For decades, Cyprus has attracted Russians, Russian Intelligence and corrupt Russian wealth - stolen or embezzled out of Russia by thieves and Oligarchs (…well they are really one and the same).

Now approximately 120 thousand Russians live on the island, both from Russia and from the countries of the former USSR, half of whom have already received Cypriot citizenship.

👉 This is 10% of the country's population - a significant political force capable of significantly influencing the situation in the state. She is also extremely wealthy and often favorably disposed towards the Russian authorities.

This is primarily due to the fact that the “golden passport” program, in effect from 2002 to 2020, allowed hundreds of Putin officials, businessmen and, quite possibly, Russian intelligence agents to enter Europe. In total, about 2,900 Russians received such passports .

In addition, Cyprus was a convenient place to store capital for Russian businessmen, including those close to the Kremlin: in 2018 alone, the outflow of investments from Russia to Cyprus amounted to almost $21 billion.

This opens up opportunities to influence the politics of Cyprus and, as a result, the general policy of EU countries: it was the Cypriot authorities who were the first in Europe - back in 2016 - to talk about lifting sanctions on Russia for the annexation of Crimea and involvement in the war in eastern Ukraine.

This picture is confirmed by a recent investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists into the leak of documents from several Cypriot financial campaigns.

👉 In addition, Cyprus is a popular place of residence for Russian intelligence officers who have gone into business or retired: take, for example, former Prime Minister and ex-head of the SVR Evgeniy Primakov, who spent a lot of time on the island in the last years of his life.

It is not surprising that with such initial data, Cyprus firmly entered the sphere of interests of the Kremlin and became an important springboard for the work of intelligence services against the backdrop of a full-fledged conflict between Russia and Western countries.

While other European countries are expelling Russian diplomats in batches and cutting off contacts with Russia, Cyprus remains on the sidelines. In words, he follows the course of Brussels and bans RT; in fact, any of the more than 120 thousand Russians in Cyprus can watch Russian channels here .

The island state not only has not expelled a single diplomat since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, but also received a new ambassador with security experience - Murat Zyazikov.

In small Cyprus , the Kremlin’s influence is clearly visible. As in other countries, it finds itself under the cover of various pseudo-public organizations under the auspices of Rossotrudnichestvo and other Kremlin departments .

This includes the Russian-language press , which either openly works in partnership with the embassy or is secretly controlled from Moscow, but invariably supports the pro-Kremlin narrative.

At the beginning of 2024, a new party, Elpis, appeared in Cyprus, which immediately set a course for friendship with Moscow. It’s not surprising: one of its founders, Marios Fotiou, not only has ties to Russia - he traveled to Donbass in 2017 with a load of optical sights for local militants together with Vitaly Milonov.

Another attempt to create a pro-Russian party was exposed when it turned out that its leaders openly said at meetings that they coordinated all their steps with the Russian Embassy.

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Next 👉 Diplomatic safe haven for the FSB After the outbreak of a full-scale war in Ukraine, EU countries expelled hundreds of Russian diplomats, banned Russian propaganda channels, and introduced visa restrictions and sanctions. It may seem that the path to Europe is now closed to Russian intelligence services - but this is not so.

An important outpost of the Kremlin in the European Union remains Cyprus, a state with a reputation as an offshore zone and more than a hundred thousand Russians and immigrants from Russia and the countries of the former USSR.

👉 Not a single diplomat has been expelled from the island, unlike most other EU countries, since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, and in 2022 the Russian embassy was headed by an FSB lieutenant general. The Dossier Center tells how Russian influence works in Cyprus.

In October 2023, Rossiyskaya Gazeta correspondent Alexander Gasyuk was arrested in Cyprus on suspicion of espionage. Gasyuk was caught red-handed while spying on a certain object and was subsequently sent to Russia.

When he was detained, the journalist was not alone - he was covered by an employee of the Russian embassy, ​​Danil Doinikov, who even tried to fight him off from the Cypriot police officers; he was also detained. Gasyuk appeared in Cyprus in the spring of 2022, shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, and before Cyprus he worked in the United States and Greece.

It was the American intelligence services that conveyed information to their Cypriot colleagues about the journalist’s undercover work for Russian intelligence.

This deportation is perhaps the only noticeable attempt by the Cypriot authorities to interfere with Russian intelligence services on the island. For example, the current head of the TASS representative office in Cyprus, Andrei Surzhansky, who came here with Gasyuk, is mentioned in the press as an employee of the Foreign Intelligence Service.

While other EU countries were expelling dozens of Russian diplomats for spying, Cyprus, although following the EU foreign policy course regarding war and supporting sanctions, did not interfere with the activities of Russian diplomats and propaganda: the authorities limited RT cable broadcasting, but Russian channels are still available on the Internet.

Not a single Russian diplomat was deported. In total, there are about 300 employees in the Russian embassy and the “Russian House” in little Cyprus, several sources familiar with the activities of the diplomatic mission told the Dossier Center. They note that since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the number of diplomats has only grown. The number of various antennas on the roof of the embassy and the residential building belonging to it has also increased sharply.

Even the Russian ambassador to Cyprus is a security officer without any diplomatic experience.

In September 2022, the Russian embassy was headed by FSB Lieutenant General Murat Zyazikov. He went into civilian life in 2002, when he changed the post of deputy director of the FSB for the Astrakhan region to deputy plenipotentiary representative of the Russian President in the Southern Federal District, and two months later, in extremely dubious elections, he was elected president of Ingushetia and served in this post until 2008 .

Later, Zyazikov held various government positions - he was an adviser to Dmitry Medvedev when he was president, he joined the embassy in the Central Federal District, but had nothing to do with diplomacy.

Probably, when Zyazikov was appointed, his connections with the security forces were much more important than his diplomatic career, especially in conditions when diplomatic contacts in Europe are kept to a minimum. Already in December 2023, Putin awarded Zyazikov the Order of Honor “For his great contribution to the implementation of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation and many years of conscientious work.”

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Next 👉 Russian Embassy in Cyprus, den of corruption

A detailed thread setting out the new OFAC sanctions published 01 May 2024:

Intro:

U.S. Continues to Degrade Russia’s Military-Industrial Base and Target Third-Country Support with Nearly 300 New Sanctions

Per the FT and OFAC press statements today:

The targets of the sanctions announced on Wednesday include two Chinese groups that provided Moscow with nitrocellulose, an ingredient for gunpowder and rocket propellant, as well as Russian importers of the chemicals.

The Chinese targets include groups that allegedly supplied Russia with drones, weapons and ammunition, in addition to chips, sensors and other military-related technology.

The Treasury placed sanctions on two Chinese groups — Wuhan Global Sensor Technology and Wuhan Tongsheng Technology — that officials recently told reporters were helping Russia. Wuhan Global produced infrared detectors for a Russian manufacturer of military optics.

It also targeted Juhang Aviation, a Shenzhen-based company that produces drone-related equipment, including propellers, signal jammers, sensors and engines.

The US also designated shipping operators that have continued to support the development of Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project after it was sanctioned last year. Among them is Red Box Energy Services, a Singapore-based company founded by US-born shipping executive Philip Adkins.

The journey of Red Box-operated vessels, the Audax and Pugnax, through the ice-bound Northern Sea Route to deliver equipment to Arctic LNG 2 was documented in a Financial Times investigation in February. Adkins has not been designated by the US. He did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The US Department of State said: “Today’s actions demonstrate the United States’ continued resolve to constrain the Arctic LNG 2 project’s production and export capacity and limit third-party support to the project.” The US has sought other ways to curb cash flows to Vladimir Putin’s regime, including a measure that passed the Senate on Tuesday to ban imports of enriched uranium from Russia.

The White House has indicated it supports the move. The bill will also release $2.7bn in government funding to build domestic uranium processing within the US. Almost a fifth of the nuclear fuel used by the US nuclear reactor fleet is supplied through enrichment contracts with Russian suppliers, which is estimated to be worth about $1bn a year.

The legislation contains temporary waivers until the start of 2028, during which US customers can continue importing Russian uranium if no alternative supplies are available.

1/12 Today, (01 may 2024), the Department of the Treasury is taking action to further degrade Russia’s ability to sustain its war machine, continuing a multilateral campaign to limit the Kremlin’s revenue and access to the materiel it needs to prosecute its illegal war against Ukraine.

Today’s actions target Russia’s military-industrial base and chemical and biological weapons programs as well as companies and individuals in third countries that help Russia acquire key inputs for weapons or defense-related production.

The United States, along with many international partners, is particularly concerned about entities based in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and other third countries that provide critical inputs to Russia’s military-industrial base.

This support enables Russia to continue its war against Ukraine and poses a significant threat to international security. The almost 300 targets being sanctioned by both Treasury and the Department of State include sanctions on dozens of actors that have enabled Russia to acquire desperately needed technology and equipment from abroad.

“Treasury has consistently warned that companies will face significant consequences for providing material support for Russia’s war, and the U.S. is imposing them today on almost 300 targets,” said Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen.

“Today’s actions will further disrupt and degrade Russia’s war efforts by going after its military industrial base and the evasion networks that help supply it. Even as we’re throwing sand in the gears of Russia’s war machine, President Biden’s recently-passed National Security Supplemental is providing badly-needed military, economic, and humanitarian support to bolster Ukraine’s courageous resistance. Combined, our support for Ukraine and our relentless targeting of Russia’s military capacity is giving Ukraine a critical leg-up on the battlefield.”

In addition to the nearly 200 targets sanctioned by the Department of the Treasury, the Department of State is imposing sanctions on over 80 entities and individuals that are engaged in sanctions evasion and circumvention or are related to Russia’s chemical and biological weapons programs and defense industrial base.

The Department of State is also targeting Russia’s revenue generation through its future energy, metals, and mining production and sanctioning additional individuals in connection with the death of opposition leader and anticorruption activist Aleksey Navalny. For more information on State actions, see the Department of State Fact Sheet.

The U.S. Department of Justice also filed a forfeiture complaint today against a set of aircraft landing gear for a Boeing 737-800 that was detained in September 2023 at Miami International Airport by U.S. Customs and Border Patrol.

The gear was purchased for $1.55 million for the benefit of a Kyrgyz Republic-based transhipper of dual-use items servicing the Russian Federation, in violation of U.S. sanctions on LLC RM Design and Development, which was designated by OFAC in July 2022.

👉 SANCTIONS EVASION, CIRCUMVENTION, AND BACKFILL

Treasury is committed to disrupting individuals and entities who help facilitate Russia’s acquisition of technology and equipment for its war machine.

Treasury and other U.S. government partners have issued extensive guidance and conducted outreach around the world to educate and inform about the risks of doing business with Russia, and Treasury will continue to take unilateral action when necessary to disrupt Russia’s military-industrial supply chains, no matter where they are located.

Today’s action includes nearly 60 targets located in Azerbaijan, Belgium, the PRC, Russia, Slovakia, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), that enable Russia to acquire desperately-needed technology and equipment from abroad.

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GPS navigation interference is being weaponised globally.

This thread offers information about GPS and other systems that are being interfered with and or spoofed to provide misleading tracking information.

Instances of GPS interference is becoming a regular occurrence - threatening navigation of ships and aircraft. On March 29, 2024 - it was reported that GPS jamming attack affects 1600 aircraft over Europe. A 63-hour-long marathon of GPS jamming attacks disrupted global satellite navigation systems for hundreds of aircraft flying through the Baltic region – and Russia is thought to be responsible. This is a problem that needs amplifying and action from the G7 coalition, before a catastrophe occurs!

Smex provides some insight on the background of GPS interference.

How GPS works, different types of interference, and how they could be detected.

👉 What is GPS?

The Global Positioning System (GPS) is one of the most crucial systems in our modern infrastructure. Almost every piece of technology around us uses GPS, from cash machines and smartwatches to phones, cars, and aircraft.

GPS is a satellite-based navigation system that helps determine the precise geographic location of devices (and those using them) anywhere on the planet. It is owned by the United States government and operated by the United States Space Force. This technology is considered essential for aerial and maritime transport.

👉 How it works:

Many GPS satellites are orbiting the Earth, with 30 currently active. These satellites continuously broadcast signals containing information about their current location. Smartphones and navigation systems have GPS receivers that pick up signals from multiple GPS satellites. The GPS receiver calculates the distance to each satellite based on the time it takes for signals to reach devices.

The receiver can determine its own 2D location (latitude and longitude) by calculating the distance from at least three satellites. Adding a fourth satellite allows for a 3D location based on altitude calculation. These are the minimum requirements to accurately determine a GPS receiver’s position on Earth.

