Two can play the ignore game. But there can only be one winner.

👉 Russian Gas to Europe:

The energy implications of the Kursk invasion go far beyond Russia. At Sudzha, a pipeline sends Russian natural gas to the EU. While it may come as a surprise to many given the war in Ukraine, European countries like Austria, Hungary and Slovakia still buy gas from Russia – all of it flowing through the town of Sudzha in Kursk.

Sudzha, located about 10km (6 miles) from the Ukrainian border, plays a key role in the transit of natural gas to the EU. An average of 42 million cubic metres (1.5 billion cubic ft) of Russian gas flows into Ukraine every day, the town playing host to a gas metering system that measures supplies flowing into Europe.

Despite the war with Russia, Kyiv has allowed the gas to continue flowing through its Soviet-era gas pipeline unabated as part of a $2bn-a-year contract between state-owned Naftogaz and Russia’s Gazprom.

👉 Russian Oil to Europe:

The European Commission has said there was “no immediate risk” of oil shortages in Hungary or Slovakia after the two countries complained about Ukraine’s decision last month to place sanctions on Russian supplier Lukoil, which transits exports to the two countries via the war-torn country.

While the EU as a whole has moved to diversify its oil and gas supplies away from Russia, the two eastern members have continued to receive oil via the Soviet-era Druzhba (Friendship) pipeline, and Ukraine’s move prompted Budapest and Bratislava to demand intervention from the Commission.

The Druzhba oil pipeline has remained functioning following Moscow's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, even as the EU weaned itself off most other sources of Russian energy. The southern branch of the pipeline runs via Ukraine to the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, and has been the primary source of supply for their refineries for years.

A few countries in the EU were given temporary dispensation to continue receiving Russian oil in December 2022 when the EU began to sanction russian oil supply into Europe. That temporary dispensation was offered to give the countries time to set up alternative, non-russian supply sources.

In the nearly three years since, Hungary has not attempted to arrange alternative suppliers - they have instead increased their dependence on Russian oil, and Orban has put Hungary at risk of Energy meltdown-down as the EU was always committed to cutting off Russia entirely.

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Next 👉 Hungary and Slovakia have abused the temporary dispensation given to them by the EU. Hungary and Slovakia used a sanctions carveout to keep pumping it in. Hungary has even ramped up Russian oil imports.

Only around 3% of Europe’s crude oil supplies now come from Russia, the EU claims, an alternative pipeline route through Croatia has sufficient spare capacity to meet the needs of both countries.

The argument comes at a time of increasing diplomatic tensions between Brussels and Budapest. Ukrainian is now blocking the transit of pipeline crude sold by Russia's largest private oil firm, Lukoil, effectively stripping the two countries of a third of their oil imports.

Szíjjártó from Hungary warned in an interview on Hungarian television station ATV last week that until the issue of oil transit is settled, Hungary would continue to block €6.5 billion in military aid to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility.

He claims that hat Lukoil currently accounts for one-third of Hungarian oil imports and around 45 per cent of Slovakian oil imports, making the Ukrainian ban a fundamental threat to the energy security of both countries.

‘This is an unacceptable and incomprehensible move by a country that wants to be a member of the European Union and that, with a single decision, puts the oil supply of two EU member states at fundamental risk,’ he said.

Slovakia and Hungary - two countries that have opposed western allies' military aid to Ukraine as it fights Russia's invasion - have complained to Brussels about Kyiv's move to put Lukoil on its sanctions list, saying it prevented them from buying Russian oil for their refineries, threatening security of supply.

Hungary and Slovakia have gone to the rule book, arguing the penalties violate a 2014 trade deal between Kyiv and the EU and asking the European Commission, the EU’s executive, to intervene.

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Next 👉 Remember Hungary ignoring the EU over their concerns of Hungary relaxing Russian visa entry into the EU?

OFAC implements new sanctions - 23 August 2024

Context:

Building on the sanctions already imposed on Russia in response to its continued war of aggression against Ukraine, today the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Department of State targeted nearly 400 individuals and entities both in Russia and outside its borders—including in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East—whose products and services enable Russia to sustain its war effort and evade sanctions.

The United States government will continue to support Ukraine as it defends its independence and hold Russia accountable for its aggression.

“Russia has turned its economy into a tool in service of the Kremlin’s military industrial complex. Treasury’s actions today continue to implement the commitments made by President Biden and his G7 counterparts to disrupt Russia’s military-industrial base supply chains and payment channels,” said Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Wally Adeyemo.

“Companies, financial institutions, and governments around the world need to ensure they are not supporting Russia’s military-industrial supply chains.”

Treasury is targeting numerous transnational networks, including those involved in procuring ammunition and military materiel for Russia, facilitating sanctions evasion for Russian oligarchs through offshore trust and corporate formation services, evading sanctions imposed on Russia’s cyber actors, laundering gold for a sanctioned Russian gold company, and supporting Russia’s military-industrial base by procuring sensitive and critical items such as advanced machine tools and electronic components.

Today’s sanctions further limit Russia’s future revenue from metals and mining. Treasury is also targeting Russian financial technology companies that provide necessary software and IT solutions for Russia’s financial sector.

Treasury is aware of Russian efforts to facilitate sanctions evasion by opening new overseas branches and subsidiaries of Russian financial institutions.

Foreign regulators and financial institutions should be cautious about any dealings with overseas branches or subsidiaries of Russian financial institutions, including efforts to open new branches or subsidiaries of Russian financial institutions that are not themselves sanctioned. Treasury has a range of tools available to respond to the establishment of new evasion channels.

The State Department is targeting entities and individuals involved in Russia’s future energy, metals, and mining production and exports; sanctions evasion; Russia’s military-industrial base, including armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) production, Belarusian support for Russia’s war effort, and air logistics entities; additional subsidiaries of State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom; and malign actors involved in the attempted, forcible “re-education” of Ukraine’s children.

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Next 👉 SANCTIONS EVASION, CIRCUMVENTION 🔐 SANCTIONS EVASION, CIRCUMVENTION, AND BACKFILL

Consistent with commitments made by President Biden and G7 leaders, Treasury continues to target transnational networks that supply Russia with military materiel and sensitive dual-use goods like those included in the multilateral Common High Priority List, jointly developed by the United States, European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom.

Treasury is also targeting multiple networks that facilitate or enable illicit financial schemes and sanctions evasion on behalf of Russian revenue generators and oligarchs.

Many of today’s designations were enabled or informed by extensive coordination with Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). Today’s action targets almost a dozen distinct networks, designating more than 100 individuals and entities across 16 jurisdictions, including the People’s Republic of China, Switzerland, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates.

🔐 RUSSIA’S TECHNOLOGICAL BASE

Today, Treasury is targeting more than 60 Russia-based technology and defense companies that are critical for the sustainment and development of Russia’s defense industry, including entities involved in weapons development and modernization, automation and robotics, development and acquisition of dual-use electronics, digital surveillance, Internet of Things, and artificial intelligence.

These sanctions target Russia’s defense industry while protecting the access by Russian citizens to crucial telecommunications and other digital technology.

🔐 LIMITING RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC METALS AND MINING SECTOR

Guided by commitments made by President Biden and G7 leaders to reduce Russia’s revenues from metals, today Treasury is targeting entities involved in Russia’s metals and mining sector, including steel, iron, and coal mining firms and auxiliary firms that provide specialized services to Russian metals and mining companies.

🔐 RUSSIAN FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY

Today, OFAC is targeting Russian financial technology companies as a part of implementing G7 commitments to curtail Russia’s use of and access to the international financial system to further its war against Ukraine.

👉 Atol is a Russian technology developer involved in services related to payments.

👉 Centre of Financial Technologies Group (CFT)is one of the largest software companies in the Russian market. CFT provides an array of software products for banking and payment solutions for the Russian financial market.

👉 Diasoft Ltd (Diasoft) is one of Russia’s largest developers and suppliers of information technology (IT) solutions for the financial sector.

Atol, CFT, and Diasoft were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy.

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Next 👉 Ammunition Procurement Network

India is fuelling the genocidal invasion of Ukraine by propping the russian regime up with expanding trade - financing the regimes federal budget to fund its military industrial complex.

India's expanding commerce with Russia has raised concerns, particularly in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine. However, India’s relationship with Russia is driven by a complex mix of historical ties, strategic interests, and economic pragmatism, rather than a desire to deepen ties in a way that directly supports Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

Here's how India navigates this delicate situation:

1. Historical and Strategic Relationship:

Long-standing Partnership: India and Russia have a deep-rooted relationship that dates back to the Cold War era when the Soviet Union was a key ally of India. This partnership continues to influence their diplomatic and defense relations today.

Defense Dependence: India relies heavily on Russia for military hardware, with about 60-70% of its defense equipment being of Russian origin. This dependence compels India to maintain a functional relationship with Russia, despite the latter's controversial actions.

2. Economic “Pragmatism” and reputation white-washing:

Energy Needs: India is one of the world’s largest energy consumers, and Russia has become a significant supplier of crude oil to India, particularly after Western sanctions on Russia limited its market access.

India has taken advantage of discounted Russian oil, which has helped it manage inflation and energy costs domestically, while filling the coffers of the federal government in Russia, used to fund the illegal war in Ukraine.

Trade Growth: Bilateral trade between India and Russia has grown significantly since the invasion of Ukraine, driven largely by energy imports. However, this trade is framed as a part of India's broader strategy to diversify its energy sources and manage its economic needs, rather than an endorsement of Russia's policies.

3. Diplomatic Whitewashing Act:

Neutral Stance on Ukraine: India has tried hard to convince the world it has a “neutral stance” on the Ukraine conflict, often abstaining from UN votes condemning Russia. This neutrality is positioned as part of India’s non-alignment policy and its broader strategic autonomy, where it seeks to avoid taking sides in conflicts between major powers.

Of course as tensions simmer with Pakistan and China - sooner or later it will become embroiled in a large conflict - probably with China over land and water resources in the next decade.

India should find no support in the future, especially from countries who have made huge financial sacrifices in changing their dependence on cheap russian fossil fuels, and who have also made substantial financial and military support aid donations. While India chooses to opaquely support Russia in the war in Ukraine conducted by a psychopathic russian.

Most of the EU, G& and coalition countries (excluding the likes of Hungary), have all worked hard to reduce trade with Russia to limit it’s revenues to support the war - India has continued expanding it’s trade, knowing it will have consequences to face at some point for this expansion and support.

Dialogue with All Sides: Despite its growing commerce with Russia, India continues to engage diplomatically with Western countries and has called for dialogue and diplomacy to resolve the conflict in Ukraine. This balanced approach helps India avoid alienating Western partners, who are critical to its economic and geopolitical interests.

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Next 👉 BRICS and India’s feigning of neutrality 4. Global South Leadership:

Advocating for Developing Countries: India has framed its engagement with Russia as part of its broader responsibility towards the Global South and its position in BRICS.

It argues that sanctions on Russia disproportionately affect developing countries, and by continuing trade, India positions itself as a voice for these nations, which is a whitewashing of it’s support of a regime led by an indicted war criminal.

5. Avoiding Direct Support:

Limited Military Engagement: While India continues to purchase Russian defense equipment, it has not provided direct military support to Russia's war efforts. India’s relationship with Russia in the defense sector is portrayed as fulfilling its own security needs rather than supporting Russia’s military agenda.

But all is not what it seems:

India is expanding its commerce with Russia, but it does so with a clear understanding of the geopolitical risks - sooner or later it will be held to account for fuelling the genocidal regime in Russia. It chooses to advocate maintaining a neutral stance on the Ukraine conflict which is a contradiction in terms - as data shows the level and type of trade it conducts with Russia.

It supports a normalisation of business as usual in russian society against the ongoing brutal suppression of Putin dissenters and opposition in Russia - and it choses to ignore the regimes daily war crimes and society destabilisation schemes it conducts globally, both in country with malevolent actors and through the propagation of propaganda and misinformation across governments and social media platforms.

