Armenia exits the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CTSO) .

This thread is offers some context, history, Ukraine related relevance and a chronology of recent events leading to Armenia rejecting the Russian led CTSO.

👉 A little bit about Armenia..

Armenia is an ancient country. Its history dates back to well before the Bronze Age and traces the beginnings of civilization. Armenia is the first country to adopt Christianity as its state religion. Today, 97% of the Armenia’s population are Christians, and Armenia has one of the most beautiful churches in the world.

The Armenian capital, Yerevan, is one of the world’s oldest inhabited cities. Founded in 782 BC by King Argishti, it is even older than Rome. There are six UNESCO World Heritage Sites in Armenia: Haghpat Monastery, Sanahin Monastery, Echmiadzin cathedral and churches, Zvartnots archaeological site, Geghard Monastery and Azat Valley.

Mining in Armenia is concentrated around the extraction of metals iron, copper, molybdenum, lead, zinc, gold, silver, antimony, and aluminum.

Armenia is a landlocked country located in the South Caucasus region of Eurasia. Armenia is bordered by Georgia in the north, the Republics of Azerbaijan and Artsakh in the east, Nakhchiva (Azerbaijan's exclave) Iran in the south, and Turkey in the west. Armenia occupies a land area of 11,484 square miles.

The population of the country is estimated at 2.9 million. Until independence, the economy of Armenia heavily depended on industry. The industry relied on outside sources. The main domestic energy source is hydroelectric. The country’s vast majority of energy is produced with imported fuel from countries such as Russia.

Natural resources play an important role in boosting the economy of Armenia. The natural resources are used domestically and are also exported. Geographically, Armenia is mountainous. This geographical peculiarity renders the country rich in mineral resources.

The mineral resources of Armenia include iron, zinc, aluminum, copper, molybdenum, gold, lead, silver and antimony. The country is also rich in other rare and hard to find metals.

Armenia possesses some of the world’s most diverse nonmetallic minerals including tuff, zeolites, nephelite syenites, perlite, scoria, marble, pumice stone, and basalts. The industrial minerals found in the country are cement, diatomite, limestone, and gypsum.

The mining industry is, therefore, one of the principal areas of Armenia’s economy. In Armenia, 24.8% of the population lived below the national poverty line in 2022.

Armenia is the 7th safest country in the world, according to NUMBEO. The analytical platform's Crime Rate and Safety Index by Country report has ranked Armenia 7th out of 146 countries, while the city of Yerevan is 15th out of 329 cities.

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Next 👉 What is the CTSO? 👉 What is the CTSO?

The CSTO is a Russia-dominated alliance of former Soviet states that have pledged to protect one another in the event of an attack.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is an intergovernmental military alliance in Eurasia consisting of six post-Soviet states: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, formed in 2002.

The Collective Security Treaty has its origins in the Soviet Armed Forces, which was replaced in 1992 by the United Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and was then itself replaced by the successor armed forces of the respective independent states.

Similar to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Article 4 of the Collective Security Treaty (CST) establishes that an aggression against one signatory would be perceived as an aggression against all.

The 2002 CSTO charter reaffirmed the desire of all participating states to abstain from the use or threat of force. Signatories are prohibited from joining other military alliances.

The CSTO holds yearly military command exercises for the CSTO nations to have an opportunity to improve inter-organizational cooperation. The largest of such exercises was held in Southern Russia and central Asia in 2011, consisting of more than 10,000 troops and 70 combat aircraft.

On 4 February 2009, an agreement to create the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (KSOR) was reached by five of the seven members, with plans finalized on 14 June. The force is intended to be used to repulse military aggression, conduct anti-terrorist operations, fight transnational crime and drug trafficking, and neutralize the effects of natural disasters.

Belarus and Uzbekistan initially refrained from signing on to the agreement. Belarus did so because of a trade dispute with Russia, and Uzbekistan due to general concerns. Belarus signed the agreement the following October, while Uzbekistan has never done so.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) maintains a peacekeeping force that has been deployed to areas of conflict, including Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The force is composed of troops from member states and is designed to provide stability and security in the region.

On 6 October 2007, CSTO members agreed to a major expansion of the organization that would create a CSTO peacekeeping force that could deploy under a United Nations mandate or without one in its member states. The expansion would also allow all members to purchase Russian weapons at the same price as Russia.

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Next 👉 A potted history of Putin squeezing Armenia

August 2024, - the EU countries are continuing to prop up revenue for Putin’s regime and the murderous onslaught against Ukraine.

The EU’s State of the Energy Union Report 2024, published on September 11, 2024 - sets out that the EU is trying to quickly replace Russian gas supply and ensure Europe’s energy security in the short-medium term. To do so the EU has reached out to other international suppliers.

Norway and the U.S. have become the EU's largest gas suppliers - for pipeline and LNG gas respectively- providing 34% and 18% of EU gas imports in the
first half of 2024.

The EU claims that a record of twelve new LNG terminals and six expansion projects of existing terminals have been commissioned between 2022 and 2024.

Overall, these are expected to increase the EU’s LNG import capacity by 70 bcm to 284 bcm by 2024.

Remember - In May 2022, the Commission responded to the European Council’s demand to phase out Europe’s dependency on Russian energy imports as soon as possible by adopting the REPowerEU Plan.

The objective was to rapidly reduce the EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels not only by saving energy and diversifying our supplies, but especially working towards the long-term objective to fast-forward the clean transition via the acceleration of renewables deployment and energy efficiency measures, joining forces to achieve a more resilient energy system and a true Energy Union.

Immediate actions focused on saving energy and enhancing energy efficiency as the cleanest and cheapest way to address the energy crisis. Actions undertaken under REPowerEU allowed one of the steepest gas demand decline in history.

In parallel to EU sanctions banning seaborne imports of Russian crude oil and refined petroleum products12 as well as Russian coal, imports of Russian gas (pipeline & LNG) dropped from a 45% share of overall EU gas imports in 2021 to only 18% in the first half of 2024.

Yet the enormous volumes of continued revenue reported by Crea for August 2024 volumes, show that the EU still provides significant income for Russia, for its fossil fuels - arguably a different reality to the one the EU suggests in it’s latest energy report.

The ongoing purchase of Russian fossil fuels by EU countries, despite sanctions, highlights the complexities and contradictions within Europe's energy policy and its efforts to reduce dependence on Russian energy amid the Ukraine conflict. Several key points arise:

The EU's decision to exempt certain Russian fossil fuels from sanctions, particularly crude oil imported through the southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, demonstrates the difficulty of fully severing ties with Russian energy.

These exemptions likely stem from the fact that many of these countries, especially landlocked ones like Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, have limited alternatives to replace Russian fossil fuel imports.

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Next 👉 Crea report for August 2024 Crea’s latest publication sets out the data on Russia’s fossil fuel revenue in August 2024 (please see the references tweet for a link to the full report).

👉 In August, the top five largest Russian fossil fuel importing countries in the EU paid Russia a total of EUR 1.2 bn for their imports. The EU has granted an exemption for Russian crude oil imported through the southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. Russian pipeline gas and liquified natural gas (LNG) also remain unsanctioned.

👉 Hungary was the largest importer of Russian fossil fuels within the EU, importing fossil fuels worth EUR 369 mn. Their August imports included crude oil via pipeline valued at EUR 155 mn and gas valued at EUR 214 mn.

👉 France, the second-largest buyer within the EU, exclusively imported LNG worth EUR 219 mn.

👉 Slovakia was the third-largest importer of Russian fossil fuels within the EU, importing pipeline oil and gas worth EUR 61 mn and EUR 130 mn, respectively.

👉 Austria exclusively imported pipeline gas worth EUR 177 mn.
Italy, the fifth-largest buyer within the EU, imported Russian pipeline gas valued at EUR 174 mn.

👉 LNG: The EU was the largest buyer, purchasing 50% of Russia’s LNG exports, followed by China (21%) and Japan (18%).

👉 Pipeline gas: The EU was the largest buyer, purchasing 40% of Russia’s pipeline gas, followed by China (28%) and Turkey (25%).

Globally - the revenue streams have seen marginal drops:

In August 2024, Russia’s monthly fossil fuel export revenues dropped 8% to EUR 636 mn per day, marking the fifth consecutive month of decline.
Revenues from seaborne crude oil (EUR 186 mn per day) dropped 14% month-on-month. A significant reason for this drop was an 8% drop in the volume of exports.

👉 Meanwhile, revenues from crude oil via pipeline (EUR 77 mn per day) dropped by 4% in August.

👉 Russian revenues from seaborne oil product exports declined 7% month on month, dropping to EUR 206 mn per day.

👉 LNG export revenues increased by 55% month-on-month to EUR 42 mn per day.

👉 Russia benefitted from a 4% month-on-month rise in revenues from pipeline gas to EUR 73 mn per day.

👉 Russian revenues from coal exports dropped 28% month-on-month to EUR 49 mn per day — the fifth consecutive month they’ve dropped.

👉 Coal: From 5 December 2022 until the end of August 2024, China purchased 45% of all Russia’s coal exports, followed by India (18%). Turkey (10%), South Korea (10%), and Taiwan (5%) round off the top five buyers list.

👉 Crude oil: China has bought 47% of Russia’s crude exports, followed by India (37%), the EU (6%), and Turkey (6%).

👉 Oil products: Turkey, the largest buyer, has purchased 24% of Russia’s oil product exports, followed by China (12%) and Brazil (11%).

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Next 👉 EU countries called out

The Vertical Gas Corridor is the key to the energy security of Ukraine, Moldova and the countries of South East Europe in the long term, confirmed the natural gas transmission system operator of Bulgaria, Bulgartransgaz in March 2024.

“After the probable end of the transport of natural gas from Russia through Ukraine from the start of 2025, the Vertical Gas Corridor will be the only project that can provide both the required transport of liquefied natual gas and the continuation of the operation of the gas transmission network and the underground gas storage facilities in Ukraine,” the CEO of Bulgartransgaz explained.

It is now certain that Ukraine will end transition of Russian gas from the end of 2024.

Bulgaria consumes about 3 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas. The Gas Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria natural gas pipeline became operational in 2022, and Bulgaria receives about 1 bcm a year from Azerbaijan, with a long-term contract at a price linked to the international oil price. In April this year, Azerbaijani gas accounted for 51.1% of Bulgaria’s domestic consumption.

Bulgaria also purchases oil to feed its Burgas refinery, which has a capacity of 190,000 barrels per day (bpd) and is operated by Russia's Lukoil. Bulgaria was the fourth largest buyer of seaborne Russian oil in 2023, purchasing over 100,000 bpd.

Bulgaria is however replacing Russian oil imports with crude from Kazakhstan, Iraq and Tunisia in January, according to traders and LSEG data.

Bulgaria has a waiver from a European Union embargo that allows it to continue seaborne imports of Russian oil in 2024. But the country has restricted exports of all refined products produced from Russian crude from this month, which makes it almost impossible for its sole refinery to run on Russian oil, and has decided to stop all Russian crude imports from March.

When flows from the Yamal and NordStream 1 pipelines halted, the CEE region had to rapidly adapt to the new reality (see Figure 1 for more details). Poland stopped sending gas to Germany, and German flows into the Czech Republic were slashed to one-fifth. Czechia then opted to receive gas from Slovakia, reversing years of flow in the opposite direction.

Similarly, Slovak flows into Austria were reduced by more than two-thirds, which in turn saw their exports to Hungary and Italy almost disappear by the end of 2023.

Further east, the inauguration of the Balkan Stream pipeline in 2021 provided some relief to the region, allowing flows from the TurkStream pipeline to reach Romania, Serbia, and Hungary, and giving the latter the opportunity to export gas to Slovakia since 2023.

However, not every country benefited from the project: Bulgaria and Moldova stopped consuming Russian gas in 2022 following disputes involving long-term contracts with Gazprom. This overhaul of the gas market resulted in a rebalancing of geopolitical power in the region.

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Next 👉 Context Context:

After the halt of Russian gas flows through the Yamal and NordStream 1 pipelines in 2022, the region now risks losing the Russian supply it receives via Ukraine. Ukraine has expressed its intention not to renew the transit contract with Russia, set to expire by the end of the year.