However, accuracy can be improved by connecting to more satellites. The more satellites the receiver can connect to, the better it can pinpoint its location. GPS and satellite constellations are designed so that at least four satellites are usually in view and can be accessed by the receiver from any point on Earth.

The signals used by GPS infrastructure are very weak at ground level, and they can be easily overpowered by unwanted transmissions. This kind of interference may happen by accident or due to a malfunction leading to signal conflict with other GPS transmissions. To prevent these interferences, governments around the world cooperate under the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Founded in 1865, it regulates communication mediums, from the telegraph to the modern world of satellites, mobile phones, and the internet.

However, interferences can also be intentional, aimed at damaging or preventing communication. They are most commonly used in government buildings housing sensitive state-related data or areas with additional security. Interferences are also used in war and sabotage efforts led by another state.

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Next 👉 GPS Interference 👉 GPS interference:

GPS jamming and spoofing are two ways for disrupting or deceiving GPS signals. This is achieved by sending out the same radio frequency signals used by GPS satellites but at a much higher power. This overpowers the weaker GPS signals, leading to their blocking or jamming.

“Imagine trying to have a conversation in an overcrowded room where everyone is shouting loudly, making it impossible to hear another person,” explained the Tech Unit at SMEX. In warfare, jamming GPS signals can prevent enemy forces from accurately navigating using GPS-guided systems such as missiles, drones, or vehicles.”

Alternatively, GPS spoofing is a more complex technique that generates fake GPS signals to trick receivers into thinking they are at a different location or trajectory. “It’s like giving someone false road signs to mislead them about their route,” added the team. “In combat, GPS spoofing is used to misdirect enemy soldiers or assets by convincing them that they are in a different place, driving them off course or into a trap.”

Both tactics can be used strategically to gain an advantage over the enemy by interfering with their ability to travel effectively or misdirecting them about their location or intended path. It’s worth mentioning that jamming and spoofing GPS signals are practices normally deemed illegal.

👉 Relentless use of GPS spoofing and jamming:

Gpsjam is a website created by John Wiseman that maps out GPS interferences around the world with regional updates on a daily basis. The website uses data provided by ADS-B Exchange to generate maps showing GPS interference based on navigational system accuracy from aircraft reporting.

According to the website, many aircraft broadcast digital radio messages (ADS-B) that contain information about their GPS accuracy. ADS-B Exchange is a network composed of signal enthusiasts who make it possible to map out real-time data that recorded low GPS accuracy.

While these reports do not say why GPS accuracy is low, they correlate well with the areas where jamming or spoofing occurs. Even though South Lebanon does not consistently show low GPS accuracy, further website data analysis suggests that Beirut constantly shows the highest concentration of GPS inaccuracies, endangering navigation systems in close proximity.

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Next 👉 How to detect the source of interference

Lithuania is buying Russian Grain, possibly stolen from Ukraine.

It is becoming increasingly clear that large quantities of Russian grain are entering the EU through both Latvia and Lithuania. It is likely that some of this grain has been seized from Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia.

Therefore, if this transit of grain through the EU under control, it will bolster Russia’s economy and its war against Ukraine. The quality of this grain is not being checked, and its possible mixing with Lithuanian grain – known for its high quality – will damage the reputation of Lithuanian grain producers.

In addition, the aforementioned entry of Russian grain onto the market has likely caused a significant drop in Lithuanian grain prices, while grain elevators are still full. At the end of 2023, the price of triticale was about 46%, rye about 37% and wheat about 33% lower than in 2022. In other words, grain prices in Lithuania have fallen by a third.

Lithuania has resumed grain purchases from Russia after a break of six months. In February, 12,2 thousand tons worth 1,95 million euros were imported. At the same time, Riga increased imports, which at the end of winter bought 58,8 thousand tons of grain from Moscow for 10 million euros compared to 52,6 thousand tons for 8,7 million euros a month earlier. In general, EU countries purchased 92,6 thousand tons of Russian grain worth 16,9 million euros in February. At the same time, in March Latvia banned the import of these Russian products, and the EU published a proposal to introduce protective duties on them.

Background:

Since 18 March, Lithuania has implemented stricter controls on grain imported into the country from Russia, other states’ regions under Russian occupation, and Belarus. At least three dry cargo ships were captured on video by Russian propaganda while loading grain in Mariupol. Journalists have identified several grain trading companies mentioned in documents related to the loading of grain onto these ships.

Latvia, which had previously stated the need to boycott Russian goods, has also increased supplies from the Russian Federation, thereby supporting Poland’s initiative to ban the import of agricultural products from the Russian Federation and Belarus.

It was previously reported that Russian components that are equipped with Lithuanian gas pipelines must be replaced. Relevant requirement Ministry of Energy of Lithuania directed to the contractor Alvora. The document proposes measures to replace components in the shortest possible time.

The main argument of the Lithuanian Ministry of Energy in this dispute is the fact that Alvora did not provide the relevant documents for the parts, and they turned out to be manufactured in the Russian Federation.

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Next 👉 The EU is dithering over penalty tariffs while Europeans fund the war with Russian imports. The EU is mulling over tariffs on Russian and Belarusian imports.

The European Union is proposing to increase tariffs on imports of various food products from Russia and Belarus in order, as European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen put it, to “mitigate the growing risk to our markets and our farmers” and “reduce Russia’s capacity to exploit the EU for the benefit of its war machine”.

A duty of either 50% or €95/t (£81/t) could be introduced, which is forecast to result in 5m tonnes less grain being imported by the EU from Russia and Belarus each year. By comparison, the UK has a 35% tariff on imported Russian grains, which has been in place since 1 June 2022.

The proposal, announced by the European commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, follows a plea to EU leaders by the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, to do something about grain “stolen” by the Russians from occupied territories.

She said: “We propose the imposition of tariffs on these Russian imports to mitigate the growing risk to our markets and our farmers. They will reduce Russia’s capacity to exploit the EU for the benefit of its war machine.”

The measure is intended principally to head off a potential illegal dumping of grain as the Kremlin seeks to weaponise as much as it can in its war against Ukraine. The increased duties will apply to imports of cereals, oilseeds and related products from Russia and Belarus. But they are designed to allow unhindered passage through EU countries.

As an EU press release put it: “Importantly, the proposed tariffs will … not affect global food security, particularly for developing countries. On the contrary, they are expected to create an incentive for Russia to export to non-EU destination markets, including developing countries.”

Globally, Russia’s abundant provision of grains has done what an excess supply of a product tends to do, according to basic economic theory: crash prices. Reuters reported recently that prices of US and European wheat have “dropped to their lowest in about 3.5 years, weighed down by Russian grain flows which have prompted China to cancel recent purchases from the United States”.

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Next 👉 Farmers Protests - the connection

The rise of Private Military Companies (PMC’s) - in Russia.

Private military companies are coming back into existence now, the Duma has approved the application by the LNG producer Novatech, to build its own private army. Private military companies are big business, reportedly paid up to $100 Billion a year.

As I set out in my thread on the effects of drone strikes (see here for the thread ), Putin has been left with two choices to defend Russian critical infrastructure. 1.) Move air defence equipment away from the front line or 2.) Subcontractor the defence of key oil refineries and infrastructure to their owners and private military companies.

Moscow’s use of PMCs has exploded in recent years, reflecting lessons learned from earlier deployments, a growing expansionist mindset, and a desire for economic, geopolitical, and military gains. Ukraine served as one of the first proving grounds for PMCs, beginning in 2014. The Russians then refined the model as these private mercenaries worked with local forces in countries such as Syria and Libya. Over time, Moscow expanded the use of PMCs to sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and other regions—including countries such as Sudan, the Central African Republic, Mozambique, Madagascar, and Venezuela. PMCs now fill various roles to undermine U.S. influence and support Russia’s expanding geopolitical, military, and economic interests.

With operations suspected or proven in as many as 30 countries across 4 continents and an increasingly refined and adaptable operational model, PMCs are likely to play a significant role in Russian strategic competition for the foreseeable future.

PMCs play key roles executing Moscow’s policy objectives and advancing Russian national security interests across the globe. Even though PMCs are technically illegal under Article 13.5 of the Russian Constitution, some of President Vladimir Putin’s closest allies—such as Yevgeny Prigozhin—head Russian PMCs. A core component of Russia’s "hybrid warfare" strategy, PMCs provide the Kremlin a quasi-deniable means through which to pursue Russian objectives, complementing or substituting for more traditional, overt forms of statecraft.

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Next 👉 PMC spheres of influence

https://x.com/beefeater_fella/status/1775078400652189769?s=61

PMC spheres of influence:

✅ Foreign Policy:
PMCs provide the Kremlin with a tool to expand Russian influence across the globe. Through the use of PMCs, Moscow can support state and non-state partners, extract resources, influence foreign leaders, and engage in other activities that further Russian foreign policy goals.

✅ Military:
With military skills and capabilities, PMCs enable Moscow to project limited power, strengthen partners, establish new military footholds, and alter the balance of power in out-of-area conflicts toward preferred outcomes while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability for the Kremlin. PMC contractors are also more expendable and less risky than Russian soldiers, particularly if they are killed during combat or training missions.

✅ Intelligence:
Often recruited from Russian military and security forces, PMC operatives build intelligence networks in key theaters to collect insights for Kremlin decisionmakers and conduct intelligence operations, including political influence, covert action, and other clandestine activities.

✅ Economic:
PMCs and associated energy, mining, security, and logistics firms provide Moscow a means to expand trade and economic influence in the developing world and build new revenue streams, particularly from oil, gas, and mineral extraction, to reduce the impact of sanctions.

✅ Political:
Typically run by Kremlin-linked oligarchs, PMCs and the lucrative benefits that can accrue from deployments give the Kremlin a lever for balancing competing political and financial interests among oligarchs and exploiting PMCs’ quasi-legal status to ensure loyalty to Putin.

✅ Informational:
Moscow leverages even small-scale deployments to enhance global perceptions of Russian power and global influence while propagating pro-Russian narratives in foreign operating environments through PMC-linked media and disinformation outlets.

✅ Ideological:
PMCs serve as a tool to expand Russian soft power, including themes of "Russian patriotism" and Slavic identity among ideologically minded citizens in the former Soviet states and Balkans.

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Next 👉 PMC’s worldwide backstory

Drone attacks of refineries - understand Russia’s refined oil production and markets:

In October 2023, Russia saw diesel and gasoline prices soar, and a severe deficit of petrol products in some regions. In an attempt to deal with the situation, the government banned the export of all petroleum products. Although the first ban was eased after a few weeks, the crisis and the frantic response to it revealed accumulating problems in Russian economy and governance.

The development of Russia’s oil refining industry has long been focused on exports. Russia produces up to 15 percent more gasoline than the country needs, while 56 percent of the diesel produced in Russia is sold abroad. Refineries tend to have a fixed slate of output with limited space for maneuver between various oil products.

Russia has only operational storage capacity for fuels, serving as buffers in the supply chain, but no strategic storage. The latter problem has only gotten worse in recent years as oil companies seek efficiency savings by moving to the just-in-time operating model and closing unneeded storage facilities.

How is it possible for an oil-producing giant like Russia to suffer from a lack of fuel?

It’s partly the result of efforts to protect domestic fuel prices from the vagaries of the market, and partly a consequence of government infighting. It’s also a stark demonstration of how the stresses of the war in Ukraine are revealing themselves in unexpected places.

For many years, Russia has attempted to both preserve an ostensibly free market for petroleum products and regulate prices in such a way as to ensure they are independent of the global economy. The aim is to prevent gasoline prices from shooting up and to keep Russian consumers happy.

Artificially low prices, however, have caused energy consumption to remain high and are increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain and would potentially make the economy vulnerable to fuel price fluctuations, when the government would have to abandon the price controls.

Market forces have tested this system several times, obliging the authorities to seek quick fixes. In 2022, the system survived currency volatility and sky-high global oil prices because Western sanctions meant Russian oil companies were having difficulties exporting. The government’s decision to calculate the mineral extraction tax in line with official oil price quotations that bore little relation to reality also helped.

By the summer of 2023, however, oil companies had found new buyers and come up with new ways to transport oil and oil products and collect payments, allowing them to mitigate Western sanctions and resume exports, and the government had modified the price quotations it used for calculating the mineral extraction tax.

At the same time, global prices jumped (petroleum product prices rose even faster than those for crude) and the ruble weakened. All this meant that there was an ever-greater difference between the recommended domestic price and the global market price.