India is masquerading as an innocent bystander, framing its actions in terms of national interest and global equity.and in doing so it tries to convince the world - india sidesteps direct involvement in the war.

This strategy is about India trying to manage its energy needs and maintain its strategic autonomy while limiting damaging its relations with Western countries by avoiding public scrutiny and attention.

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Next 👉 Trade details reveal the extent of their support for Russia and its war time budget.

Hungary refuses to provide the EU with an explanation regarding the issuance of visas to Russians and Belarusians

Hungary missed the European Commission's deadline this week to respond to questions about its decision to ease entry requirements for Russian and Belarusian nationals, raising concerns across the EU.

Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson had given Budapest until 19 August to explain the changes in its immigration policy, but as of Monday afternoon, no reply had been received, the commission confirmed. Frustration is boiling over with Viktor Orbán's rogue foreign policy in EU capitals.

In August 2024, Viktor Orban signed a decree on the extension of the accelerated visa issuance program to eight countries, including Russia and Belarus.

Hungary recently relaxed entry rules for Russians and Belarusians, allowing "guest workers" to stay for two years, with an option to extend for another three years. Johansson sent a letter in August to Hungary's Interior Minister, Sándor Pintér, requesting an explanation for these changes.

The European Union began to publicly demand explanations from Hungary regarding its decision to ease the visa regime for citizens of Russia and Belarus.

Several EU countries, led by the Czech Republic, pushed to ban Schengen travel for Russian diplomats due to espionage concerns. After entering the passport-free zone, Russian diplomats could potentially travel freely across the bloc.

Points of concern:

👉 Hungary's decision to issue visas to Russians and Belarusians without providing explanations to the EU has raised concerns in the European Union.

👉 The relaxation of the visa regime by Hungary for citizens of Russia and Belarus may have security implications for the EU, leading to demands for clarifications from Hungarian authorities.

👉 The EU's Internal Affairs Commissioner expressed concerns about the risk of espionage due to the simplified visa regime, urging Hungary to respond to inquiries by a specified deadline.

👉 Viktor Orban's decree to extend the visa program to include citizens of Russia and Belarus with 'national cards' for work has further fueled the controversy and prompted the EU to take action if necessary.

👉 The issue highlights the need for balanced immigration policies that consider security implications and the integrity of the EU's internal border control, emphasizing the importance of transparency and cooperation among member states.

History of ignoring the EU Commission:

In June 2024, the European Court of Justice fined Hungary €200 million for breaking the EU’s asylum laws and ignoring an earlier judgment.

The Luxembourg court first ruled in December 2020 that Hungary had failed to comply with the bloc’s rules on the treatment of migrants by “unlawfully detaining” asylum seekers and deporting them before they could appeal the rejection of their applications, ordering Budapest to make changes to its policies.

Hungary ignored the judgment, which the ECJ described in a statement on Thursday as “deliberately evading the application of the EU common policy.” Along with the €200 million fine, Hungary will be fined an additional €1 million per day that it fails to comply with the court’s judgment. If Budapest refuses to pay the fines, they can be deducted from its share of the EU budget, as was the case with Poland.

Orbán, imitating his super-hero Donold Trump, lashed out at the judgment, calling it “outrageous and unacceptable” in a post on X.

Viktator Orbán has undermined Europe for long enough, Hungary brazenly flouts EU laws as Orbán openly courts and admires indicted war criminal Vladimir Putin, dictator Xi JingPing who has over one million ethnic Chinese in concentration camps and Turkey’s right wing Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

The EU should have called the Vatnik’s bluff 2 years ago. References and sources:







uk.news.yahoo.com/tensions-rise-…
news.online.ua/en/hungary-ref…
euronews.com/my-europe/2024…
politico.eu/article/hungar…

Russia-linked social media accounts have incited violence and racism in online groups discussing the far-right disorder that have engulfed the UK.

This thread is long - why not consider listening to the audio narration. Great for multi-tasking and commuting. The audio link can be found in the first answer to the last tweet in this thread.

In July and August 2024, far-right riots occurred in England and Northern Ireland, after a mass stabbing in Southport on 29 July. The first riot started in Southport and later many protests and riots spread across the country.

The riots involved racist attacks, arson and looting, and were the worst disorder in the United Kingdom since the 2011 England riots. The riots were fuelled by underlying Islamophobic, racist, anti-immigrant sentiments, and disinformation about the identity of the Southport stabber.

Far-right groups spread misinformation online, and the UK government under Keir Starmer accused Russia of spreading disinformation to stoke the unrest.

The Prime Minister’s spokesman said the Government has “seen bot activity online, much of which may well be amplified by foreign-state actors amplifying some of the disinformation and misinformation that we’ve seen”.

It comes after it emerged that initial disinformation that the teenager accused of killing three girls in Southport was an asylum seeker who had crossed the English Channel can be traced back to Channel3 Now, a Russia-linked website that claims to be a legitimate American news outlet.

Channel3 Now incorrectly claimed the suspect was an asylum seeker named Ali Al-Shakati, and circulation of the name was boosted by thousands of other accounts on X, formerly known as Twitter. As the protests unfolded, two key far-right Telegram channels linked to the protests were flooded with words of encouragement from people purporting to be from Russia.

A post discussing leafleting about the “demographic demise” of Britons “because of mass immigration” in the channel of far-right group Patriotic Alternative received praise from several accounts claiming to be run by Russians.

The Daily Mail reported in recent days that Channel3 Now — whose post was viewed by more than 2 million people before being deleted and followed by an apology — started life 11 years ago as a Russian YouTube channel.

The Royal United Services Institute (Rusi) says rightwing violence “is often classified as mere thuggery” by politicians, prosecutors and the security services. Equivalent acts by Islamists would “swiftly be labelled as terrorism”, it says in an article in the Guardian.

It’s not the first time Britain has probed state interference in its domestic affairs. Russian state media outlets RT and Sputnik pushed false narratives about the 2018 poisoning of former Russian intelligence officer Sergei Skripal on British soil.

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Next 👉 Who or what is the far-right? Who or what is the far-right?

The right-wing spectrum consists of many sub-variants of ideology; however, the landscape contains actors who are – to varying degrees – “right of” centre on the political spectrum.

A Centre for Research on Extremism (C-REX) report clearly explains how the right-wing spectrum holds that inequalities and superiority are natural states, which allow for, and inform, the nativist and authoritarian views of society that some of them adhere to.

Essential features of groups and individuals on the right-wing spectrum that are discussed in the literature include nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and advocacy for a strong state.

While “law and order” are essential to maintaining the natural hierarchy and societal system on the right-wing spectrum, the extent to which this can be achieved within democratic means varies across the spectrum.

At the extreme end of the spectrum, scholars have often distinguished between those hostile to liberal democracy and those strictly in opposition to democracy by referring to them as the radical right and extreme right respectively.

Nativism (i.e., a policy of favouring native inhabitants) is often based on either biological racism, from which white supremacism promotes racial interpretations of ethnic superiority, or ethnic nationalism, from which an ethno-cultural understanding of the nation is used to challenge pluralism, promote xenophobia, and stoke anti-immigration sentiment.

The right-wing spectrum comprises of and is influenced by everything from political parties and organisations to social movements, as well as the media and intellectual organisations.

Often the line between mainstream and extreme is very blurry, with some right-wing groups combining political participation and sometimes-violent forms of activism and expression. The current global political and social climate, including the escalating impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, has encouraged the spread of and mainstreaming of this threat, as well as the nebulous use of political speech, left-wing causes, and pop cultural symbols.

Governments and international bodies are increasingly recognising the threat posed by the far-right, both at national and international levels.

The right-wing spectrum consists of many sub-variants of ideology; however, the landscape contains actors who are – to varying degrees – “right of” centre on the political spectrum. A Centre for Research on Extremism (C-REX) report clearly explains how the right-wing spectrum holds that inequalities and superiority are natural states, which allow for, and inform, the nativist and authoritarian views of society that some of them adhere to.

Essential features of groups and individuals on the right-wing spectrum that are discussed in the literature include nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and advocacy for a strong state.

While “law and order” are essential to maintaining the natural hierarchy and societal system on the right-wing spectrum, the extent to which this can be achieved within democratic means varies across the spectrum.

At the extreme end of the spectrum, scholars have often distinguished between those hostile to liberal democracy and those strictly in opposition to democracy by referring to them as the radical right and extreme right respectively.

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Next 👉 Nativism and Transnational far-right extremism

The United States has threatened Turkey with "consequences" for exporting technology to Russia.

This thread explores Turkey’s trade with Russia - and questions whether equal threats should now be made to EU countries complicit in building Turkey as a hub for their products being re-exported into the russian parallel market.

07 August 2024, The Financial Times reports on possible sanctions against Ankara for cooperation with Moscow.

“Washington has warned Turkey that there will be “consequences” if the country does not curtail its exports to Russia of US military-linked hardware that is vital to Moscow’s war machine.”

As part of efforts to curb illegal trade, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Commerce Matthew Axelrod met with Turkish officials. According to the representative of Ankara, the American official demanded that they work harder to limit trade in American-made chips and other spare parts that may be in demand in Russia.

Washington’s warning is the latest sign of how Turkey’s decision to retain strong trade ties with Russia has tarnished relations between the two Nato allies. The US, EU and other western partners have imposed sweeping sanctions on Russia since it launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but Turkey has eschewed the curbs and increased trade with the country since the war broke out.

Of particular concern to the United States is the fact that Turkey has become a key hub through which Western-made electronics, including processors, memory cards and amplifiers, enter Russia.

At the end of 2023, the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury for Counterterrorism and Financial Intelligence, Brian Nelson, already shared his disappointment about Ankara's trade in military goods. The US Department of Commerce has already imposed sanctions against Turkish companies for allegedly supplying products to the military-industrial complex (MIC) of Russia.

Earlier, Turkish analyst Mehmet Perincek said that Turkey is being forced to impose anti-Russian sanctions in order to weaken its economy and make it not resist the plans of the United States. In his opinion, the conflict in Ukraine is also being used to worsen relations between Moscow and Ankara. This is done to leave Turkey without partners, the analyst believes.

Turkish economic commentator Mustafa Recep Ercin added that because of the sanctions, trade with Russia has turned into a nightmare. In May, he complained that the United States and the EU were intimidating Turkish financial institutions in the event of their cooperation with Russia.

Because of this, the volume of banking transactions fell, and importers faced difficulties in making transactions for purchased products. According to the Turkish Institute of Statistics, shipments to Russia decreased by 32 percent year-on-year in the first quarter.

Washington’s warning is the latest sign of how Turkey’s decision to retain strong trade ties with Russia has tarnished relations between the two Nato allies.

The US, EU and other western partners have imposed sweeping sanctions on Russia since it launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but Turkey has eschewed the curbs and increased trade with the country since the war broke out.

The US is particularly worried that Turkey has become a key hub through which western-made electronics, including processors, memory cards and amplifiers, are making their way to Russian missiles and drones in contravention of export controls. Machine tools are another significant area of concern.

I argue that if the US is prepared to warn turkey and threaten sanctions for trading with Russia - a wider view and equal threat of sanctions should be applied to European countries. If you think that is controversial, here is why:

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Next 👉 European countries are complicit too European countries are complicit in the growth of Turkey being a russian trading hub - and they know it!

Not every country in the Caucuses has followed the sanctions circumvention supply chain scam - one exception as an example is Azerbaijan. Their main export markets are Russia, and another group of countries is Central Asia, Caucuses, Belarus, and the UAE. Azerbaijans exports have not spiked or boomed since the invasion and remain comparatively low and moderate, at circa $70 million.

This only represents a handful of dozens of countries that have all seen exponential exports. And this is only one of potentially hundreds of satellite hubs for Russian trade.

One of the largest trading hubs is of course Turkey. The amount of goods and services passing through Turkey is simply staggering. European and G7 nations are masking their sales to Russia through trading hubs such as Turkey.

