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Mar 2, 2023 11 tweets 5 min read Read on X
1/8 Russian Oligarch Files: Roman #Abramovich

A morally #corrupt high-profile Russian billionaires because of the success of football club Chelsea FC, Roman Abramovich was sanctioned later than some others, because he is less obviously influential than other #Putin allies. Image
2/8 His influence in the Kremlin is limited, he is more #Putin ‘s bitch than his friend, but is tolerated by Mr Putin (as long as he pays). Abramovich has made corrupted money out of the relationship, through #putin awarding him contracts for the #FIFA 2018 World Cup in Russia. Image
3/8 #Abramovich denies having close ties to Mr Putin or the Kremlin, but the UK portion of his estimated $12.4bn fortune is now frozen. At the start of the war he was forced to put Chelsea up for sale for £3bn. and his £150m house in London's Kensington Palace Gardens in London. Image
4/8 #Abramovich profited off Russians in the 1990’ during Boris Yeltsin's presidency, buying the oil company Sibneft at a corrupt undervaluation. His assets include the third-longest yacht in the world, Eclipse and another mega-yacht, Solaris. Image
5/6 In 2018 he did not renew his UK visa, and has instead been using his newly acquired #Israeli passport to travel.

#Abramovich is now he is banned from entering the UK, and is stuck in #Russia and #Israel for the rest of his corrupt life. Image
This is a summary of a detailed report from the BBC - it is available on this link: Russia oligarchs: The mega-rich men facing global sanctions bbc.co.uk/news/uk-605930…
An excerpt from an investigation into the corrupt awarding of #Portugese citizenship:

Usually, as Portugal’s citizenship application portal makes explicit, candidates can expect to wait 24 to 29 months, but Abramovich waited only nine weeks from the February date the Porto board flagged his application for Lurdes Serrano to the time he was granted a “naturalized citizen birth certificate” on April 30. A few weeks later, Lurdes Serrano confirmed to the board that Abramovich’s citizenship had been granted: “I inform you that the respective nationality registration has already been carried out.”

A rare surviving billionaire from Russia’s “gangster capitalism” era who still retained a direct line to Vladimir Putin now possessed EU citizenship. Even his own local lawyer told VF she had been “surprised” at the speed. In response to questions from VF, the Portuguese government agency that oversees that central registry office said “disciplinary procedures” were ongoing.

It was ultimately Alexei Navalny—the Russian opposition leader currently in a Siberian jail—who directed global attention to Abramovich’s citizenship in December 2021, shortly after the Portuguese press first confirmed it. He criticized Portuguese authorities for “carrying suitcases of money” and wrote on his Twitter account that the oligarch had “finally managed to find a country where you can give some bribes and make some semi-official and official payments to end up in the EU.” Santos Silva, the Portuguese foreign minister who back in 2020 had advocated for changes to the law, pushed back against Navalny’s claims in a press conference.

“The idea that Portuguese public sector employees carry suitcases of money is insulting,” Santos Silva said, insisting the allegation was “not true. And as we all know, when criticism has no basis, it also has no pertinence.” (VF has seen no evidence that Porto’s board members or civil servants working in the Conservatória dos Registos Centrais received any payment beyond the standard processing fee.)

A spokesperson clarified to VF that Santos Silva had not meant to imply that Abramovich’s application procedure was legal, however; around the time of Litvak’s arrest in March last year, Santos Silva asserted that action was needed to keep the law from being “manipulated”—pervertida. The Portuguese government, meanwhile, has acknowledged that Abramovich will not lose his nationality as a result of EU sanctions, nor can he be prevented from visiting Portugal (barring an extraordinary outcome from the Litvak investigation).

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More from @Beefeater_Fella

Jul 21
The Russian shadow fleet, also known as the ‘dark fleet,’ poses serious maritime security and environmental risks. The vessels are often old and unsafe, engaging in dangerous and deceptive shipping practices such as turning off location tracking systems, which flouts international maritime standards and increases the likelihood of catastrophic incidents.

The ‘shadow fleet’ comprises ships engaged in illegal operations for the purposes of circumventing sanctions, evading compliance with safety or environmental regulations, avoiding insurance costs or engaging in other illegal activities.

Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ poses a threat to our nations and others who depend on the world’s seas and oceans. Many ships in this ‘shadow fleet’ are uninsured and poorly maintained. Many engage in activities which violate basic safety and environmental standards and regulations.

The shadow fleet, comprising around 600 vessels or 10% of the global “wet cargo” fleet, transports approximately 1.7 million barrels of oil daily, significantly funding Russia’s war efforts. Some ships may also serve as Russian listening stations or transport weaponry to Russia.

Remember this! The shadow fleet wasn’t purpose built. Approximately 600 vessels in the shadow fleet were sold to Russia primarily by the Greek shipping Oligarchs, who enriched themselves with $Billions, selling their ageing tankers to Russia for the intended purpose of moving russian oil above the price cap.

The average age of shadow fleet vessels in roughly 15 years, of a 20 year life expectancy. Not a single Greek oligarch has been brought to account for selling their vessels to the russians via shell companies and intermediary organisations - making it very difficult to bring a case against the Greek oligarchs, beside which - the sale of vessels to russia was not specifically sanctioned and one might argue they have operated within the law.