With the expected end of Russian gas transit through Ukraine at the end of this year, the Balkan Stream gas pipeline through Bulgaria will become the main supply route for the EU and Ukraine, as discussed during the visit of the EU’s top energy official, Ditte Juul Jorgensen, to the dispatch centre of state-owned gas company Bulgartransgaz (BTG).

In the long term, Bulgaria will become an important transit country to ensure supplies to Romania, Moldova and the countries of south-eastern Europe.

“After the probable termination of the transmission of natural gas from Russia through Ukraine from the beginning of 2025, the vertical gas corridor through Bulgaria will be the only project that can ensure both the necessary transmission of liquefied gas and the continued operation of the gas transmission network and underground gas storage facilities in Ukraine,” said Vladimir Malinov, head of Bulgartransgaz.

Data from the EU Commission show that since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU has drastically reduced its imports of Russian gas from more than 50% to 15% last year. In total, 9% of Russian gas supplies to the EU come via pipelines, with the remainder being liquefied gas. Following the suspension of the Ukrainian gas corridor, supplies to the EU and Ukraine will have to pass mainly through Bulgaria.

The Balkan country operates the Balkan Stream gas pipeline, which is a continuation of Turk Stream, a gas pipeline that was inaugurated exactly one year before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s project to bypass Ukraine was supported by the former leaders of Bulgaria, Turkey, and Serbia – Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Boyko Borissov and Aleksandar Vučić.

After the outbreak of the war, Russia cut off gas supplies to Bulgaria, but the authorities in Sofia did not interfere with the transit of Russian gas to Serbia, Hungary and from there to Austria. Separately, Bulgaria and Greece built a gas interconnector linking the Bulgarian gas network to the Trans-Adriatic Gas Pipeline, which carries gas from Azerbaijan.

This connection also allows the transfer of LNG from the Greek terminals and the import of LNG from the Russian terminals via the Balkan Stream.

Currently, Bulgaria and Romania are not using the potential of the Trans-Balkan gas pipeline, which was the old route for the transit of Russian gas from Ukraine through Romania to Bulgaria before the launch of the Turkish Stream. The idea of the authorities in Sofia is to reverse the direction of this gas pipeline and make Bulgaria a gas export route to Romania and Ukraine.

This project is called the Vertical Gas Corridor and is a joint project of the gas companies of Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Moldova and Ukraine to extend the existing gas connections between them.

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Next 👉 Kpler analysis of russian gas interruption

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), a potted history, it’s makeup, it’s role in Ukraine and current relationship with Russia, and news of the move by the IMF in September 2024 - to appoint a US sanctioned russian to the board of the IMF, a close connection to the indicted war criminal Vladimir Putin.

This thread is not a comprehensive view and history of the IMF, it brings together key reported information and facts that will provide you with a better understanding.

The thread is long - have you considered bookmarking and listening to the podcast version (see the reply to the last tweet in the thread for a link), or keep an eye out for the YouTube version which should be released in the coming days.

Please remember to like and share this post, it will help with the reach of information to a wider audience.

👉 IMF History

The IMF is an United Nations (UN) specialised agency, founded at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 to secure international monetary cooperation, to stabilize currency exchange rates, and to expand international liquidity (access to hard currencies).

The first half of the 20th century was marked by two world wars that caused enormous physical and economic destruction in Europe and a Great Depression that wrought economic devastation in both Europe and the United States.

These events kindled a desire to create a new international monetary system that would :

💰stabilize currency exchange rates without backing currencies entirely with gold;
💰 to reduce the frequency and severity of balance-of-payments deficits (which occur when more foreign currency leaves a country than enters it);
💰 to eliminate destructive mercantilist trade policies, such as competitive devaluations and foreign exchange restrictions

…all while substantially preserving each country’s ability to pursue independent economic policies.

Multilateral discussions led to the UN Monetary and Financial Conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, U.S., in July 1944. Delegates representing 44 countries drafted the Articles of Agreement for a proposed International Monetary Fund that would supervise the new international monetary system.

The framers of the new Bretton Woods monetary regime hoped to promote world trade, investment, and economic growth by maintaining convertible currencies at stable exchange rates.

Countries with temporary, moderate balance-of-payments deficits were expected to finance their deficits by borrowing foreign currencies from the IMF rather than by imposing exchange controls, devaluations, or deflationary economic policies that could spread their economic problems to other countries.

After ratification by 29 countries, the Articles of Agreement entered into force on December 27, 1945. The fund’s board of governors convened the following year in Savannah, Georgia, U.S., to adopt bylaws and to elect the IMF’s first executive directors.

The governors decided to locate the organization’s permanent headquarters in Washington, D.C., where its 12 original executive directors first met in May 1946. The IMF’s financial operations began the following year.

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Next 👉 Structure and objectives 👉 Structure of the IMF

The IMF is headed by a board of governors, each of whom represents one of the organization’s approximately 180 member states. The governors, who are usually their countries’ finance ministers or central bank directors, attend annual meetings on IMF issues.

The fund’s day-to-day operations are administered by an executive board, which consists of 24 executive directors who meet at least three times a week.

Eight directors represent individual countries (China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and the other 16 represent the fund’s remaining members, grouped by world regions. Because it makes most decisions by consensus, the executive board rarely conducts formal voting.

The board is chaired by a managing director, who is appointed by the board for a renewable five-year term and supervises the fund’s staff of about 2,700 employees from more than 140 countries. The managing director is usually a European and—by tradition—not an American. The first female managing director, Christine Lagarde of France, was appointed in June 2011.

Each member contributes a sum of money called a quota subscription. Quotas are reviewed every five years and are based on each country’s wealth and economic performance—the richer the country, the larger its quota.

The quotas form a pool of loanable funds and determine how much money each member can borrow and how much voting power it will have.

For example, the United States’ approximately $83 billion contribution is the most of any IMF member, accounting for approximately 17 percent of total quotas. Accordingly, the United States receives about 17 percent of the total votes on both the board of governors and the executive board.

The Group of Eight industrialized nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) controls nearly 50 percent of the fund’s total votes.

👉 The IMF’s Primary Objectives;

(a). To Promote exchange stability throughout the world

(b). To Promote international monetary cooperation;

(c). To Facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade;

(d). To Assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments; and

(e). Make resources available to members experiencing Balance of Payments difficulties.

Publications:

IMF provides periodic assessments of global prospects in its "World Economic Outlook", of financial markets in its "Global Financial Stability Report", of public finance developments in its "Fiscal Monitor", and of external positions of the largest economies in its "External Sector Report", in addition to a series of Regional Economic Outlooks.

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Next 👉 IMF’s operation

04 September, 2024 - The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 10 individuals and two entities as part of a coordinated U.S. government response to Moscow’s malign influence efforts targeting the 2024 U.S. presidential election.

Russian state-sponsored actors have long used a variety of tools, such as generative artificial intelligence (AI) deep fakes and disinformation, in an attempt to undermine confidence in the United States’ election processes and institutions.

Beginning in early 2024, executives at RT—Russia’s state-funded news media outlet—began an even more nefarious effort to covertly recruit unwitting American influencers in support of their malign influence campaign.

RT used a front company to disguise its own involvement or the involvement of the Russian government in content meant to influence U.S. audiences.

“Today’s action underscores the U.S. government’s ongoing efforts to hold state-sponsored actors accountable for activities that aim to deteriorate public trust in our institutions,” said Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen. “Treasury will not waver in our commitment to safeguarding our democratic principles and the integrity of our election systems.”

Today’s designations complement law enforcement actions taken by the Department of Justice and the Department of State’s designation of the Rossiya Segodnya media group and five of its subsidiaries, RIA Novosti, RT, TV-Novosti, Ruptly, and Sputnik, as Foreign Missions, steps to impose visa restrictions, and release of a Rewards for Justice (RFJ) reward offer of up to $10 million relating to information pertaining to foreign interference in a U.S. election.

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Next 👉 Sanctions target RT (Russia Today) Sanctions targeting russian propagandists and RT:

RT, formerly Russia Today, is a Russian state-funded news outlet that began broadcasting internationally in 2005. In 2017, RT registered as an agent of a foreign government in the United States.

Beginning in early 2024, RT executives began an effort to covertly recruit unwitting American influencers. RT used a front company to disguise its own involvement or the involvement of the Russian government.

Margarita Simonovna Simonyan (Simonyan) is the Editor-in-Chief of RT and a central figure in Russian government malign influence efforts. She allowed the operations of a front company to occur under the cover of RT.

Elizaveta Yuryevna Brodskaia (Brodskaia) is the Deputy Editor-in-Chief of RT, who has reported to Russian President Putin and other government officials. Anton Sergeyvich Anisimov (Anisimov) is an RT Deputy Editor-in-Chief, who conducts activities on behalf of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).

Andrey Vladimirovich Kiyashko (Kiyashko) is the Deputy Director of the RT English-Language Information Broadcasting and is responsible for updating Russian government officials and providing an overview of RT’s operations.

Konstantin Kalashnikov (Kalashnikov) is RT’s Digital Media Projects Manager, who, in early 2022, worked with Kiyashko. In mid‑2023, Brodskaia and Kiyashko implemented a large-scale influence operation for RT on U.S. social media with the intent of obscuring RT’s connection to the content meant to influence online audiences.

Elena Mikhaylovna Afanasyeva (Afanasyeva) is an employee of RT’s Digital Media Projects Department and reports to Kalashnikov. Starting in early 2024, Afanasyeva covertly interacted with prominent U.S. social media influencers under the cover of a fake persona, purporting to be an employee at a U.S. company to obscure RT’s and the Russian government's involvement.

The pro-Kremlin hacktivist group RaHDit is composed of active and former Russian intelligence officers. Aleksey Alekseyevich Garashchenko (Garashchenko) is the head of RaHDit and was an FSB officer at the time he started leading the group.

Garashchenko directly interacts with members of the Russian intelligence and security services, members of the Russian Presidential Administration, and employees from RT.

Anastasia Igorevna Yermoshkina (Yermoshkina) is an affiliate of Garashchenko. Aleksandr Vitalyevich Nezhentsev (Nezhentsev) works with Garashchenko and is an administrator and developer of cyber tools used by the FSB. Nezhentsev also leads a team focusing on developing new tools that can be used in the surveillance of information data files.

Today, OFAC designated Simonyan, Brodskaia, Anisimov, Kiyashko, Kalashnikov, Afanasyeva, Garashchenko, Yermoshkina, and Nezhentsev pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being owned or controlled, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the Russian Federation.

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Next 👉 Sanctions implications

Mongolia threatens Putins pipeline deal. Putin rushes to Mongolia to save the deal, risking arrest under the ICC warrant of arrest.

Mongolia is a key transit route for new Russia-China pipeline. The landlocked country is a key transit route for Russian gas supplies to China and will host almost 1000 kilometres of the planned Sila Sibiri 2 pipeline.

With capacity of 50 billion cubic metres of gas per annum, the project aims to help replace volumes lost after Russia almost halted its pipeline gas exports to Europe in 2022 following its invasion of Ukraine.

Russian state-controlled gas giant Gazprom and the Russian government have repeatedly assured that talks are progressing with China and Mongolia over the Sila Sibiri 2 route and gas supply terms.

On June 2, the Financial Times (FT) reported that China and Russia did not conclude a deal on the pipeline because China demanded to receive it at Russia’s subsidized domestic prices and that it would only purchase a small fraction of the pipeline’s planned annual capacity.

But reported on August 22nd, 2024 - The planned pipeline intended to transport gas from Russia to northeastern China known as Power of Siberia-2 has likely fallen through. Former Mongolian Security Council member Munkhnaar Bayarlkhaag said Moscow has failed to reach an agreement with Beijing.

Bayarlkhaag added that Beijing might’ve been displeased with Russian state-owned energy conglomerate Gazprom’s potentially obtaining unilateral control over the Mongolian section of the pipeline. “This would have meant a sudden and long-term increase in Moscow’s influence in Mongolia, to the detriment of Beijing,” he said. “Though never explicitly verbalized, it would have been ‘fair’ to include the Chinese into the Mongolian section’s development from the beginning.”

The South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported on Monday, Aug 19, Mongolia, whose territory the pipeline would transit through, did not include the project in its national development plans through 2028.