For example - one of the smallest export EU countries, The Netherlands. Let’s compare what they were trading 2 years ago with a look at their current export destinations:

👉 Dutch exports to Russia were at circa $300 million Euros and after Russia’s latest war on Ukraine this has levelled out to $100 million.

👉 Simultaneously they increased their exports to Turkey from a low of €250 million to a current level in excess of $450 million.

Turkey is a middle man in the supply chain. Yes it enjoys a substantial revenue stream for being the trading hub - but I argue, the players simplicity in the trade begin at manufacturer level. They need to be regulated to ensure they are also not benefiting for knowingly selling to known parallel market exporters and importers.

They are all driven by greed and a need to maintain or increase their global sales, and in doing so they are feeding their products directly to the parallel market and providing russia with both sanctioned and un-sanctioned products, many of which are dual use with commercial and military applications.

Many products are not sanctioned, but lets be clear - any products or services that find their way into russia, support the federal budget in tax revenues to fund the war - and the availability of Western goods and Services, normalises russian consumer expectations and consumer activity - in spite of their genocidal and illegal war being waged in Ukraine.

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Next 👉 The effects of US sanctions threats

A Potted History of Russian Poisoning

On May 23, 1938, a Soviet intelligence agent named Pavel Sudoplatov assassinated the Ukrainian nationalist leader Yevhen Konovalets in Rotterdam.

The order for the murder had come personally from Josef Stalin. The method was none too subtle: Sudoplatov had given his victim a box of chocolates, containing a bomb.

Subtler forms of liquidation had been in the works for some time in Soviet Russia. In 1921—the year Sudoplatov was recruited at age 14 into the Cheka, the Soviet security organization formed by Vladimir Lenin—the Soviets established their first laboratory for the study and testing of poisons.

They made rapid progress. From 1928–35 secret laboratories were overseen by the accomplished Soviet biochemist Grigory Mairanovsky. The author of a 1940 classified doctoral thesis on the interaction of mustard gas with human skin, Mairanovsky was tasked to develop tasteless, colorless, odorless, and lethal poisons that could be placed in the food and drink of enemies of the state. Mairanovsky and his colleagues tested their concoctions on political prisoners of various sizes and ages.

He was so successful that by the 1940s he had become a key member of Pavel Sudoplatov’s team for political assassinations. In summer 1947, again on the order of Stalin, Mairanovsky killed the American spy for the Soviets Isaiah Oggins by injecting him in one of his laboratories with a lethal dose of the poison curare.

Poisoning has a long history. Socrates was forced to take hemlock as his death sentence. For a period of time in ancient Persia, different poisons were the weapons of choice for rivals bent on doing away with this or that Persian king. British science writer John Emsley provides a helpful history of poison in his riveting book .

In 19th-century France, arsenic came to be known as poudre de succession—”inheritance powder,” a method by which wily women would rid themselves of cumbersome husbands. Thallium, according to Emsley, was Saddam Hussein’s poison of choice for political opponents.

Russians have always seemed to have a special fondness for poisoning. In 1453, Dmitry Shemyaka, the Grand Duke of Moscow, was poisoned with arsenic in a chicken dinner, his cook having been bribed by Muscovite agents of a rival.

In 1610, Russian general Mikhail Skopin-Shuisky was poisoned on orders of the Tsar; in this instance, his wife enlisted to poison his food. In 1936, Abkhaz Communist leader Nestor Lakoba was poisoned by orders of Lavrentiy Beria, head of the NKVD, the Soviet security organization responsible for extrajudicial killings and the gulag system. Lakoba was poisoned during a dinner in Tbilisi with Beria, his death announced as a heart attack.

During the Cold War, the tradition continued. Most spectacular and famous is the case of Georgi Markov, an anti-communist Bulgarian writer who in exile had worked for Radio Free Europe and the BBC. On the morning of September 7, 1978—the birthday of Bulgarian dictator Todor Zhivkov—Markov made his way across Waterloo Bridge in London to wait for a bus.

An assassin, working for the Bulgarian secret police and aided by the KGB, poked Markov with the tip of his umbrella. By evening, Markov was checked into a hospital, feeling unwell with a high fever. Four days later he was dead.

Forensic pathologists discovered a pellet filled with traces of ricin in the back thigh of Markov’s right leg. According to former Russian intelligence officer Boris Volodarsky in his book, , Markov had likely been surveilled before the assassination by another Bulgarian BBC broadcaster named Vladimir Simeonov.

Twenty days after Markov’s murder—and two days after being questioned by Scotland Yard—the 30-year-old Simeonov was himself found dead under mysterious circumstances. In the kitchen of his flat, reports Volodarsky, “two glasses were found in the sink without any fingerprints. Traces of a bottle were identified on the table.”

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Next 👉 A decade earlier, Alexander Dubcek, the reform communist leader of the ill-fated Prague Spring, was thought in Czech anti-Communist circles to have been poisoned by the KGB, in this instance by radioactive isotopes sneaked into his soup during a brief captivity in Moscow. Dubcek fell ill later in Bratislava, had to cancel a speech, and was hospitalized due to “a cold.” He recovered.

As in the case of Pavel Sudoplatov’s detonating chocolates in Rotterdam, surreptitious poisoning gets trumped at times in Russian political assassinations by a somewhat heavier hand. In 1940, at his compound outside Mexico City, Russian revolutionary Leon Trotsky was fatally wounded by an ice-axe-wielding assassin (whose murder was ordered by Stalin and carried out under the direction of Sudoplatov).

And there was no poison involved in the murder this winter of Kremlin critic and former Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov. Shortly before midnight on February 27, walking after dinner with his Ukrainian girlfriend, Anna Durytska, across the Bolshoy Moskvoretsky Bridge close to Red Square, Nemtsov had four shots pumped into his back at close range from an assassin’s handgun.

Which brings us to the case at hand. At this writing, Nemtsov’s associate, journalist and civil society activist Vladimir Kara-Murza, lies ill in a Moscow hospital, according to reports stricken by kidney failure, double pneumonia, and pancreatitis. The 33-year-old Kara-Murza fell suddenly ill and collapsed in his Moscow office on May 26.

The day before, the organization for which Kara-Murza currently works (Open Russia, which was created in September 2014 by former political prisoner and Russian businessman Mikhail Khodorkovsky) had released a documentary about Ramzan Kadyrov, the ruthless ruler of Chechnya and a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

No one can say for sure at this point whether Kara-Murza has been poisoned. What we do know is that Russia has a ghastly tradition of poisoning political dissidents. We also know that very recent history has been alarming.

Although he survived—his face disfigured—pro-Western Ukrainian Presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko was poisoned with dioxin at a dinner in Kiev during an election campaign in September 2004.

Former FSB man and Putin opponent Alexander Litvinenko died of polonium ingested in a London hotel bar in 2006. Russian businessman Alexander Perepilichny, a key witness in a Moscow money laundering case, expired outside his Surrey home in London in 2012, apparently having been killed by poison from the highly toxic Gelsemium plant (grown remote areas of China).

Then there’s the case of journalist and Putin critic Anna Politkovskaya. She was shot to death by assassins in the elevator to her apartment on October 7, 2006. But in September 2004, Politkovskaya had become violently ill and lost consciousness after drinking tea on a Russian flight.

With the history of poisonings in Russia, one is curious about one of the preferred methods used by the russians. Here’s an intro into just one such commonly found poison…

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Next 👉 болиголов - AKA - Dropwort, Hemlock Water

A timeline of the major political events as seen through a British lens, in the conflict in Ukraine during 2024. This chronology is an abridged version of a comprehensive chronology from the beginning of the latest invasion in February 2022.

This research document is recorded in the Commons Library Research Briefing, 16 July 2024, and the author is Nigel Walker. Please see the references tab for links to two such research papers covering the period before and after February 2022.

This is a British lens of major political and key events, it is not a record of key events as may be seen though other countries lens’s. It is a useful reminder of some key events - there are arguably other events which have not been included.

The chronology does not cover military events and the genocidal actions of Russia during this period.

Chronology:

1 January 2024 In his New Year address, President Zelenskyy vows to unleash “wrath” against Russian forces in 2024, saying Ukraine has become stronger as the war moves toward its second year.

5 January 2024 In a briefing, John Kirby, the US’s national security council spokesperson, says North Korea is providing Russia with ballistic missile launchers and ballistic missiles. The US intelligence assessment is that Iranian missiles have not yet arrived in Russia, but that the deal will eventually be done. Posting on X (formerly Twitter), the UK Defence Secretary, Grant Shapps, says “we’ll make sure North Korea pays a high price for supporting Russia.”

11 January 2024 Ukraine’s parliament refuses to debate a bill aimed at drafting more soldiers, amid fierce criticism from lawmakers and the public. Ukrainian MPs criticised certain measures included in the bill as unconstitutional. Some clauses caused particular outrage, such as limiting draft dodgers from their right to own property and to freely use their personal money.

12 January 2024 Prime Minister Sunak visits Kyiv to sign a new security agreement and announce an increase in military funding for Ukraine.

24 January 2024 Writing in an article for Politico, Grant Shapps says the UK’s allies must increase their Ukraine military aid: “Kyiv needs more support — and not just from the United Kingdom. Our fellow allies must step up too.”

1 February 2024 European Union leaders unanimously approve a €50 billion plan to support Ukraine for the next four years. The deal, known as the “Ukraine Facility“, consists of €17 billion in grants and €33 billion in loans, designed to help Ukraine rebuild and recover from the war.

8 February 2024 In a two-hour interview with former Fox News host Tucker Carlson, President Putin says the US “needs to stop supplying weapons” to Ukraine. The interview is Putin’s first with a western media outlet since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022.

16 February 2024 President Zelenskyy visits Germany and France, signing security pacts with both countries, committing further support to Ukraine from each.

24 February 2024 Four western leaders, including the prime ministers of Italy, Canada, and Belgium, visit Kyiv to show solidarity with Ukraine on the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion. Italy’s Giorgia Meloni, Canada’s Justin Trudeau, Belgium’s Alexander De Croo and the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, travelled to the Ukrainian capital together on an overnight train from neighbouring Poland.

26 February 2024 Hungary’s parliament approves a bill to allow Sweden to join NATO, clearing the way for the Nordic country to join the alliance after months of delay.

27 February 2024 Several European countries say they are not considering sending ground troops to Ukraine after France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, said he refused to rule out sending soldiers to the country. The UK, Germany, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Poland, Italy and Hungary all rule out the move, as does the NATO Secretary-General.

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Next 👉 March 2024 onwards 7 March 2024 Sweden becomes NATO’s 32nd member state, upon depositing its instrument of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty with the US government in Washington DC.

8 March 2024 Andriy Yermak, the head of Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s office, meets with a delegation headed by Li Hui, the Chinese government’s special representative for Eurasian affairs. They discuss China-Ukrainenrelations and the war in Ukraine.

11 March 2024 The chairs of foreign affairs committees in 23 parliaments issue a joint statement rejecting the legitimacy of elections conducted by Russia in the Ukrainian territories it has annexed.

15 March 2024 Three days of voting begins in Russia and in the annexed regions of Ukraine. There is no serious challenge to President Putin securing another term in office.

17 March 2024 In the Russian presidential election, Putin wins 87% of the vote, securing a fifth term in office. The resultbmeans Putin will overtake Joseph Stalin to become Russia’s longest-serving leader in more than 200 years.

18 March 2024 At an open-air concert in Moscow’s Red Square, to mark the 10th anniversary of Russia’s annexation of Crimea from Ukraine, Putin says Crimea had “returned to its home harbour” and would move forwards with Russia “hand in hand”.

20 March 2024 A report issued by the UN Human Rights Office accuses Russia of torturing and arbitrarily detaining people in occupied Ukraine, creating a “climate of fear”. In a press release accompanying the report, the UN says Russia has imposed its “language, citizenship, laws, court system, and education curricula on the occupied areas”.