The refiners chose to export their products rather than supply the domestic market at cheaper prices, with less profit. This then led to sever market shortages in refined products including petrol, diesel and lubricants. This is turn saw shortages manifesting in the military, with the army being forced to commandeer the little supplies that were coming to market at gas stations. Petroleum product consumption dynamics in Russia also changed. There was a boom in demand in southwestern Russia due to military requirements amid the war in Ukraine, and along north-south transport routes leading to holiday destinations in the Caucasus and Russia-occupied Crimea (destinations made more popular by Russia’s international isolation).

In addition, Russia’s grain harvest ripened earlier than usual, and repairs at several oil refineries took longer than anticipated, likely as a result of Western sanctions making it difficult to obtain spare parts and consumables.

The result was a severe regional deficit of petroleum products and price hikes. Railroads that could have been used to bring in supplies from regions without shortages were overloaded (again, likely due to military requirements). The spreading news of a deficit led to price rises across the country.

At the same time, the Finance Ministry—under pressure to raise revenue to fund ballooning military spending—decided to slash so-called “dampener payments” designed to compensate oil companies for selling fuel on the domestic market. Inevitably, this led to a situation in which companies could only supply the domestic market at a loss: both compared with exports, and in absolute terms. The cuts to “dampener payments” began in September, but they were announced in July and the market effect was immediate.

The shortage of petroleum products quickly became a serious issue for the authorities. As well as causing economic problems, particularly in the transportation and agricultural sectors, it showed that officials had lost control of the situation.

Efforts to persuade oil companies to operate at a loss fell on deaf ears. Nor was the Finance Ministry amenable to returning “dampener payments” to their previous level. Indeed, the Finance Ministry blamed the Energy Ministry for the crisis. In the end, the government decided to play its trump card and ban all exports of diesel and gasoline.

After fifteen days, the government partially lifted restrictions on diesel exports for volumes arriving to the ports via pipelines for companies supplying at least half of their produced diesel to the domestic market. Restrictions on gasoline exports, as well as on diesel delivered to ports via railway, remain in force. Yet no matter how short-lived the full ban, it was a draconian step with long-term ramifications.

Using the nuclear option of an export ban was a sign of desperation. Government officials were trying to show ordinary Russians, as well as their bosses in the Kremlin, that they were taking decisive action. But it was also an attempt to seize the initiative in negotiations with oil companies. When there was a deficit, officials pleaded with oil companies to make concessions—whereas the ban had turned the tables on the companies, forcing them to petition the government and come up with possible solutions.

Historical Exports:

In 2022, Russia exported $67.4B in Refined Petroleum. The main destinations of Russia exports on Refined Petroleum were Turkey ($6.51B), France ($6.46B), Germany ($5.19B), United States ($4.73B), and India ($4.05B).

In 2022, Russia imported $1.37B in Refined Petroleum, mainly from Turkey ($289M), South Korea ($233M), Germany ($124M), Finland ($110M), and China ($96.5M).

Historical Imports:

In 2022, Russia imported $1.37B in Refined Petroleum, mainly from Turkey ($289M), South Korea ($233M), Germany ($124M), Finland ($110M), and China ($96.5M).

See graphic for 2021 data.

Russian Ministry of Finance data release for Oil and Gas revenue - January and February 2024.

Putin declared economic data a state secret back in 2022, and stopped reporting a comprehensive and auditable range of economic information to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (which they are obliged to report on as a condition of membership of those organisations), back in December 2022.

In spite of the severe restrictions on economic data reporting by Putin, the Finance Ministry do release a carefully selected set of highlights which they have chosen to represent Russia as a thriving and successful economy, while withholding the substance and details of many key indicators and revenue streams.

The information they have since released on a monthly basis to paint the regime as a success - must be viewed as propaganda and they should not be relied on as a statement of truth. In any event, in their attempt to weaponise and propagandise economic data - they do betray some information that shows that things are a lot worse than they would have you believe. (The monthly figures have historically never been accurate and all are “revised to a worse position, normally annually in January or early Feb for the previous year).

The link to the Russian Ministry of Finance report is provided in the links - these are their own declarations.

From the “released data, it appears that Russia is losing its dependence on Oil and Gas revenues - for decades their economy has been mainly built around revenue from its fossil fuels. They now have “other revenue” that has overtaken the size of revenue streams from oil and gas. Understanding what “other revenue” is, provide a clue to the darker side of their economics and worldwide subversive operations which drive revenue.

Oil and Gas revenue:

The oil and gas revenue continues to fall year on year.

2024: January and February revenues total 1.621 Trillion Rubles ($17.5 Billion)
2023: January and February revenues total 947 Billion Rubles (
2022: January and February revenues total 1.766 Trillion Rubles
2021: January and February revenues total 2.756 Trillion Rubles ($36.7 Billion)

Summary:

2024: For the first two months of the year, comparing it’s revenue from the same pre-war period in 2021, Russia has seen a dramatic -41% fall in revenues (when converting to USD this is over 50% with the devaluation of the Ruble).

When comparing its 2024 to last year (2023’s) revenue, there has been a big increase in revenue. The reason for this increase is the oil price rise in 2024.

In the same two month period last year, Russian oil was trading for $59 (below the price cap of $60).

This year Russian oil is trading well above the price cap at $77 per barrel. This strengthens the argument for the G7, the EU and Norway owned / registered / insured seaborne oil carriers, to reduce the price cap from $60 per barrel to $30 per barrel - which is still 100% above the cost price of producing a barrel of Urals.

“Other Revenue”

2024: January and February revenues total = 3.405 Trillion Rubles
2023: January and February revenues total = 2.217 Trillion Rubles
2022: January and February revenues total = 2.439 Trillion Rubles
2021: January and February revenues total = 1.036 Trillion Rubles

2021 saw non oil and gas revenue at it’s lowest, and this revenue has grown steadily year on year since the invasion of Ukraine. It’s other revenue in the first two months of 2024 ( 3.405 Trillion Rubles ), is more than double its revenue from oil and gas in the first two months of this year. The key point here is that Russia is making 66% of all its revenues from non oil and gas revenue in 2024.

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Next 👉 What is “Other Revenue”? What is other revenue?

Joe Bloggs suggests that the primary reason is that the Russian economy has transformed into a war time economy, with businesses being compelled to produce equipment for the military, which the regime is funding and is reflected as turnover for businesses and hence counted as revenue in these figures.

However, as this turnover is essentially funded by the state, and a corresponding increase in state expenditure is realised - this is a false economy, as value is not being derived without a corresponding cost to the state coffers and expenditure.

I will also suggest that a sizeable (hidden and un-declared) chunk of other revenue, is also being derived from operations across Africa in what was estimated at a Trillion Ruble gold and mineral revenue stream, established by the Wagner group and now continued by the Russian Afrika Corp.

Once the war ends, this inflated view of “other revenue” would disappear over night and the true decline in total revenues would be catastrophic for Russia.

Bear this in mind when reading from press outlets such as Associated Press who recently said that in the “estimate” of the Economic Development Ministry, in February 2024 GDP exceeded last year's level by 7.7% after 4.6% year-on-year [growth] in January. Seasonally adjusted, GDP growth in February amounted to 0.2% month-on-month.

Industrial production growth accelerated to 8.5% year-on-year in February from 4.6% in January. "Seasonally adjusted, production rose by 1.3%. Compared to the level two years ago, there was acceleration to 6.3% after 1.6% a month earlier," the report said.

These growth figures are artificial in a war economy, as it measures growth by an inflated and false economy.

This artificial strength in the war economy though, does have a positive impact on other sectors (providing the war continues and people continue to have jobs).

"Consumer activity is demonstrating confident growth of all components," the ministry said. The combined turnover of retail sales, the food services industry and consumer services grew by 10.6% year-on-year in real terms in February after increasing by 8.1% in January, and was up by 4.7% compared to February 2022, the report said.

Retail sales growth accelerated to 12.3% year-on-year in real terms from 9.1% in January, and growth amounted to 2.5% compared to February 2022. Consumer services grew by 6.4% year-on-year in February, the same as the previous month, and were up by 9.1% from February 2022.

The food services sector saw the strongest acceleration of growth, to 8.9% year-on-year in February from 2.1% a month earlier, and was up 17.6% from two years earlier.

Just to remind you - these are figures carefully manicured by the Russian regime and filtered through propaganda to paint a rosy picture of a buoyant economy in Russia. To make that point, take the regimes “official” inflation rate numbers, they declare that the current inflation rate is 7.5%, when all sectors are reporting double digit increases in cost prices across the economy.

Some sectors including airline, automotive, retail and housing are reporting inflationary increases of between 25 and 70% year on year - yet Putin and his propaganda have carefully published unverified headline numbers suggesting the inflation rate is just 7.5%

The published figures are part of a disinformation campaign to boost support for the regime, the indicted war criminal who has appointed himself as a tsar for a 5th time and to encourage world-wide support for it’s illegal invasion of Ukraine.

For a full analysis of the income, expenditure and economic collapse, please use the provided links - where a lot more information is analysed by the likes of Joe Bloggs and the original publications link to the Ministry of Finance report is provided too.

If you enjoy my threads, please consider supporting my work on Patreon or BuymeACoffee!

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Next 👉 Read my other threads on Economic disinformation:

Introducing Murmansk: Putin’s lost hope for replacing lost EU Gas Pipeline Revenue.

Murmansk is the seaport and center of Murmansk oblast (region), northwestern Russia, lying 125 miles (200 km) north of the Arctic Circle, and on the eastern shore of Kola Bay, 30 miles (48 km) from the ice-free Barents Sea.

Murmansk Commercial Seaport is a seaport located on the eastern shore of the Kola Bay of the Barents Sea in the city of Murmansk. The port ranks fourth in Russia in terms of processed goods and is the second-largest port in northwest Russia (after the port of St. Petersburg). Murmansk seaport is one of the largest ice-free ports in Russia and forms the backbone of the economy of the city.

Murmansk Port consists of three parts: the Fishing port, the commercial port and the passengers port. In recent years, there has been a trend of repression of all other trading ports because of an increase in exports of coal and a number of other mineral resources, which only Murmansk has the necessary reception and storage infrastructure. Intake of fish was also significantly reduced, as it became more profitable to export, rather than sell inside the country.

In 2022 it was reported that the Russian state-owned energy company Rosatom along with UAE-based DP World are co-developing new ports at Murmansk and Vladivostok on either end of the route. They’re being specially designed to transfer cargo off ice-class ships and onto ordinary vessels. The UAE isn’t the only country to see the opportunity of investing in Russia’s infrastructure. South Korea and China are both eager for new ports and trade routes too.

In 2018 China declared it would cooperate with Russia on an “Arctic Silk Road”, signing 20 bilateral cooperative documents and agreeing to invest in the region. As part of this, Beijing will build several Chinese docks across Russia’s north in ports that are currently underdeveloped and unable to handle massive volumes of shipping. A number of new railways are also being built to service these ports. Construction is underway on a 500-kilometre line to link Perm in the Ural Mountains with several northern port cities. Russia is also dependent on foreign investment to fund much of this new infrastructure, relying on other countries who would greatly benefit from an alternative to the Suez Canal.

Russia has been focusing on developing global sales of seaborne LNG to make up for a drop in pipeline gas exports to Europe.

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Next 👉 LNG Gas is not sanctioned (yet) ! EU, G7 and Norway Sanctions on Russia do not apply to LNG

Despite the EU sanctions exempting Russian LNG exports, restrictions on LNG and drilling technology exports to Russia remain in place. This has spurred Russia’s efforts to bolster its LNG capabilities, aiming for independence from Western technology and open the global LNG market for massive volumes of Russian natural gas.

Imagery intelligence indicates that Russia has constructed an LNG facility in Belokamenka near Murmansk, situated in the Barents Sea. This facility is intended for the production of indigenous LNG trains. Both optical and SAR satellite imagery provide insights into the development and departure of the first LNG train from the facility during the summer of 2023. This ongoing monitoring offers valuable intelligence on Russia’s advancements in LNG production, with implications for the global energy landscape.

At the Arctic-2 LNG terminal situated on the Gydan Peninsula, Russia is constructing its largest LNG export facility. While open-source intelligence suggests that Russians plan for three LNG trains, SpaceKnow’s imagery-intelligence analysis uncovers an additional fourth berth, potentially indicating preparations for a fourth LNG train. This revelation underscores Russia’s ambitious expansion plans for LNG production at the Arctic-2 terminal, signifying its commitment to capitalize on the region’s vast natural resources and strategic location for global energy exports.