Although Russia has seen an increase in gas exports to China through the Power of Siberia 1 pipeline, this has not been sufficient to compensate for the decline in European exports.

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Next 👉 Mongolia’s decoupling from Russian gas and their obligation to arrest Putin. Mongolia has rolled out a plan to end its energy shortfall by the end of 2028, long before it expects cheap Russian gas to finally start flowing into the country.

The Mongolian parliament’s final approval this week of a government-proposed, five-year development plan that excludes any gas input from Sila Sibiri 2, means the nation will need to rely on coal, hydropower and renewable energy sources to eliminate energy shortfall, according to a copy of the plan available on the parliament’s website.

According to the development plan, two hydropower stations with a total capacity of 400 megawatts, and one 450-MW coal-fired power plant are to be built before the end of 2028 to answer the increasing energy demands of the country and its capital Ulaanbaatar, where energy use exceeds available supply by about one third during winter.

As well as the proposed new power plants, Mongolia’s energy policy will also focus on wind and solar energy sources, the plan said. The country is estimated to have an ultimate capacity to produce 2600 gigawatts of renewable power, which could potentially cover its energy needs and provide capacity to export electricity to neighbouring countries, according to the approved document.

Putin risks being arrested in Mongolia - he arrived on Monday 02 September, 2024 - for a state visit in Mongolia, which lies on the route of a planned new gas pipeline connecting Russia and China. He is clearly desperate to prevent the collapse of the pipeline deal with Mongolia. He is due to hold talks with Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh on Tuesday.

Ukraine urged Mongolia last week to arrest Putin on a warrant issued by the International Criminal Court warrant last year, when it accused him of the war crime of illegally deporting hundreds of children from Ukraine. The Kremlin has dismissed the accusation, saying it is politically motivated, and has said it has no worries about Putin making the trip.

The warrant obliges the court's 124 member states, including Mongolia, to arrest Putin and transfer him to The Hague for trial if he sets foot on their territory.

What will the consequences be if Mongolia fails to arrest Putin - have they given Putin cast iron assurances that they will not meet their obligations as an ICC signatory? What will the @IntlCrimCourt do if Mongolia fails in its obligation to arrest Putin?

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Debunking the malinformation - Ukrainian drone strikes are just a temporary inconvenience.

Foreign Policy has published many insightful think-tank opinions on Russia and the illegal war conducted by Russia in Ukraine, (see references tweet).

However - I take substantial issue with a recent publication that purports Ukrainian drone strikes have minimal effect.

The article was published by a so-called “energy expert” Sergey Vakulenko, from Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. The article suggests that while the drone strikes are a boost to Ukrainian morale - they have little effect on Russia’s oil revenues.

In April 2023, the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center opened in Berlin, Germany. who wrote for the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre. @CarnegieRu / @CarnegieEndow. The center focuses on major policy challenges across the wider region in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is home to the digital publication Carnegie Politika. The current director of the center is Alexander Gabuev.

Key points in the publication:

So far this year, Ukraine says that it has successfully attacked more than 30 Russian oil installations, some deep inside Russia.

“The latest estimates are that about 17 percent of Russia’s (admittedly ample) oil-refining capacity has been damaged to some extent by the strikes. But more broadly, Russia continues to export huge volumes of oil and even a fair bit of natural gas, ensuring that oil revenues continue to fuel its war machine

In some ways, the energy fight is an adjunct to the fight on the battlefield. Ukraine’s ability to damage (even for short periods of time) Russian refineries and fuel depots is meant, in part, to undermine logistics for the Russian army, which continues to occupy large swaths of southern and eastern Ukraine.

Blowing up expensive installations deep inside Russia is also a psychological boon for Ukraine, which has been largely on the back foot since early 2022. Russia’s systematic destruction of the Ukrainian electric power grid, meanwhile, is meant to undermine civilian morale and resilience ahead of winter.”

The White House had initially warned Kyiv not to strike Russian oil installations, fearing Russian reprisals as well as an inconvenient spike in oil and gasoline prices ahead of the U.S. election, but Ukraine has plowed ahead regardless (just as it did with the Kursk incursion).

The big question is: Do all the eye-grabbing explosions at refineries and fuel depots make much of a difference to Russia’s surprisingly resilient oil-based economy?

But the damage done is brief and relatively easy to repair,” said Sergey Vakulenko, an energy expert at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. “Will it make drastic impacts on Russian oil revenues? Probably not. The drones cannot do what the sanctions were unable to achieve.”

In some cases, Vakulenko said, the oil installations that Ukraine is targeting, chosen because they are within easy range of drones, may not be the critical marks that Kyiv imagines.

Many of the older refineries in western Russia were built to take advantage of export customs loopholes that made it more beneficial to export barely refined oil products, even very low-quality ones, than to export regular crude.

These aren’t the crown jewels, but the cracked zircons. “The benefits of hitting those refineries may not be what the Ukrainians thought,” said Vakulenko, who was previously an oil executive at Russian and international companies.”

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Next 👉 Debunking the mal-information Debunking this view:

This report smacks of a biase from the start, showing a reluctance to recognise the facts or credit the real and wider impact drone strikes have on Russia.

This biased opinion is highlighted from the outset where the author says 17 percent of Russia’s oil-refinery has been damaged “to some extent” and “admittedly ample”. To admit something reluctantly has strong overtones that the opposite is about to be argued, and true to form - the article then sets out to minimise the perceived impact of drone strikes on Russia oil infrastructure.

The author of this article, a “senior fellow” and “energy expert” Sergey Vakulenko, from Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.

In April 2023, the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center opened in Berlin, Germany. The center focuses on major policy challenges across the wider region in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is home to the digital publication Carnegie Politika. The current director of the center is Alexander Gabuev.

Challenging the analysis:

👉 The assertion is that oil installations being targeted are within easy range of drones, is misleading.

In fact a growing number of attacks are penetrating deep into Russia. For example, Reuters reported on May 9, 2024 - “A Ukrainian drone struck a major oil processing plant in Russia's Bashkiria region on Thursday from some 1,500 km (932 miles) away, its longest-range such attack since the start of the war.”

The Kyiv source said the drone flew 1,500 km, calling it a record, and hit a catalytic cracking unit in an attack that showed "Russian refineries and oil depots serving the military complex cannot feel safe even in the deep rear".

While the article published on foreignpolicy. Com suggests hitting a catalytic cracking is of little consequence and easily repaired, tries to diminish the effects of ordinary Russians and oil refinery employees having their businesses attacked in the plain sight of day - 1500km from the nearest Ukraine border.

👉In terms of the impacts of the drone strikes.

The suggestion the impact is minimal sounds like a Kremlin playbook response. Ukraine has stepped up its drone attacks on oil processing facilities in Russia since the start of the year, disrupting 15% of Russia's oil refining capacity according to an estimate by a NATO official at the beginning of April.

15% of Russia’s refining capacity of 5.2 million barrels per day (According to Bloomberg, Russia refined 5.2 million barrels of oil per day on average in April 2024, compared to 5.5 million in January. ). This the equivalent of 780,000 barrels per day of refined oil income.

Hydracarbonprocessing .com reported that Russia's primary offline oil refining capacity has been raised by 114% from the previous plan to 4.1 million metric tons for June mainly to due to last-month stoppages at the Tuapse and Komsomoslk plants, Reuters calculations show. Llll reported “In May, idle capacity stood at 3.8 MMt.

The Russian oil refining industry has been targeted by Ukrainian drone attacks. Technical outages have also contributed to idle capacity. Russia and Ukraine have both used drones to strike critical infrastructure, military installations and troop concentrations in their more than 2-yr conflict, with Kyiv hitting Russian refineries and energy facilities in recent months.

According to the current plan, which is likely be revised upward, the offline refining capacity in July is seen declining to 1.8 MMt, according to Reuters calculations based on data from industry sources.

To suggest the impact of the drone strikes on Russia’s oil refining capacity is just a “psychological boon”, with minimal, temporary or of no consequence - is misleading and factually incorrect.

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Next 👉 Catalyst Crackers..

Selling more oil at higher prices ought to be the stuff of dreams for a petrostate. But for Russia it is a sign of a new, punishing phase in its war with Ukraine.

Months of Ukrainian drone strikes on refineries have crimped Russia’s ability to produce refined fuels, such as diesel and petrol, and turned the world’s third-largest oil producer into an importer of petrol.

Russian oil companies have tried to pare their losses by selling unrefined oil overseas, pushing exports to a new highs in 2024.

Despite the US administration’s fears that the global oil and fuel market could be destabilised, the price dynamic for both categories of commodities to date does not suggest that the Ukrainian strikes have driven prices up.

On the contrary, the need to reduce processing and the impossibility of storing crude have forced Russian exporters to increase exports. At the same time, the refinery shutdowns have driven down sales of petroleum products abroad, resulting in losses primarily for Russian companies.

The Ukrainian attacks and the resulting drop in fuel production have created a number of challenges for the Kremlin, including the need to deal with logistical tensions, strengthen air defence and increase imports of petroleum products.

Given the political importance of fuel availability, reduced processing has forced the Russian government to use tools of intervention in order to ensure that the market is adequately saturated.

For example, it has forced the fuel sector to redirect supplies onto the domestic market at the expense of the foreign markets.

Should the Ukrainian strikes continue and cause more temporary shutdowns at refineries, the government will probably have to step up its intervention, and that will generate costs for the state and may lead to market imbalances.

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Next 👉 A convenient target Refineries are a convenient target.

Oil is seen as the mainstay of the Russian economy, so elements of the oil industry are obvious and symbolic targets. Unlike oil fields, which are vast with dispersed islands of equipment and located in remote Siberia, refineries appear to be a far more rewarding target.

Refineries cost tens of billions of dollars to build; they are large targets and therefore hard to miss; and there is a lot of flammable and explosive matter, making substantial fire damage probable after the hit. There are also plenty of Russian refineries relatively close to Ukrainian territory.

From the attack planners’ standpoint, it would be ideal if Russia were not only to lose export volumes, but also experience difficulties in supplying enough fuel for its army and economy.

To seriously affect Russia’s refined oil market - significant attacks are required, as Russian refining capacity is 2.5 times bigger than its fuel consumption. Evidently the ongoing refinery attacks are working as Russia implemented a ban on refined exports.

From the attack planners’ standpoint, it would be ideal if Russia were not only to lose export volumes, but also experience difficulties in supplying enough fuel for its army and economy. Alas, that would require a very large-scale attack, as Russian refining capacity is 2.5 times bigger than its fuel consumption.

This logic is not new. Eighty years ago, U.S. and British military planners had a similar idea: to bring Germany and its army to its knees by targeting oil refineries in Germany, Austria, and Romania. For a year from May 1944, over 200,000 tons of bombs were dropped in more than 600 raids, with about 2.5 percent landing on refinery installations. Even under that scale of attack, after the initial shock, German fuel production stabilized at about 40 percent of its previous level.

News reports show that damaged units at many of the refineries were brought back in operation after two to three weeks of repairs, and Bloomberg-reported refining volumes are down from their peaks but above the troughs and again within the customary volume band.

But the capacity to repair refineries is severely restricted now in Russia - the equipment and technology is largely dependent on western companies, who have exited Russia since the illegal invasion of Ukraine.

Some shortages of fuel in Russia became evident in early 2024. Russia did import some volumes of gasoline from Belarus, which was widely celebrated by the media. But the volume in question was a single trainload in one week—less than 0.5 percent of one week’s consumption—while Russia kept exporting naphtha (straight-run gasoline) and diesel.

Considering that not a single unit converting naphtha into gasoline was subject to an attack, that import was most likely for logistical reasons, rather than because of a countrywide shortage of fuels.

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Next 👉 Russian regime interventions

Two can play the ignore game. But there can only be one winner.

👉 Russian Gas to Europe:

The energy implications of the Kursk invasion go far beyond Russia. At Sudzha, a pipeline sends Russian natural gas to the EU. While it may come as a surprise to many given the war in Ukraine, European countries like Austria, Hungary and Slovakia still buy gas from Russia – all of it flowing through the town of Sudzha in Kursk.

