported sanctions on Russia. In fact, members including India and China have used Western-led boycotts of Russian energy to secure cheaper oil, gas, and other commodities for themselves.

Failed expectations, differing views on the region and more importantly - a reluctance to pick sides in the competition between China and the US – and to aggravate Russia – have sent them on diverging paths. That said, they are pursuing multi-alignment rather than seeking a break with the Western powers that remain central to their security and prosperity.

BRICS will not solve their fundamental security, or even economic, challenges. These Middle Eastern powers will bring both simmering rivalries and high expectations to the BRICS grouping, but also will not be keen to antagonise Russia, and above all China and India. This guarantees complex, and at times awkward, statecraft in coming years.

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Next 👉 BRICS makeup

👉 BRICS makeup:

Together, BRICS countries have 3.24 billion inhabitants—or 41 percent of the world population—and a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of $26 trillion, or 60 percent of the G7 countries’ combined GDP. However, on a purchasing power parity basis, BRICS countries’ GDP accounts for 31.5 percent of the global economy, overtaking the G7 share of 30.4 percent.

Despite this, BRICS countries get only 15 percent of the voting power at the International Monetary Fund—a source of developing countries’ discontent over the governance of international financial institutions.

Russia was the first to call a convening of the four countries, a decision analysts say was driven by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s growing desire to create a counterweight to the West. Russia hosted the first official BRIC summit in 2009, and South Africa joined a year later by invitation from China, forming the five-country grouping that would persist for more than a decade.

In August 2023, at the 15th BRICS Summit, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa announced that 6 emerging market group countries (Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) had been invited to join the bloc. Full membership was scheduled to take effect on 1 January 2024.

However, the Argentine general election in November 2023 led to a change in president to Javier Milei, who had committed to withdraw the country's membership application. On 30 November 2023, incoming Foreign Minister of Argentina Diana Mondino confirmed that Argentina would not join the BRICS.

On 29 December 2023 the Government of Argentina sent a letter to all BRICS leaders to officially announce its withdrawal from the application process.

Saudi Arabia did not join BRICS at the start of 2024 as had been planned, and they announced in mid-January that they were still considering the matter. The matter is still under consideration.

👉 BRICS offering of an alternate financial system:

BRIC’s NRB and Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) are meant to mimic the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), respectively. BRICS members hope that alternative lending institutions can invigorate South-South cooperation and reduce dependence on traditional funding sources.

The NDB and the CRA were designed as an alternative to the so-called Bretton Woods arrangement, the mainstream global financial system founded by leading industrial countries in the aftermath of World War II.

Many countries of the Global South believe those institutions, especially the World Bank and the IMF, are failing to meet the needs of poorer nations, especially in areas such as climate financing.

The CRA, a common fund among the BRICS central banks that offers support during a currency crisis, is limited to BRICS countries, while in 2021 the NDB opened to private projects in other emerging-market countries.

The NDB offers loans, guarantees, and other financial mechanisms to support private projects that contribute to sustainable development and building out infrastructure. It is intended to offer more flexibility, greater equality among shareholders, and easier access to funds than the World Bank, which must share its attention across 190 members.

Its lending focuses on clean energy, transportation, sanitation, and social development, and it has sought to devote 40 percent of its projects to tackling climate change. To date, the bank has approved more than $32 billion for ninety-six projects since operations began in 2016.

However, those efforts face roadblocks. The NDB is more than five times smaller than the World Bank, and experts doubt it could completely replace it. Others contend that its ambitions to redesign the global financial system have fallen short as it maintains many of the practices of its competitors. It has also faced criticism for vague commitments on environmental and social impact standards.

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Next 👉 Can a BRICS currency replace the dollar?

👉 Can a BRICS currency replace the dollar?

The BRICS countries have sought to reduce the primacy of the U.S. dollar in international trade for more than a decade, primarily by increasing the use of their own currencies for trading, especially China’s renminbi.

There is also a push to introduce a new, BRICS-wide currency, of which Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is a major proponent.

Other monetary proposals laid out at the 2023 summit included founding a new cryptocurrency or using a combined basket of BRICS currencies.

A BRICS currency would require major political compromises, including a banking union, a fiscal union, and general macroeconomic convergence. The dollar, long the world’s principal reserve currency, is still used in more than 80 percent of global trade, and many experts doubt that a new BRICS reserve currency would be stable or reliable enough to be widely trusted for global transactions.

Another key factor limiting BRICS local currency use is that most of the global commodity trade is priced and settled in dollars. This inherently bolsters the importance of the dollar in commodity-dependent economies, such as Argentina, Brazil, Ethiopia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Indeed, the UAE and Saudi Arabia peg their respective currencies to the dollar.