The UK reacts in July 2024 - targeting the shadow fleet:

In July the Uk Goverment under Keir Starmer, said they were determined to address the risks that the ‘shadow fleet’ poses to the environment, maritime safety and security in Europe and beyond, the integrity of international seaborne trade, and respect for international maritime law. The UK Government released a statement on 19 July 2024, saying:

“We call on flag States to ensure that ships flying their flag adhere to highest possible safety and pollution prevention requirements and best practices, including those contained within relevant IMO conventions and resolutions.

We call on port States to ensure the enforcement of the safety and liability conventions on these ships, including those that relate to ship-to-ship transfer operations and the requirement to have on board valid State certificates of insurance.

We urge ship owners and operators, the marine insurance industry, ship brokers and other relevant maritime stakeholders to adhere to their relevant obligations, and support the prevention, detection and reporting of ‘shadow fleet’ activities.

We encourage IMO Member States to keep under close review the risks posed by the ‘shadow fleet’ and take further collective action at the IMO to address those risks.

We have agreed to share information on the practices and operations of the ‘shadow fleet’, to coordinate our responses to the risks posed by its ships and facilitators, and to work with the private sector and other maritime stakeholders to address the threat.“

Keir Starmer said in a statement: ““Russia’s incremental gains on the battlefield are nothing compared with the collective international support for Ukraine or the strength of ties between our people.

And alongside our European partners, we have sent a clear message to those enabling Putin’s attempts to evade sanctions: we will not allow Russia’s shadow fleet, and the dirty money it generates, to flow freely through European waters and put our security at risk,”, 19 July 2024.

1/7
Next 👉 Countries signed up to thisImage
This ‘Call to Action’ has been endorsed by:

Albania
Andorra
Austria
Belgium
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Czechia
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Kosovo
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Moldova
Monaco
Montenegro
Netherlands
North Macedonia
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
San Marino
Serbia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Ukraine
United Kingdom
The European Union

2/7
Next 👉 What does this mean in practice though?
What does this mean in practice though?

Speaking at the European Political Community summit today he called on the 44 European Countries and the European Union to “tackle the use of illegitimate vessels which also pose significant security and environmental threats to European waterways.”

The UK repeated allegations that some of the ships are doubling as “Russian listening stations,” while they said others are believed to be transporting weapons.

Legal changes in the UK in May 2024 made it possible for the first time to directly sanction tankers as opposed to companies. The former Prime Minister Rishi Sunak’s government imposed the first sanctions in June targeting four Russian tankers. The Financial Times calculates the U.S. has imposed sanctions on 42 tankers while the EU sanctioned 17 vessels in June.

👉 The Challenges Ahead and questions unanswered:

Here are some of the challenges that lie ahead in implementing a crackdown on the shadow fleet.

💥 Shadow tankers often have their trackers turned off. Many of the ships have their AIS turned off, or are proven to be spoofing their locations which is dangerous and illegal. Some of the world’s biggest tankers trade their oil daily - spoofing the AIS system to show the ship in another location on ship trackers. Will there be a crackdown on this?

💥 Shadow tankers meet in popular ship to ship transfer dogging spots - often within a stones throw of the Greek coastline at Lakonikos, as I set out in this thread:

💥 Shadow vessels do not only transport oil - they are also involved in shipping arms, ammunition and stolen grain. Will this crackdown be extended to stolen grain? SO far all the bluster and speeches from Keir Starmer are limited to oil transportation only?. see my thread here for an example:

💥 Blacklisted Sovcomflot has become a symbol of the shadow fleet that deploys a wide variety of deceptive practices to beat sanctions. For instance, Sovcomflot has established a subsidiary called Sun Ship Management in Dubai that controls some of its fleet and, as mentioned above, it is busily reflagging other ships in Gabon.

💥 What actions will be taken - and against whom, when the shadow fleet causes a major maritime disaster? I wrote a thread on this here :

💥 The easy workarounds for oil price cap evasion; the cap only applies to russian crude and refined oil transported at sea by vessels, insured / owned or registered in countries of the G7, EU and Norway. As none of the shadow fleet fill none fo the criteria, they are free to ship oil from russia to customers such as China / India etc.

But as these ships are rarely used to transport the oil to the end destination, as they transfer the cargo to registered ships in a cloak and dagger ship top ship transfer operation - and once the oil is transferred, it is difficult to prove where that oil has originated from. At least it’s difficult when no controls are in place.

So what controls can be implemented to stop this ship to ship transfer and blending with other oil to make it untraceable? Will the banning un-authorised ship to ship transfers is a starting point? If cargo does need to be transferred for legitimate reasons, it should be done only under supervision of an authorised country?

If that were implemented, the assumption could be drawn that any unauthorised transfers at sea would be deemed illegal ?

Ownership of vessels needs to be tightly regulated - and this means the ending of dubious flag origins, from countries such as Gabon (and many others), who are simply conduits for criminal organisations and illegal vessels - allowing the ownership of vessels to be hidden through shell companies.

Keep it simple, no more dodgy flag operators, and clear vessel ownership - as every country expects with say motor vehicles using public roads?

3/7
Next 👉 Flags of convenience..

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Read 10 tweets
Jul 20
Viktor Orbán-led government with serious rule-of-law deficits and worryingly close ties to the Kremlin, Hungary is a prime example of how Putin leverages political influence over EU countries and weakens support for Ukraine using gas and oil price and upply manipulation.