Sudzha, located about 10km (6 miles) from the Ukrainian border, plays a key role in the transit of natural gas to the EU. An average of 42 million cubic metres (1.5 billion cubic ft) of Russian gas flows into Ukraine every day, the town playing host to a gas metering system that measures supplies flowing into Europe.

Despite the war with Russia, Kyiv has allowed the gas to continue flowing through its Soviet-era gas pipeline unabated as part of a $2bn-a-year contract between state-owned Naftogaz and Russia’s Gazprom.

👉 Russian Oil to Europe:

The European Commission has said there was “no immediate risk” of oil shortages in Hungary or Slovakia after the two countries complained about Ukraine’s decision last month to place sanctions on Russian supplier Lukoil, which transits exports to the two countries via the war-torn country.

While the EU as a whole has moved to diversify its oil and gas supplies away from Russia, the two eastern members have continued to receive oil via the Soviet-era Druzhba (Friendship) pipeline, and Ukraine’s move prompted Budapest and Bratislava to demand intervention from the Commission.

The Druzhba oil pipeline has remained functioning following Moscow's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, even as the EU weaned itself off most other sources of Russian energy. The southern branch of the pipeline runs via Ukraine to the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, and has been the primary source of supply for their refineries for years.

A few countries in the EU were given temporary dispensation to continue receiving Russian oil in December 2022 when the EU began to sanction russian oil supply into Europe. That temporary dispensation was offered to give the countries time to set up alternative, non-russian supply sources.

In the nearly three years since, Hungary has not attempted to arrange alternative suppliers - they have instead increased their dependence on Russian oil, and Orban has put Hungary at risk of Energy meltdown-down as the EU was always committed to cutting off Russia entirely.

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Next 👉 Hungary and Slovakia have abused the temporary dispensation given to them by the EU. Hungary and Slovakia used a sanctions carveout to keep pumping it in. Hungary has even ramped up Russian oil imports.

Only around 3% of Europe’s crude oil supplies now come from Russia, the EU claims, an alternative pipeline route through Croatia has sufficient spare capacity to meet the needs of both countries.

The argument comes at a time of increasing diplomatic tensions between Brussels and Budapest. Ukrainian is now blocking the transit of pipeline crude sold by Russia's largest private oil firm, Lukoil, effectively stripping the two countries of a third of their oil imports.

Szíjjártó from Hungary warned in an interview on Hungarian television station ATV last week that until the issue of oil transit is settled, Hungary would continue to block €6.5 billion in military aid to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility.

He claims that hat Lukoil currently accounts for one-third of Hungarian oil imports and around 45 per cent of Slovakian oil imports, making the Ukrainian ban a fundamental threat to the energy security of both countries.

‘This is an unacceptable and incomprehensible move by a country that wants to be a member of the European Union and that, with a single decision, puts the oil supply of two EU member states at fundamental risk,’ he said.

Slovakia and Hungary - two countries that have opposed western allies' military aid to Ukraine as it fights Russia's invasion - have complained to Brussels about Kyiv's move to put Lukoil on its sanctions list, saying it prevented them from buying Russian oil for their refineries, threatening security of supply.

Hungary and Slovakia have gone to the rule book, arguing the penalties violate a 2014 trade deal between Kyiv and the EU and asking the European Commission, the EU’s executive, to intervene.

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Next 👉 Remember Hungary ignoring the EU over their concerns of Hungary relaxing Russian visa entry into the EU?

OFAC implements new sanctions - 23 August 2024

Context:

Building on the sanctions already imposed on Russia in response to its continued war of aggression against Ukraine, today the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Department of State targeted nearly 400 individuals and entities both in Russia and outside its borders—including in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East—whose products and services enable Russia to sustain its war effort and evade sanctions.

The United States government will continue to support Ukraine as it defends its independence and hold Russia accountable for its aggression.

“Russia has turned its economy into a tool in service of the Kremlin’s military industrial complex. Treasury’s actions today continue to implement the commitments made by President Biden and his G7 counterparts to disrupt Russia’s military-industrial base supply chains and payment channels,” said Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Wally Adeyemo.

“Companies, financial institutions, and governments around the world need to ensure they are not supporting Russia’s military-industrial supply chains.”

Treasury is targeting numerous transnational networks, including those involved in procuring ammunition and military materiel for Russia, facilitating sanctions evasion for Russian oligarchs through offshore trust and corporate formation services, evading sanctions imposed on Russia’s cyber actors, laundering gold for a sanctioned Russian gold company, and supporting Russia’s military-industrial base by procuring sensitive and critical items such as advanced machine tools and electronic components.

Today’s sanctions further limit Russia’s future revenue from metals and mining. Treasury is also targeting Russian financial technology companies that provide necessary software and IT solutions for Russia’s financial sector.

Treasury is aware of Russian efforts to facilitate sanctions evasion by opening new overseas branches and subsidiaries of Russian financial institutions.

Foreign regulators and financial institutions should be cautious about any dealings with overseas branches or subsidiaries of Russian financial institutions, including efforts to open new branches or subsidiaries of Russian financial institutions that are not themselves sanctioned. Treasury has a range of tools available to respond to the establishment of new evasion channels.

The State Department is targeting entities and individuals involved in Russia’s future energy, metals, and mining production and exports; sanctions evasion; Russia’s military-industrial base, including armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) production, Belarusian support for Russia’s war effort, and air logistics entities; additional subsidiaries of State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom; and malign actors involved in the attempted, forcible “re-education” of Ukraine’s children.

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Next 👉 SANCTIONS EVASION, CIRCUMVENTION 🔐 SANCTIONS EVASION, CIRCUMVENTION, AND BACKFILL

Consistent with commitments made by President Biden and G7 leaders, Treasury continues to target transnational networks that supply Russia with military materiel and sensitive dual-use goods like those included in the multilateral Common High Priority List, jointly developed by the United States, European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom.

Treasury is also targeting multiple networks that facilitate or enable illicit financial schemes and sanctions evasion on behalf of Russian revenue generators and oligarchs.

Many of today’s designations were enabled or informed by extensive coordination with Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). Today’s action targets almost a dozen distinct networks, designating more than 100 individuals and entities across 16 jurisdictions, including the People’s Republic of China, Switzerland, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates.

🔐 RUSSIA’S TECHNOLOGICAL BASE

Today, Treasury is targeting more than 60 Russia-based technology and defense companies that are critical for the sustainment and development of Russia’s defense industry, including entities involved in weapons development and modernization, automation and robotics, development and acquisition of dual-use electronics, digital surveillance, Internet of Things, and artificial intelligence.

These sanctions target Russia’s defense industry while protecting the access by Russian citizens to crucial telecommunications and other digital technology.

🔐 LIMITING RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC METALS AND MINING SECTOR

Guided by commitments made by President Biden and G7 leaders to reduce Russia’s revenues from metals, today Treasury is targeting entities involved in Russia’s metals and mining sector, including steel, iron, and coal mining firms and auxiliary firms that provide specialized services to Russian metals and mining companies.

🔐 RUSSIAN FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY

Today, OFAC is targeting Russian financial technology companies as a part of implementing G7 commitments to curtail Russia’s use of and access to the international financial system to further its war against Ukraine.

👉 Atol is a Russian technology developer involved in services related to payments.

👉 Centre of Financial Technologies Group (CFT)is one of the largest software companies in the Russian market. CFT provides an array of software products for banking and payment solutions for the Russian financial market.

👉 Diasoft Ltd (Diasoft) is one of Russia’s largest developers and suppliers of information technology (IT) solutions for the financial sector.

Atol, CFT, and Diasoft were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy.

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Next 👉 Ammunition Procurement Network

India is fuelling the genocidal invasion of Ukraine by propping the russian regime up with expanding trade - financing the regimes federal budget to fund its military industrial complex.

India's expanding commerce with Russia has raised concerns, particularly in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine. However, India’s relationship with Russia is driven by a complex mix of historical ties, strategic interests, and economic pragmatism, rather than a desire to deepen ties in a way that directly supports Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

Here's how India navigates this delicate situation:

1. Historical and Strategic Relationship:

Long-standing Partnership: India and Russia have a deep-rooted relationship that dates back to the Cold War era when the Soviet Union was a key ally of India. This partnership continues to influence their diplomatic and defense relations today.

Defense Dependence: India relies heavily on Russia for military hardware, with about 60-70% of its defense equipment being of Russian origin. This dependence compels India to maintain a functional relationship with Russia, despite the latter's controversial actions.

2. Economic “Pragmatism” and reputation white-washing:

Energy Needs: India is one of the world’s largest energy consumers, and Russia has become a significant supplier of crude oil to India, particularly after Western sanctions on Russia limited its market access.

India has taken advantage of discounted Russian oil, which has helped it manage inflation and energy costs domestically, while filling the coffers of the federal government in Russia, used to fund the illegal war in Ukraine.

Trade Growth: Bilateral trade between India and Russia has grown significantly since the invasion of Ukraine, driven largely by energy imports. However, this trade is framed as a part of India's broader strategy to diversify its energy sources and manage its economic needs, rather than an endorsement of Russia's policies.

3. Diplomatic Whitewashing Act:

Neutral Stance on Ukraine: India has tried hard to convince the world it has a “neutral stance” on the Ukraine conflict, often abstaining from UN votes condemning Russia. This neutrality is positioned as part of India’s non-alignment policy and its broader strategic autonomy, where it seeks to avoid taking sides in conflicts between major powers.

Of course as tensions simmer with Pakistan and China - sooner or later it will become embroiled in a large conflict - probably with China over land and water resources in the next decade.

India should find no support in the future, especially from countries who have made huge financial sacrifices in changing their dependence on cheap russian fossil fuels, and who have also made substantial financial and military support aid donations. While India chooses to opaquely support Russia in the war in Ukraine conducted by a psychopathic russian.

Most of the EU, G& and coalition countries (excluding the likes of Hungary), have all worked hard to reduce trade with Russia to limit it’s revenues to support the war - India has continued expanding it’s trade, knowing it will have consequences to face at some point for this expansion and support.

Dialogue with All Sides: Despite its growing commerce with Russia, India continues to engage diplomatically with Western countries and has called for dialogue and diplomacy to resolve the conflict in Ukraine. This balanced approach helps India avoid alienating Western partners, who are critical to its economic and geopolitical interests.

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Next 👉 BRICS and India’s feigning of neutrality 4. Global South Leadership:

Advocating for Developing Countries: India has framed its engagement with Russia as part of its broader responsibility towards the Global South and its position in BRICS.

It argues that sanctions on Russia disproportionately affect developing countries, and by continuing trade, India positions itself as a voice for these nations, which is a whitewashing of it’s support of a regime led by an indicted war criminal.

5. Avoiding Direct Support:

Limited Military Engagement: While India continues to purchase Russian defense equipment, it has not provided direct military support to Russia's war efforts. India’s relationship with Russia in the defense sector is portrayed as fulfilling its own security needs rather than supporting Russia’s military agenda.

But all is not what it seems:

India is expanding its commerce with Russia, but it does so with a clear understanding of the geopolitical risks - sooner or later it will be held to account for fuelling the genocidal regime in Russia. It chooses to advocate maintaining a neutral stance on the Ukraine conflict which is a contradiction in terms - as data shows the level and type of trade it conducts with Russia.

It supports a normalisation of business as usual in russian society against the ongoing brutal suppression of Putin dissenters and opposition in Russia - and it choses to ignore the regimes daily war crimes and society destabilisation schemes it conducts globally, both in country with malevolent actors and through the propagation of propaganda and misinformation across governments and social media platforms.

India is masquerading as an innocent bystander, framing its actions in terms of national interest and global equity.and in doing so it tries to convince the world - india sidesteps direct involvement in the war.

This strategy is about India trying to manage its energy needs and maintain its strategic autonomy while limiting damaging its relations with Western countries by avoiding public scrutiny and attention.

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Next 👉 Trade details reveal the extent of their support for Russia and its war time budget.

Hungary refuses to provide the EU with an explanation regarding the issuance of visas to Russians and Belarusians

Hungary missed the European Commission's deadline this week to respond to questions about its decision to ease entry requirements for Russian and Belarusian nationals, raising concerns across the EU.

Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson had given Budapest until 19 August to explain the changes in its immigration policy, but as of Monday afternoon, no reply had been received, the commission confirmed. Frustration is boiling over with Viktor Orbán's rogue foreign policy in EU capitals.

In August 2024, Viktor Orban signed a decree on the extension of the accelerated visa issuance program to eight countries, including Russia and Belarus.

Hungary recently relaxed entry rules for Russians and Belarusians, allowing "guest workers" to stay for two years, with an option to extend for another three years. Johansson sent a letter in August to Hungary's Interior Minister, Sándor Pintér, requesting an explanation for these changes.

The European Union began to publicly demand explanations from Hungary regarding its decision to ease the visa regime for citizens of Russia and Belarus.

Several EU countries, led by the Czech Republic, pushed to ban Schengen travel for Russian diplomats due to espionage concerns. After entering the passport-free zone, Russian diplomats could potentially travel freely across the bloc.

Points of concern:

👉 Hungary's decision to issue visas to Russians and Belarusians without providing explanations to the EU has raised concerns in the European Union.

👉 The relaxation of the visa regime by Hungary for citizens of Russia and Belarus may have security implications for the EU, leading to demands for clarifications from Hungarian authorities.

👉 The EU's Internal Affairs Commissioner expressed concerns about the risk of espionage due to the simplified visa regime, urging Hungary to respond to inquiries by a specified deadline.

👉 Viktor Orban's decree to extend the visa program to include citizens of Russia and Belarus with 'national cards' for work has further fueled the controversy and prompted the EU to take action if necessary.

👉 The issue highlights the need for balanced immigration policies that consider security implications and the integrity of the EU's internal border control, emphasizing the importance of transparency and cooperation among member states.

History of ignoring the EU Commission:

In June 2024, the European Court of Justice fined Hungary €200 million for breaking the EU’s asylum laws and ignoring an earlier judgment.

The Luxembourg court first ruled in December 2020 that Hungary had failed to comply with the bloc’s rules on the treatment of migrants by “unlawfully detaining” asylum seekers and deporting them before they could appeal the rejection of their applications, ordering Budapest to make changes to its policies.

Hungary ignored the judgment, which the ECJ described in a statement on Thursday as “deliberately evading the application of the EU common policy.” Along with the €200 million fine, Hungary will be fined an additional €1 million per day that it fails to comply with the court’s judgment. If Budapest refuses to pay the fines, they can be deducted from its share of the EU budget, as was the case with Poland.

Orbán, imitating his super-hero Donold Trump, lashed out at the judgment, calling it “outrageous and unacceptable” in a post on X.

Viktator Orbán has undermined Europe for long enough, Hungary brazenly flouts EU laws as Orbán openly courts and admires indicted war criminal Vladimir Putin, dictator Xi JingPing who has over one million ethnic Chinese in concentration camps and Turkey’s right wing Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

The EU should have called the Vatnik’s bluff 2 years ago. References and sources:







uk.news.yahoo.com/tensions-rise-…
news.online.ua/en/hungary-ref…
euronews.com/my-europe/2024…
politico.eu/article/hungar…

Russia-linked social media accounts have incited violence and racism in online groups discussing the far-right disorder that have engulfed the UK.

This thread is long - why not consider listening to the audio narration. Great for multi-tasking and commuting. The audio link can be found in the first answer to the last tweet in this thread.

In July and August 2024, far-right riots occurred in England and Northern Ireland, after a mass stabbing in Southport on 29 July. The first riot started in Southport and later many protests and riots spread across the country.

The riots involved racist attacks, arson and looting, and were the worst disorder in the United Kingdom since the 2011 England riots. The riots were fuelled by underlying Islamophobic, racist, anti-immigrant sentiments, and disinformation about the identity of the Southport stabber.

Far-right groups spread misinformation online, and the UK government under Keir Starmer accused Russia of spreading disinformation to stoke the unrest.

The Prime Minister’s spokesman said the Government has “seen bot activity online, much of which may well be amplified by foreign-state actors amplifying some of the disinformation and misinformation that we’ve seen”.

It comes after it emerged that initial disinformation that the teenager accused of killing three girls in Southport was an asylum seeker who had crossed the English Channel can be traced back to Channel3 Now, a Russia-linked website that claims to be a legitimate American news outlet.

Channel3 Now incorrectly claimed the suspect was an asylum seeker named Ali Al-Shakati, and circulation of the name was boosted by thousands of other accounts on X, formerly known as Twitter. As the protests unfolded, two key far-right Telegram channels linked to the protests were flooded with words of encouragement from people purporting to be from Russia.

A post discussing leafleting about the “demographic demise” of Britons “because of mass immigration” in the channel of far-right group Patriotic Alternative received praise from several accounts claiming to be run by Russians.

The Daily Mail reported in recent days that Channel3 Now — whose post was viewed by more than 2 million people before being deleted and followed by an apology — started life 11 years ago as a Russian YouTube channel.

The Royal United Services Institute (Rusi) says rightwing violence “is often classified as mere thuggery” by politicians, prosecutors and the security services. Equivalent acts by Islamists would “swiftly be labelled as terrorism”, it says in an article in the Guardian.

It’s not the first time Britain has probed state interference in its domestic affairs. Russian state media outlets RT and Sputnik pushed false narratives about the 2018 poisoning of former Russian intelligence officer Sergei Skripal on British soil.

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Next 👉 Who or what is the far-right? Who or what is the far-right?

The right-wing spectrum consists of many sub-variants of ideology; however, the landscape contains actors who are – to varying degrees – “right of” centre on the political spectrum.

A Centre for Research on Extremism (C-REX) report clearly explains how the right-wing spectrum holds that inequalities and superiority are natural states, which allow for, and inform, the nativist and authoritarian views of society that some of them adhere to.

Essential features of groups and individuals on the right-wing spectrum that are discussed in the literature include nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and advocacy for a strong state.

While “law and order” are essential to maintaining the natural hierarchy and societal system on the right-wing spectrum, the extent to which this can be achieved within democratic means varies across the spectrum.

At the extreme end of the spectrum, scholars have often distinguished between those hostile to liberal democracy and those strictly in opposition to democracy by referring to them as the radical right and extreme right respectively.

Nativism (i.e., a policy of favouring native inhabitants) is often based on either biological racism, from which white supremacism promotes racial interpretations of ethnic superiority, or ethnic nationalism, from which an ethno-cultural understanding of the nation is used to challenge pluralism, promote xenophobia, and stoke anti-immigration sentiment.

The right-wing spectrum comprises of and is influenced by everything from political parties and organisations to social movements, as well as the media and intellectual organisations.

Often the line between mainstream and extreme is very blurry, with some right-wing groups combining political participation and sometimes-violent forms of activism and expression. The current global political and social climate, including the escalating impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, has encouraged the spread of and mainstreaming of this threat, as well as the nebulous use of political speech, left-wing causes, and pop cultural symbols.

Governments and international bodies are increasingly recognising the threat posed by the far-right, both at national and international levels.

The right-wing spectrum consists of many sub-variants of ideology; however, the landscape contains actors who are – to varying degrees – “right of” centre on the political spectrum. A Centre for Research on Extremism (C-REX) report clearly explains how the right-wing spectrum holds that inequalities and superiority are natural states, which allow for, and inform, the nativist and authoritarian views of society that some of them adhere to.

Essential features of groups and individuals on the right-wing spectrum that are discussed in the literature include nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and advocacy for a strong state.

While “law and order” are essential to maintaining the natural hierarchy and societal system on the right-wing spectrum, the extent to which this can be achieved within democratic means varies across the spectrum.

At the extreme end of the spectrum, scholars have often distinguished between those hostile to liberal democracy and those strictly in opposition to democracy by referring to them as the radical right and extreme right respectively.

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Next 👉 Nativism and Transnational far-right extremism

The United States has threatened Turkey with "consequences" for exporting technology to Russia.

This thread explores Turkey’s trade with Russia - and questions whether equal threats should now be made to EU countries complicit in building Turkey as a hub for their products being re-exported into the russian parallel market.

07 August 2024, The Financial Times reports on possible sanctions against Ankara for cooperation with Moscow.

“Washington has warned Turkey that there will be “consequences” if the country does not curtail its exports to Russia of US military-linked hardware that is vital to Moscow’s war machine.”

As part of efforts to curb illegal trade, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Commerce Matthew Axelrod met with Turkish officials. According to the representative of Ankara, the American official demanded that they work harder to limit trade in American-made chips and other spare parts that may be in demand in Russia.

Washington’s warning is the latest sign of how Turkey’s decision to retain strong trade ties with Russia has tarnished relations between the two Nato allies. The US, EU and other western partners have imposed sweeping sanctions on Russia since it launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but Turkey has eschewed the curbs and increased trade with the country since the war broke out.

Of particular concern to the United States is the fact that Turkey has become a key hub through which Western-made electronics, including processors, memory cards and amplifiers, enter Russia.

At the end of 2023, the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury for Counterterrorism and Financial Intelligence, Brian Nelson, already shared his disappointment about Ankara's trade in military goods. The US Department of Commerce has already imposed sanctions against Turkish companies for allegedly supplying products to the military-industrial complex (MIC) of Russia.

Earlier, Turkish analyst Mehmet Perincek said that Turkey is being forced to impose anti-Russian sanctions in order to weaken its economy and make it not resist the plans of the United States. In his opinion, the conflict in Ukraine is also being used to worsen relations between Moscow and Ankara. This is done to leave Turkey without partners, the analyst believes.

Turkish economic commentator Mustafa Recep Ercin added that because of the sanctions, trade with Russia has turned into a nightmare. In May, he complained that the United States and the EU were intimidating Turkish financial institutions in the event of their cooperation with Russia.

Because of this, the volume of banking transactions fell, and importers faced difficulties in making transactions for purchased products. According to the Turkish Institute of Statistics, shipments to Russia decreased by 32 percent year-on-year in the first quarter.

Washington’s warning is the latest sign of how Turkey’s decision to retain strong trade ties with Russia has tarnished relations between the two Nato allies.

The US, EU and other western partners have imposed sweeping sanctions on Russia since it launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but Turkey has eschewed the curbs and increased trade with the country since the war broke out.

The US is particularly worried that Turkey has become a key hub through which western-made electronics, including processors, memory cards and amplifiers, are making their way to Russian missiles and drones in contravention of export controls. Machine tools are another significant area of concern.

I argue that if the US is prepared to warn turkey and threaten sanctions for trading with Russia - a wider view and equal threat of sanctions should be applied to European countries. If you think that is controversial, here is why:

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Next 👉 European countries are complicit too European countries are complicit in the growth of Turkey being a russian trading hub - and they know it!

Not every country in the Caucuses has followed the sanctions circumvention supply chain scam - one exception as an example is Azerbaijan. Their main export markets are Russia, and another group of countries is Central Asia, Caucuses, Belarus, and the UAE. Azerbaijans exports have not spiked or boomed since the invasion and remain comparatively low and moderate, at circa $70 million.

This only represents a handful of dozens of countries that have all seen exponential exports. And this is only one of potentially hundreds of satellite hubs for Russian trade.

One of the largest trading hubs is of course Turkey. The amount of goods and services passing through Turkey is simply staggering. European and G7 nations are masking their sales to Russia through trading hubs such as Turkey.

For example - one of the smallest export EU countries, The Netherlands. Let’s compare what they were trading 2 years ago with a look at their current export destinations:

👉 Dutch exports to Russia were at circa $300 million Euros and after Russia’s latest war on Ukraine this has levelled out to $100 million.

👉 Simultaneously they increased their exports to Turkey from a low of €250 million to a current level in excess of $450 million.

Turkey is a middle man in the supply chain. Yes it enjoys a substantial revenue stream for being the trading hub - but I argue, the players simplicity in the trade begin at manufacturer level. They need to be regulated to ensure they are also not benefiting for knowingly selling to known parallel market exporters and importers.

They are all driven by greed and a need to maintain or increase their global sales, and in doing so they are feeding their products directly to the parallel market and providing russia with both sanctioned and un-sanctioned products, many of which are dual use with commercial and military applications.

Many products are not sanctioned, but lets be clear - any products or services that find their way into russia, support the federal budget in tax revenues to fund the war - and the availability of Western goods and Services, normalises russian consumer expectations and consumer activity - in spite of their genocidal and illegal war being waged in Ukraine.