At an August 2023 BRICS summit where Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were invited to join the bloc, frustrations with the dollar were an important topic of conversation. Participants discussed how to make BRICS local currencies’ use in commerce and finance within and between emerging markets more attractive than the dollar’s use—in other words, how to dedollarize.

For over a decade, such ambitions have been a focus of BRICS policymakers. Yet, today, the vast majority of cross-border transactions involving BRICS members and other emerging markets continue to be invoiced in dollars. Exchanging BRICS members’ and recent invitees’ local currencies with each other and with other emerging market currencies often requires using the dollar as an intermediary to be done efficiently, and a large share of public and private debt in these economies is dollar denominated.

In short, dedollarization faces serious headwinds. Will expanded BRICS membership and a renewed focus by BRICS members on increasing local currency usage change this dynamic? BRICS finance ministers and central bankers were tasked at the August 2023 summit with considering the issues of local currencies’ use and payments infrastructure and to report back this years session currently underway.

The Iranian government still has the potential to boost its oil and non-oil exports to BRICS members using the Chinese yuan, local currencies, and barter arrangements. This strategy could mitigate a substantial portion of the pressure stemming from U.S. sanctions.

The influence of the Chinese yuan might grow, especially considering that five nations that will be in BRICS —Argentina, Brazil, Iran, Russia, and Saudi Arabia—already include yuan in their payments. Nonetheless, economists indicate that the U.S. dollar will likely maintain its dominance among the BRICS countries.

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Next 👉 Analysing the current and rising differences

Read 14 tweets

Beefeater

@Beefeater_Fella

Oct 17

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktator Orbán has said he’s terrified by the contents of Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky’s victory plan for the defeating Russia.Perhaps an indication he realises when (not if) Putin falls, his pro-russian and pro-chinese world will collapse on him - exposing his deceit and corruption for the world to see?

He is actually afraid of Ukraine’s victory.

“I am one of those who urge the European Union to change its current strategy. The European Union went into this war with a badly organized, badly executed, badly calculated strategy, for which the president of the Commission bears the main responsibility,” Orbán wrote, referring to Ursula von der Leyen.

“We are losing this war, so the strategy is not working. But this does not mean that we need more war, more dangerous and long-range weapons — it means that we need to change from a war strategy to a peace strategy. We need a cease-fire and peace talks!”

The Victator Orbán claimed that the EU, which has been providing Kiev with weapons and funds, has approached the conflict between Russia and Ukraine “with a poorly organized, poorly executed, poorly calculated strategy”.

“This does not mean that we need more wars, more dangerous weapons, and long-range weapons, but that we need to switch from a war strategy to a peace strategy. We need a ceasefire and peace talks,” Orbán wrote. He also muttered during a meeting of EU leaders in Brussels on October 17, 2024 - that he would urge German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and French President Emmanuel Macron to “start negotiating with the Russians as soon as possible on behalf of the entire EU.”

Viktor Orbán’s pro-Russian stance represents a significant challenge within the European Union, particularly in relation to its unified position on the war in Ukraine. Hungary has been blocking the transfer of €6.6 billion in military aid to Ukraine, a move that has frustrated many EU leaders, including Josep Borrell, the EU's chief diplomat.

This ongoing blockade, lasting over a year, reveals a divergence between Hungary and the broader EU approach to the conflict, which is largely characterized by support for Ukraine against Russia's invasion.

Orbán has long pursued closer ties with Russia, even before the war in Ukraine. Hungary's reliance on Russian energy, particularly natural gas, has shaped this stance.

Orbán has consistently defended his country's need for energy security, positioning Hungary as more accommodating to Moscow compared to other EU member states. His government has also cooperated with Russia on projects like the Paks nuclear plant, further entrenching these ties.

Throughout the conflict, Orbán has criticized the EU's sanctions regime against Russia, arguing that sanctions harm European economies more than they hurt Russia. He has frequently framed Hungary’s opposition to military and economic support for Ukraine as a matter of national interest, focusing on domestic economic stability and energy security.

Orbán's stance puts him at odds with EU leaders who are committed to a unified front against Russian aggression. Leaders like Borrell have emphasized the importance of providing military and financial support to Ukraine to defend against Russia’s invasion.

The European Peace Facility (EPF), the fund Hungary is blocking, is an off-budget mechanism designed to support the EU's foreign and defense policies, particularly through military assistance to Ukraine.

Orbán’s stance also undermines broader EU strategies aimed at isolating Russia diplomatically and economically. His reluctance to fall in line with the EU's consensus damages the bloc's credibility and unity.