As the Arctic-2 LNG terminal aims to become Russia’s primary LNG export hub to the global market, addressing the challenge of shipping LNG to customers is crucial. The Northern Sea Route (NSR) remains ice-free only for a few months during the summer, presenting logistical hurdles for most of the year due to thick ice. Icebreakers are essential to lead convoys of ships through the Arctic Ocean.

To overcome this obstacle, Russia seeks to develop icebreaking-capable LNG tanker vessels. These specialized vessels, exemplified by the Yamalmax class ships currently servicing the neighboring Yamal LNG terminal, are crucial for year-round operations. South Korean shipyard DSME has been instrumental in building these vessels.

To achieve self-sufficiency, Russia endeavors to acquire the technology to domestically produce these icebreaking-capable LNG tankers. SpaceKnow’s imagery analysis captures the construction of these vessels at the Zvezda Shipyard near Vladivostok in the Far East. This development underscores Russia’s strategic efforts to operate the Arctic-2 LNG terminal year-round, enhancing its position in the global LNG market.

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Next 👉 Update April 2024: The project has stalled, ending hopes it will replace the EU pipeline gas revenue

What drives the price of oil?

The current oil price rise is attributable to geopolitical tensions rising in the Middle East, with tensions and conflict spanning from Iran’s retaliatory threats to Israels ongoing operations across its borders and in Gaza.

Also impacting the oil price is the looming OPEC+ cuts in production in the coming months. The price is not moving because of ongoing Ukrainian attacks on oil refineries, which is driving excess stocks of Urals crude which can not be refined - and not a shortage of crude or refined products resulting from the drone attacks.

The price of oil is broadly determined by the relationship between supply and demand. Here we look at seven of the key factors which affect these drivers, and how they affect the price of oil. There are 7 key factors that influence the price of oil:

✅ Supply factors

1. OPEC and OPEC+

The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, is a cartel made up of 14 countries who export petroleum. Cartel in this instance means that the countries within OPEC have come together to regulate the price of oil by controlling supply.

OPEC used to hold considerable influence over the price and supply of oil. This was evidenced in 1973, when the so-called ‘oil crisis’ saw global crude oil prices nearly quadruple as OPEC restricted supply to a number of countries.

More recently, however, OPEC has warned that the oil market could be heading towards a surplus as a result of the expansion of the American fracking industry. This expansion has led to OPEC's influence declining in the last decade or so.

The OPEC+ alliance in JUNE 2023 - chose to focus on a lower production target for 2024. As well as extending the group's existing supply cuts of 3.66 million bpd for another year, it agreed to reduce overall production targets from January 2024 by a further 1.4 million bpd versus current targets to a combined 40.46 million bpd. Including additional voluntary production cuts, which the nine partaking countries extended to the end of 2024, this results in an even lower target of 38.81 million bpd

The OPEC Secretariat noted the announcements of several OPEC+ countries extending additional voluntary cuts of 2.2 million barrels per day, aimed at supporting the stability and balance of oil markets.

These voluntary cuts are calculated from the 2024 required production level as per the 35th OPEC Ministerial Meeting held on June 4, 2023, and are in addition to the voluntary cuts previously announced in April 2023 and later extended until the end of 2024.

Russia's government has ordered oil companies to lower their output in the second quarter so that the country can meet its OPEC+ production target of 9 million barrels per day (bpd) by the end of June. Previously, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak announced that Russia would cut oil output and exports by an extra 471,000 barrels per day (bpd) in the second quarter, in tandem with production cuts by other OPEC+ members.

These additional voluntary cuts are announced by the following OPEC+ countries : Saudi Arabia (1,000 thousand barrels per day); Iraq (220 thousand barrels per day); United Arab Emirates (163 thousand barrels per day); Kuwait (135 thousand barrels per day); Kazakhstan (82 thousand barrels per day); Algeria (51 thousand barrels per day); and Oman (42 thousand barrels per day) for the second quarter of 2024. Afterwards, in order to support market stability, these voluntary cuts will be returned gradually subject to market conditions.

World oil production is projected to fall by 870 kb/d in 1Q24 vs 4Q23 due to heavy weather-related shut-ins and new curbs from the OPEC+ bloc. From the second quarter, non-OPEC+ is set to dominate gains after some OPEC+ members announced they would extend extra voluntary cuts to support market stability. Global supply for 2024 is forecast to increase 800 kb/d to 102.9 mb/d, including a downward adjustment to OPEC+ output.

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Next 👉 Non-OPEC countries 2. Non-OPEC oil producing countries

In contrast to OPEC oil production, which is subject to central coordination, non-OPEC producers make independent decisions about oil production. Also, in contrast to OPEC, where oil production is mostly in the hands of national oil companies (NOCs), international or investor-owned oil companies (IOCs) perform most of the production activities in non-OPEC countries.

IOCs seek primarily to increase shareholder value and make investment decisions based on economic factors. While some NOCs operate in a similar manner as IOCs, many have additional objectives such as providing employment, infrastructure, or revenue that impact their country in a broader sense.

Led by the United States, non-OPEC+ production is forecast to rise by 1.6 mb/d in 2024 compared to 2.4 mb/d last year when global oil output climbed by 2 mb/d to 102 mb/d. Substantial gains will also come from Guyana, Brazil and Canada, all forecast to pump at record-highs this year.

3. Exogenous shocks

Events that economics cannot explain or control, such as natural disasters, war and geopolitical instability can all impact the price of oil. For example, when Hurricane Katrina hit the east coast of America in 2005, it damaged vital oil supply lines, causing an oil crisis in America. As a result, between 29 August and 5 September 2005, prices for fuel rose more than half a dollar in some parts of the country.

This was then exacerbated by a media frenzy in which it was said that supply of fuel would soon run out, which led to queues of people forming at petrol stations to fill up their tanks. The shortages were so severe that President George W. Bush released 30 million gallons of fuel from the American strategic reserves in an attempt to prevent fuel prices escalating further.

ICE Brent futures rose by $2/bbl during February 2024 as ongoing Houthi shipping attacks in the Red Sea kept a firm bid under crude prices. With oil tankers taking the longer route around Africa more oil was kept on water, further tightening the Atlantic Basin market and sending crude’s forward price structure deeper into backwardation.

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Next 👉 Demand factors

German companies are working on building contracts in Mariupol, are they complicit in covering up war crimes? It seems at least one of the German companies has deep links up to Putin. The company is now assisting Putin in covering up war crimes in Mariupol (see second tweet).

About Knauf - a designated International Sponsor of War:

After Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the company officially made it clear that it saw no reason to leave the aggressor's market. They said they would remain in Russia as long as the political and commercial situation allows them to do so.

In 2022 alone, one of the world's largest manufacturers of building materials, Knauf, paid about USD 117 million to the budget of the terrorist state of Russia. In addition, the German company actively promotes mobilization in Russia, sending its employees to the war against Ukraine.

This was the reason for the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) to include Knauf in the list of international sponsors of the war. Overall, since 1993, Knauf has invested more than EUR 1.65 billion in the Russian economy.

The company is represented in Russia by 10 subsidiaries, 20 plants, and almost 30 resource centers. The German manufacturer of building materials employs 4,000 people in Russia. Today, Knauf is the largest German investor in the construction industry in Russia. Knauf's management is also closely linked to the Kremlin regime.

The company's co-owner, Nikolaus Wilhelm Knauf, had the status of Honorary Consul of the Russian Federation for 23 years (from February 1999 to March 2022), with a representative office with the powers of an Honorary Consulate in Nuremberg.

Knauf also has existing facilities for the production of acoustic ceiling panels and suspension systems in the Special Economic Zone "Alabuga" (Tatarstan), on the territory of which the Russian production of the Shahed-136 UAV is organized.

After Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the company officially made it clear that it saw no reason to leave the aggressor's market: "We will remain in Russia as long as the political and commercial situation allows us to do so. We clearly have a responsibility for more than 4,000 employees and their families, as well as for customers and suppliers, many of whom we have had excellent and long-standing relationships with over the years."

In October 2022, German media focused on the fact that Knauf supported the mobilization of its employees into the Russian armed forces. It was said that the Russian managers of the Knauf plant in Krasnogorsk near Moscow agreed with the authorities on the lists of those who were needed at the plant and who could be sent to war.

Some of those who received a military subpoena were allegedly even taken to military enlistment offices in a company minibus. Also in February 2023, Knauf took part in the YugBuild exhibition event (Krasnodar Territory, Russia) and presented innovative building materials made in Russia.

Knauf specialists continue to build cities for the aggressor country. This contrasts especially cynically with the thousands of destroyed residential buildings in Ukraine by the aggressor's army, which is funded, among other things, by Knauf taxes.

Knauf is on the list of "International Sponsors of War" on the War and Sanctions portal is a powerful reputational tool for achieving integrity of supply chains in the international dimension, withdrawal of international business from Russia, and thus reducing the financial and technological capacity of the terrorist country to kill Ukrainians.

The consequences of being on the International Sponsors of War list, are worse than continuing to do business with the aggressor country.

November 23, 2023:
Still operating across 14 sites in Russia but promised to suspend new investments. In reality - it is engaged in ongoing support for Russia

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Next 👉 Knauf are helping Russia hide evidence of war crimes in Mariupol. Also Read the tagesschau .de report (link in references) - here is s small part translated.

Knauf is working with Russia to rebuild the thousands of home destroyed by Putin, effectively concealing the evidence of war crimes. 👇

“Mariupol was destroyed nationwide by Russia. Tens of thousands of civilians were killed and displaced. Reconstruction plays a central role in the Russian propaganda war. According to monitor research, German companies are also involved in this.

4,000 Knauf employees still in Russia Company Patriarch Nikolaus Knauf was a Russian Honorary Consul for more than two decades, in photos he smiles next to President Putin. He kept this post even after the annexation of Crimea, he described the subsequent sanctions against Russia as "terrible" in 2018.

According to his own statement, Knauf continues to employ 4,000 employees in Russia, converts billions there. Knauf writes Monitor in a general statement on the Russia business that they condemn the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and follow all EU sanctions against Russia.

They produce in Russia "exclusively for the Russian market". However, Knauf left an extensive catalogue of questions from the editors unanswered. So does the Russian business have nothing to do with the German parent company?

The sanction law expert Viktor Winkler contradicts: "The idea that I move with a subsidiary in Russia only in the Russian area, only in the Russian territories, that this is, so to speak, insignificant in sanctions, is an absolute myth and could not be further away from reality."

39 Nobel Laureates Condemn indicted war criminal - Putin.
28 March 2024

“Give up any illusions regarding Mr. Putin” called world politicians thirty-nine Nobel laureates. An appeal published in seven languages, scientists demand not to recognize Putin as a legal president-elect, increase aid to Ukraine, rescue political prisoners in Russia, support Russian democratic anti-Putin organizations, including independent Russian media.

“The war in Ukraine and the murder of Alexei Navalny concern not only Russia and Ukraine. Putin’s regime has shown that it poses a direct and obvious threat to all humanity,” note physicists, chemists, biologists, economists and writers.

They range from those who received science’s top prize more than forty-five years ago, like 1979 Nobel Prize winner in physics Sheldon Glashaw, to those who received it more recently, like 2023 Physiology or Medicine Prize winner Drew Weissman .

The signatories believe that politicians underestimate the criticality of the situation the world is in and remind heads of state of the lessons of the past:

“It is quite natural that this appeal appeared on behalf of the greatest scientists, because we are experiencing a decisive moment in history. It is important to realize that the current situation in the world represents something more than just a local war between Russia and Ukraine or even a conflict between Russia and the West.

Instead, we are witnessing a tectonic cultural shift with unpredictable consequences. Unfortunately, politicians and the world community have not yet fully realized the seriousness of this conflict. That is why the statement of world scientists, led by Nobel laureates who signed this letter, is of such paramount importance.

Politicians are obliged to heed the call of the laureates, otherwise we will all face the fate of the heroes of the film “Don’t look up”, who died because that they refused to believe in the seriousness of the catastrophe predicted by scientists,” noted Alexander Kabanov, one of the initiators of the appeal, professor at the University of North Carolina, member of the T-invariant coordinating council.

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Next 👉 The Letter: The letter:

Two years ago, Vladimir Putin started an unprovoked full-scale military aggression against Ukraine, resulting in deaths and destruction unseen since World War II. The war against Ukraine coincided with a growing and severe crackdown on political dissent and freedom of speech within Russia.