Remember in April 2022 - two months after Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine when Vatnik Orban of Hungary broke ranks with the European Union, saying it will accept Moscow's demand that gas supplies be paid for in rubles?

Vatnik Orban opposed any EU sanctions on Russian oil and gas or Western arms shipments through Hungarian territory to Ukraine, told journalists on April 6 that he had agreed with Russian President Vladimir Putin that if asked, Hungary would pay for gas shipments using the Russian currency.

The EU has said it wouldn’t abide by Russia's demand as it was a breach of contract since payment was agreed upon in euros.

Earlier April 6, 2022 - Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto said gas contracts were between his country and Russia, and that the EU had "no role" to play in the deal. This is the same muppet who now whines about Russia cutting off oil supply to Hungary in July 2024

The EU warned Hungary in 2022 that while the EU has yet to apply any sanctions on oil or gas from Russia, though European Council chief Charles Michel said on April 6 that measures on the sector will be needed "sooner or later." Yet 2 years later Hungary has increased it’s dependency on russian gas and not made any effort to diversify or build LNG infrastructure - choosing instead to ignore the EU warnings and temporary dispensation granted when the initial sanctions and oil caps were introduced.

With Lukoil cutting piped oil supply off to Hungary in July 2024 - vatnik Peter Szijjarto should pay attention to current EU arbitration cases that could soon see the ending of Russian gas supply to Hungary. Buying russian gas through a dubious intermediary, Turkey - will also draw the EU’s attention and action to block this as a sanctions circumvention.

Reported in June 2024, “Ongoing court cases could lead to the cessation of gas deliveries from the Russian company to the Hungarian state gas provider, as Gazprom would not have access to the payments initiated by MVM.

The Hungarian government aims to prevent this potential disruption with the decree issued on Thursday, ensuring that EU-appointed executors cannot seize payments made by MVM to Gazprom.

Orban’s government stated that the decree is intended to guarantee Hungary’s uninterrupted gas supply and maintain economic and social order.

The statement specifies that “the counter value of natural gas to be paid to the contractual partner cannot be seized or enforced to secure or satisfy the claims of a third party due to its conflict with Hungarian public order.”

The decree follows several European companies winning cases against Gazprom, resulting in claims against the Russian company.

If these claims were enforced, payments initiated by companies in contract with Gazprom could be seized, potentially cutting off MVM from the Russian gas supply. This would jeopardise the long-term gas transport contract signed in 2021 for 15 years.”

Reuters reported on 06 June 2024, “ Hungary signalled on Thursday it had no plans to abandon natural gas imports from Russia and sought to deepen business ties with Moscow in non-sanctioned areas, triggering a strong rebuke from Washington over its "dangerous addiction" to Russian energy.

A day after Hungary, which gets most of its energy from Russia, announced a deal to acquire a 5% stake in Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz gas field, its foreign minister travelled to Russia to affirm energy ties with the Kremlin.

1/2
Next 👉 Warning tho Hungary; Vatnik Orban is walking the country into Energy ArmageddonImage
WARNING TO HUNGARY:

Orban is putting Hungarian energy supply into a great jeopardy. In it’s quest for circumventing sanctions and as it’s gas sources as it nears the end of a deal that brings the country around 4.5 billion cubic meters of Russian gas each year via Ukrainian pipelines, Orban struck a deal with Turkey for russian gas supply earlier this year.

In April 2024 Hungary received the first gas deliveries via a new agreement with Turkey, according to Hungary's foreign minister, Péter Szijjártó.

Turkey's gas deal with Hungary is not the vatnik vaunted energy lifeline — it is just a new backdoor for Russia to re-establish its grip on Europe's power systems.

2/2
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Read 5 tweets
Jul 18
Ukraine Drone strikes on refineries - they are working in ways not previously imagined.

Just to refresh you - earlier this year there was concern expressed by some countries including the US, that hitting russian refineries would cause a spike in oil prices ad destabilise the global markets.

I wrote an argument supporting the drone strikes and the effects on March 21st 2024, please see the thread here 👉

In this thread I set out that when a significant portion of Russia’s refinery capacity is disabled by these attacks, the volume of excess crude oil that would normally be processed at refineries will increase sharply. Russia does not have the capacity to store a lot of Crude oil and currently it is approaching maximum capacity of storage.

If the crude cannot be sold abroad for a steep discount, then Russia will find itself in a paradoxical position, with a shortage of refined fuel for it’s own market, yet the country will have an excess of oil.

The next day the FT ran an article - that has not aged well..

On the 22nd March 2024 - the FT reported “The US has urged Ukraine to halt attacks on Russia’s energy infrastructure, warning that the drone strikes risk driving up global oil prices and provoking retaliation, according to three people familiar with the discussions.

The repeated warnings from Washington were delivered to senior officials at Ukraine’s state security service, the SBU, and its military intelligence directorate, known as the GUR, the people told the Financial Times. Both intelligence units have steadily expanded their own drone programmes to strike Russian targets on land, sea and in the air since the start of the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.”

Fast forward a few months and many refinery strikes later..

1/
Next 👉 The Centre of Eastern Studies study on refinery strikesImage
The Centre of Eastern Studies published a view on the consequences of Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries.

Ukrainian drone strikes on refinery facilities inside Russia have dealt a significant blow to the Russian fuel sector. During the first four months of 2024, the Ukrainian forces attacked more than a dozen refineries; damage of varying degrees was reported at eight of these. As a result, Russian plants temporarily shut down some of their processing capacity, which led to a drop in fuel production.