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Next 👉 The effects of US sanctions threats

A Potted History of Russian Poisoning

On May 23, 1938, a Soviet intelligence agent named Pavel Sudoplatov assassinated the Ukrainian nationalist leader Yevhen Konovalets in Rotterdam.

The order for the murder had come personally from Josef Stalin. The method was none too subtle: Sudoplatov had given his victim a box of chocolates, containing a bomb.

Subtler forms of liquidation had been in the works for some time in Soviet Russia. In 1921—the year Sudoplatov was recruited at age 14 into the Cheka, the Soviet security organization formed by Vladimir Lenin—the Soviets established their first laboratory for the study and testing of poisons.

They made rapid progress. From 1928–35 secret laboratories were overseen by the accomplished Soviet biochemist Grigory Mairanovsky. The author of a 1940 classified doctoral thesis on the interaction of mustard gas with human skin, Mairanovsky was tasked to develop tasteless, colorless, odorless, and lethal poisons that could be placed in the food and drink of enemies of the state. Mairanovsky and his colleagues tested their concoctions on political prisoners of various sizes and ages.

He was so successful that by the 1940s he had become a key member of Pavel Sudoplatov’s team for political assassinations. In summer 1947, again on the order of Stalin, Mairanovsky killed the American spy for the Soviets Isaiah Oggins by injecting him in one of his laboratories with a lethal dose of the poison curare.

Poisoning has a long history. Socrates was forced to take hemlock as his death sentence. For a period of time in ancient Persia, different poisons were the weapons of choice for rivals bent on doing away with this or that Persian king. British science writer John Emsley provides a helpful history of poison in his riveting book .

In 19th-century France, arsenic came to be known as poudre de succession—”inheritance powder,” a method by which wily women would rid themselves of cumbersome husbands. Thallium, according to Emsley, was Saddam Hussein’s poison of choice for political opponents.

Russians have always seemed to have a special fondness for poisoning. In 1453, Dmitry Shemyaka, the Grand Duke of Moscow, was poisoned with arsenic in a chicken dinner, his cook having been bribed by Muscovite agents of a rival.

In 1610, Russian general Mikhail Skopin-Shuisky was poisoned on orders of the Tsar; in this instance, his wife enlisted to poison his food. In 1936, Abkhaz Communist leader Nestor Lakoba was poisoned by orders of Lavrentiy Beria, head of the NKVD, the Soviet security organization responsible for extrajudicial killings and the gulag system. Lakoba was poisoned during a dinner in Tbilisi with Beria, his death announced as a heart attack.

During the Cold War, the tradition continued. Most spectacular and famous is the case of Georgi Markov, an anti-communist Bulgarian writer who in exile had worked for Radio Free Europe and the BBC. On the morning of September 7, 1978—the birthday of Bulgarian dictator Todor Zhivkov—Markov made his way across Waterloo Bridge in London to wait for a bus.

An assassin, working for the Bulgarian secret police and aided by the KGB, poked Markov with the tip of his umbrella. By evening, Markov was checked into a hospital, feeling unwell with a high fever. Four days later he was dead.

Forensic pathologists discovered a pellet filled with traces of ricin in the back thigh of Markov’s right leg. According to former Russian intelligence officer Boris Volodarsky in his book, , Markov had likely been surveilled before the assassination by another Bulgarian BBC broadcaster named Vladimir Simeonov.

Twenty days after Markov’s murder—and two days after being questioned by Scotland Yard—the 30-year-old Simeonov was himself found dead under mysterious circumstances. In the kitchen of his flat, reports Volodarsky, “two glasses were found in the sink without any fingerprints. Traces of a bottle were identified on the table.”

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Next 👉 A decade earlier, Alexander Dubcek, the reform communist leader of the ill-fated Prague Spring, was thought in Czech anti-Communist circles to have been poisoned by the KGB, in this instance by radioactive isotopes sneaked into his soup during a brief captivity in Moscow. Dubcek fell ill later in Bratislava, had to cancel a speech, and was hospitalized due to “a cold.” He recovered.

As in the case of Pavel Sudoplatov’s detonating chocolates in Rotterdam, surreptitious poisoning gets trumped at times in Russian political assassinations by a somewhat heavier hand. In 1940, at his compound outside Mexico City, Russian revolutionary Leon Trotsky was fatally wounded by an ice-axe-wielding assassin (whose murder was ordered by Stalin and carried out under the direction of Sudoplatov).

And there was no poison involved in the murder this winter of Kremlin critic and former Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov. Shortly before midnight on February 27, walking after dinner with his Ukrainian girlfriend, Anna Durytska, across the Bolshoy Moskvoretsky Bridge close to Red Square, Nemtsov had four shots pumped into his back at close range from an assassin’s handgun.

Which brings us to the case at hand. At this writing, Nemtsov’s associate, journalist and civil society activist Vladimir Kara-Murza, lies ill in a Moscow hospital, according to reports stricken by kidney failure, double pneumonia, and pancreatitis. The 33-year-old Kara-Murza fell suddenly ill and collapsed in his Moscow office on May 26.

The day before, the organization for which Kara-Murza currently works (Open Russia, which was created in September 2014 by former political prisoner and Russian businessman Mikhail Khodorkovsky) had released a documentary about Ramzan Kadyrov, the ruthless ruler of Chechnya and a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

No one can say for sure at this point whether Kara-Murza has been poisoned. What we do know is that Russia has a ghastly tradition of poisoning political dissidents. We also know that very recent history has been alarming.

Although he survived—his face disfigured—pro-Western Ukrainian Presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko was poisoned with dioxin at a dinner in Kiev during an election campaign in September 2004.

Former FSB man and Putin opponent Alexander Litvinenko died of polonium ingested in a London hotel bar in 2006. Russian businessman Alexander Perepilichny, a key witness in a Moscow money laundering case, expired outside his Surrey home in London in 2012, apparently having been killed by poison from the highly toxic Gelsemium plant (grown remote areas of China).

Then there’s the case of journalist and Putin critic Anna Politkovskaya. She was shot to death by assassins in the elevator to her apartment on October 7, 2006. But in September 2004, Politkovskaya had become violently ill and lost consciousness after drinking tea on a Russian flight.

With the history of poisonings in Russia, one is curious about one of the preferred methods used by the russians. Here’s an intro into just one such commonly found poison…

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Next 👉 болиголов - AKA - Dropwort, Hemlock Water

A timeline of the major political events as seen through a British lens, in the conflict in Ukraine during 2024. This chronology is an abridged version of a comprehensive chronology from the beginning of the latest invasion in February 2022.

This research document is recorded in the Commons Library Research Briefing, 16 July 2024, and the author is Nigel Walker. Please see the references tab for links to two such research papers covering the period before and after February 2022.

This is a British lens of major political and key events, it is not a record of key events as may be seen though other countries lens’s. It is a useful reminder of some key events - there are arguably other events which have not been included.

The chronology does not cover military events and the genocidal actions of Russia during this period.

Chronology:

1 January 2024 In his New Year address, President Zelenskyy vows to unleash “wrath” against Russian forces in 2024, saying Ukraine has become stronger as the war moves toward its second year.

5 January 2024 In a briefing, John Kirby, the US’s national security council spokesperson, says North Korea is providing Russia with ballistic missile launchers and ballistic missiles. The US intelligence assessment is that Iranian missiles have not yet arrived in Russia, but that the deal will eventually be done. Posting on X (formerly Twitter), the UK Defence Secretary, Grant Shapps, says “we’ll make sure North Korea pays a high price for supporting Russia.”

11 January 2024 Ukraine’s parliament refuses to debate a bill aimed at drafting more soldiers, amid fierce criticism from lawmakers and the public. Ukrainian MPs criticised certain measures included in the bill as unconstitutional. Some clauses caused particular outrage, such as limiting draft dodgers from their right to own property and to freely use their personal money.

12 January 2024 Prime Minister Sunak visits Kyiv to sign a new security agreement and announce an increase in military funding for Ukraine.

24 January 2024 Writing in an article for Politico, Grant Shapps says the UK’s allies must increase their Ukraine military aid: “Kyiv needs more support — and not just from the United Kingdom. Our fellow allies must step up too.”

1 February 2024 European Union leaders unanimously approve a €50 billion plan to support Ukraine for the next four years. The deal, known as the “Ukraine Facility“, consists of €17 billion in grants and €33 billion in loans, designed to help Ukraine rebuild and recover from the war.

8 February 2024 In a two-hour interview with former Fox News host Tucker Carlson, President Putin says the US “needs to stop supplying weapons” to Ukraine. The interview is Putin’s first with a western media outlet since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022.

16 February 2024 President Zelenskyy visits Germany and France, signing security pacts with both countries, committing further support to Ukraine from each.

24 February 2024 Four western leaders, including the prime ministers of Italy, Canada, and Belgium, visit Kyiv to show solidarity with Ukraine on the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion. Italy’s Giorgia Meloni, Canada’s Justin Trudeau, Belgium’s Alexander De Croo and the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, travelled to the Ukrainian capital together on an overnight train from neighbouring Poland.

26 February 2024 Hungary’s parliament approves a bill to allow Sweden to join NATO, clearing the way for the Nordic country to join the alliance after months of delay.

27 February 2024 Several European countries say they are not considering sending ground troops to Ukraine after France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, said he refused to rule out sending soldiers to the country. The UK, Germany, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Poland, Italy and Hungary all rule out the move, as does the NATO Secretary-General.

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Next 👉 March 2024 onwards 7 March 2024 Sweden becomes NATO’s 32nd member state, upon depositing its instrument of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty with the US government in Washington DC.

8 March 2024 Andriy Yermak, the head of Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s office, meets with a delegation headed by Li Hui, the Chinese government’s special representative for Eurasian affairs. They discuss China-Ukrainenrelations and the war in Ukraine.

11 March 2024 The chairs of foreign affairs committees in 23 parliaments issue a joint statement rejecting the legitimacy of elections conducted by Russia in the Ukrainian territories it has annexed.

15 March 2024 Three days of voting begins in Russia and in the annexed regions of Ukraine. There is no serious challenge to President Putin securing another term in office.

17 March 2024 In the Russian presidential election, Putin wins 87% of the vote, securing a fifth term in office. The resultbmeans Putin will overtake Joseph Stalin to become Russia’s longest-serving leader in more than 200 years.

18 March 2024 At an open-air concert in Moscow’s Red Square, to mark the 10th anniversary of Russia’s annexation of Crimea from Ukraine, Putin says Crimea had “returned to its home harbour” and would move forwards with Russia “hand in hand”.

20 March 2024 A report issued by the UN Human Rights Office accuses Russia of torturing and arbitrarily detaining people in occupied Ukraine, creating a “climate of fear”. In a press release accompanying the report, the UN says Russia has imposed its “language, citizenship, laws, court system, and education curricula on the occupied areas”.

21 March 2024 Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, addresses the European Council summit via videoconference and calls for more help with air defences and ammunition, as well for progress on Ukraine’s path towards European integration.

2 April 2024 The Register of Damages for Ukraine opens in The Hague, as part of a Ministerial Conference on “Restoring Justice for Ukraine”. The conference brings together the Council of Europe, heads of international organisations, and ministers and senior officials from more than 60 states.

9 April 2024 UK foreign secretary David Cameron visits former US president Donald Trump at his Mar-a-Lago residence, to discuss a new aid package for Ukraine that is being held up in Congress.

15 April 2024 President Macron of France calls for a truce in international conflicts during the Paris Olympics.Referencing the Israel-Hamas conflict, the war in Ukraine and the ongoing conflict in Sudan, Macron says: “We will work on an Olympic truce. It is something on which I will actually try to engage many of our partners.”

16 April 2024 Russia reacts coolly to the suggestion of an Olympics truce, with Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov
saying both President Putin and the Russian military had “noticed that, as a rule, the Kyiv regime uses such ideas, such initiatives to try to regroup, to try to rearm, and so on and so forth”.

24 April 2024 At a press conference in Berlin, UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz agree to closer defence cooperation between the two allies, with both leaders saying Europe must unite to support Ukraine against Russia “for as long as it takes”.