Recently, the world has been rocked by the death of Alexei Navalny, the principal political adversary of Putin. Before his incarceration, where he was tortured and murdered, Navalny survived a state-sponsored poisoning by chemical warfare. Despite that harrowing experience, he defiantly chose to return to Russia, exhibiting a true act of patriotism.

The war in Ukraine and the murder of Alexei Navalny concern not only Russia and Ukraine. Putin’s regime has shown that it poses a clear and imminent threat to humanity. Since assuming power in 2000, Putin has systematically dismantled post-Soviet democratic institutions and fueled conflicts in the former USSR states.

The full-scale aggression against Ukraine and the assassination of Alexei Navalny illustrate the escalation of the threat to a new level, as Putin’s regime no longer acknowledges any constraints on violating human rights and international norms.

The horrors of the world wars in the 20th century underscored that humanity can avoid self-destruction only by upholding principles of democracy and adhering to international human rights laws. However, Putin’s regime cynically tramples upon these principles.

The tragedies of 20th-century totalitarianism necessitate a commitment to freedoms and dignity of an individual. Putin blatantly violates them. He has transformed Russia into a heavily militarized police state, armed with the largest nuclear arsenal, which poses an existential threat to the world.

These dangers were articulated by Alexei Navalny and other leaders of the Russian opposition, echoing the legacy of their great predecessor and 1975 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Academician Andrei Sakharov.

We, scholars from around the world, implore world leaders to vigorously advocate for peace, progress, and human rights. As members of the international academic community, we are deeply concerned that scientific progress is under threat when dictators undermine intellectual freedom, especially during a time when global cooperation is more important than ever, in the shadow of worldwide pandemics, climate change, and the existential threat of weapons of mass destruction.

We call on world leaders and all people of good will to shed any illusions about Mr. Putin and his criminal regime. History teaches us that appeasing the aggressor means encouraging further crimes against humanity. No temporary benefits can justify this. We are determined not to repeat Munich-1938!

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Next 👉 We call on world leaders..

Drone strategy update 21 March 2024.

The range of drones striking refineries is growing, attacked nearly 1000 miles deep into Russian heartlands have been successful. Ukraine is developing the drone capability and technology to improve payload and distance.

Ukraine could shortly shift attacks to include terminals where oil is being shipped from, and not limiting the attacks to just refineries. Ukraine has attacked refineries located North East of Crimea, located a stones throw from two key oil terminals that serve shipments from the Black Sea.

Ukraine has also targeted refineries near St Petersburg, again a stones throw from terminals serving the Baltic Sea. Targeting the terminals would see additional pressure on Russian revenue streams in oil exports.

Russia has used a fleet of “shadow” tankers to move its oil around the world, with much of it travelling through the Baltic Sea or the Arctic. That presents an opportunity for Ukraine’s drone strike strategy, which may unfold in the coming weeks and months.

When a significant portion of Russia’s refinery capacity is disabled by these attacks, the volume of excess crude oil that would normally be processed at refineries will increase sharply. Russia does not have the capacity to store a lot of Crude oil and currently it is approaching maximum capacity of storage.

If the crude cannot be sold abroad for a steep discount, then Russia will find itself in a paradoxical position, with a shortage of refined fuel for it’s own market, yet the country will have an excess of oil.

See the attached image for the drone strikes so far. If all of these refineries were knocked out with irreparable damage, Russia would lose 50% of its refining capacity. Repairing the damage to these refineries is proving very difficult, as most of the key technical and equipment requirements are foreign and both the parts and know how is subject to sanctions.

These are a few effects of the Drone strategy:

👉 Excess oil will have to be sold at a discount (with increased supply in the market, this will drive oil prices lower - just when they have been working with the bone-saw crew in Saudi Arabia to cut supply in order to drive the oil price higher)

👉 This then puts Putin’s arrangement with OPEC+ in jeopardy, where all OPEC+ countries agree to cut specific output as a percentage of their overall capacity. If Russia has to renege on its output cut promise, the other OPEC+ countries are entitled to up their output and ignore the agreed cuts, which substantially reduce their own revenues. This may lead to an over-supply of oil on the markets and this will quite likley drive the global oil price back down to rock bottom.

👉 Crude oil as a revenue stream is not as profitable as refined out, so even if RUssia do offload excess oil onto the market, it will probably be at a steep discount, the price of oil will drop - reducing profits further and Russia will not be able to make up the shortfall in profitable revenue between crude and refined products.

👉 Even in peacetime, the failure of several oil refineries could create a significant problem, and in a situation where the Kremlin needs to provide a huge army that burns thousands of tons of fuel per day, it is not only about money, but also about the ability to provide the occupying forces with fuel and lubricants.

👉 Reduced refining capacity will immediately result in higher fuel prices for motorists and farmers in Russia, as well as shortages in supply. Spring has begun and farmers may find difficulty in planting crops - is just one likely outcome from shortages in the refined oil product market.

👉 Putin has already imposed a ban on exporting refined products, with refineries now mandated to sell only to the Russian market at steeply capped and subsidised prises, denying refineries with profits too

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Next 👉 What damage has been done? What do we know about the damage inflicted thus far:

The strikes, by the end of February had reduced Moscow’s overall oil processing capacity by 370,500 barrels per day, or 7% of its total output, according to calculations by Reuters.

Fast forward to march 2024 - The Ryazan oil refinery alone - which was set on fire after a drone attack March 13, forcing the shutdown of two damaged primary oil refining units. The plant, which is located south of Moscow, produces around 317,000 barrels per day, or 5.8% of Russia’s total refined crude oil.

By the 21st march the impact has grown to approximately 14 - 16%of the processing capacity - circa 900,000 barrels per day, which is valued at around $70million per day in lost revenue.

⁉️ But the losses don’t end there - $70million per day is the value of the crude oil value pb, when in fact what they have lost is the refined oil value which is even more expensive, meaning the real loss in revenue is closer to $135million per day!

Confirmation of this estimate: Per Bloomberg, however, JP Morgan estimates Russia’s refining capacity losses are significantly higher than Gunvor, at 900,000 bpd. This would add a hefty risk premium to middle distillate prices because it would take weeks if not months to restore that capacity, the report noted.

Reports from Russian telegram: “A a ton of AI-95 on the stock exchange cost 63,361 rubles - a record high since September 2023 and 12% more expensive than in early March. In time, the rise in prices directly correlates with attacks by Ukrainian drones on refineries in the European part of Russia.”

Brent crude oil has risen to $86 pb and Urals (Russian Crude) is trading at $79 pb.

Depending on Russia’s reaction to these drone strikes, the price of oil may very well start to drop rapidly - if Russia is forced to offload excess crude onto the market.

Watch out for the reaction of OPEC+ - will other countries not party to the conflict hold their voluntary cuts, will Saudi Arabia agree to decrease their output to stabilise a falling oil price - and will China’ s economy slowdown lead to a reduction in their demand, again putting pressure on the oil price falling.

These are interesting times, Russia is being subject to a massive loss in income which they have used to fund their military and nefarious foreign country conflicts and propaganda across the globe.

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The International Olympics Committee has announced they will ban Russia from the opening ceremony, but allow Russian athletes to compete under the Genocide Flag.

The International Olympic Committee has published the disgusting “AIN flag”, which neutral athletes will have to compete under, and the genocide anthem, which will be played to any dope head, military officer-cum athlete, who is an event competitor.

This is a genocide sportswashing feint is designed by Thomas Bach and the IOC, to give Russia “a path” into the Olympics. The conditions set by the IOC in 2023 was that no athlete who had affiliation, or advocated for the war, or who is linked to the military - will be allowed to participate.

⁉️ Nearly 400 Ukrainian Olympics athletes won’t be able to compete.

Because they are DEAD.

☠️ Murdered by Russians in their illegal invasion of Ukraine. ☠️

⁉️ Thomas Bach (IOC “President”), and the corrupt IOC Board are attempting to sportswash Russia into the Olympics in Paris 2024. He called critics of Russia “deplorable” in March 2023 - and vowed personally to his friend, donor and indicted war criminal - Vladimir Putin, that he would find “a path” for Russia to compete.

The IOC are openly refusing to acknowledge that documented proof of athletes and their active military roles and ranks. The [Russian] athletes permitted to participate in the Olympics are not ‘neutral’, but are open supporters of the war, which is confirmed by information published on the Internet.

⁉️ – the Russian Army sports club’s website states that three-time Olympic champion luger Albert Demchenko is a reserve major in the Russian army.

⁉️ Daniil Serokhvostov, biathlete and a participant in the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, is a junior sergeant in the army. He has been training for the Olympics at CSKA.

⁉️ Snowboarder Dmitry Loginov also participated in the 2022 Winter Olympics as a member of the CSKA team. Loginov's Russian army rank is “praporshchik” — equivalent to the rank of sergeant major.

⁉️ Two-time Olympic champion in diving Dmitry Sautin has the military rank of lieutenant colonel and is also a member of CSKA.

⁉️ Two-time Olympic figure skating champion and CSKA team member Evgeni Plushenko holds the rank of senior lieutenant in the Russian army.

⁉️ CSKA athlete and Russian army corporal Evgenia Burtasova took part in the biathlon competitions at the 2022 Beijing Olympics.

⁉️ CSKA team biathlete Irina Kazakevich has the rank of praporshchik (sergeant major) in the army. She won a silver medal at the 2022 Beijing Olympics.

⁉️ Eduard Latypov, a three-time Olympic biathlon bronze medalist and member of the CSKA team, was promoted to the rank of lieutenant in the army on April 29, 2022. Upon his promotion, Latypov thanked Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu: “Our military spirit helps us cope with these difficulties and achieve victories. Thank you for your attention to sports and physical training in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. I'm proud to be part of the army family."

You have the opportunity to prove Bach wrong - but you MUST raise your voice and reject the IOC’s decision to allow Russia to participate.

#NAFO - please rise up and make this a regular retweet. The world needs to deliver this message to the IOC, every sponsor and advertiser and all public representatives.

Retweet this now please! Time is ticking!CSKA.ru

https://twitter.com/beefeater_fella/status/1770077315101262163

Ukrainian Refugees Update 2024:

Can Europe afford Ukraine losing the war? Could it sustain the exodus of Ukrainians if they have to flee their home form the invading genocidal regime?

This thread explores some important context and information to help you form a view on the effect of Russia being allowed to prevail in Ukraine, because we did not provide Ukraine with the tools to prevent this scenario.

The economic impact of the war in Ukraine may be less urgent than the immediate suffering and death in the warzone. It has, nonetheless, proved to be immense – and especially for Ukraine and Russia. The impacts themselves cause further harm by driving food insecurity and poverty to perilous levels. The longer the war goes on, the deeper the economic crisis goes.

Much is still unfolding on the exact scale of the war’s impacts. But through insights, this thread summarises leading expert analysis - building a quantitative picture of the war’s economic hazards. While a clear end to the war remains out of view, the question of what impacts might materialise if the West failed to support Ukraine, and Russia prevailed - resulting in millions of Ukrainians migrating out of Ukraine.

The impact of the war in Ukraine and migration:

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, has killed many civilians, caused massive displacements of the population, and destroyed infrastructure to a significant extent. By early 2023, about 18% of the population, or eight million people, have taken shelter in Europe, and a sizable share of the population has relocated to safer regions in Ukraine (UNHCR Operational Data Portal, 2022a).

This figure is different to the EU’s claimed figures discussed set out below, probably because of the number of grey refugees - those who are unregistered and exist in a shadow subset of the refugee population.

📊Ukraine’s Population composition

The structure of Ukraine's population changed between the early 1990s and 2020 (see graphic attached). In 1992, those born in the 1930s formed the largest cohort, and the population structure was young with large groups of individuals aged 5–45. However, by then a decline was already visible in the number of children in the 0–4 age group. In 2020, the population structure by age and sex looks remarkably different.

The pyramid shows an ageing population and a gender imbalance. The group of 0- to 20-year-olds is relatively small, and women outnumber men in middle and older ages. Overall, past population trends in Ukraine, especially significant emigration in the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s and low fertility since the mid-1990s, have led to an ageing and declining population, making it vulnerable to any external shock.

📉 Population change

Ukraine gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Since then, its population has been continuously declining. In 1991, there were almost 52 million people in Ukraine but by 2021, the total population has decreased to 41.6 million (Figure 1). The decline has been gradual except for a sharp decrease in population size between 2014 and 2015 from 45.4 million to 42.9 million.