21 March 2024 Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, addresses the European Council summit via videoconference and calls for more help with air defences and ammunition, as well for progress on Ukraine’s path towards European integration.

2 April 2024 The Register of Damages for Ukraine opens in The Hague, as part of a Ministerial Conference on “Restoring Justice for Ukraine”. The conference brings together the Council of Europe, heads of international organisations, and ministers and senior officials from more than 60 states.

9 April 2024 UK foreign secretary David Cameron visits former US president Donald Trump at his Mar-a-Lago residence, to discuss a new aid package for Ukraine that is being held up in Congress.

15 April 2024 President Macron of France calls for a truce in international conflicts during the Paris Olympics.Referencing the Israel-Hamas conflict, the war in Ukraine and the ongoing conflict in Sudan, Macron says: “We will work on an Olympic truce. It is something on which I will actually try to engage many of our partners.”

16 April 2024 Russia reacts coolly to the suggestion of an Olympics truce, with Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov
saying both President Putin and the Russian military had “noticed that, as a rule, the Kyiv regime uses such ideas, such initiatives to try to regroup, to try to rearm, and so on and so forth”.

24 April 2024 At a press conference in Berlin, UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz agree to closer defence cooperation between the two allies, with both leaders saying Europe must unite to support Ukraine against Russia “for as long as it takes”.

25 April 2024 The UK’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, Jeremy Hunt, meets President Zelenskyy in Kyiv and discuss sanctions against Russia.

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Next 👉 May 2024 onwards

The CNC Scourge helping russia build it’s weapons of destruction - consolidating reports on what we know:

When a Russian Iskander short-range precision-guided ballistic missile struck a cafe in the village of Hroza 35 km away from the frontline, killing 52 people who gathered to commemorate a fallen soldier. Later - two volunteers, Emma Igual of Spain and Anthony Ignat of Canada, were killed, and two more were hospitalized when their car was struck by Russian shelling while assessing the needs of civilians caught in the daily crossfire.

What connects these tragedies is the fact that the weapons used were built using Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machine tools, produced in the West and imported into Russia.

Shockingly, despite sanctions, Russia continues to buy high-precision machine tools and spare parts from Western firms, enabling it to commit the most atrocious war crimes.

At least 70% of all Russian CNC machine tools are imported, largely from the US, EU, and Japan. Over 80% of all CNCs end up in Russia’s military production facilities. This makes CNCs a perfect target for the West to degrade the Russian military complex by clamping down on imports.

Researchers from the Economic Security Council of Ukraine (ESCU) have recently developed a roadmap to achieve just that.

What are CNC machine tools?

👉 CNC (Computer Numerical Control) machine tools are automated robot machines using software to manufacture various metal products without direct human intervention. CNC machinery is a crucial means of production for advanced arms manufacturing such as missiles, aircraft, or radars.

👉 WСNC machines are the backbone of Russia’s military production and a window of opportunity for trying to stop the aggressor, ESCU said.

With a CNC, a computer program does all the necessary shaping and cutting. The machine tool uses a drill bit mounted on a head that moves in three dimensions to automatically carve digitally modeled shapes into metal.

What can CNC machines produce?

There is not a single Russian tank, plane, or APC that does not have parts made with foreign CNC machine tools. Even nuclear weapons are manufactured with the help of CNC machinery. With the help of CNCs, Russia produces:

👉 Aircraft components: engine components, landing gear parts, and structural elements.

👉 Weapon systems: firearm components, missile guidance systems, and other weapon parts.

👉 Armor and vehicle components: body panels, turrets, etc;

👉 Electronic and communication equipment: communication equipment, and radar systems for military use.

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Next 👉 Manufacturers and countries that are conduits for CNC exports to russia, supporting the russian military industrial complex.

The most influential manufacturers are DMG Mori, Trumpf, Fair Friend Group, Haas, Sodick, Dr. Johannes Heidenhain GmbH, Maier Werkzeugmaschinen GmbH & Co., KG HEDELIUS, GF Machining Solutions, Yamazaki Mazak Corporation, Okuma, Index Traub, Hermle, FICEP, Nakamura-Tome, Willemin-Macodel.

Russia’s arms industry still importing vital foreign CNC machines despite sanctions. Japan and Germany are the top two CNC producers whose machines help Russia produce high-tech weapons.

Türkiye, the UAE. and China are acting as key conduits for Western technology feeding Russia’s arms production, an investigation has found. Despite sanctions, Russia imported at least 6.4 billion rubles ($68 million) worth of computer numerical control (CNC) machines and parts in 2023, according to a report by the investigative outlet Istories.

The actual figure is likely much higher due to incomplete documentation and misclassification of imports from countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

CNC tools are considered to be a hole in the West’s sanctions regime against Russia, as they allow Russia to build precise weapons domestically.

The machines, essential for modern weapons manufacturing, are sourced from leading global producers including Doosan and Hanwha of South Korea, Spinner and Hermle of Germany, Fanuc of Japan, and others.

Others like Spain’s Vanto Machines and Poland’s Soldream Polska claimed their products were falsely declared as Russia-bound by Turkish middlemen. Switzerland’s TL Technology insisted it halted Russian operations in early 2022.

Several major Russian importers of foreign machines are already under sanctions, the report noted. But others like the Engineering Center for Production Equipment from St. Petersburg, which supplied DMG Mori machines to UEC Saturn and other defense firms in 2023, have so far avoided them.

Even if Western imports are cut off, Russia could last quite a long time in the war by shifting to Chinese machines with components from US allies. The vulnerability it appears - is the software that modern CNC equipment depends on, which could be disabled or hacked?

On January 02, 2024 - the FT reported “Chinese shipments to Russia of an important class of advanced machine tools have increased tenfold since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with the country’s producers now dominating trade in high-precision “computer numerical control” devices vital to Moscow’s military industries.

The soaring shipments of CNC units, which permit extremely precise metal milling, have become a big concern to Ukraine’s allies as they seek to crack down on Russia’s access to the equipment.

Russian customs returns show Chinese producers shipped $68mn worth of CNC tools in July, the latest verifiable figure available, up from just $6.5mn in February 2022 when Moscow launched the full-scale invasion.

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Next 👉

This thread is intended to introduce you to the murky world of sanctions circumvention through parallel imports. Some ideas are suggested, but this is unchartered territory for most countries - who have not had to deal with the complexities and risks associated with a full blown war in their trading markets during the past 60 years.

A long thread (you won’t gain wisdom in 280 characters), perhaps consider skipping to the last tweet and the first reply will be a link to an audio narration of the thread. Great for multitasking and produced for my visually impaired followers.

Introduction:

Nearly 1,400 companies, including many of the most internationally recognisable brands, have since February 2022 announced that they would cease or dial back their operations in Russia in protest of Moscow’s military aggression against Ukraine.

But two years after the invasion, many of these companies’ products are still widely sold in Russia, in many cases in violation of Western-led sanctions.

Russia’s economy is resilient because it is, for the most part, still a market economy. Russia has been allowed to find their ways around sanctions and “keep things working” – thus proving to be one the key factors behind Russia’s relative “resilience” to Western sanctions.

Aided by the Russian government’s legalisation of parallel imports, Russian businesses have established a network of alternative supply chains (parallel imports), to import restricted goods through third countries.

The companies that make the products have been either unwilling or unable to clamp down on these unofficial distribution networks.

The Russian government claimed in December 2023, over $70 billion worth of goods were confirmed to have been imported into the country through so-called “parallel” or “grey” imports – helping the total 2023 imports to slightly exceed pre-sanction levels to reach $300 billion, according to Moscow.

👉 What are parallel imports?

Summary

👀 Parallel imports are items designed to be sold in one part of the world, which are they bought by a third party and imported against the brand’s intentions.

👀 The legality of parallel imports is often murky, and can depend on minor details.

👀 Parallel imports can be a headache for brands, and are extremely time-consuming to track.

👀 A parallel import is an item that’s imported and sold outside of the brand’s authorized distribution channels. It is no longer on the white market, but on the gray market. This can happen with electronics, books, magazines, software, accessories, cars and much more. Most of the time, it’s not illegal, unless local courts decide otherwise.

Parallel imports are commonly understood to mean imports into the country without the consent of the rightholder of goods to which a trademark is lawfully affixed and which have been lawfully introduced into civil turnover in the territory of any other state outside the Russian Federation.

Such consent is usually required in countries where the national principle of exhaustion of the exclusive right to a trademark is applied.

Parallel imported goods in russia are imported directly to russia and through countries “friendly” to the Russian Federation or countries of the Eurasian Economic Union – Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkey, UAE, etc.

The list of goods allowed for parallel import includes ferrous metals, inorganic compounds, medical and other equipment, ships, spare parts for railways and auto components, consumer goods such as electronics and household appliances, clothing, footwear, and cosmetics.

In particular, among the brands approved for parallel imports are Apple, Samsung, Hewlett Packard, ASUS, Cisco, Dell, Microsoft, Mercedes-Benz, General Motors, and others.

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Next 👉 Russia legitimises parallel imports! 👉 Russia has legitimised parallel imports in law:

After some foreign companies started to stop direct deliveries of their products to the Russian market through their subsidiaries and official distributors, there was a threat of shortages of a number of goods. This was due to the fact that the goods were no longer supplied by official importers but third parties were still not allowed to import them without the consent of the rightholder.

In this regard, Federal Law No. 46-FZ was enacted on 8 March 2022, which tasked the Government or another body to which such right has been delegated with approving a list of goods in respect of which parallel imports are permitted. In exercising this authority, the Ministry of Industry and Trade approved such a list (“List”). The List is currently approved by Order No. 2701 dated 21 July 2023, which replaced Order No. 1532 dated 19 April 2022.

The List has been amended many times. As a rule, it includes trademarks belonging to companies that have left the Russian market, but there are also exceptions.

At the St Petersburg International Economic Forum in 2024, it was announced that the existing approach to differentiated regulation of parallel imports would be extended to 2025. At the same time, a decision was made to extend such approach to the use of inventions, utility models, industrial designs without the consent of the patentee with notification of the patentee as soon as possible and with the payment of commensurate compensation.

In practice, courts assume that persons reselling goods after purchasing them from importers are to be held civilly liable only if they sell counterfeit goods (but not goods imported through parallel import).

This arguably, should / could have been a starting point for companies to proactively prevent their products from being bought by an intermediary country. An indicator of products at risk of seeing a surge in sales to an existing or new country, at volumes previously not realised in the trading relationship. Or an indicator for new buyers entering the market from known russian trading hubs.

👉 Parallel imports - the cloak of innocence or the legitimate get-out clause for products sold in Russia?

The parallel imports scheme is aimed at helping Russia bypass supply restrictions put in place by Western countries and companies in response to the invasion of Ukraine.

The parallel imports list includes critical imports like warships, spare parts needed for railways and auto components as well as consumer goods like electronics (including mobile phones), household appliances, clothing, footwear, and cosmetics.

Potential red flags may include companies registered recently; companies based in Armenia, Belarus, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan or other countries helping Russia circumvent sanctions; companies making large orders of products within a short space of time; companies with obscure beneficial ownership structures, etc.

Parallel import supply chains is the cloak that western businesses at best, use for indirect trade to distance themselves from Russia - or at worst knowingly disguise their ongoing trade with Russia. The question arises, who deserves more contempt?

⚠️ The businesses like Unilever who have anchored their position to stay in Russia, actively trading and profiting from the market and paying tens of $ millions in taxes - which are disbursed into the federal budget to support the illegal war in Ukraine.

⚠️ The businesses who feign their exit from Russia, using opaque and unregulated supply chains to conduct business as usual using intermediary countries like Turkey, the UAE, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and others?

These companies have often spent extraordinary efforts and money creating PR whitewashing campaigns - protesting their ignorance to the grey market imports to Russia of their products?

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Next 👉 Who is the bigger culprit, morally?