Despite the US administration’s fears that the global oil and fuel market could be destabilised, the price dynamic for both categories of commodities to date does not suggest that the Ukrainian strikes have driven prices up. On the contrary, the need to reduce processing and the impossibility of storing crude have forced Russian exporters to increase exports. At the same time, the refinery shutdowns have driven down sales of petroleum products abroad, resulting in losses primarily for Russian companies.

The Ukrainian attacks and the resulting drop in fuel production have created a number of challenges for the Kremlin, including the need to deal with logistical tensions, strengthen air defence and increase imports of petroleum products. Given the political importance of fuel availability, reduced processing has forced the Russian government to use tools of intervention in order to ensure that the market is adequately saturated. For example, it has forced the fuel sector to redirect supplies onto the domestic market at the expense of the foreign markets. Should the Ukrainian strikes continue and cause more temporary shutdowns at refineries, the government will probably have to step up its intervention, and that will generate costs for the state and may lead to market imbalances.

The scale of the destruction

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian side has conducted strikes against facilities associated with Russia’s oil and fuel sector, including fuel depots, pipeline infrastructure and refining plants. As of last autumn, Ukraine has stepped up its attacks on refineries and expanded the range of its drone strikes. It has carried out a series of successful attacks on plants in European Russia: eight of these facilities have suffered damage that forced them to shut down some of their processing capacity. The most extensive damage was reported last March.

On April 8th 2024 - Reuters reported “MOSCOW, April 8 (Reuters) - Russia has asked Kazakhstan to stand ready to supply it with 100,000 tons of gasoline in case of shortages exacerbated by Ukrainian drone attacks and outages, three industry sources told Reuters.

As a result of these attacks, some of the country’s refining capacity has been shut down. Depending on estimates, primary oil processing has fallen by 500,000–900,000 bbl/d of capacity, or 8–14% of Russian plants’ total production. The real duration of the shutdowns has varied depending on the type of facility, its role, and above all the scale of damage. In some cases, refineries resumed operations the day after the strike; in others, it took weeks or even months before production resumed.

The Ukrainian airstrikes have thus caused a drop in crude processing at Russian refineries: from the start of the year to April, its rate fell from 5.5 to 5.2 million bbl/d, or more than 5%, hitting its lowest level in nearly a year. The effects of shutdowns at plants can also be seen in the structure of fuel production. In March, the month which saw the heaviest attacks, the production volumes decreased in each of the four categories of petroleum products. This occurred despite the fact that production usually picks up in this period ahead of maintenance work in May.

2/
Next 👉 The Centre of Eastern Studies analysis continued..Image
In the case of gasoline and diesel, the falls in March were 7.9% and 6.4% y/y respectively; it is worth noting here that the production dynamic did not fall in the first quarter of last year. The biggest drop was recorded in fuel oil production.

This may suggest that the production volume of this product was deliberately reduced with the aim of preventing diesel shortages at petrol stations. Diesel oil is produced through a similar process to fuel oil; thus, some refineries were able to increase diesel production at the expense of fuel oil.

The damage to the refineries was also reflected in Russia’s structure of exports, for both fuel and crude oil. At the same time, no significant drop in oil production was reported. In a situation of limited refining, Russia was able to maintain its existing levels of production by increasing its sales of crude abroad.

In March, Russian exports of crude oil hit their highest level in ten months at nearly 4.9 million bbl/d, up more than 5% on the volume in February.

This rise came even though in early March Russia announced that it would reduce crude production and foreign sales as part of the OPEC+ cartel: it committed to reduce production voluntarily by 350,000 bbl/d and exports by 121,000 bbl/d in April, and to follow it up with more cuts in the following months.

Contrary to these pledges, the volume of its foreign sales in April dropped only slightly.

However, Russia’s foreign sales of petroleum products decreased more markedly. According to data cited by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Russia’s total fuel exports by sea fell by almost 10% in March compared to February, dropping to 2.5 million bbl/d.

This fall partly stemmed from the government’s decision to halt gasoline exports. However, there were also declines in exports of other products, whose sales abroad are much more important to the Russian industry, such as diesel and fuel oil.

The negative trend also continued in April: according to the IEA, Russian exports of petroleum products fell by 15% m/m. Sales of diesel, one of the most important fuels in the structure of Russian exports, dropped to 762,000 bbl/d. Since the start of the year, they have fallen by nearly 400,000 bbl/d, or 34%.

3/
Next 👉 The strikes have had no impact on oil pricesImage
Read 10 tweets
Jul 16
The volume of money transfers to Georgia from Russia in the first half of the 2024 decreased by 3.5 times, to $321.8 million.

But what is the historic extent of money flows between Georgia and Russia (that we know about)? Is there evidence of State Capture through trade and dependence on Putin’s regime?

Context:

Once considered a beacon of democracy and a staunch Western ally, Georgia is being pushed into Russia’s sphere of influence and away from the West, not by Russian soldiers but by its own ruler, a reclusive businessman named Bidzina Ivanishvili.

He made his billions in Russia in the 1990s and has ruled Georgia since 2012, largely from behind the scenes through the party he founded, Georgian Dream.

Two decades ago it had been Mikheil Saakashvili, a US-educated and media-friendly ally of the west, leading the revolution. He became president with 96% of the vote but the support was genuine.