This rapid population decline was related to the annexation of Crimea by Russia (a population of 2.3 million in 2014) and the War in Donbas (around 200,000 refugees and 10,000 deaths). Overall, the size of the Ukrainian population has declined by 20% since 1991.

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Next 👉 The key global impacts What are the key global impacts from the illegal war so far?

⁉️ Poverty and food insecurity

For the people of Ukraine, incomes have plummeted. Poverty in the country soared from 5.5% of the population to 24.2% in 2022, according to the World Bank. The war has thus pushed 7.1 million more people into poverty, undoing 15 years of progress.

Further, Ukraine is now one of the most food-insecure countries in the world, despite being one of the world’s biggest exporters of crops, such as maize, barley and wheat, before the war.

The United Nations (UN) World Food Programme estimates that one in three Ukrainian households is food-insecure, rising to one in two in some areas of the east and south. Ukraine’s rising deprivation is, in part, due to job losses following Russia’s destruction of infrastructure such as ports and manufacturing plants. It is also a result of a slow-down, or cessation, of economic activity including agriculture (see below).

Deaths among household earners also add to the deprivation. In August 2023, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) recorded 26,717 civilian casualties in the country: 9,511 killed and 17,206 injured since the conflict started.

Firstly, consider what is the impact of the war on countries around the world so far, after two years of war and their illegal invasion of Ukraine.

⁉️ Increased cost of living

Clearly, many would argue that there is never a good time for war. But the timing of Russia’s first full-scale attack on Ukraine in February 2022 felt particularly brutal.

It came at a point when societies around the world were attempting to resume ‘business as usual’ after two gruelling years of the pandemic. Businesses faced chaotic supply chains as they tried to meet resurging demand for goods and services, and started passing on rising production costs to their customers.

Russia’s attack on Ukraine placed a further squeeze on critical commodities – food and energy. This was the result of reduced output from both countries and sanctions on Russia. Costs climbed even further, triggering inflation rates that far outpace wage growth. This cost of living crisis has diminished the health and wellbeing of people around the world, especially for the poorest, and increased the risk of famine

⁉️ Global food insecurity

The conflict has hit food security around the world. Before the war, Ukraine and Russia were together the world’s largest exporter of wheat – responsible for over a third (36%) of wheat exports. They also exported more than half of the world’s sunflower oil. Early predictions, including those in Economics Observatory, that the conflict would exacerbate global food insecurity have, sadly, proved to be correct. It has hit developing and emerging economies the hardest, as they rely more on Ukraine and Russia for fuel and grain imports.

Without equitable food distribution, achieving global food security (one of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals) by 2030 could become elusive, even with a surge in food exports and supply. Food prices are still snowballing in many developing countries. For example, in March 2023, food inflation climbed to over 24% year-on-year in Nigeria. This was at the same time as some European countries were cautiously celebrating a fall in global food prices.

⁉️ High Energy prices

The severe economic sanctions on Russia have triggered further increases in energy prices in the international market. The ultimate picture is one of further inflation, as energy adds costs to each stage – production, storage and transport – in the supply chains of goods and services. During the first two weeks of the war, Brent prices – the European oil benchmark – increased by more than 25%. By the end of March, European gas prices were around 580% higher than a year earlier, although they have fallen back since then.

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Next 👉 Impacts on global financial markets

Breaking: Putin puts his card on the table over Taiwan.

While some Taiwanese fear they could face a fate similar to Ukrainians in their own confrontation with mainland China, there has been no real backlash against Russia on the island since the start of the war in Ukraine. The relationship between Russia and Taiwan is relatively new, dating back to perestroika. Any prior connection was hindered by ideological disagreements: fighting communism was the foreign policy priority for Taiwan’s ruling Kuomintang party.

A Russian presidential decree on relations between the two countries was signed by Boris Yeltsin in 1992, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Even then, it quickly became clear that Moscow had no intention of sacrificing stability in its relations with mainland China for the benefits of friendship with Taiwan.

The decree emphasized that relations with Taipei were unofficial. Still, the cautious step toward Taiwan promised economic advantages for Russia, as the island was at that time experiencing a golden era of development.

From the vantage point of 2024, recent relations between Russia and Taiwan look like a distant dream. Although bilateral ties were never a priority for Moscow or Taipei, senior delegations from both sides had exchanged visits, and visa requirements for tourists were abolished.

Officially - Taiwan does support Ukraine financially. An example is Nov. 15, 2023 - Taiwan's representative to Poland Sharon Wu signed several memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with representatives from the Ukrainian city of Bucha and several non-governmental organizations, pledging a combined US$3.8 million in aid.

Taiwan has emerged as an important Asian ally, offering strong support to Ukraine at a time when other countries in the region have preferred to maintain a more neutral stance.
This backing was recently evident as Ukraine struggled with the consequences of a nationwide infrastructure bombing campaign unleashed by Vladimir Putin with the aim of freezing the country into submission.

However…

In January 2024, a joint investigation by Taiwanese publication The Reporter and Russia’s The Insider revealed that Russia continues to import Taiwanese machinery and processing centers, despite all prohibitions.

Up to 50 percent of the banned equipment reaches Russia through Turkey, with the rest arriving through mainland China and other countries. As a result, Russia remains one of the largest buyers of machinery from Taiwan, with some of it destined for military-industrial complex enterprises.

On February 3, Taiwanese authorities drastically increased the size of fines for violating sanctions against Russia, but it remains to be seen how efficiently the law will be implemented.

On the political front, the island authorities still refrain from making hostile statements concerning Moscow, other than occasional criticism of the Kremlin’s adherence to the One China principle. In November 2023, the experienced diplomat Luo Jingru was appointed head of the Taipei-Moscow Commission in the Russian capital, indicating Taipei’s desire to continue to develop bilateral relations.

The Taiwanese education department continues to grant scholarships for its universities to Russians; Russia studies programs are still in place; and the Russian service of Radio Taiwan International is still broadcasting. In East Asia, the Russia-Ukraine conflict seems far, far away. Taiwan is no exception, and so in some situations, it is prepared to turn a blind eye to violations of export restrictions. Both Moscow and Taipei will likely try to maintain relations at their current level.

Until today..

Emboldened by his sham election - Putin let rip in a news conference tonight, saying:

TAIWAN BELONGS TO CHINA

See the translated video here 👇



FAFO time for ongoing trade with Russia, Taiwan?

https://twitter.com/SputnikInt/status/1769479667092729953/video/1

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Russian oil revenue is increasing!

☠️ The Price Cap MUST be CUT ☠️

☠️ Europe MUST end fossil fuel TRADE with Russia ☠️

2 years into the illegal war, Russia has seen a reduction in it’s oil output and oil shipments, but oil revenue continues to rise. This thread explains why this is happening, and what needs to be done to reduce oil revenue which funds the genocidal war in Ukraine.

👉 Crude Oil Shipments Update

Russian crude oil exports to Europe and Turkey have nose-dived in 2024. A year ago in January 2023, crude oil shipments 4 week average was around 1.5 million barrels per day.

Crude shipments to Northern Europe (1.2 million bpd in January 2022, to zero by the end of 2022) and Mediterranean (also ended by the end of 2022) have dried up, while crude oil shipments via the Black Sea ground to a halt in February 2024 - leaving Turkey as the main destination for Russian crude oil shipments increasing it’s Russian crude oil shipments from 100,000 bpd to 400,000 bpd by 2024.

Shipments to Asia:

At the start of 2022, Russia was exporting 1.2 million bpd by seaborne transport, with the biggest customer being China. The biggest increase however, came from India, who increased orders to over 3.5 million bpd in May 2023.
Over the past year there has been a decrease in sales to these countries. Analysis of total seaborne shipments show that in March 2024, Russia shipped 2.8 million bdp in total, and the level of oil to India has halved.

Reuters reported in February 2024, “Imports from Russia declined 4.2% to 1.3 million barrels per day (bpd), according to LSEG data. Data from ship tracking agency Vortexa showed a slide of 9% to 1.2 million bpd.

CREA (Energy and clean ) published it’s latest 2024 report claiming crude oil accounted for 82% (EUR 1.6 bn) of India’s total fossil fuel imports from Russia. Oil products accounted for 11% (EUR 0.2 bn), and coal accounted for 7% (EUR 0.14 bn) of their total imports in February.

India’s import volumes of Russian crude oil decreased by 7%, subsequently also reducing its total imports by 7%. India’s crude oil imports from Russia fell for a third consecutive month, impacted by ongoing issues with payments and The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions.

While some sanctioned vessels started delivering Sokol shipments stranded at sea, they were mostly diverted to China.

The narrowing of Russian crude discounts versus Middle Eastern crude, recent U.S. sanctions on shipowners carrying Russian crude above the price cap and rising tanker premiums as a result of the Red Sea attacks have made Russian crude less attractive for Indian refiners in recent months," said Serena Huang, Vortexa's head of APAC analysis. India's imports of Russian crude could fall further in the coming months”, she added.

China and India are the only two big buyers of Russia seaborne oil left in the market for Russia. The 1 million bpd reduction is sales to India corresponds to the 1 million bpd cuts in Russian production they committed to with OPEC+. (Russia and Saudi hatched a plan in April 2023 to cut 500,000 bpd from Russian oil output to raise the price of oil, and last month Russia agreed to increase that 500k cut up to 1 million bpd reduction).

It could be argued that Russia agreed to these cuts, not in the interests of OPEC+, but because India’s reduction in purchases has resulted in Russia not having the storage capacity for the oil that India now longer wants to buy.

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Next 👉 Europe is still funding Russia’s war machine.

⁉️IT HAS TO STOP⁉️air.org 👉 Europe is still buying Russian fossil fuels, providing a substantial revenue to fund the genocidal war too.

❌ In February 2024 - The EU’s imports of fossil fuels from Russia consisted of pipeline gas (39% worth EUR 0.7 bn), LNG (31% worth EUR 0.55 bn), crude oil (30% worth EUR 0.53 bn), and oil products (EUR 0.15 bn). This is around €2 Billion in revenue for the month, equivalent to €24 Billion a year!

❌ Landlocked Central and Eastern European countries and some Southern European countries received Russian fossil gas via pipeline through Ukraine and TurkStream in February 2024. Crude oil was obtained via the Druzhba oil pipeline. The EU has not banned fossil gas and crude oil via pipelines.

❌ Hungary was the largest importer of Russian fossil fuels within the EU in February, importing fossil fuels worth EUR 253 mn. Imports comprised of crude oil and gas, delivered via pipelines, valued at EUR 226 mn and EUR 132 mn, respectively. While there was a marginal month-on-month decrease in Hungary’s pipeline gas imports from Russia, crude oil imports saw a sharp 23% (EUR 42 mn) rise.

❌ Despite a 10% (EUR 12 mn) drop in pipeline gas imports, Slovakia’s imports of Russian fossil fuels rose by 4% (12 mn) in February. Their increased imports of crude via pipeline (14% worth EUR 24 mn) more than made up for the difference.

❌ Belgium’s entire imports of Russian fossil fuels in February consisted of LNG valued at EUR 253 mn. While Belgium’s total volume of LNG imports rose by a mere 4%, their imports from Russia saw a much more significant 44% rise. In February, Belgium’s LNG re-exports rose by a massive 81%, with a significant portion directed towards Spain and China. Almost half of Belgium’s total imports of LNG in February were subsequently exported to other countries, pointing towards the country’s role in transhipping Russian gas across Europe.

❌ The Czech Republic was the EU’s fourth-largest importer of Russian fossil fuels, importing EUR 116 mn of crude oil and EUR 0.74 mn of pipeline gas. While their imports of Russian crude rose by 12% (EUR 12 mn), their imports of gas via pipeline dropped by 17% (EUR 15 mn).

❌ In February, France was the EU’s fifth-largest importer of Russian fossil fuels. The majority of their imports consisted of LNG valued at EUR 161 mn. Despite a 12% rise in total monthly LNG imports to France, Russian LNG imports dropped by 40%, substituted by LNG from the USA.

👉 Russian revenue from Oil in 2024

Oill accounts for roughly one-third of tax receipts and half of all export revenue. The Kyiv School of Economics estimates that Moscow made $178bn from oil sales last year and that revenues could rise to $200bn in 2024 – not far off the $218bn earned in 2022.

Last month, the majority of Russian Urals were sold above $60. But, Western countries have been clamping down, since a reported information request from the US Treasury to shipping companies suspected of violating the cap.

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Next 👉 The Price Cap FOLLY.