The relationships that Russia forges through nuclear projects surpass even the lengthy contracts for pipeline gas supplies. The coalition has focused on restricting Russia’s revenue through fossil fuel sales, and focus almost all of it’s efforts in sanctions to restrict income from oil and gas - that is used to fund Russia’s murderous and illegal war in Ukraine.

What is not spoken about or targeted - is the substantial revenue stream and global influence russia has using nuclear energy and enterprises associated with it.

🧵 This thread pieces together information around Russia’s nuclear energy reach as a political tool in the UN, as well as leading thoughts and analysis.

Please see the references tab for links to full articles this thread has combined together.

👉 In June 2024, FT ran an article titled: “How Russia is using nuclear power to win global influence despite sanctions”.

Russian companies are building more than a third of the new reactors around the world, which is gaining Moscow new friends

Nuclear plant construction takes about 10 years, with a reactor lifespan of 60 years for newer plants. Dismantling preparations, including removing radioactive parts, take another 10-20 years and require substantial funds. The Russian side treats the plants as if they are owned by Rosatom. The only role of the host country is to buy the electricity from the reactor.

Istituto Affari Internazionali suggest that Russia has found in the nuclear market a means to buttress ties with countries in the Global South by providing high-technology elements to these nations.

Through partnerships in the nuclear sector, Russia has not only strengthened its presence in the global energy landscape but has also enhanced its geopolitical influence, particularly in regions where emerging economies seek technological advancements and energy solutions.

Russia’s strategic use of nuclear partnerships with countries in the Global South does not only increase its global influence, but also poses challenges related to technology transfer and economic dependency. Indeed, these partnerships often rely heavily on Russian technology and financing, raising concerns about recipient countries’ autonomy and economic vulnerability.

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Next 👉 About Rosatom 👉About Rosatom:

Russia’s nuclear industry is concentrated in Rosatom, a state-owned company that is the successor to the Soviet Union’s Ministry of Medium Machine Building and Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy.

Through its state company Rosatom, Russia is the world leader in nuclear power export markets. The company controls almost half of the world uranium processing and enrichment market and holds 70% of the reactor export market. Setting aside some cancellations following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Rosatom’s portfolio of foreign orders appears stable at about $200 billion.

In addition to its commercial role, Rosatom is a foreign policy instrument that may advance Russian strategic interests by establishing long-term official and commercial ties with governments and businesses in customer nations.

Rosatom offers one-stop shopping for design, construction, fuel, training, maintenance, and spent fuel processing as well as attractive financing. The company generally has strong support from Russia’s government.

While some of Rosatom’s prewar aspirations for growth may no longer be realistic, and while the company is losing some business in the West, Rosatom appears to be largely on track with its non-Western projects, which comprise the bulk of the company’s business. Reducing Rosatom’s global role will not be quick, easy, or cheap.

👉 Per Rosatom’s self description - “ROSATOM is the only company in the world that has all technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mining to the back end of nuclear facilities life cycles. Its scope of activities also includes production of innovative non-nuclear products, nuclear medicine, digitalization and software development, logistics and development of the Northern Sea Route.

ROSATOM incorporates over 450 enterprises employing a total of more than 350,000 people.”

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Next 👉 Foreign projects and revenue

An estimated €200 billion worth of Russian assets were frozen in the EU following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, with around 90% held in Belgium, home to the international fund depository Euroclear. In May, the EU-27 agreed to utilise the interest generated by these frozen Russian central bank assets.

The interest is expected to yield between €2.5 and €3 billion annually, which will be used to support Ukraine’s defence and post-war reconstruction.

Ninety percent of the interest generated by these frozen funds (which remain frozen) will be allocated to the European Peace Facility (EPF), an EU mechanism for managing interventions in conflicts, including supplying arms. The remaining 10% will go to the EU’s separate “Facility” for Ukraine, established to support the country’s reconstruction needs.

The Swiss have chosen not to disappoint - Russia. They will not release any proceeds of the profits on frozen russian assets to Ukraine. In fact they may be hiding a significant amount of russian assets from public scrutiny in an attempt to remain “neutral” by harbouring the assets of russians and genocide merchants the world over.

The Swiss timeline on russian assets:

👉 13 February, 2024 - Over a third of the assets reported in Switzerland with links to Russia are at Credit Suisse. This includes funds from sanctioned persons, but not exclusively.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine, the Swiss federal government has frozen assets of those with links to Russia and Belarus in Switzerland worth more than 7.5 billion francs ($8.1 billion). In addition, 15 properties were seized as a result of the adoption of EU sanctions.

According to Seco, around 7,500 business relationships and a total of 46.1 billion francs with a connection to Russia had been reported by mid-November. Credit Suisse has frozen Russian assets of 17.6 billion francs, according to a report in the Sonntagszeitun, corresponding to over a third of all reported Russian assets in Switzerland.

Only about 4 billion francs of Russian assets at Credit Suisse assets originate from people on the sanctions list, according to the newspaper. The remaining 13.6 billion francs are said to be partly from people such as Viktor Vekselberg, who has an account with Credit Suisse but cannot access it because of other sanctions.

At UBS (so subsequently bought Credit Suisse after it faced bankruptcy), is twice the size of Credit Suisse. The share of Russian funds affected amounts to 0.3 percent of invested assets in Global Wealth Management, according to a UBS spokeswoman. That percentage corresponds to $7.5 billion of assets.

For the fourth quarter in 2023, UBS mysteriously stopped reporting the on frozen assets.

Just one bank Credit Suisse - claims it had frozen 17.6 billion Swiss Francs ($15 billion USD) from assets held by Credit Suisse and another 6.4 billion Swiss Francs ($7.5 billion) held by the new parent company UBS. That is $22.5 billion (19.91 billion Swiss Francs) - held by this one bank alone!

Remember Switzerland is built on its corrupt, secretive and opaque banking and shell company offering. Russia had money, assets and gold distributed across all major banks in Switzerland,

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Next 👉 16th Feb 2023 position 👉 16 February 2023 - Switzerland has said it is legally impossible for it to confiscate the assets of sanctioned Russians held in the country, dealing a blow to European efforts to use that wealth for Ukrainian postwar reconstruction. Until then, Bern has moved in line with the EU in freezing the assets of high-profile Russians connected to the regime of president Vladimir Putin.

Switzerland holds more than SFr7.5bn ($8.1bn) in frozen Russian assets nearly one year after the invasion of Ukraine, according to the Swiss ministry of finance. (Remember, in February 2023, one bank alone admitted to freezing $22.5 billion in russian assets) - it appears quite a lot has been unfrozen and returned to the russians on the quite.

“The expropriation of private assets of lawful origin without compensation is not permissible under Swiss law. The confiscation of frozen private assets is inconsistent with the constitution,” the Swiss Government added, and “violates Switzerland’s international commitments”.

March 08, 2024 - The Swiss Foreign minister said that “over $8 billion” of Russian central bank reserves and assets are currently held in Switzerland. That at today’s exchange rate is 7.07 billion Swiss Francs.

Foreign Minister Ignazio Cassis stated, "Russia has seriously violated international law. It must therefore repair the damage caused." Cassis added that Switzerland's commitment to international discussions around compensation mechanisms was consistent with its history of involvement in such matters.

The only russian frozen assets in the world, to “lose in value”

👉 April 23, 2024 - Switzerland has frozen Russian assets worth 5.8 billion Swiss francs ($6.36 billion), the Swiss government said, a big drop that could intensify international pressure on the neutral country to do more to sanction Moscow over its invasion of Ukraine. The figure, which applies to assets frozen at the end of 2023, was down from the 7.5 billion francs in assets frozen at the end of 2022.

The main reason was a decrease in the market value of the shares and other financial assets that have been blocked, said the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, which oversees sanctions. Switzerland seem to be the only country in the EU alliance that has not generated interest profits form the assets they claim to have frozen. There is something fishy going on here.

Falling stock values had wiped 2.3 billion francs off the worth of previously blocked assets, SECO said, while an extra 580 million francs in assets held via complex financial structures had been discovered and frozen last year. This included luxury cars and artworks.

Switzerland was now in a "completely different place" to last year when the G7 countries criticised, opens new tab Swiss loopholes on sanctions, and was implementing them well, said Simon Pluess, head of export controls and sanctions at SECO.

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Next 👉 23 April, 2023 onwards

China is Russia’ largest trading partner, supporting the criminal regime in its war effort by financing the regime and the war.

This week following the communist goons huddle- China announced surprise cuts to the key interest rate, amid the worst deflation since 1999. Deflation is generally viewed negatively by economists as lower prices typically lead to lower consumer spending and reduced production, in turn causing layoffs and salary cuts. See the second tweet for an easy to understand guide on why deflation is even worse than inflation.

Monday (July 22, 2024), the People’s Bank of China governor embarked on a routine that will test his monetary balance, agility and motor coordination in tantalizing ways. The PBOC’s move to cut a key short-term policy rate for the first time in almost a year surprised many traders, lowering the seven-day reverse repo rate by 10 basis points to 1.7%.

The world’s second-largest economy is in the midst of a slowdown, and has slipped into deflation with prices falling year on year as slowing domestic spending weighs on the country’s post-Covid economic recovery. The Chinese property industry is also in crisis, as the slowdown exposes overextended developers.

Figures released on the opening day of the meeting showed that the economy grew by 4.7% in the second quarter, compared with a year earlier. The number was both weaker than expected and slower than the previous quarter’s figure, when growth seemed to be stabilising. It puts the government’s official growth target for this year—around 5%—in doubt.

The People’s Bank of China announced on Monday that the one-year loan prime rate, widely used as a benchmark for corporate lending, would be lowered 0.1 percentage point to 3.35 per cent, the first such cut since August last year.

The five-year equivalent, which influences mortgage pricing, was also reduced 0.1 percentage point for the first time since February, to 3.85 per cent.

The cuts to the central bank's key short-term policy rate, its market operations rates and benchmark bank lending rates came after China reported weaker-than-expected second-quarter economic data last week and its top leaders met for a plenum that occurs roughly every five years.

The country faces a prolonged property crisis, surging debt and weak consumer and business sentiment. Trade tensions are also flaring, as global leaders grow increasingly wary of China's export dominance.

The cut in July 2024 - is an unexpected move, likely due to the sharp slowdown in growth momentum in the second quarter as well as the call for achieving this year's growth target' by the third plenum. For the last two decades, the market has been propped up by the government, and by official actions.

The world's second-biggest economy has been grappling with slowing prices since early last year, forcing policymakers to cut interest rates to spur growth even as many developed economies were focused on taming stubbornly high inflation.

On May 17, 2024 - China announced new policy measures to support the property market, including a nationwide programme to provide 300 billion yuan in loans to fund state purchases of unsold homes, and the relaxation of mortgage rules.

Trade tensions continue to bite, with tariffs announced by the US on a range of Chinese manufactured goods and by the EU on Chinese electric vehicles. China continues to struggle with foreign direct investment (FDI).

The headline GDP growth story has been helped by domestic deflation. Accounting for this deflation, nominal GDP growth was lower at 4.2% yoy (compared to real GDP growth of 5.3%). Factory gate prices have been falling over the past 18 months (although it has stabilised in the last few months) and this has helped China’s export competitiveness abroad. Export competitiveness was supported further by a weaker Chinese Yuan.

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Next 👉 What is deflation? Deflation in China, causes and effects.

Deflation is when the prices of goods and services decrease across the entire economy, increasing the purchasing power of consumers. It is the opposite of inflation and can be considered bad for a nation as it can signal a downturn in an economy, leading to a recession or depression.

Deflation can also be described when when a country experiences a fall in the overall level of prices in an economy and an increase in the purchasing power of the currency.

It can be driven by an increase in productivity and the abundance of goods and services, by a decrease in total or aggregate demand, or by a decrease in the supply of money and credit. The two main problems with deflation is that often it can contribute to lower economic growth.

