#Critical_Technology: The concentration of R&D, academic and technological potential is something to watch closely: 1) China is a leader in many areas; 2) The US and India are closest to China in this race; 3) the EU is falling behind; 4) Russia is not close.⤵️
Analysis by @ASPI_org shows the following trends: 1) The risk of monopoly in defense, robotics and transportation is medium to low, with main competition between China and the US. Drones and small satellites are the areas where that Italy and Germany are in the top 5;⤵️
2) China and the US are dominant in artificial intelligence and computing. India follows in third place, with South Korea and the United Kingdom completing the top 5 in almost all cases;⤵️
3) The situation is more fragmented in advanced materials and manufacturing, with India successfully competing for second place with the US, while China leads the way. South Korea, Germany and the UK are also present in the top 5.⤵️
4) Quantum technology is the only sector where Germany (the EU) has a chance to be in strong positions in the top five, competing with the United Kingdom for third place. China and the United States lead the pack. This makes monopoly unlikely in this sector.⤵️
All in all, China is the leading country in 37 of 44 sectors and the US in 7, respectively. However, monopoly risk persists in only 7 sectors, with China leading the pack. Some of these sectors refer to manufacturing and energy. In general, if the trends do not change,⤵️
the Global South has the potential to become future providers of advanced technology for the Global North. Also, there are different poles of attraction, not just two. The balance of power between democracies and autocracies will be determined by India's trajectory.⤵️
#Geopolitics: The abduction of Maduro and his wife by the US, together with the CIA's admission that it had prepared the operation since mid-December, prompted my curiosity about the role of the intelligence services in reshaping US foreign policy in the hemisphere. Given the well-known vicissitudes surrounding US pressure on Venezuela, I would like to highlight several key aspects that indicate the interaction between intelligence and US decision-makers. A long🧵:
1) Firstly, the CIA is the world's leading intelligence agency regarding Latin America, due to its interest in the region since the late 1940s and during the Cold War. That's why, to contain the Soviet risk of spreading left-wing regimes in what, since the Monroe Doctrine, was labelled as the "backyard" of the US sphere of influence, the CIA (and, briefly before that, the FBI) was involved in covert and espionage operations across Latin America. The academic literature provides ample detail on how the US utilised its intelligence services to advance its strategic interests in Guatemala, Ecuador, Argentina, etc. (Gates, 1987; Becker, 2020; and Mistry, 2021 - instrumental reading, if no AI is used). ⤵️
2) Secondly, because of the granular knowledge of Venezuela since before the Cold War, it took only a couple of weeks for the US to organise the abduction of Maduro. This operation was different from what the CIA had organised in the region in the past - coups d'etat to remove governments, leading to military dictatorships and crimes against humanity committed by them during the Cold War. Since the opposition in Venezuela doesn't have the resources to rise against the military, which Maduro groomed for years to secure loyalty, the US didn't even consider engaging with it (something confirmed by D. Trump during today's press conference). Instead, the CIA carried out a plan according to which Maduro had to be brought to the US, serving the urgent needs of domestic (mobilising the Republicans and the rest of the society, including among the leftist segments - to tame "the Mandami effect") and foreing policy of the US (projecting power, especially against China, which just finished conducting drills in the proximity of Taiwan). ⤵️
#Geopolitics: The events in Venezuela are consequential for the dynamics of the rest of the world: 1) It's right to point out that Trump's moves from "isolationism" to "interventionism" in US foreign policy (both for domestic goals at home and to project power globally). He claims that by intervening in Venezuela, the US aims to dismantle drug-smuggling routes. Fearing invasion, Maduro's government proposed cooperation in this field, but Washington refused the offer;⤵️
2) The EU has been reluctant to push back against the US military interventionist agenda. No statement has been issued by the EUDEL in Caracas or in Brussels on the current US interventions in Venezuela. "Wait and see" by the EU in Venezuela might be explained by the strategic prioritisation of Ukraine and the Taiwan Strait. Individually, France has condemned the move by the US, considering it against international law (such interventions can be approved only by the UN Security Council);⤵️