⁉️IT HAS TO STOP⁉️

Iran-Houthi Connection explained

Militant groups allied with Iran are frequently called Tehran’s proxies, but many experts say the Houthis are better characterized as Iran’s willing partner. Houthis and the Islamic Republic share an ideological affinity and geopolitical interests that motivate the Houthis to assist Iran. “They don’t have to be told, they don’t have to be coerced, they don’t even really have to be bribed. They’re a very loyal fellow traveler to the Islamic Revolution in Iran.”

In return for Iran’s aid, the Houthis serve as an increasingly important part of Iran’s “axis of resistance," a network of state and nonstate actors seeking to undermine Western influence in the Middle East. That mission involves pushing the United States out of the region, destroying Israel, and intimidating those countries’ regional partners. The Houthis regularly engage with leaders from across the alliance, especially Hezbollah, Knights says, and that group provides the Houthis with support at Iran’s behest. In addition, IRGC and Hezbollah representatives advise the Houthis’ military command authority, the Jihad Council, though their influence on Houthi decision-making is unclear

Iranian military support to the Houthis began as early as 2009, amid the Houthis’ first war against Yemen’s government. Most experts agree that the Houthis were receiving weapons from Iran by 2014, the year they captured Sanaa. In both cases, military intervention against the Houthis by Iran’s regional rival, Saudi Arabia, likely catalyzed Tehran’s increased interest in the group.

While the Houthis hold Iran’s supreme leader and the Islamic Revolution in high esteem, notable differences separate them from Iran and its closest partners. The Houthis don’t practice the “Twelver” Shiism prevalent in Iran, though they have reportedly incorporated Twelver beliefs into their interpretation of Zaidism. They also weren’t founded with Iran’s help, as groups including Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Iraq’s Badr Organization were. And unlike with some Iran-backed groups, Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi reportedly doesn’t see himself as subordinate to Iran’s supreme leader.

The military relationship:

The role of Iran has been decisive in providing the Houthis with smuggled weapons and expertise to project power into the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait. Iranian support has boosted the military prowess of Yemen’s Houthis, helping them project force into the Red Sea. In return, the group has extended the reach of Iran’s anti-West axis of resistance.

Iran is the Houthis’ primary benefactor, providing them mostly with security assistance, such as weapons transfers, training, and intelligence support. In late January 2024, for example, U.S. forces intercepted a shipment carrying military aid from Iran to the Houthis, including drone parts, missile warheads, and anti-tank missile units. Such aid mainly reaches the Houthis via Iran’s paramilitary Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

For the Houthis, the Iran connection provides more sophisticated weaponry than they could acquire on their own, especially missiles and drones. Iranian support has bolstered the group’s fighting abilities, helping the Houthis gain and maintain military superiority within Yemen, but experts say it has had greater impact elsewhere. “The role of Iran has been decisive in providing the Houthis with smuggled weapons and expertise to project power into the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait,”

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Next 👉 Iran is the beneficiary in Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, UAE, US coalition, while providing support for Hamas. The Houthis assist Iran by menacing Saudi Arabia’s border and protecting Iranian ships in the Red Sea, giving Iran room to evade sanctions on oil shipping. At the same time, the Houthis help field test Iranian-made weapons on Yemen’s front lines and in the Red Sea. Like all axis members, the Houthis offer Iran plausible deniability; members routinely claim responsibility for attacks likely ordered or perpetrated by Iran. For instance, many experts blame Iran for attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities that the Houthis claimed in September 2019.

In what the Houthis are calling a show of support for Hamas and Palestinians, the group has attacked supposed U.S.- and Israel-linked targets in the Red Sea and even fired missiles at Israel, with ruinous effects for international shipping. Experts say it is unclear whether Iran or Houthi leaders ordered the initial strikes, but Tehran has voiced its unequivocal support for the operations and reportedly assists the Houthis in targeting vessels.

The Houthi threat in the Red Sea concerns Washington especially, as freedom of navigation is a core U.S. interest. In response, the United States is working with the United Kingdom to bomb Houthi targets in Yemen, and U.S. and European Union naval missions are protecting ships in the Red Sea.

The US says Iran enabled the Houthis to target ships, and President Biden has sent a "private message" to Tehran urging it to stop. Iran has denied involvement. Saudi Arabia and the US say Iran has smuggled weapons - including drones, and cruise and ballistic missiles - to the Houthis during Yemen's civil war in violation of a UN arms embargo. It says such missiles and drones have been used in attacks on Saudi Arabia, as well as its ally, the United Arab Emirates.

According to the Italian Institute of International Political Studies, Iran has helped the Houthis build factories to make drones in Yemen. The Houthis have also received military advice and support from the Lebanese Islamist group Hezbollah, the US-based Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Military Academy says.

Like all terrorist regimes and groups, Iran denies supplying weapons to the Houthis and says it only supports them politically.

Responses to the attacks and why the Red Sea is an important battlefield.

In response to the war in the Gaza Strip, the Houthis started firing drones and missiles towards Israel. Most have been intercepted. On October 31, over three weeks after the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war, a Houthi spokesman announced that the group had launched a “large number” of ballistic missiles and drones toward the Jewish state.

Israel reported that it destroyed an unidentified “aerial target” over the Red Sea. Ever since, the Houthis have continued to launch missiles and drones against the southern Israeli city of Eilat. All of them were intercepted by Israel and the U.S. Navy.

On 19 November, 2023 - the Houthis hijacked a commercial ship in the Red Sea and have since attacked more than two dozen others with drones, missiles and speed boats. The Houthis say they are targeting ships which are Israeli-owned, flagged or operated, or which are heading to Israeli ports. However, many of the vessels which have been attacked have no connection with Israel. Also among those attacked was a British-linked tanker, which the Houthis said was in response to "American-British aggression".

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Next 👉 Attacks in the Red Sea and the US coalition response.

Since they first began launching missile and drone attacks at commercial ships to protest the Israeli military offensive in Gaza last November, the Houthis in Yemen have drastically cut maritime trade in the Red Sea, a strategic global trade chokepoint.

Iran is a key supporter and enabler of the Houthis. During the Yemen conflict, Iran provided political, military and other forms of support, including training, arms and intelligence. It is believed that Iranian intelligence, technology and weapons have enabled the Houthis to conduct their attacks in the Red Sea.

U.S. and British strikes on Houthi military targets, which began on Jan. 11, have degraded the Houthis’ arsenal, but they haven’t stopped or even slowed the group’s attacks so far.

The attacks may arguably have proved to be a massive boon for the Houthis’ reputation and credentials both internally in Yemen and in the region, amid a groundswell of anger at the high civilian casualty toll in Gaza.

If you want to learn about this conflict, why it matters, who the key players are and how it will affect you - it’s covered in this thread!

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Next 👉 The Houthis potted history History:

The Houthis are a large clan originating from Yemen’s northwestern Saada province. They practice the Zaydi form of Shiism. Zaydis make up around 35 percent of Yemen’s population.

A Zaydi imamate ruled Yemen for 1,000 years, before being overthrown in 1962. Since then, the Zaydis – stripped of their political power – have struggled to restore their authority and influence in Yemen. In the 1980s, the Houthi clan began a movement to revive Zaydi traditions, feeling threatened by state-funded Salafist preachers who established a base in Houthi areas. Not all Zaydis, however, align with the Houthi movement.

Houthi insurgents have clashed with Yemen’s government for more than a decade. Since 2011, the Houthi movement has expanded beyond its Zaydi roots and become a wider movement opposed to the central government. The insurgents have also begun referring to themselves as Ansarullah, or “Party of God.”

Show me religion - I’ll show you a war..

Like other Shiites, Zaydis believe that only descendants of the Prophet Mohammed’s cousin and son-in-law, Ali, have the right to lead the Muslim community as imams - divinely-appointed successors of the Prophet. Most adherents of Zaydism reside in Yemen, and Zaydis make up around eight percent of the world’s 70 million Shiites.

But the Zaydis are distinct from the “Twelver” form of Shiism practiced by the majority of the world’s Shiites, including most Shiites in Iran. Twelver Shiites believe the twelfth imam, whom they consider infallible, disappeared in 874AD and will one day return to usher in an age of justice as the Mahdi, or promised one. In the Mahdi’s absence, Twelver Shiites believe clerics can substitute for his authority on certain issues. The faithful are obliged to obey the clerics’ religious rulings, a power transferred to Iran’s theocracy after the 1979 revolution.

Zaydis, also known as “Fivers,” believe that Zayd, the great-grandson of Ali, was the rightful fifth imam. But Twelver Shiites consider Zayd’s brother, Mohammad al Baqir, the fifth imam. The Zaydis do not recognize the later Twelver imams, and instead believe anyone related to Ali is eligible to lead the Muslim community. They also reject the Twelver doctrine that the imam is infallible.

The Houthis’ close connections to Iran, however, seem to have led to an increase in Twelver influence. “Twelver Shiite practices that are novel to Yemen are increasingly being incorporated into religious practice; for example, the commemoration of Ashura was publicly celebrated by Houthi supporters en masse for the first time in 2017, and Yemeni Shiites now openly observe Eid al-Ghadir, a Shiite religious celebration rumored to have been practiced mostly in secret previously,” according to Sama’a Al-Hamdani. The movement’s leadership has close ties to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Lebanese Hezbollah.

In the early 1990s, Iran accommodated Houthi religious students. Among those students was Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, who led the Houthi insurgency in Yemen against the government.

The Houthis have been engaged in a war for eight years against the Saudi-backed government in Yemen—and have maintained their arsenal under years of Saudi airstrikes. The Houthis, a Zaydi Shiite movement that has been fighting Yemen’s Sunni-majority government since 2004.

Following the departure of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2012, Iranian officials began to rhetorically support the Houthis.

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Next 👉 Iran using the terrorists playbook

OPEC+ cartel (including Russia), announce additional oil output cuts today 03 March 2024. Their intention is to drive oil prices higher and earn more revenue, but will they succeed? A thread offering insight and conclusions:

S&P reported “OPEC and its allies will maintain their tight grip on oil supply, with several members on March 3 announcing extensions of their voluntary production cuts that had been scheduled to expire at the end of the month”.

The supply curbs will see the 22-country OPEC+ alliance continue to rein in barrels to tighten the market into the Northern Hemisphere summer, when oil demand typically peaks, as the group battles growing output from the US, Brazil and other rival producers, while global economic indicators have yet to quell fears of recessions in major consuming nations.

The alliance in November had announced its latest tranche of production cuts, including a 1 million b/d reduction from Saudi Arabia and a combined 700,000 b/d from several other members. Those are additional to several other rounds of production cuts in place under the OPEC+ Declaration of Cooperation agreed until the end of 2024.

In Nov 2023, OPEC+ announced there would be no new group cut target for 2024, Instead members led by Saudi Arabia to make voluntary cuts: Saudi to roll over 1 million bpd cut into Q1, 2024, Russia agreed to cut 500,000 bpd. (Russia will lower crude output by 350,000 b/d and exports by 121,000 b/d in April; 400,000 b/d in production and 71,000 b/d in exports in May; and 471,000 b/d from production in June 2024).

OPEC kingpin Saudi Arabia, which co-chairs the alliance with Russia and has led the group's efforts to bolster prices, will keep its crude production at two-year lows of around 9 million b/d through June, an energy ministry official said. Russia, which for the first quarter had committed to only a mix of crude and product export cuts, will now make some formal reductions to its crude production, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said.

What might the effect of Russia’s oil output cuts have on Russian revenue?

Russia (and all OPEC+ countries who have agreed to cut output), will see their income from oil fall.

Note: this is IF the prices remain the same as today.

However, production cuts are designed to reduce supply on the global market, which will almost certainly lead to the price of oil increasing. The OPEC+ and Russia’s objective is to push the price of oil up towards the $100 per barrel mark?

Various factors will determine the price movement - I have summarised a few (but not all!)

Factors that will push the price of oil up:

👉 A reduced amount of oil output and supply by the OPEC+ cartel (a simple supply and demand effect)

👉 Market sentiment, i.e fears of oil shortages and oil price spikes

👉 Destabilisation factors such as the Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping, and escalations in conflicts worldwide

Factors that will push the price of oil down:

👉 Reduced demand for oil globally. It is worth noting that The International Energy Agency (IEA) has forecast a slowdown in 2024 demand growth as "the last phase of the pandemic economic rebound dissipates and as advancing energy efficiency gains, expanding electric vehicle fleets and structural factors reassert themselves."

👉 Major economies such as China falling into deflationary cycles and recessions - again leading to less demand for oil

👉 Conflict resolution worldwide - and in particular in the Middle East.