This is because deflation increases the real value of debt – and therefore reducing the spending power of firms and consumers. Also, falling prices can discourage spending as consumers delay their purchases. The two main problems of deflation in the long-term, deflation creates higher rates of unemployment and can eventually cause consumers to default on their debt obligations.

Deflation can be brought about either by an increase in the supply of goods and services or by a lack of increase (or decrease) in the supply of money and credit.

If China chooses as it’s solution to deflation - the reduction in the supply of money and credit, that then reduces the ability of consumers, businesses, and speculative investors to continue to borrow and bid up asset and consumer goods prices, so that prices may stop rising or even begin to fall.

The shift in the global supply chain away from China, is seeing manufacturing move to South East Asia and India - as companies de risk / decouple from China, who has become increasingly hostile over Taiwan, as is grows aligned to it’s temporary ally Russia, and as intellectual property owners have drawn the line on having China steal proprietary product knowledge and develop a large cheap product copy industry, and western business products are being sold under fake brans names across the world.

Falling prices put even more pressure on indebted businesses, consumers, and investors because the nominal value of their debts remains fixed as the corresponding nominal value of their revenues, incomes, and collateral falls through price deflation. And at that point, the cycle of debt and price deflation feeds back on itself. In the near term this process of debt deflation involves a wave of business failures, personal bankruptcies, and increasing unemployment.

This will lead to the Chinese economy experiencing a recession as economic output slows as debt-financed consumption and investment drop.

Geopolitics threatens to dampen Chinese exports as third country concerns over the country’s overcapacity increase. Critics argue China’s industrial policy has supported the creation of significant production capacity in a number of green technologies (namely EVs, solar panels, and batteries).

China’s overcapacity allows Chinese manufacturers to export their products at prices that undercut existing competitors, and by extension hampers the development (or even threatens the survival) of those industries overseas. China contends that existing competitors should instead focus on improving their competitiveness. In response to these concerns, a number of countries have announced restrictions on Chinese imports.

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👇 Informative, evidence lead research for the price of a few coffees!

Time to clean up the British Virgin Islands - another corrupt den of iniquity. Home to a growing number of corrupt shadow companies that fuel corrupt dictatorships the world over.

The thread is 8 pages long - why not consider listening to the audio narration?

The link is found in the first reply to the last tweet in the thread. I provide audio versions for my visually impaired followers, they are also useful for busy folk and great commute podcasts.

British Virgin Islands (BVI) - Geographical and political context:

The British Virgin Islands (BVI), officially the Virgin Islands, are a British Overseas Territory in the Caribbean, to the east of Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands and north-west of Anguilla. The islands are geographically part of the Virgin Islands archipelago and are located in the Leeward Islands of the Lesser Antilles and part of the West Indies.

In 1968 the British Government issued a memorandum requiring that the postage stamps in the territory should say "British Virgin Islands" (whereas previously they had simply stated "Virgin Islands"), a practice which is still followed today. The islands gained separate colony status in 1960 and became autonomous in 1967 under the new post of Chief Minister.

The territory operates as a parliamentary democracy. Overseas Territory of the UK with limited self-government; parliamentary democracy. Ultimate executive authority in the British Virgin Islands is vested in the King, and is exercised on his behalf by the Governor of the British Virgin Islands.

The governor is appointed by the King on the advice of the British Government. Defence and most foreign affairs remain the responsibility of the United Kingdom.

The twin pillars of the economy are financial services (60%) and tourism (roughly 40-45% of GDP). Economically however, financial services associated with the territory's status as an offshore financial centre are by far the more important. 51.8% of the Government's revenue comes directly from licence fees for offshore companies, and considerable further sums are raised directly or indirectly from payroll taxes relating to salaries paid within the trust industry sector (which tend to be higher on average than those paid in the tourism sector).

This is important context for the purpose of the thread.

Other notable information:

👉 Chief of state: King CHARLES III (since 8 September 2022); represented by Governor Daniel PRUCE (since 29 January 2024)

👉 Head of government: Premier Dr. Natalio WHEATLEY (since 5 May 2022)

👉 Cabinet: Executive Council appointed by the governor from members of the House of Assembly

👉 Elections/appointments: the monarchy is hereditary; governor appointed by the monarch; following legislative elections, the leader of the majority party or majority coalition usually appointed premier by the governor

💥 Note; on 5 May 2022, Premier Andrew FAHIE was removed from office by a no confidence vote in House of Assembly following his arrest on drug trafficking and money laundering charges on 28 April 2022; Premier Dr. Natalio WHEATLEY sworn in as premier on 5 May 2022

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Next 👉 Financial services

Financial services account for over half of the income of the territory. The majority of this revenue is generated by the licensing of offshore companies and related services.

The British Virgin Islands is a significant global player in the offshore financial services industry. Since 2001, financial services in the British Virgin Islands have been regulated by the independent Financial Services Commission.

The BVI Financial Services Commission is an autonomous regulatory authority responsible for the regulation, supervision and inspection of all the British Virgin Islands financial services including insurance, banking, trustee business, company management, mutual funds business, the registration of companies, limited partnerships and intellectual property. It was established in 2001 pursuant to the Financial Services Commission Act, 2001.

The commission now oversees all regulatory responsibilities previously handled by the government through its Financial Services Department; protecting the independence of financial services regulation and fulfilling international commitments to the prevention of international white collar crime while safeguarding the privacy and confidentiality of legitimate business transactions.

The commission also has new responsibilities including promoting public understanding of the financial system and its products, policing the perimeter of regulated activity, reducing financial crime and preventing market abuse.

The Chairman of the Board of Commissioners is Mr Robin Gaul, who qualified as an accountant in the United Kingdom in 1967, was a partner of KPMG and had served on various boards and committees in the BVI public sector including the Development Bank of the Virgin Islands and the BVI Electricity Corporation.

Gaul was appointed as Deputy Chairman of the Inaugural Board of the Financial Services Commission in 2002 and chairman of the board in May, 2006.

Colin O'Neal is the Deputy Chairman. He was admitted as a barrister in the British Virgin Islands in 1987 and was the founder and managing partner of the law firm O'Neal Webster where he practiced commercial law for nearly twenty years. He is a member of the BVI Bar Association, Associate Member of the American Bar Association and member of the Urban Land Institute.

Robert Mathavious is the Managing Director/CEO. He was appointed the first Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer of the Financial Services Commission in 2002.

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Next 👉

The Russian shadow fleet, also known as the ‘dark fleet,’ poses serious maritime security and environmental risks. The vessels are often old and unsafe, engaging in dangerous and deceptive shipping practices such as turning off location tracking systems, which flouts international maritime standards and increases the likelihood of catastrophic incidents.

The ‘shadow fleet’ comprises ships engaged in illegal operations for the purposes of circumventing sanctions, evading compliance with safety or environmental regulations, avoiding insurance costs or engaging in other illegal activities.

Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ poses a threat to our nations and others who depend on the world’s seas and oceans. Many ships in this ‘shadow fleet’ are uninsured and poorly maintained. Many engage in activities which violate basic safety and environmental standards and regulations.

The shadow fleet, comprising around 600 vessels or 10% of the global “wet cargo” fleet, transports approximately 1.7 million barrels of oil daily, significantly funding Russia’s war efforts. Some ships may also serve as Russian listening stations or transport weaponry to Russia.

Remember this! The shadow fleet wasn’t purpose built. Approximately 600 vessels in the shadow fleet were sold to Russia primarily by the Greek shipping Oligarchs, who enriched themselves with $Billions, selling their ageing tankers to Russia for the intended purpose of moving russian oil above the price cap.

The average age of shadow fleet vessels in roughly 15 years, of a 20 year life expectancy. Not a single Greek oligarch has been brought to account for selling their vessels to the russians via shell companies and intermediary organisations - making it very difficult to bring a case against the Greek oligarchs, beside which - the sale of vessels to russia was not specifically sanctioned and one might argue they have operated within the law.

The UK reacts in July 2024 - targeting the shadow fleet:

In July the Uk Goverment under Keir Starmer, said they were determined to address the risks that the ‘shadow fleet’ poses to the environment, maritime safety and security in Europe and beyond, the integrity of international seaborne trade, and respect for international maritime law. The UK Government released a statement on 19 July 2024, saying:

“We call on flag States to ensure that ships flying their flag adhere to highest possible safety and pollution prevention requirements and best practices, including those contained within relevant IMO conventions and resolutions.

We call on port States to ensure the enforcement of the safety and liability conventions on these ships, including those that relate to ship-to-ship transfer operations and the requirement to have on board valid State certificates of insurance.

We urge ship owners and operators, the marine insurance industry, ship brokers and other relevant maritime stakeholders to adhere to their relevant obligations, and support the prevention, detection and reporting of ‘shadow fleet’ activities.

We encourage IMO Member States to keep under close review the risks posed by the ‘shadow fleet’ and take further collective action at the IMO to address those risks.

We have agreed to share information on the practices and operations of the ‘shadow fleet’, to coordinate our responses to the risks posed by its ships and facilitators, and to work with the private sector and other maritime stakeholders to address the threat.“

Keir Starmer said in a statement: ““Russia’s incremental gains on the battlefield are nothing compared with the collective international support for Ukraine or the strength of ties between our people.

And alongside our European partners, we have sent a clear message to those enabling Putin’s attempts to evade sanctions: we will not allow Russia’s shadow fleet, and the dirty money it generates, to flow freely through European waters and put our security at risk,”, 19 July 2024.

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Next 👉 Countries signed up to this This ‘Call to Action’ has been endorsed by:

Albania
Andorra
Austria
Belgium
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Czechia
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Kosovo
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Moldova
Monaco
Montenegro
Netherlands
North Macedonia
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
San Marino
Serbia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Ukraine
United Kingdom
The European Union

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Next 👉 What does this mean in practice though?

Viktor Orbán-led government with serious rule-of-law deficits and worryingly close ties to the Kremlin, Hungary is a prime example of how Putin leverages political influence over EU countries and weakens support for Ukraine using gas and oil price and upply manipulation.

Remember in April 2022 - two months after Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine when Vatnik Orban of Hungary broke ranks with the European Union, saying it will accept Moscow's demand that gas supplies be paid for in rubles?

Vatnik Orban opposed any EU sanctions on Russian oil and gas or Western arms shipments through Hungarian territory to Ukraine, told journalists on April 6 that he had agreed with Russian President Vladimir Putin that if asked, Hungary would pay for gas shipments using the Russian currency.

The EU has said it wouldn’t abide by Russia's demand as it was a breach of contract since payment was agreed upon in euros.

Earlier April 6, 2022 - Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto said gas contracts were between his country and Russia, and that the EU had "no role" to play in the deal. This is the same muppet who now whines about Russia cutting off oil supply to Hungary in July 2024

The EU warned Hungary in 2022 that while the EU has yet to apply any sanctions on oil or gas from Russia, though European Council chief Charles Michel said on April 6 that measures on the sector will be needed "sooner or later." Yet 2 years later Hungary has increased it’s dependency on russian gas and not made any effort to diversify or build LNG infrastructure - choosing instead to ignore the EU warnings and temporary dispensation granted when the initial sanctions and oil caps were introduced.

With Lukoil cutting piped oil supply off to Hungary in July 2024 - vatnik Peter Szijjarto should pay attention to current EU arbitration cases that could soon see the ending of Russian gas supply to Hungary. Buying russian gas through a dubious intermediary, Turkey - will also draw the EU’s attention and action to block this as a sanctions circumvention.

Reported in June 2024, “Ongoing court cases could lead to the cessation of gas deliveries from the Russian company to the Hungarian state gas provider, as Gazprom would not have access to the payments initiated by MVM.

The Hungarian government aims to prevent this potential disruption with the decree issued on Thursday, ensuring that EU-appointed executors cannot seize payments made by MVM to Gazprom.

Orban’s government stated that the decree is intended to guarantee Hungary’s uninterrupted gas supply and maintain economic and social order.

The statement specifies that “the counter value of natural gas to be paid to the contractual partner cannot be seized or enforced to secure or satisfy the claims of a third party due to its conflict with Hungarian public order.”