25 April 2024 The UK’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, Jeremy Hunt, meets President Zelenskyy in Kyiv and discuss sanctions against Russia.

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Next 👉 May 2024 onwards

The CNC Scourge helping russia build it’s weapons of destruction - consolidating reports on what we know:

When a Russian Iskander short-range precision-guided ballistic missile struck a cafe in the village of Hroza 35 km away from the frontline, killing 52 people who gathered to commemorate a fallen soldier. Later - two volunteers, Emma Igual of Spain and Anthony Ignat of Canada, were killed, and two more were hospitalized when their car was struck by Russian shelling while assessing the needs of civilians caught in the daily crossfire.

What connects these tragedies is the fact that the weapons used were built using Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machine tools, produced in the West and imported into Russia.

Shockingly, despite sanctions, Russia continues to buy high-precision machine tools and spare parts from Western firms, enabling it to commit the most atrocious war crimes.

At least 70% of all Russian CNC machine tools are imported, largely from the US, EU, and Japan. Over 80% of all CNCs end up in Russia’s military production facilities. This makes CNCs a perfect target for the West to degrade the Russian military complex by clamping down on imports.

Researchers from the Economic Security Council of Ukraine (ESCU) have recently developed a roadmap to achieve just that.

What are CNC machine tools?

👉 CNC (Computer Numerical Control) machine tools are automated robot machines using software to manufacture various metal products without direct human intervention. CNC machinery is a crucial means of production for advanced arms manufacturing such as missiles, aircraft, or radars.

👉 WСNC machines are the backbone of Russia’s military production and a window of opportunity for trying to stop the aggressor, ESCU said.

With a CNC, a computer program does all the necessary shaping and cutting. The machine tool uses a drill bit mounted on a head that moves in three dimensions to automatically carve digitally modeled shapes into metal.

What can CNC machines produce?

There is not a single Russian tank, plane, or APC that does not have parts made with foreign CNC machine tools. Even nuclear weapons are manufactured with the help of CNC machinery. With the help of CNCs, Russia produces:

👉 Aircraft components: engine components, landing gear parts, and structural elements.

👉 Weapon systems: firearm components, missile guidance systems, and other weapon parts.

👉 Armor and vehicle components: body panels, turrets, etc;

👉 Electronic and communication equipment: communication equipment, and radar systems for military use.

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Next 👉 Manufacturers and countries that are conduits for CNC exports to russia, supporting the russian military industrial complex.

The most influential manufacturers are DMG Mori, Trumpf, Fair Friend Group, Haas, Sodick, Dr. Johannes Heidenhain GmbH, Maier Werkzeugmaschinen GmbH & Co., KG HEDELIUS, GF Machining Solutions, Yamazaki Mazak Corporation, Okuma, Index Traub, Hermle, FICEP, Nakamura-Tome, Willemin-Macodel.

Russia’s arms industry still importing vital foreign CNC machines despite sanctions. Japan and Germany are the top two CNC producers whose machines help Russia produce high-tech weapons.

Türkiye, the UAE. and China are acting as key conduits for Western technology feeding Russia’s arms production, an investigation has found. Despite sanctions, Russia imported at least 6.4 billion rubles ($68 million) worth of computer numerical control (CNC) machines and parts in 2023, according to a report by the investigative outlet Istories.

The actual figure is likely much higher due to incomplete documentation and misclassification of imports from countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

CNC tools are considered to be a hole in the West’s sanctions regime against Russia, as they allow Russia to build precise weapons domestically.

The machines, essential for modern weapons manufacturing, are sourced from leading global producers including Doosan and Hanwha of South Korea, Spinner and Hermle of Germany, Fanuc of Japan, and others.

Others like Spain’s Vanto Machines and Poland’s Soldream Polska claimed their products were falsely declared as Russia-bound by Turkish middlemen. Switzerland’s TL Technology insisted it halted Russian operations in early 2022.

Several major Russian importers of foreign machines are already under sanctions, the report noted. But others like the Engineering Center for Production Equipment from St. Petersburg, which supplied DMG Mori machines to UEC Saturn and other defense firms in 2023, have so far avoided them.

Even if Western imports are cut off, Russia could last quite a long time in the war by shifting to Chinese machines with components from US allies. The vulnerability it appears - is the software that modern CNC equipment depends on, which could be disabled or hacked?

On January 02, 2024 - the FT reported “Chinese shipments to Russia of an important class of advanced machine tools have increased tenfold since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with the country’s producers now dominating trade in high-precision “computer numerical control” devices vital to Moscow’s military industries.

The soaring shipments of CNC units, which permit extremely precise metal milling, have become a big concern to Ukraine’s allies as they seek to crack down on Russia’s access to the equipment.

Russian customs returns show Chinese producers shipped $68mn worth of CNC tools in July, the latest verifiable figure available, up from just $6.5mn in February 2022 when Moscow launched the full-scale invasion.

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Next 👉

This thread is intended to introduce you to the murky world of sanctions circumvention through parallel imports. Some ideas are suggested, but this is unchartered territory for most countries - who have not had to deal with the complexities and risks associated with a full blown war in their trading markets during the past 60 years.

A long thread (you won’t gain wisdom in 280 characters), perhaps consider skipping to the last tweet and the first reply will be a link to an audio narration of the thread. Great for multitasking and produced for my visually impaired followers.

Introduction:

Nearly 1,400 companies, including many of the most internationally recognisable brands, have since February 2022 announced that they would cease or dial back their operations in Russia in protest of Moscow’s military aggression against Ukraine.

But two years after the invasion, many of these companies’ products are still widely sold in Russia, in many cases in violation of Western-led sanctions.

Russia’s economy is resilient because it is, for the most part, still a market economy. Russia has been allowed to find their ways around sanctions and “keep things working” – thus proving to be one the key factors behind Russia’s relative “resilience” to Western sanctions.

Aided by the Russian government’s legalisation of parallel imports, Russian businesses have established a network of alternative supply chains (parallel imports), to import restricted goods through third countries.

The companies that make the products have been either unwilling or unable to clamp down on these unofficial distribution networks.

The Russian government claimed in December 2023, over $70 billion worth of goods were confirmed to have been imported into the country through so-called “parallel” or “grey” imports – helping the total 2023 imports to slightly exceed pre-sanction levels to reach $300 billion, according to Moscow.

👉 What are parallel imports?

Summary

👀 Parallel imports are items designed to be sold in one part of the world, which are they bought by a third party and imported against the brand’s intentions.

👀 The legality of parallel imports is often murky, and can depend on minor details.

👀 Parallel imports can be a headache for brands, and are extremely time-consuming to track.

👀 A parallel import is an item that’s imported and sold outside of the brand’s authorized distribution channels. It is no longer on the white market, but on the gray market. This can happen with electronics, books, magazines, software, accessories, cars and much more. Most of the time, it’s not illegal, unless local courts decide otherwise.

Parallel imports are commonly understood to mean imports into the country without the consent of the rightholder of goods to which a trademark is lawfully affixed and which have been lawfully introduced into civil turnover in the territory of any other state outside the Russian Federation.

Such consent is usually required in countries where the national principle of exhaustion of the exclusive right to a trademark is applied.

Parallel imported goods in russia are imported directly to russia and through countries “friendly” to the Russian Federation or countries of the Eurasian Economic Union – Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkey, UAE, etc.

The list of goods allowed for parallel import includes ferrous metals, inorganic compounds, medical and other equipment, ships, spare parts for railways and auto components, consumer goods such as electronics and household appliances, clothing, footwear, and cosmetics.

In particular, among the brands approved for parallel imports are Apple, Samsung, Hewlett Packard, ASUS, Cisco, Dell, Microsoft, Mercedes-Benz, General Motors, and others.

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Next 👉 Russia legitimises parallel imports! 👉 Russia has legitimised parallel imports in law:

After some foreign companies started to stop direct deliveries of their products to the Russian market through their subsidiaries and official distributors, there was a threat of shortages of a number of goods. This was due to the fact that the goods were no longer supplied by official importers but third parties were still not allowed to import them without the consent of the rightholder.

In this regard, Federal Law No. 46-FZ was enacted on 8 March 2022, which tasked the Government or another body to which such right has been delegated with approving a list of goods in respect of which parallel imports are permitted. In exercising this authority, the Ministry of Industry and Trade approved such a list (“List”). The List is currently approved by Order No. 2701 dated 21 July 2023, which replaced Order No. 1532 dated 19 April 2022.

The List has been amended many times. As a rule, it includes trademarks belonging to companies that have left the Russian market, but there are also exceptions.

At the St Petersburg International Economic Forum in 2024, it was announced that the existing approach to differentiated regulation of parallel imports would be extended to 2025. At the same time, a decision was made to extend such approach to the use of inventions, utility models, industrial designs without the consent of the patentee with notification of the patentee as soon as possible and with the payment of commensurate compensation.

In practice, courts assume that persons reselling goods after purchasing them from importers are to be held civilly liable only if they sell counterfeit goods (but not goods imported through parallel import).

This arguably, should / could have been a starting point for companies to proactively prevent their products from being bought by an intermediary country. An indicator of products at risk of seeing a surge in sales to an existing or new country, at volumes previously not realised in the trading relationship. Or an indicator for new buyers entering the market from known russian trading hubs.

👉 Parallel imports - the cloak of innocence or the legitimate get-out clause for products sold in Russia?

The parallel imports scheme is aimed at helping Russia bypass supply restrictions put in place by Western countries and companies in response to the invasion of Ukraine.

The parallel imports list includes critical imports like warships, spare parts needed for railways and auto components as well as consumer goods like electronics (including mobile phones), household appliances, clothing, footwear, and cosmetics.

Potential red flags may include companies registered recently; companies based in Armenia, Belarus, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan or other countries helping Russia circumvent sanctions; companies making large orders of products within a short space of time; companies with obscure beneficial ownership structures, etc.

Parallel import supply chains is the cloak that western businesses at best, use for indirect trade to distance themselves from Russia - or at worst knowingly disguise their ongoing trade with Russia. The question arises, who deserves more contempt?

⚠️ The businesses like Unilever who have anchored their position to stay in Russia, actively trading and profiting from the market and paying tens of $ millions in taxes - which are disbursed into the federal budget to support the illegal war in Ukraine.

⚠️ The businesses who feign their exit from Russia, using opaque and unregulated supply chains to conduct business as usual using intermediary countries like Turkey, the UAE, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and others?

These companies have often spent extraordinary efforts and money creating PR whitewashing campaigns - protesting their ignorance to the grey market imports to Russia of their products?

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Next 👉 Who is the bigger culprit, morally?

The relationships that Russia forges through nuclear projects surpass even the lengthy contracts for pipeline gas supplies. The coalition has focused on restricting Russia’s revenue through fossil fuel sales, and focus almost all of it’s efforts in sanctions to restrict income from oil and gas - that is used to fund Russia’s murderous and illegal war in Ukraine.

What is not spoken about or targeted - is the substantial revenue stream and global influence russia has using nuclear energy and enterprises associated with it.

🧵 This thread pieces together information around Russia’s nuclear energy reach as a political tool in the UN, as well as leading thoughts and analysis.

Please see the references tab for links to full articles this thread has combined together.

👉 In June 2024, FT ran an article titled: “How Russia is using nuclear power to win global influence despite sanctions”.

Russian companies are building more than a third of the new reactors around the world, which is gaining Moscow new friends

Nuclear plant construction takes about 10 years, with a reactor lifespan of 60 years for newer plants. Dismantling preparations, including removing radioactive parts, take another 10-20 years and require substantial funds. The Russian side treats the plants as if they are owned by Rosatom. The only role of the host country is to buy the electricity from the reactor.

Istituto Affari Internazionali suggest that Russia has found in the nuclear market a means to buttress ties with countries in the Global South by providing high-technology elements to these nations.

Through partnerships in the nuclear sector, Russia has not only strengthened its presence in the global energy landscape but has also enhanced its geopolitical influence, particularly in regions where emerging economies seek technological advancements and energy solutions.

Russia’s strategic use of nuclear partnerships with countries in the Global South does not only increase its global influence, but also poses challenges related to technology transfer and economic dependency. Indeed, these partnerships often rely heavily on Russian technology and financing, raising concerns about recipient countries’ autonomy and economic vulnerability.