👉 The increase in oil output by countries not part of the oil thugs cartels - OPEC and OPEC+

👉 Members of the oil cartels leaving, for example - in December 2023, Angola announced their exit from OPEC+, saying it ‘gains nothing’ from remaining in the group after disagreements emerge over production cuts. This means they are now free to increase production as they see fit.

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Next 👉 Oil prices and trends Russian Oil prices trend to today:

👉 In January, the average Urals Europe cost and freight (CFR) spot price was USD 64.45 per barrel, a 7% increase compared to December.

👉 The prices for the East Siberia Pacific Ocean (ESPO) and Sokol blends, primarily associated with Asian markets, rose 3% in January — the first surge in two months. The average price for ESPO was USD 75.37 per barrel in January.

👉 Urals prices fluctuated around the specified price cap level (60 USD) for the entire month, and ESPO prices remained far above the price cap.

👉 Throughout this period, vessels owned or insured by the G7 and European countries continued to load Russian oil in all Russian port regions. These cases call for further investigation for breach of sanctions.

What will the additional agreed output cuts do to Russian revenue, and how might this affect the war in Ukraine?

Firstly a disclaimer: economic data and reports have been classified as a state secret, and weaponised to project financial positions that are totally unreliable, regularly ammended and downgraded and can not be verified due to Putin’s decree covering economic reporting and data.

Russia is still posting deficit losses on a monthly basis, adding to an ongoing budget deficit. The latest figures “published” by the Russian government is now on the Russian Ministry of Finance portal. The data sheet offering some reported information contains multiple blank or redacted columns.

Oil and Gas revenue is available, but the data may well be manipulated to reflect Russia in a good economic light. Substantial adjustments down from these published annual and accumalitive figures have been made every year in the 4 weeks after the end of the year, and the trend is the positions month to month are always overstated.

Russian current “published” revenue in Oil and Gas.

Only one month’s data is published (January) for 2024 revenue. It claims total sales for oil and gas in January equated to 675 billion Rubles (equal to $7.5 billion). This is nearly a 60% increase on the previous year, 2023 - but it also represents a 55% fall in the pre-invasion income in January 2021.

This 55% fall is explained by way of a huge decrease in pipeline gas sales to Europe, substantially reduced oil revenue as a result of the sanctions on Russian oil and gas, the $60 price cap imposed in December 2022, the effect of discounts applied to Russia’s main oil buyers (China and India), and a steady and low price of oil and gas globally.

This compares to previous years as follows:

January 2023 - 426 billion Rubles
January 2022 - 795 billion Rubles
January 2021 - 1504 billion Rubles (1.5 trillion Rubles)

Fossil fuel revenue:

Russia's monthly fossil fuel export revenues fell by 10% (EUR 70 mn per day) in January 2024 compared to the prior month. Russia's revenues from fossil fuel exports have been falling steadily since September 2023.

👉 In January 2024, Russia’s monthly fossil fuel export revenues saw a month-on-month drop of 10% (EUR 70 mn per day).

👉 Monthly revenues from crude oil pipelines dropped by 4% (EUR 6 mn per day), while revenues from seaborne crude oil increased 5% (EUR 9 mn per day).

👉 There was a month-on-month drop of 17% (EUR 38 mn per day) in seaborne oil products.

👉 Russia’s revenues from LNG exports decreased by 23% (EUR 12 mn per day). At the same time, export revenues from fossil gas via pipeline increased by 23% (21 mn per day).

👉 Russian revenues from coal exports fell by 26% (EUR 12 mn per day).

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Next 👉 Who is buying Russian fossil fuels and how much!

China “Invasion Threat” Gives Sleepless Nights To Russia; Moscow Held Wargames For Six Years – Leaked Docs. China has been one of the few countries that has maintained strong ties with Russia despite global sanctions.

Moscow, however, is not taken by Beijing’s friendly demeanor. Leaked Russian military documents have laid bare the long-standing fears that the country harbors about China.

The documents are about the war games conducted by Russia from 2008 to 2014.

These exercises considered how China is fomenting unrest in Russia by paying protestors and attacking its sparsely populated areas in the far east of the country. Russian military documents leaked to the Financial Times quote wargames written by the Russian officers.

The conflict simulations talked about the population in the eastern cities of Russia rising in violent protests and clashing with police. In the meantime, smugglers brought in arms across the borders to carry out attacks on police stations and military barracks.

And as tensions reach their tipping point, China increases its defense production and shores up its deployment along the border while accusing Russia of “genocide.”

These wargames were ongoing even as Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese Xi Jinping were professing their commitment to a “no limits” partnership.

The Russian government has cast aspersions on the veracity of the documents, and the Chinese ministry has re-iterated previously articulated thoughts about “eternal friendship and non-enmity.”

The Chinese foreign ministry said the “threat theory” has no place in ties between China and Russia. Despite making the right noises and the Ukraine invasion leaving Russia with few choices in terms of friendly countries, the Chinese government has not failed to remember the territorial disputes between the two countries.

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Next 👉 The history of deep rooted hatred between China and Russia, a must read! In case you don’t know that China and Russia are actually deep rooted enemies, who have formed a bond of convenience over the current invasion of Ukraine - buckle up, here’s the run down for you:

Unequal Treaties and China’s extended Century of Shame.

China and Russia’s relationship is temporary, these two Genocide regimes are inherently disposed to being competitors and enemies 👉 this is why:

Russia has a long history of conflict with China dating back to the Mongul Conquest in the 13th century. China has also had a long conflict with foreign powers, described as the “Century of Humiliation”. Between 1839 and 1949, China was weak, divided and fragmented.

During this century the British conquered Hong Kong and the Japanese conquered Taiwan, and the century of humiliation supposedly ended in 1949 when the Communists won the war on the mainland and established the Peoples Republic. But in reality, the humiliation lives on in 2023, and the dictator Xi Jinping aims to fix that while Russia is weakened and busy fighting an illegal war and murderous land invasion in Ukraine

Many of the territories gained by foreign powers remained in place even though the war had ended. HongKong was returned to China in the 1997, while Taiwan remains outside of teh Communist Party of China’s control to today. These “unequal treaties” as they call them, includes one with Russia.

In 1858 the Qing dynasty had a civil war, and Russia seized on the turmoil and seized a massive territory called Outer Manchuria, agreed by treaty with Russia in 1860 - it surrender the territory which includes a vast coastline containing modern day Vladivostok with it’s Russian naval base HQ of the Pacific Fleet and nuclear submarines which depend on this port to operate anywhere in the Pacific.

When this territory reverts to China, the consequences include a catastophic impact to resource revenues, and Russia will lose its only Naval HQ access point to the Pacific Ocean!👇

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Next 👉 Khabarovsk, Sea of Japan and Taiwan

February 2024: European MEPs condemned continuous Russian efforts to undermine European democracy. This thread connects the dots in leading reports, 2017 - 2024, to interference in Spain and Catalonia.

On February 8th, 2024 - the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly in favor of a resolution urging the Spanish judicial authorities to “effectively” investigate the “alleged links” between Catalan MEPs and the Kremlin, as well as Russia’s attempts to “destabilize and interfere in the European Union and its member states.”

A total of 433 MEPs voted in favor of the resolution, which also expresses the Parliament’s “deep concern” over the “large-scale disinformation campaign launched by Russia in Catalonia.” 56 MEPs voted against the resolution, while 18 abstained.

The resolution was put forward by the conservative European People’s Party and the liberals of Renew Europe, and argues that the alleged Russian interference in Catalonia is part of a “broader” strategy by the Kremlin to “promote internal destabilization and disunity” in the EU.

The EU Parliament expressed its complete outrage and grave concern about the continuous efforts by Russia to undermine European democracy through various forms of interference and disinformation.

With the Kremlin attempting to sow divisions between European citizens, the text highlights how Moscow is recruiting some MEPs as “influence agents” and has created a dependent relationship with certain European political parties, including through funding, which then act as amplifiers of Russian propaganda and serve Russia’s interest.

Expressing deep concern over recent media reports that Latvian MEP Tatjana Ždanoka has allegedly acted as an informant for Russian security service FSB, the resolution stresses it is imperative for both the European Parliament and Latvian authorities to thoroughly investigate the matter, to determine any appropriate sanctions and criminal proceedings.

At the same time, the resolution also points to other cases of MEPs knowingly serving Russia’s interests including through fake electoral observation missions to Russian occupied territories.

Russia is targeting a number of EU countries:

Referring to regular revelations across Europe for many years, MEPs are outraged that Russia, often in breach of EU member state legislation, has found ways to provide significant funding to political parties, politicians, officials and movements in several democratic countries to interfere and gain leverage in their democratic processes. This includes giving bank loans, purchase and commercial agreements and facilitating financial activities.

The text also lists examples of recent Russian inference attempts in various countries, including the supplying of narratives to far-right political parties and actors in Germany and France with the aim of subverting public support for Ukraine, but also in Slovakia. MEPs are also concerned about the widespread disinformation and illegal content spread on the social media platform X, formerly known as Twitter.

Looking at Moscow’s support for separatist movements in Europe, MEPs are extremely concerned about alleged relations between Catalan secessionists, including the representatives of the regional Catalan government as well as former regional President and current MEP Carles Puigdemont on the one hand, and the Russian administration on the other.

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Next 👉 Catalan and Russia - joining the dots on Putin’s destabilisation efforts in Europe, Parliament wants the cases revolving around contacts between the Catalan MEPs in question and Russian representatives to be referred to the European Parliament’s Advisory Committee on the Conduct of Members for further scrutiny.

The resolution also notes that Russian interference in Catalonia would be part of a broader Russian strategy to promote internal destabilisation and EU disunity. Parliament also calls on the relevant judicial authorities to undertake effective investigations into the connections of MEPs allegedly associated with the Kremlin.

Russian corruption and interference has been going on in Europe in plain sight for decades, in broad daylight. The dots have never been connected, until Russia’s illegal invasion in 2022.

Back in 2017, Politico reported that a Russian group offered to send 10,000 soldiers to Catalonia to help the region achieve independence in 2017, according to a judge who is investigating alleged misuse of public money to fund the failed separatist bid.

Hours after Spanish police arrested 21 influential Catalan businessmen on suspicion of misuse of public funds and money laundering, the judge, Joaquín Aguirre, said a Russian group created during Mikhail Gorbachev’s era had offered “support” to former Catalan regional President Carles Puigdemont, including sending 10,000 soldiers to the region and money to pay off Catalonia’s debts, if he declared independence.

No more details on the Russian group were provided. Although Puigdemont did declare Catalonia’s independence in October 2017, the judge said he believes the Russian offer was declined.

The bid for independence, considered illegal under the Spanish constitution, led to the suspension of Catalonia’s autonomy, convictions for 12 Catalan leaders and Puigdemont fleeing to Belgium.

Reported by CEPA on 27 September 2021, The October 2017 Catalonia referendum gave a good insight into the Kremlin’s ability to identify and exploit weaknesses in democratic states. Spanish judge Joaquín Aguirre, who is investigating the 2017 referendum, has made several statements regarding the role Russia has played in supporting Catalonia’s separatist campaign.

This included everything from their widely used and most effective weapon against the West, the spreading of disinformation and setting up troll/bot farms, to an investigation of a Russian group who apparently offered to send 10,000 troops and money to clear Catalonia’s debt if independence was declared.

Predictably perhaps, GRU unit 29155, which gained notoriety for multiple assassination and sabotage operations across Europe, is also said to have been involved.

🇬🇧 The unit attempted to assassinate Sergei and Yulia Skripal by using the military-grade nerve agent Novichok, which resulted in the death of a British citizen in Salisbury; they were responsible for a series of ammunition depot bombings in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria that killed two Czech citizens, they attempted to assassinate a Bulgarian arms dealer, and have conducted cyber-attacks.

According to a Bellingcat investigation, GRU agent Denis Sergeev, aka Sergey Fedotov, who was just named a suspect and mastermind of the Novichok poisoning of the Skripals, traveled to Catalonia multiple times, including on the eve of the 2017 referendum. The purpose of his trip is unknown.

Russia’s operations in Catalonia are just a sample of a more extensive campaign to destabilize the West and not only weaken alliances, but divide and attempt to break up countries.

President Vladimir Putin appears to view this as payback for the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire. “There was a time when they welcomed the collapse of a whole series of governments in Europe, not hiding their happiness about this,” he said, adding a sour reference to “double standards.”

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Next 👉 Putin’s Ukraine playbook, and the OCCRP report in January 2024 on the extended investigation by a Spanish Judge.