The decree follows several European companies winning cases against Gazprom, resulting in claims against the Russian company.

If these claims were enforced, payments initiated by companies in contract with Gazprom could be seized, potentially cutting off MVM from the Russian gas supply. This would jeopardise the long-term gas transport contract signed in 2021 for 15 years.”

Reuters reported on 06 June 2024, “ Hungary signalled on Thursday it had no plans to abandon natural gas imports from Russia and sought to deepen business ties with Moscow in non-sanctioned areas, triggering a strong rebuke from Washington over its "dangerous addiction" to Russian energy.

A day after Hungary, which gets most of its energy from Russia, announced a deal to acquire a 5% stake in Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz gas field, its foreign minister travelled to Russia to affirm energy ties with the Kremlin.

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Next 👉 Warning tho Hungary; Vatnik Orban is walking the country into Energy Armageddon WARNING TO HUNGARY:

Orban is putting Hungarian energy supply into a great jeopardy. In it’s quest for circumventing sanctions and as it’s gas sources as it nears the end of a deal that brings the country around 4.5 billion cubic meters of Russian gas each year via Ukrainian pipelines, Orban struck a deal with Turkey for russian gas supply earlier this year.

In April 2024 Hungary received the first gas deliveries via a new agreement with Turkey, according to Hungary's foreign minister, Péter Szijjártó.

Turkey's gas deal with Hungary is not the vatnik vaunted energy lifeline — it is just a new backdoor for Russia to re-establish its grip on Europe's power systems.

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End

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Ukraine Drone strikes on refineries - they are working in ways not previously imagined.

Just to refresh you - earlier this year there was concern expressed by some countries including the US, that hitting russian refineries would cause a spike in oil prices ad destabilise the global markets.

I wrote an argument supporting the drone strikes and the effects on March 21st 2024, please see the thread here 👉

In this thread I set out that when a significant portion of Russia’s refinery capacity is disabled by these attacks, the volume of excess crude oil that would normally be processed at refineries will increase sharply. Russia does not have the capacity to store a lot of Crude oil and currently it is approaching maximum capacity of storage.

If the crude cannot be sold abroad for a steep discount, then Russia will find itself in a paradoxical position, with a shortage of refined fuel for it’s own market, yet the country will have an excess of oil.

The next day the FT ran an article - that has not aged well..

On the 22nd March 2024 - the FT reported “The US has urged Ukraine to halt attacks on Russia’s energy infrastructure, warning that the drone strikes risk driving up global oil prices and provoking retaliation, according to three people familiar with the discussions.

The repeated warnings from Washington were delivered to senior officials at Ukraine’s state security service, the SBU, and its military intelligence directorate, known as the GUR, the people told the Financial Times. Both intelligence units have steadily expanded their own drone programmes to strike Russian targets on land, sea and in the air since the start of the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.”

Fast forward a few months and many refinery strikes later..

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Next 👉 The Centre of Eastern Studies study on refinery strikes

https://x.com/beefeater_fella/status/1770918524392706526?s=61

The Centre of Eastern Studies published a view on the consequences of Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries.

Ukrainian drone strikes on refinery facilities inside Russia have dealt a significant blow to the Russian fuel sector. During the first four months of 2024, the Ukrainian forces attacked more than a dozen refineries; damage of varying degrees was reported at eight of these. As a result, Russian plants temporarily shut down some of their processing capacity, which led to a drop in fuel production.

Despite the US administration’s fears that the global oil and fuel market could be destabilised, the price dynamic for both categories of commodities to date does not suggest that the Ukrainian strikes have driven prices up. On the contrary, the need to reduce processing and the impossibility of storing crude have forced Russian exporters to increase exports. At the same time, the refinery shutdowns have driven down sales of petroleum products abroad, resulting in losses primarily for Russian companies.

The Ukrainian attacks and the resulting drop in fuel production have created a number of challenges for the Kremlin, including the need to deal with logistical tensions, strengthen air defence and increase imports of petroleum products. Given the political importance of fuel availability, reduced processing has forced the Russian government to use tools of intervention in order to ensure that the market is adequately saturated. For example, it has forced the fuel sector to redirect supplies onto the domestic market at the expense of the foreign markets. Should the Ukrainian strikes continue and cause more temporary shutdowns at refineries, the government will probably have to step up its intervention, and that will generate costs for the state and may lead to market imbalances.

The scale of the destruction

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian side has conducted strikes against facilities associated with Russia’s oil and fuel sector, including fuel depots, pipeline infrastructure and refining plants. As of last autumn, Ukraine has stepped up its attacks on refineries and expanded the range of its drone strikes. It has carried out a series of successful attacks on plants in European Russia: eight of these facilities have suffered damage that forced them to shut down some of their processing capacity. The most extensive damage was reported last March.

On April 8th 2024 - Reuters reported “MOSCOW, April 8 (Reuters) - Russia has asked Kazakhstan to stand ready to supply it with 100,000 tons of gasoline in case of shortages exacerbated by Ukrainian drone attacks and outages, three industry sources told Reuters.

As a result of these attacks, some of the country’s refining capacity has been shut down. Depending on estimates, primary oil processing has fallen by 500,000–900,000 bbl/d of capacity, or 8–14% of Russian plants’ total production. The real duration of the shutdowns has varied depending on the type of facility, its role, and above all the scale of damage. In some cases, refineries resumed operations the day after the strike; in others, it took weeks or even months before production resumed.

The Ukrainian airstrikes have thus caused a drop in crude processing at Russian refineries: from the start of the year to April, its rate fell from 5.5 to 5.2 million bbl/d, or more than 5%, hitting its lowest level in nearly a year. The effects of shutdowns at plants can also be seen in the structure of fuel production. In March, the month which saw the heaviest attacks, the production volumes decreased in each of the four categories of petroleum products. This occurred despite the fact that production usually picks up in this period ahead of maintenance work in May.

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Next 👉 The Centre of Eastern Studies analysis continued..

Russian Oil Supply to Hungary Halted Due to Ukraine Sanctions on Lukoil

Ukraine last month hardened sanctions against Lukoil that effectively prohibit the firm from using Ukraine as a transit country for its product. Mol Nyrt., the Hungarian energy company, and the Russian oil firm are working on a solution, Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto said late Tuesday following a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on the sidelines of a UN meeting in New York.

Despite the fact that EU pipeline crude imports from Russia are not banned by the embargo, Russia is not delivering crude oil to Hungary at present after Ukraine imposed stricter sanctions on Russian oil giant Lukoil, effectively banning it from using Ukraine as a transit for oil exports.

Lukoil was supplying Hungary with crude via the southern leg of the Druzhba oil pipeline which crosses Ukraine. With the toughened sanctions Kyiv imposed on Lukoil in June, Russian oil does not reach Hungary now.

However, Hungary – whose Prime Minister Viktor Orban is seeking ties with Vladimir Putin and even visited Moscow earlier this month – is currently working with Russia to restore Lukoil’s oil deliveries to the central EU country, which has tried to keep “friendly” ties with Russia despite EU objections.

Lukoil is one of several Russian companies that supply oil to Hungary through the southern part of the Druzhba pipeline in Ukraine. Currently, Russian supplies provide two-thirds of all crude oil held by Hungarian Mol Nyrt.

However, the company hopes to completely replace them from 2025. Hungary intensified its energy ties with Russia after its invasion of Ukraine, signing several agreements to increase natural gas supplies.

Hungary and some other eastern European states cover most of their crude imports via the Soviet-era Druzhba pipeline, which traverses Ukraine. One alternative route exists: the Adria pipeline from the Croatian coast, which could theoretically cover 80 per cent of the region’s needs via seaborne crude.

Lukoil has been under sanctions in Ukraine since 2018, though they were limited, affecting only capital withdrawal, trade restrictions, and bans on involvement in state property privatisation or leasing.

In June 2024, the NSDC significantly expanded them, adding, among other things, a ban on transit.

1/3 Hungary’s resistance to EU plans to hit Russia with an oil embargo might seem yet another aspect of the hostile relationship between Brussels and Viktor Orbán’s government, but officials and oil industry executives have stressed practical concerns behind Budapest’s stance.

Landlocked and with an oil pipeline infrastructure that points towards Moscow, Hungary says it would find an embargo on the import of Russian oil and fuel nearly impossible to handle.

Currently, Russian supplies provide two-thirds of all crude oil held by Hungarian Mol Nyrt. However, the company hopes to completely replace them from 2025.

Hungary intensified its energy ties with Russia after its invasion of Ukraine, signing several agreements to increase natural gas supplies. Szijjártóʼs meeting with Lavrov followed Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbánʼs visit to Moscow earlier this month. The visit was condemned by other EU leaders.

Hungary and Russia are working to resume oil deliveries by Lukoil PJSC after tougher sanctions by Ukraine kicked in against the company.

Remember - in May 2022, Hungary’s government has said it could support the EU’s plan to ban Russian crude and fuel imports unless it exempts countries that rely exclusively on Russian pipelines to import their crude needs, putting the plan on hold as it requires unanimous backing from all 27 member states

Under Orbán, disputes with the EU over corruption or democratic values have led to a stand-off that now threatens Budapest with financial penalties running to billions of euros, while Orbán has also been one of the EU leaders closest to Russian president Vladimir Putin.

But Péter Szijjártó, Hungary’s foreign minister, said his government’s reluctance to sanction Russian oil with an embargo was “not a matter of a lack of political will or timing. “It is the simple geographical, physical, infrastructural reality . . .

Hungary’s energy supplies are secure at the moment, but this sanctions package would completely ruin that security,” said Szijjártó.

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The volume of money transfers to Georgia from Russia in the first half of the 2024 decreased by 3.5 times, to $321.8 million.

But what is the historic extent of money flows between Georgia and Russia (that we know about)? Is there evidence of State Capture through trade and dependence on Putin’s regime?

Context:

Once considered a beacon of democracy and a staunch Western ally, Georgia is being pushed into Russia’s sphere of influence and away from the West, not by Russian soldiers but by its own ruler, a reclusive businessman named Bidzina Ivanishvili.

He made his billions in Russia in the 1990s and has ruled Georgia since 2012, largely from behind the scenes through the party he founded, Georgian Dream.

Two decades ago it had been Mikheil Saakashvili, a US-educated and media-friendly ally of the west, leading the revolution. He became president with 96% of the vote but the support was genuine.

In his first term, his anti-corruption zeal and determination to bring Georgia closer to Nato and the EU won him accolades at home and abroad, and impressive economic growth.

By the second term, however, international monitors and domestic NGOs were warning of the growth of a kleptocracy and creeping authoritarianism. Saakashvili’s zeal and purpose, which had been so attractive, started to wear thin.

Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, after a confrontation between Tbilisi and Moscow over the breakaway region of South Ossetia, appeared on the face of it to replenish Saakashvili’s political stock. When he announced a ceasefire after five days of conflict he was cheered by those who, a year earlier, had taken to the streets calling for his resignation.

But Russia continued to occupy 20% of Georgia. Saakashvili’s apparent disregard for upsetting Moscow would come to be portrayed by the opposition Georgian Dream party as reckless.

Then there was a major domestic scandal. Video footage emerged on the eve of the 2012 election, broadcast by the opposition-supporting channel TV9, that appeared to show a half-naked prisoner weeping and begging for mercy as two guards kicked and slapped him, before raping him with a broomstick.

For ten years, Vatnik oligarch Ivanishvili (the creator and financier of the ruling Georgia Dream Party) - kept up a pretence of democracy and trod a careful line between Russia and the West. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, though, he has thrown in his lot with Russia and has openly turned against the West, which he calls a “party of global war”.

Georgia has reopened direct flights to Russia and helps it evade sanctions, as shown by increased trade flows. At the same time its helmeted police and vigilante thugs assault the young Westernised Georgians who have taken to the streets in protest. So far, the government has had the upper hand.