By keeping the €6.6 billion blocked, Hungary is seen as impeding Ukraine's ability to defend itself, which raises tensions within the EU and between Hungary and Ukraine.

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Next 👉 Domestic considerations: State Capture and the right wing.

Domestic Considerations:

Orbán’s pro-Russian stance can be understood in the context of his domestic state capture and corruption. If you are interested in learning more about this, see my thread here 👇

x.com/beefeater_fell…

Orbán masquerades as a nationalist leader who resists foreign interference and prioritizes his own survival, masquarading as Hungary's “interests” above all.

By taking a contrarian position within the EU, Orbán appeals to a segment of his right wing electorate that views the EU with suspicion and values national sovereignty. Geopolitically, Orbán's stance has alienated Hungary from some of its traditional partners in the EU and NATO, but it has also allowed him to cultivate a unique role for Hungary as a "mediator" of sorts between East and West.

This positioning could allow Orbán to leverage Hungary’s strategic importance, both within the EU and in its relations with Russia, to extract concessions or achieve favorable deals for his country.

⚠️ EU’s Response and Potential Consequences:

While EU leaders are frustrated by Orbán’s stance, their frustrations of own their own making in their collective failure to complete the Article 7 process and sanctions, under the stewardship of Von der Leyden.

Hungary has previously faced threats of sanctions and reductions in EU funds due to its democratic backsliding and rule of law violations, but Orbán has been as adept at navigating these challenges - as the EU has been inept at sanctioning Orbán using Article 7, the net result is a moral and political victory for his right wing domestic political support.

Continued obstruction of Ukraine’s aid could result in more tangible consequences for Hungary. Other member states could push for financial penalties or explore ways to bypass Hungary's veto power within the EPF.

Additionally, as the war in Ukraine drags on, Hungary’s close ties to Russia may further isolate Orbán within the EU, limiting Hungary's influence in future negotiations on a variety of policy issues.

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Next 👉 Reminder of existing sanctions levied on Orbán’s regime

⚠️ As a reminder of existing fines imposed on Hungary ⚠️

The European Commission said at the begining of October, 2024 - that it is suing Hungary over a law that imposes jail terms on groups receiving foreign funds for political causes, which rights organizations argue is designed to silence government critics.

The law, referred to as the "Defence of Sovereignty" law, grants the Hungarian state the authority to investigate foreign-funded organizations.

The European Commission has challenged this law in the EU's top court. A Hungarian "Defence of Sovereignty" law allowing the state to investigate foreign-funded organizations is being challenged in the European Union's top court by the European Commission, the EU executive announced on Thursday (3 October).

The procedure for the Commission to challenge national laws that it believes violate EU law always begins with a complicated and bureaucratic back-and-forth between Brussels and the government concerned, which usually resolves disputes before they get to court.

Such infringement proceedings are extremely common - every single EU country faces them - so much so that the Commission publishes them in huge batches every month.

But if the Commission believes its concerns are not being addressed, it can ultimately file a complaint in the Court of Justice of the European Union, which is the bloc's highest court. If the Court of Justice finds that Budapest has violated EU law, it can issue a fine. In June, the Court fined Hungary over its handling of migrants and asylum seekers.

In June 2024 Hungary was ordered to pay a €200m (£169m) fine for its refusal to uphold the rights of asylum seekers in what was described as an “unprecedented” breach of EU law by the bloc’s highest court.

The European court of justice in Luxembourg also ordered Budapest to pay €1m a day until it complies with EU laws guaranteeing refugees the right to claim asylum inside Hungarian borders.

The judgment relates to a 2020 ruling that found Hungary had broken EU migration law by limiting the rights of refugees and migrants to claim asylum in numerous ways, including by holding asylum seekers in transit camps at Röszke and Tompa on its border with Serbia.

Hungary closed the container camps and argued it had complied with the ruling. In 2020 it passed a law requiring asylum seekers to make a “declaration of intent” at a Hungarian embassy in a non-EU country before entering the country. As a result, almost no one can claim asylum in Hungary: authorities received just 30 applications in 2023. In comparison, Cyprus, with a population 10 times smaller, received 12,000 applications that year, according to the EU Agency for Asylum.

Viktator Orbán’s pro-Russian stance, exemplified by his blocking of military aid to Ukraine, highlights the fractures within the EU over its response to the war.

Orbán's position is driven by a combination of energy dependence on Russia, domestic political calculations, and a broader vision of Hungary’s sovereignty. However, this stance has deepened tensions with EU leaders and risks further isolating Hungary in the long term, as the rest of the EU moves to increase support for Ukraine and counter Russian influence.

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