3) Ukraine's stance is a mixture of support for removing an illegitimate Venezuelan leader by the US and support for international law for the follow-up after the capture (sequestration) of Maduro and his wife by the US. The UN officials called the episode a dangerous precedent because it's based on no international mandate. The unknown risks are for the further decisions of the US, which could also be on a military invasion, seeking to oust the regime and bring the opposition to power. Such a scenario could spark a military confrontation, including a civil war, unless Maduro's regime does not capitulate;⤵️
#EU: Orban's ability to persuade Trump to meet Putin in Hungary highlights several points of interest (in addition to what was underscored by @alemannoEU): 1) Both Trump and Putin aim to further peace talks, but they face overlapping manoeuvring hurdles. Trump cannot persuade the EU to accept peace conditions under the current status quo (occupied territories, non-NATO membership, etc.). Putin's main limit is Brussels' desire to support Ukraine by using Russian assets to finance the country;⤵️
2) Speaking from Budapest will reinforce the negative perception of Orban as not being an EU guy, yet Trump and Putin hope to support Orban's political survival. With weak support in surveys, Orban needs to garner legitimacy from abroad. While Brussels supports his electoral rival Magyar, Orban can rely on Trump (a leading voice of the Western sovereignist movement) and Putin (who opens the door to the Global South); 3) The EU will not be at the table, but Orban's gesture again challenges the EU's unity. It's likely that Orban may try to attract other leaders from CEE to travel to Budapest by inviting them to Trump's visit (however, the Polish president has recently met Trump in DC). Putin's visit will again demonstrate that Hungary does not intend to implement the Rome Statute, which would imply arresting Putin under the ICC arrest warrant;
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4) Trump wants to signal to the EU on European soil that peace talks are a priority for the US administration. This doesn't necessarily mean that Trump intends to favour Putin. In all circumstances, Trump is self-centred. And when meeting with Putin, he seeks to project strength over Russia; 5) Putin will be unable to travel directly to Hungary; his itinerary will likely include Turkiye and Serbia (neither of which has confirmed Putin's visit in the upcoming weeks), the only two significant players in the EU's neighbourhood where Russia has some leverage
#Moldova: The elections on 28 September will reveal the country's future direction. To truly understand what is at stake, a binary analysis is not very helpful. Here is my take on these critical elections: 1) PAS has been leading in the polls, but the "Patriotic" Bloc, which advocates restarting strategic dialogue with Russia, is not far behind; 2) The leaders of these political forces have used the narrative of "war" to rally voters. PAS utilised videos from Ukraine showing attacks from the Russian side. The "Patriotic" Bloc has also invoked the war, accusing PAS of intending to provoke a conflict in Transnistria.⤵️
3) The Moldovan authorities, which are politically subordinate to PAS, are closely monitoring the actions of opposition forces. More than 250 searches have been carried out in the past few days, with over 100 individuals being investigated. All of these targeted opposition forces; 4) The "Great Moldova" Party was excluded today, mainly due to a hidden alliance with the political parties of Ilan Shor ("Victory" Bloc). The votes for this party (ranging from 5-10%) could shift towards the "Patriotic" Bloc.⤵️
5) Another political party likely to be excluded is the "Heart of Moldova," which belongs to the "Patriotic" Bloc and is suspected of illegal financing (no final court decision has been made). Whether the Central Electoral Commission will decide to exclude the entire Bloc remains to be seen. However, by doing so, PAS risks facing adverse assessments from international observers, which could affect the legitimacy of the elections;⤵️
#EU_Enlargement: It was back in 2023, when I argued that Hungary was pursuing a strategy of "blockades and unconditional support" within the framework of the EU's eastern enlargement policy: ⤵️
1) Orbán wielded his veto power over Ukraine. He even organized a multi-week referendum (accompanied by a powerful propaganda) to cement the Hungarian public's negative vote on Ukraine's EU accession (anti-Ukraine legitimacy among the Hungarians); ⤵️
2) Initially, Orbán spoke out against alleged violations of the Hungarian minority's rights and then warned that Ukraine was too large and problematic to be absorbed into the EU. ⤵️
#EU: The outcome of the Romanian elections highlighted several risks for the EU: 1) Both exponents of the US-based MAGA movement and Russia have supported, in one way or another, the far-right candidate, George Simion; ⤵️
2) Fear and revenge are two key emotional factors that can have a tremendous impact on voter behavior within EU member states, using all big platforms (but mainly X, Facebook and TikTok); ⤵️
3) Disinformation and propaganda were present in the Romanian elections, used both to mobilize voters and to fuel speculation about interference by external state actors in favor of one of the candidates (either Russia or France and Moldova); ⤵️