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Next 👉 About Rosatom 👉About Rosatom:

Russia’s nuclear industry is concentrated in Rosatom, a state-owned company that is the successor to the Soviet Union’s Ministry of Medium Machine Building and Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy.

Through its state company Rosatom, Russia is the world leader in nuclear power export markets. The company controls almost half of the world uranium processing and enrichment market and holds 70% of the reactor export market. Setting aside some cancellations following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Rosatom’s portfolio of foreign orders appears stable at about $200 billion.

In addition to its commercial role, Rosatom is a foreign policy instrument that may advance Russian strategic interests by establishing long-term official and commercial ties with governments and businesses in customer nations.

Rosatom offers one-stop shopping for design, construction, fuel, training, maintenance, and spent fuel processing as well as attractive financing. The company generally has strong support from Russia’s government.

While some of Rosatom’s prewar aspirations for growth may no longer be realistic, and while the company is losing some business in the West, Rosatom appears to be largely on track with its non-Western projects, which comprise the bulk of the company’s business. Reducing Rosatom’s global role will not be quick, easy, or cheap.

👉 Per Rosatom’s self description - “ROSATOM is the only company in the world that has all technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mining to the back end of nuclear facilities life cycles. Its scope of activities also includes production of innovative non-nuclear products, nuclear medicine, digitalization and software development, logistics and development of the Northern Sea Route.

ROSATOM incorporates over 450 enterprises employing a total of more than 350,000 people.”

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Next 👉 Foreign projects and revenue

An estimated €200 billion worth of Russian assets were frozen in the EU following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, with around 90% held in Belgium, home to the international fund depository Euroclear. In May, the EU-27 agreed to utilise the interest generated by these frozen Russian central bank assets.

The interest is expected to yield between €2.5 and €3 billion annually, which will be used to support Ukraine’s defence and post-war reconstruction.

Ninety percent of the interest generated by these frozen funds (which remain frozen) will be allocated to the European Peace Facility (EPF), an EU mechanism for managing interventions in conflicts, including supplying arms. The remaining 10% will go to the EU’s separate “Facility” for Ukraine, established to support the country’s reconstruction needs.

The Swiss have chosen not to disappoint - Russia. They will not release any proceeds of the profits on frozen russian assets to Ukraine. In fact they may be hiding a significant amount of russian assets from public scrutiny in an attempt to remain “neutral” by harbouring the assets of russians and genocide merchants the world over.

The Swiss timeline on russian assets:

👉 13 February, 2024 - Over a third of the assets reported in Switzerland with links to Russia are at Credit Suisse. This includes funds from sanctioned persons, but not exclusively.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine, the Swiss federal government has frozen assets of those with links to Russia and Belarus in Switzerland worth more than 7.5 billion francs ($8.1 billion). In addition, 15 properties were seized as a result of the adoption of EU sanctions.

According to Seco, around 7,500 business relationships and a total of 46.1 billion francs with a connection to Russia had been reported by mid-November. Credit Suisse has frozen Russian assets of 17.6 billion francs, according to a report in the Sonntagszeitun, corresponding to over a third of all reported Russian assets in Switzerland.

Only about 4 billion francs of Russian assets at Credit Suisse assets originate from people on the sanctions list, according to the newspaper. The remaining 13.6 billion francs are said to be partly from people such as Viktor Vekselberg, who has an account with Credit Suisse but cannot access it because of other sanctions.

At UBS (so subsequently bought Credit Suisse after it faced bankruptcy), is twice the size of Credit Suisse. The share of Russian funds affected amounts to 0.3 percent of invested assets in Global Wealth Management, according to a UBS spokeswoman. That percentage corresponds to $7.5 billion of assets.

For the fourth quarter in 2023, UBS mysteriously stopped reporting the on frozen assets.

Just one bank Credit Suisse - claims it had frozen 17.6 billion Swiss Francs ($15 billion USD) from assets held by Credit Suisse and another 6.4 billion Swiss Francs ($7.5 billion) held by the new parent company UBS. That is $22.5 billion (19.91 billion Swiss Francs) - held by this one bank alone!

Remember Switzerland is built on its corrupt, secretive and opaque banking and shell company offering. Russia had money, assets and gold distributed across all major banks in Switzerland,

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Next 👉 16th Feb 2023 position 👉 16 February 2023 - Switzerland has said it is legally impossible for it to confiscate the assets of sanctioned Russians held in the country, dealing a blow to European efforts to use that wealth for Ukrainian postwar reconstruction. Until then, Bern has moved in line with the EU in freezing the assets of high-profile Russians connected to the regime of president Vladimir Putin.

Switzerland holds more than SFr7.5bn ($8.1bn) in frozen Russian assets nearly one year after the invasion of Ukraine, according to the Swiss ministry of finance. (Remember, in February 2023, one bank alone admitted to freezing $22.5 billion in russian assets) - it appears quite a lot has been unfrozen and returned to the russians on the quite.

“The expropriation of private assets of lawful origin without compensation is not permissible under Swiss law. The confiscation of frozen private assets is inconsistent with the constitution,” the Swiss Government added, and “violates Switzerland’s international commitments”.

March 08, 2024 - The Swiss Foreign minister said that “over $8 billion” of Russian central bank reserves and assets are currently held in Switzerland. That at today’s exchange rate is 7.07 billion Swiss Francs.

Foreign Minister Ignazio Cassis stated, "Russia has seriously violated international law. It must therefore repair the damage caused." Cassis added that Switzerland's commitment to international discussions around compensation mechanisms was consistent with its history of involvement in such matters.

The only russian frozen assets in the world, to “lose in value”

👉 April 23, 2024 - Switzerland has frozen Russian assets worth 5.8 billion Swiss francs ($6.36 billion), the Swiss government said, a big drop that could intensify international pressure on the neutral country to do more to sanction Moscow over its invasion of Ukraine. The figure, which applies to assets frozen at the end of 2023, was down from the 7.5 billion francs in assets frozen at the end of 2022.

The main reason was a decrease in the market value of the shares and other financial assets that have been blocked, said the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, which oversees sanctions. Switzerland seem to be the only country in the EU alliance that has not generated interest profits form the assets they claim to have frozen. There is something fishy going on here.

Falling stock values had wiped 2.3 billion francs off the worth of previously blocked assets, SECO said, while an extra 580 million francs in assets held via complex financial structures had been discovered and frozen last year. This included luxury cars and artworks.

Switzerland was now in a "completely different place" to last year when the G7 countries criticised, opens new tab Swiss loopholes on sanctions, and was implementing them well, said Simon Pluess, head of export controls and sanctions at SECO.

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Next 👉 23 April, 2023 onwards

China is Russia’ largest trading partner, supporting the criminal regime in its war effort by financing the regime and the war.

This week following the communist goons huddle- China announced surprise cuts to the key interest rate, amid the worst deflation since 1999. Deflation is generally viewed negatively by economists as lower prices typically lead to lower consumer spending and reduced production, in turn causing layoffs and salary cuts. See the second tweet for an easy to understand guide on why deflation is even worse than inflation.

Monday (July 22, 2024), the People’s Bank of China governor embarked on a routine that will test his monetary balance, agility and motor coordination in tantalizing ways. The PBOC’s move to cut a key short-term policy rate for the first time in almost a year surprised many traders, lowering the seven-day reverse repo rate by 10 basis points to 1.7%.

The world’s second-largest economy is in the midst of a slowdown, and has slipped into deflation with prices falling year on year as slowing domestic spending weighs on the country’s post-Covid economic recovery. The Chinese property industry is also in crisis, as the slowdown exposes overextended developers.

Figures released on the opening day of the meeting showed that the economy grew by 4.7% in the second quarter, compared with a year earlier. The number was both weaker than expected and slower than the previous quarter’s figure, when growth seemed to be stabilising. It puts the government’s official growth target for this year—around 5%—in doubt.

The People’s Bank of China announced on Monday that the one-year loan prime rate, widely used as a benchmark for corporate lending, would be lowered 0.1 percentage point to 3.35 per cent, the first such cut since August last year.

The five-year equivalent, which influences mortgage pricing, was also reduced 0.1 percentage point for the first time since February, to 3.85 per cent.

The cuts to the central bank's key short-term policy rate, its market operations rates and benchmark bank lending rates came after China reported weaker-than-expected second-quarter economic data last week and its top leaders met for a plenum that occurs roughly every five years.

The country faces a prolonged property crisis, surging debt and weak consumer and business sentiment. Trade tensions are also flaring, as global leaders grow increasingly wary of China's export dominance.

The cut in July 2024 - is an unexpected move, likely due to the sharp slowdown in growth momentum in the second quarter as well as the call for achieving this year's growth target' by the third plenum. For the last two decades, the market has been propped up by the government, and by official actions.

The world's second-biggest economy has been grappling with slowing prices since early last year, forcing policymakers to cut interest rates to spur growth even as many developed economies were focused on taming stubbornly high inflation.

On May 17, 2024 - China announced new policy measures to support the property market, including a nationwide programme to provide 300 billion yuan in loans to fund state purchases of unsold homes, and the relaxation of mortgage rules.

Trade tensions continue to bite, with tariffs announced by the US on a range of Chinese manufactured goods and by the EU on Chinese electric vehicles. China continues to struggle with foreign direct investment (FDI).

The headline GDP growth story has been helped by domestic deflation. Accounting for this deflation, nominal GDP growth was lower at 4.2% yoy (compared to real GDP growth of 5.3%). Factory gate prices have been falling over the past 18 months (although it has stabilised in the last few months) and this has helped China’s export competitiveness abroad. Export competitiveness was supported further by a weaker Chinese Yuan.

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Next 👉 What is deflation? Deflation in China, causes and effects.

Deflation is when the prices of goods and services decrease across the entire economy, increasing the purchasing power of consumers. It is the opposite of inflation and can be considered bad for a nation as it can signal a downturn in an economy, leading to a recession or depression.

Deflation can also be described when when a country experiences a fall in the overall level of prices in an economy and an increase in the purchasing power of the currency.

It can be driven by an increase in productivity and the abundance of goods and services, by a decrease in total or aggregate demand, or by a decrease in the supply of money and credit. The two main problems with deflation is that often it can contribute to lower economic growth.

This is because deflation increases the real value of debt – and therefore reducing the spending power of firms and consumers. Also, falling prices can discourage spending as consumers delay their purchases. The two main problems of deflation in the long-term, deflation creates higher rates of unemployment and can eventually cause consumers to default on their debt obligations.

Deflation can be brought about either by an increase in the supply of goods and services or by a lack of increase (or decrease) in the supply of money and credit.

If China chooses as it’s solution to deflation - the reduction in the supply of money and credit, that then reduces the ability of consumers, businesses, and speculative investors to continue to borrow and bid up asset and consumer goods prices, so that prices may stop rising or even begin to fall.

The shift in the global supply chain away from China, is seeing manufacturing move to South East Asia and India - as companies de risk / decouple from China, who has become increasingly hostile over Taiwan, as is grows aligned to it’s temporary ally Russia, and as intellectual property owners have drawn the line on having China steal proprietary product knowledge and develop a large cheap product copy industry, and western business products are being sold under fake brans names across the world.

Falling prices put even more pressure on indebted businesses, consumers, and investors because the nominal value of their debts remains fixed as the corresponding nominal value of their revenues, incomes, and collateral falls through price deflation. And at that point, the cycle of debt and price deflation feeds back on itself. In the near term this process of debt deflation involves a wave of business failures, personal bankruptcies, and increasing unemployment.

This will lead to the Chinese economy experiencing a recession as economic output slows as debt-financed consumption and investment drop.

Geopolitics threatens to dampen Chinese exports as third country concerns over the country’s overcapacity increase. Critics argue China’s industrial policy has supported the creation of significant production capacity in a number of green technologies (namely EVs, solar panels, and batteries).

China’s overcapacity allows Chinese manufacturers to export their products at prices that undercut existing competitors, and by extension hampers the development (or even threatens the survival) of those industries overseas. China contends that existing competitors should instead focus on improving their competitiveness. In response to these concerns, a number of countries have announced restrictions on Chinese imports.

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