The story of the past 12 years has been of Georgia talking up its prospective membership of the EU while pursuing incompatible policies – and getting away with it. It was only when Russia invaded Ukraine that the Georgian government had to pick a side – declining to join the west in imposing sanctions. Even then, it was granted EU candidate status in December.

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Next 👉 Pre-2022 invasion trade and activity with russia Georgia’s economic dependence on Russia has decreased in 2023 compared to 2022, although, in comparison to 2021, economic dependence on Russia is still considerably higher. In 2023, the decrease of economic dependence on Russia was mainly brought about by a decrease in remittances.

In 2023, Georgia received a revenue of USD 3.1 billion from Russia through remittances, tourism and export of goods, which is 13% lower than the respective figure of 2022.

In 2023, the revenue received from Russia was 10.3% of the Georgian economy (GDP), while in 2022, this figure amounted to 14.5%. In 2021, this figure equaled 6.3%, and before the pandemic, in 2019, it amounted to 9.7%.

Pre 2022 Invasion:

There are about 3,200 companies registered in the Georgian Business Registry, all or part of which are owned by an offshore company. Since high-ranking public officials are restricted from doing business, they may have used offshore-based companies to maintain their privacy. It will also allow them to participate in state projects, privatization, and public procurement.

Offshore-based companies own Tbilisi Energy, Beeline, IDS Borjomi, Chiaturmanganum Georgia, Rustavi Steel, Silk Road Group Holding, Batumi International Container Terminal, Rustavi Auto Market, Poti Grain Terminal, Clean House and up to 160 other Georgian companies.

Post 2022 Invasion of Ukraine:

Georgia has emerged as the prime destination for Russian entrepreneurs, topping the list of countries where they set up businesses last year, according to the Russian edition of Forbes.

Vyacheslav Kartamyshev, the director of Finion, the company whose analysts prepared the data for Forbes, attributes Georgia’s popularity among Russian entrepreneurs to its favorable business regulations and tax system.

For comparison, according to Forbes, from February 2022 to February 2023, about 16,000 Russians registered as individual entrepreneurs in Georgia, while from January 1995 to February 2022, only 7,788 companies were established by Russians in the country.

Georgia was followed by Kazakhstan with 6,100 new companies, while Armenia and Montenegro shared third place, each registering around 3,200 Russian-owned companies during the same period.

Forbes reported that in 2023 about 2,750 companies were established in Turkey, 3,000 in Serbia, and about 950-1,000 in the UAE. By the end of 2023, the total number of companies registered by Russian citizens worldwide reached 23,713 legal entities.

The Institute for the Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI), a watchdog, recently released a report as part of the third phase of its study, titled “Russian Capital and Russian Connections in Georgian Business.” IDFI analyzed the construction sector, investments in tourism/hotel services, and road transport.

As part of their investigation, IDFI explored the impact on these sectors resulting from two waves of Russian citizens entering Georgia in 2022.

In their analysis of Russian capital and connections, the researchers examined information on company owners and shareholders, connections with Russian government circles, involvement in politics and business, direct investments and sources of funding from Russia.

They also looked at areas of business activity and other interests, projects undertaken, funding of political parties/actors, organizations, media, events, and activities.

The researchers looked at partner organizations in Georgia and possible links with Georgian political groups/parties/politicians/state officials/activists/journalists, as well as public perception of their activities and lobbying tendencies.

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Next 👉 Key findings by The Institute for the Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI) in 2023

Decoupling from Russia Gas: A compilation of analysis on russian gas supply into Europe from 2022 to 2024, and plans for beyond 2025.

The thread is wordy, it is put together as a reference point for knowledge - not as a click bait article. I recommend you use the audio narration to listen to the thread at your own leisure, while multi-tasking or commuting. Find the link to the narration in the first reply to the last thread. The source brief, sources and references are also provided in the thread.

As set out by the Brookings Institute, “when the war began, Europe was importing a variety of energy products from Russia, including crude oil and oil products, uranium products, coal, and liquefied natural gas (LNG).

But the Kremlin’s sharpest energy weapon was natural gas, delivered by the state-backed gas monopolist Gazprom via pipelines and based on long-term contracts. Europe needs gas for power generation, household heating, and industrial processes.”

Before the invasion, more than 40% of Europe’s imported natural gas came from Russia, its single largest supplier, delivered via four main pipelines. Some European countries relied on Russia for more than 80% of their gas supply, including Austria and Latvia.

But Germany was by far Russia’s largest gas customer by volume, importing nearly twice the volume of Italy, the next largest customer. “Oil and gas combined account for 60% of primary energy,” wrote the Economist in May 2022, “and Russia has long been the biggest supply of both.

On the eve of the war in Ukraine, it provided a third of Germany’s oil, around half its coal imports, and more than half its gas.”

Russia’s actions to cut off gas supply to Europe starting in May 2022 were particularly virulent because it was extremely difficult to cope with the loss of such a large volume of gas. Other regional sources of pipeline gas (e.g., from the North Sea) have been declining and key sectors of European industry (e.g., chemicals) depend on gas as their primary energy source.

LNG is a potential substitute for pipeline gas, but it requires specialized infrastructure and global LNG markets were already tight, with much of the world’s supply going to Asia.

The story of Europe’s adjustment to its main supplier of natural gas turning off the taps is generally told in heroic terms: with the continent securing new supply, conserving or substituting (often with generous government subsidies for industry and/or consumers) in order to weather the storm, and throwing Russia’s weaponization of gas back in its face through declining revenues.

This narrative is not false, and the scale and speed of the response would certainly have been politically unimaginable before the invasion. But the self-congratulatory tale masks the fact that there were substantial regional differences in both energy supply and response to the crisis, which will make it difficult to generate a Europe-wide political response in the future.

Even more importantly, the decoupling is by no means complete. Overall, in 2023, Europe still imported 14.8% of its total gas supply from Russia, with 8.7% arriving via pipelines (25.1 billion cubic meters or bcm) and 6.1% as LNG (17.8 bcm).

(For comparison, during the first quarter of 2021, 47% of Europe’s total gas supply came from Russia, 43% via pipeline and 4% as LNG.)This means that the handful of member states that have not been able to or have not chosen to reduce their dependency remain highly vulnerable to Russia’s weaponization of energy imports.

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Next 👉 The Centre for the Study of Democracy’s brief on decoupling from russian gas. Founded in late 1989, the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) is a European public policy institute dedicated to the values of democracy and market economy.

More than two years after the Russian invasion in Ukraine, the decoupling from the Russian energy dependence remains elusive. Russia can still legally sell natural gas around the world.

As of June 2024 - despite efforts by major European natural gas consumers like Germany and Italy to reduce dependence on Russian gas, it still accounts for 15% of the EU’s total gas imports, just behind the United States (19%) and ahead of North Africa (14%).

Natural gas flows through TurkStream, which delivers Russian gas to Greece, the Western Balkans, and Hungary, are rising, thus making it the largest source of Russian gas exports to Europe.

To cut off the Kremlin from EU-generated gas profits and deprive it of its energy weapon after the transit of Russian natural gas through Ukraine ceases at the end of 2024, the EU must halt Russian gas transit through the European expansion of TurkStream.

The current policy brief provides a comprehensive overview of Russia’s continued presence on the European gas market and proposes a complete phaseout of Russian gas from 2025.

Key points From the brief for you to know about russian gas and the need for Europe to decouple from it:

👉 Despite efforts by major natural gas consumers like Germany and Italy to diversify away from Russian gas, import risks in Europe remain high due to continued dependence on Russian supplies.

👉 Russia still accounts for 15% of the EU’s total gas imports, just behind the U.S. (19%) and ahead of North Africa (14%).
Natural gas flows through TurkStream, which delivers Russian gas to Greece, the Western Balkans, and Hungary, remain unchanged, making it the single largest source of Russian gas exports to Europe.

👉 To fully phase out Russian pipeline gas imports after the transit of Russian natural gas through Ukraine ends at the end of 2024, the EU must halt Russian gas transit through the European expansion of TurkStream.

👉 The EU should expand sanctions to include natural gas. Both buyers of Russian LNG (which accounts for 5% of total EU consumption) and pipeline gas can replace these imports with US sources.

👉 European countries should expedite the termination of all long-term gas supply contracts with Gazprom. The EU should also ensure that Russia does not circumvent sanctions by facilitating gas exports via intermediaries with close ties to Gazprom

👉 Full decoupling from Russia requires dismantling the state capture networks that continue funding Kremlin’s subversion actions across Europe.

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Next 👉 The flow of russian gas into Europe; the background

Victor Orban meets with his idol, the indicted war criminal Putin - as Russia commits an atrocious war crime by bombing a children’s hospital. The EU needs to act now - starting with the disbanding of the Presidency of the European Council - which Orban and his corrupt government currently chair in a rotating presidency.

It is clear that the European Union has evaded a key dilemma - and every member state is complicit with Vatnik Orban’s disgraceful conduct in meting with the indicted war criminal Putin, a move designed to elevate Orban’s sense of self importance as a corrupt and apparently untouchable corrupt European Union head of state.

The issue that the EU has failed to deal with over the past two years under Ursula von der Leyen - is how the EU deals with a member state that breaks away from the principles of the rule of law.

What is the Council of the EU?

The Council of the EU is an institution of the EU. It is one of the EU’s main decision-making bodies alongside the European Parliament. Its members are ministers of member states’ governments. The Council of the EU’s responsibilities are to:

☑️ negotiate and adopt EU laws
☑️ coordinate member states’ policies
☑️ develop the EU’s common foreign and security policy
☑️ conclude international agreements
☑️ adopt the EU budget.

The main responsibilities of the presidency of the Council are to:

☑️ maintain continuity of the EU’s agenda
☑️ ensure sound law-making
☑️ facilitate cooperation and coordination between member states and EU institutions.
☑️ In practice, the presidency carries out its role by planning and chairing meetings of the sectoral councils across a range of policy areas such as economic and financial affairs, the environment, or foreign affairs.

The presidency further represents the Council in dealings with other EU institutions. The presidency’s legislative priorities are informed by the work programme of the European Commission.

⚡️None of the presidency tasks allow for Orban to visit and negotiate with foreign indicted war criminals and dictators.

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Next 👉 The EU Council Presidency historical issues:

An organisational quirk dating back to the eu’s earliest days is meant to help smooth the continent back into action: the rotating presidency.

Every six months, a new country is put in charge of running vast swathes of the bloc’s business. For the Council presidency there is no election: every country takes its turn. This means that every member state – however big or small – holds the presidency of the Council. Their turn comes every 13-and-a half years.

The system of rotating presidencies goes back to the very beginning of the European integration. Every six months, a member state becomes the president of the Council of the EU and helps ensure the smooth running of the EU legislative process. Presidencies used to be more visible until a new eu treaty in 2009 curtailed their reach.

The biggest change was that the summit meetings of European leaders are no longer chaired by national leaders taking turns, but by a permanent “president” (the job title is used liberally in Brussels). Still, holding the mantle gives each country plenty of behind-the-scenes sway.

The presidency is responsible for driving forward the Council's work on EU legislation, ensuring the continuity of the EU agenda, orderly legislative processes and cooperation among member states. To do this, the presidency must act as an honest and neutral broker.

The Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force in 2009, significantly reduced the powers of the presidency by formally separating the presidency of the European Council and the presidency of the Foreign Affairs Council. Whereas in the past the presidency still encompassed both institutions—and thus also a higher profile and more responsibility—the agenda for the European Council is now set by the president of the European Council.

In addition, the council presidency operates within a narrow institutional framework. The council has no right of initiative. In the EU, this lies exclusively with the European Commission. It is also the European Council that sets the EU's general priorities and has the final say on particularly important and politically sensitive issues.

Last but not least, the council presidency is supported in terms of content and administration by the General Secretariat of the Council, which should ensure a certain degree of consistency and continuity. The same applies to the trio presidency, which in the case of Hungary coincides with the previous presidencies of Belgium and Spain.

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