In his first term, his anti-corruption zeal and determination to bring Georgia closer to Nato and the EU won him accolades at home and abroad, and impressive economic growth.

By the second term, however, international monitors and domestic NGOs were warning of the growth of a kleptocracy and creeping authoritarianism. Saakashvili’s zeal and purpose, which had been so attractive, started to wear thin.

Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, after a confrontation between Tbilisi and Moscow over the breakaway region of South Ossetia, appeared on the face of it to replenish Saakashvili’s political stock. When he announced a ceasefire after five days of conflict he was cheered by those who, a year earlier, had taken to the streets calling for his resignation.

But Russia continued to occupy 20% of Georgia. Saakashvili’s apparent disregard for upsetting Moscow would come to be portrayed by the opposition Georgian Dream party as reckless.

Then there was a major domestic scandal. Video footage emerged on the eve of the 2012 election, broadcast by the opposition-supporting channel TV9, that appeared to show a half-naked prisoner weeping and begging for mercy as two guards kicked and slapped him, before raping him with a broomstick.

For ten years, Vatnik oligarch Ivanishvili (the creator and financier of the ruling Georgia Dream Party) - kept up a pretence of democracy and trod a careful line between Russia and the West. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, though, he has thrown in his lot with Russia and has openly turned against the West, which he calls a “party of global war”.

Georgia has reopened direct flights to Russia and helps it evade sanctions, as shown by increased trade flows. At the same time its helmeted police and vigilante thugs assault the young Westernised Georgians who have taken to the streets in protest. So far, the government has had the upper hand.

The story of the past 12 years has been of Georgia talking up its prospective membership of the EU while pursuing incompatible policies – and getting away with it. It was only when Russia invaded Ukraine that the Georgian government had to pick a side – declining to join the west in imposing sanctions. Even then, it was granted EU candidate status in December.

1/6
Next 👉 Pre-2022 invasion trade and activity with russiaImage
Georgia’s economic dependence on Russia has decreased in 2023 compared to 2022, although, in comparison to 2021, economic dependence on Russia is still considerably higher. In 2023, the decrease of economic dependence on Russia was mainly brought about by a decrease in remittances.

In 2023, Georgia received a revenue of USD 3.1 billion from Russia through remittances, tourism and export of goods, which is 13% lower than the respective figure of 2022.

In 2023, the revenue received from Russia was 10.3% of the Georgian economy (GDP), while in 2022, this figure amounted to 14.5%. In 2021, this figure equaled 6.3%, and before the pandemic, in 2019, it amounted to 9.7%.

Pre 2022 Invasion:

There are about 3,200 companies registered in the Georgian Business Registry, all or part of which are owned by an offshore company. Since high-ranking public officials are restricted from doing business, they may have used offshore-based companies to maintain their privacy. It will also allow them to participate in state projects, privatization, and public procurement.

Offshore-based companies own Tbilisi Energy, Beeline, IDS Borjomi, Chiaturmanganum Georgia, Rustavi Steel, Silk Road Group Holding, Batumi International Container Terminal, Rustavi Auto Market, Poti Grain Terminal, Clean House and up to 160 other Georgian companies.

Post 2022 Invasion of Ukraine:

Georgia has emerged as the prime destination for Russian entrepreneurs, topping the list of countries where they set up businesses last year, according to the Russian edition of Forbes.

Vyacheslav Kartamyshev, the director of Finion, the company whose analysts prepared the data for Forbes, attributes Georgia’s popularity among Russian entrepreneurs to its favorable business regulations and tax system.

For comparison, according to Forbes, from February 2022 to February 2023, about 16,000 Russians registered as individual entrepreneurs in Georgia, while from January 1995 to February 2022, only 7,788 companies were established by Russians in the country.

Georgia was followed by Kazakhstan with 6,100 new companies, while Armenia and Montenegro shared third place, each registering around 3,200 Russian-owned companies during the same period.

Forbes reported that in 2023 about 2,750 companies were established in Turkey, 3,000 in Serbia, and about 950-1,000 in the UAE. By the end of 2023, the total number of companies registered by Russian citizens worldwide reached 23,713 legal entities.

The Institute for the Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI), a watchdog, recently released a report as part of the third phase of its study, titled “Russian Capital and Russian Connections in Georgian Business.” IDFI analyzed the construction sector, investments in tourism/hotel services, and road transport.

As part of their investigation, IDFI explored the impact on these sectors resulting from two waves of Russian citizens entering Georgia in 2022.

In their analysis of Russian capital and connections, the researchers examined information on company owners and shareholders, connections with Russian government circles, involvement in politics and business, direct investments and sources of funding from Russia.

They also looked at areas of business activity and other interests, projects undertaken, funding of political parties/actors, organizations, media, events, and activities.

The researchers looked at partner organizations in Georgia and possible links with Georgian political groups/parties/politicians/state officials/activists/journalists, as well as public perception of their activities and lobbying tendencies.

2/6
Next 👉 Key findings by The Institute for the Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI) in 2023Image
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Key findings by The Institute for the Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI) in 2023:

According to the report, there was a significant increase in the share of Russian citizens involved in house/apartment purchase transactions in Tbilisi and Batumi. From January to November 2022, the share of Russian citizens in Tbilisi transactions rose from 0.9% to 5%, while in Batumi, it increased from 5% to 17.6%.

The study, based on data released by the National Public Registry Agency, revealed that Russian citizens purchased a total of 15,164 buildings/structures (including 13,262 apartments) and 13,850 plots of land in Georgia by September 9, 2022.

The report also highlighted that as of December 31, 2022, there were 161,032 Russian citizens (individuals) and 55 legal entities holding accounts in Georgian commercial banks. Furthermore, the deposits made by Russian citizens in the commercial banks of Georgia reached 2.87 billion GEL by December 2022, which is an increase of 2.16 billion GEL compared to the pre-war rate in January 2022.

The report mentions data provided by the National Tourism Administration, which indicates that in 2022, the number of visitors from Russia reached 1,087,257, representing a quarter of the total international visitors.

Additionally, the National Bank’s data reveals that the income generated from trips made by Russian citizens to Georgia amounted to 891 million US dollars, also constituting a quarter of the total income from international visits.

The report also highlights that in 2022, there were 1.46 million instances of Russian citizens crossing the Georgian border, and as of the ninth month of that year, 112,733 Russian citizens remained in the country.

Fast forward to 2024 - the explosion of Russian trade and businesses is now reported. The discovery of the depth of russian businesses and trade in Georgia was published in 2024 by Transparency International. The findings eclipsed Forbe’s reporting and the results are stark and concerning.

Transparency International published a report setting out the depth of Georgia’s role and dependency on russia in trade and money flows. 👇

3/6
Next 👉 Fast forward to 2024 - russian State capture is underwayImage
Read 9 tweets
Jul 15
Decoupling from Russia Gas: A compilation of analysis on russian gas supply into Europe from 2022 to 2024, and plans for beyond 2025.

The thread is wordy, it is put together as a reference point for knowledge - not as a click bait article. I recommend you use the audio narration to listen to the thread at your own leisure, while multi-tasking or commuting. Find the link to the narration in the first reply to the last thread. The source brief, sources and references are also provided in the thread.

As set out by the Brookings Institute, “when the war began, Europe was importing a variety of energy products from Russia, including crude oil and oil products, uranium products, coal, and liquefied natural gas (LNG).

But the Kremlin’s sharpest energy weapon was natural gas, delivered by the state-backed gas monopolist Gazprom via pipelines and based on long-term contracts. Europe needs gas for power generation, household heating, and industrial processes.”

Before the invasion, more than 40% of Europe’s imported natural gas came from Russia, its single largest supplier, delivered via four main pipelines. Some European countries relied on Russia for more than 80% of their gas supply, including Austria and Latvia.

But Germany was by far Russia’s largest gas customer by volume, importing nearly twice the volume of Italy, the next largest customer. “Oil and gas combined account for 60% of primary energy,” wrote the Economist in May 2022, “and Russia has long been the biggest supply of both.

On the eve of the war in Ukraine, it provided a third of Germany’s oil, around half its coal imports, and more than half its gas.”

Russia’s actions to cut off gas supply to Europe starting in May 2022 were particularly virulent because it was extremely difficult to cope with the loss of such a large volume of gas. Other regional sources of pipeline gas (e.g., from the North Sea) have been declining and key sectors of European industry (e.g., chemicals) depend on gas as their primary energy source.

LNG is a potential substitute for pipeline gas, but it requires specialized infrastructure and global LNG markets were already tight, with much of the world’s supply going to Asia.

The story of Europe’s adjustment to its main supplier of natural gas turning off the taps is generally told in heroic terms: with the continent securing new supply, conserving or substituting (often with generous government subsidies for industry and/or consumers) in order to weather the storm, and throwing Russia’s weaponization of gas back in its face through declining revenues.

This narrative is not false, and the scale and speed of the response would certainly have been politically unimaginable before the invasion. But the self-congratulatory tale masks the fact that there were substantial regional differences in both energy supply and response to the crisis, which will make it difficult to generate a Europe-wide political response in the future.

Even more importantly, the decoupling is by no means complete. Overall, in 2023, Europe still imported 14.8% of its total gas supply from Russia, with 8.7% arriving via pipelines (25.1 billion cubic meters or bcm) and 6.1% as LNG (17.8 bcm).

(For comparison, during the first quarter of 2021, 47% of Europe’s total gas supply came from Russia, 43% via pipeline and 4% as LNG.)This means that the handful of member states that have not been able to or have not chosen to reduce their dependency remain highly vulnerable to Russia’s weaponization of energy imports.

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The Centre for the Study of Democracy’s brief on decoupling from russian gas. Founded in late 1989, the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) is a European public policy institute dedicated to the values of democracy and market economy.

More than two years after the Russian invasion in Ukraine, the decoupling from the Russian energy dependence remains elusive. Russia can still legally sell natural gas around the world.

As of June 2024 - despite efforts by major European natural gas consumers like Germany and Italy to reduce dependence on Russian gas, it still accounts for 15% of the EU’s total gas imports, just behind the United States (19%) and ahead of North Africa (14%).

Natural gas flows through TurkStream, which delivers Russian gas to Greece, the Western Balkans, and Hungary, are rising, thus making it the largest source of Russian gas exports to Europe.

To cut off the Kremlin from EU-generated gas profits and deprive it of its energy weapon after the transit of Russian natural gas through Ukraine ceases at the end of 2024, the EU must halt Russian gas transit through the European expansion of TurkStream.

The current policy brief provides a comprehensive overview of Russia’s continued presence on the European gas market and proposes a complete phaseout of Russian gas from 2025.

Key points From the brief for you to know about russian gas and the need for Europe to decouple from it:

👉 Despite efforts by major natural gas consumers like Germany and Italy to diversify away from Russian gas, import risks in Europe remain high due to continued dependence on Russian supplies.

👉 Russia still accounts for 15% of the EU’s total gas imports, just behind the U.S. (19%) and ahead of North Africa (14%).
Natural gas flows through TurkStream, which delivers Russian gas to Greece, the Western Balkans, and Hungary, remain unchanged, making it the single largest source of Russian gas exports to Europe.

👉 To fully phase out Russian pipeline gas imports after the transit of Russian natural gas through Ukraine ends at the end of 2024, the EU must halt Russian gas transit through the European expansion of TurkStream.

👉 The EU should expand sanctions to include natural gas. Both buyers of Russian LNG (which accounts for 5% of total EU consumption) and pipeline gas can replace these imports with US sources.

👉 European countries should expedite the termination of all long-term gas supply contracts with Gazprom. The EU should also ensure that Russia does not circumvent sanctions by facilitating gas exports via intermediaries with close ties to Gazprom

👉 Full decoupling from Russia requires dismantling the state capture networks that continue funding Kremlin’s subversion actions across Europe.

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Next 👉 The flow of russian gas into Europe; the backgroundImage
The flow of russian gas into Europe; the background:

Natural gas flows through TurkStream, which delivers Russian gas to Greece, the Western Balkans, and Hungary, remain unchanged in comparison to pre-war levels, making it the single largest source of Russian gas exports to Europe.

Since its commissioning on 1 January, 2021, until March, 2024, TurkStream has transported 46 billion cubic meters (bcm) of Russian natural gas to Greece, Serbia, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Hungary. At the same time, countries such as Slovakia, Austria, and indirectly Czechia have continued buying Russian pipeline gas through Ukraine, adhering to Gazprom’s proposed ruble-based payment scheme since April 2022.

In 2022, Russian pipeline exports to Europe fell by 62% compared to 2021, but Russia still received EUR 13.8 billion more in revenues. In addition, Russia has been steadily increasing its LNG exports to the EU by investing heavily in LNG export infrastructure. In 2022, Russian LNG sales saw the largest year-on-year increase (30%) in volume terms so far, leading to a 209% increase in revenues (around EUR 16 billion) based on the high prices in Europe.

In 2023, the phaseout of Russian gas imports in Europe finally started biting at the Kremlin’s revenues, which fell by close to two-thirds. Yet, Russia still sold more than 73 bcm of LNG and pipeline gas, raking EUR 17,3 billion in the process. For all the hype around Europe’s successful cut in its gas dependence, Russia still makes up 15% of the total EU’s gas imports closely behind the U.S. (19%) and above North Africa (14%).

Among the EU countries that have increased Russian LNG imports are Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal, Greece and Italy. Some of this gas is not consumed in the country of LNG cargo arrival but is shipped onwards to other markets including to those that suffered a direct Gazprom supply cut in 2022. The goal is to make the ultimate ownership of the natural gas untraceable.

Three examples are clearly standing out. Bulgaria and Greece have been buying Russian LNG cargoes since 2022 although the former stopped buying Russian pipeline gas directly in April, 2022, and the latter cut Russian pipeline gas imports by 20%. Greek traders have raised Russian LNG imports four times in 2023 widening the overall Greek dependence on Russian natural gas to 47%. Bulgaria has indirectly imported this Russian LNG volumes, initially destined for Greek companies with long-term agreements with Gazprom.

Similarly, Belgium has significantly increased its LNG imports since February 2022 to meet not only its own demand, but also that of the EU’s largest economy, Germany. In 2023, Belgium’s purchases of Russian LNG jumped by 30% to around 13,4 bcm, a bulk of which has been reexported to Germany, which receives around a quarter of its pipeline imports from Belgium. Netherlands and France, which jointly imported another 11,6 bcm in Russian LNG are making up another 25% of the German pipeline gas imports.

Finally, Spain and Portugal became the biggest resellers of Russian LNG in Europe in 2023 buying a total of over 14 bcm, and, likely sending more than 50% of that volumes east to France, Italy, Switzerland and others.

Spain has become a hub for transhipments of Russian LNG enabled by a number of trading companies that have had close ties to Russia, including MET and Gunvor among others.

Exporting gas via intermediaries has become a strategic Russian objective as the Kremlin aims to not only obfuscate the ownership of the natural gas entering the European market but to also preempt a potential full EU ban of Russian natural gas imports.

The European Commission has advised member-states to stop buying Russian gas by 2027 in line with the end of the long- term supply contracts of most Gazprom clients in Europe.

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Next 👉 Still hooked on russian gas in 2024Image
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Jul 8
Victor Orban meets with his idol, the indicted war criminal Putin - as Russia commits an atrocious war crime by bombing a children’s hospital. The EU needs to act now - starting with the disbanding of the Presidency of the European Council - which Orban and his corrupt government currently chair in a rotating presidency.

It is clear that the European Union has evaded a key dilemma - and every member state is complicit with Vatnik Orban’s disgraceful conduct in meting with the indicted war criminal Putin, a move designed to elevate Orban’s sense of self importance as a corrupt and apparently untouchable corrupt European Union head of state.

The issue that the EU has failed to deal with over the past two years under Ursula von der Leyen - is how the EU deals with a member state that breaks away from the principles of the rule of law.

What is the Council of the EU?

The Council of the EU is an institution of the EU. It is one of the EU’s main decision-making bodies alongside the European Parliament. Its members are ministers of member states’ governments. The Council of the EU’s responsibilities are to:

☑️ negotiate and adopt EU laws
☑️ coordinate member states’ policies
☑️ develop the EU’s common foreign and security policy
☑️ conclude international agreements
☑️ adopt the EU budget.

The main responsibilities of the presidency of the Council are to:

☑️ maintain continuity of the EU’s agenda
☑️ ensure sound law-making
☑️ facilitate cooperation and coordination between member states and EU institutions.
☑️ In practice, the presidency carries out its role by planning and chairing meetings of the sectoral councils across a range of policy areas such as economic and financial affairs, the environment, or foreign affairs.

The presidency further represents the Council in dealings with other EU institutions. The presidency’s legislative priorities are informed by the work programme of the European Commission.

⚡️None of the presidency tasks allow for Orban to visit and negotiate with foreign indicted war criminals and dictators.

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The EU Council Presidency historical issues:

An organisational quirk dating back to the eu’s earliest days is meant to help smooth the continent back into action: the rotating presidency.

Every six months, a new country is put in charge of running vast swathes of the bloc’s business. For the Council presidency there is no election: every country takes its turn. This means that every member state – however big or small – holds the presidency of the Council. Their turn comes every 13-and-a half years.

The system of rotating presidencies goes back to the very beginning of the European integration. Every six months, a member state becomes the president of the Council of the EU and helps ensure the smooth running of the EU legislative process. Presidencies used to be more visible until a new eu treaty in 2009 curtailed their reach.

The biggest change was that the summit meetings of European leaders are no longer chaired by national leaders taking turns, but by a permanent “president” (the job title is used liberally in Brussels). Still, holding the mantle gives each country plenty of behind-the-scenes sway.

The presidency is responsible for driving forward the Council's work on EU legislation, ensuring the continuity of the EU agenda, orderly legislative processes and cooperation among member states. To do this, the presidency must act as an honest and neutral broker.

The Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force in 2009, significantly reduced the powers of the presidency by formally separating the presidency of the European Council and the presidency of the Foreign Affairs Council. Whereas in the past the presidency still encompassed both institutions—and thus also a higher profile and more responsibility—the agenda for the European Council is now set by the president of the European Council.

In addition, the council presidency operates within a narrow institutional framework. The council has no right of initiative. In the EU, this lies exclusively with the European Commission. It is also the European Council that sets the EU's general priorities and has the final say on particularly important and politically sensitive issues.

Last but not least, the council presidency is supported in terms of content and administration by the General Secretariat of the Council, which should ensure a certain degree of consistency and continuity. The same applies to the trio presidency, which in the case of Hungary coincides with the previous presidencies of Belgium and Spain.

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Lack of response and actions to curb Vatnik Orban.

Lots of ministerial meetings are held in presidency countries, giving diplomats home advantage. More broadly, whoever chairs a meeting can often decide what goes on the agenda—and what gets left off. A savvy minister can discern what “consensus” emerged from a flaming row, skewing policies this way or that. A misfiring presidency can thus hold back eu business for months.

While the state of Hungary assumed the Presidency on July 01, 2024 - Victorian Orban is the corrupt Vatnik that leads Hungary in the Presidency seat, and his actions in meeting with an indicted war criminal - Vladimir Putin, and the brutal dictator Xi Jinping, drags the EU into a political and ethical quagmire. In the absence of any actions taken to wing-clip Orban in his un-authorised contact with russia and china, one might argue that every member state acquiesces to his actions and siding with russia.

Debates about whether and how the Hungarian council presidency can be prevented are not expedient and distract from larger problems. For although the prospect of a Hungarian EU presidency under the leadership of a government with severe rule of law deficiencies understandably causes headaches, it will do little practical damage. The problem lies elsewhere: in the EU’s lack of a long-term strategy for dealing with Hungary beyond 2024.

The Orbán government—even more so than other council presidencies—will only prioritize issues that serve its own interests and will let others fall by the wayside. As holder of the council presidency, it will also lead negotiations on dossiers where conflicts of interest are obvious and a constructive fulfillment of its role as an honest broker will be, at the very least, questionable. Rule of law or migration issues come to mind here, for example.

It also seems likely that Orbán will use the council presidency as a significant stage for himself and his government. Given his other attempts to divide the EU, this poses a problem.

👉 The method to clip his pro-russian and pro-chinese wings:

The Orbán government’s assumption of the council presidency may therefore be viewed critically in principle, and debates about withdrawing the country’s presidency are not expedient. Not only is such a withdrawal not explicitly provided for and would legally require the activation of the required procedure under Article 7.

There is also little interest among other member states in pursuing such a course of action. This is perhaps because withdrawing the council presidency from another government would mean changing the rules of the game with an uncertain outcome and creating a precedent that could be detrimental to oneself in the future.

This distracts from a bigger problem, namely the question of how to deal with a country in the European Union that no longer wishes to abide by the rules of the game agreed at the outset.

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Next 👉 The EU has a problem with Orban and have failed to act. They are complicit in Orban’s pro-russian and pro-chinese support.Image
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