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Dionis Cenușa

@DionisCenusa

Oct 17

#EU: Orban's ability to persuade Trump to meet Putin in Hungary highlights several points of interest (in addition to what was underscored by @alemannoEU): 1) Both Trump and Putin aim to further peace talks, but they face overlapping manoeuvring hurdles. Trump cannot persuade the EU to accept peace conditions under the current status quo (occupied territories, non-NATO membership, etc.). Putin's main limit is Brussels' desire to support Ukraine by using Russian assets to finance the country;⤵️

2) Speaking from Budapest will reinforce the negative perception of Orban as not being an EU guy, yet Trump and Putin hope to support Orban's political survival. With weak support in surveys, Orban needs to garner legitimacy from abroad. While Brussels supports his electoral rival Magyar, Orban can rely on Trump (a leading voice of the Western sovereignist movement) and Putin (who opens the door to the Global South);
3) The EU will not be at the table, but Orban's gesture again challenges the EU's unity. It's likely that Orban may try to attract other leaders from CEE to travel to Budapest by inviting them to Trump's visit (however, the Polish president has recently met Trump in DC). Putin's visit will again demonstrate that Hungary does not intend to implement the Rome Statute, which would imply arresting Putin under the ICC arrest warrant;

⤵️

4) Trump wants to signal to the EU on European soil that peace talks are a priority for the US administration. This doesn't necessarily mean that Trump intends to favour Putin. In all circumstances, Trump is self-centred. And when meeting with Putin, he seeks to project strength over Russia; 5) Putin will be unable to travel directly to Hungary; his itinerary will likely include Turkiye and Serbia (neither of which has confirmed Putin's visit in the upcoming weeks), the only two significant players in the EU's neighbourhood where Russia has some leverage

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Dionis Cenușa

@DionisCenusa

Sep 26

#Moldova: The elections on 28 September will reveal the country's future direction. To truly understand what is at stake, a binary analysis is not very helpful. Here is my take on these critical elections: 1) PAS has been leading in the polls, but the "Patriotic" Bloc, which advocates restarting strategic dialogue with Russia, is not far behind; 2) The leaders of these political forces have used the narrative of "war" to rally voters. PAS utilised videos from Ukraine showing attacks from the Russian side. The "Patriotic" Bloc has also invoked the war, accusing PAS of intending to provoke a conflict in Transnistria.⤵️

3) The Moldovan authorities, which are politically subordinate to PAS, are closely monitoring the actions of opposition forces. More than 250 searches have been carried out in the past few days, with over 100 individuals being investigated. All of these targeted opposition forces; 4) The "Great Moldova" Party was excluded today, mainly due to a hidden alliance with the political parties of Ilan Shor ("Victory" Bloc). The votes for this party (ranging from 5-10%) could shift towards the "Patriotic" Bloc.⤵️

5) Another political party likely to be excluded is the "Heart of Moldova," which belongs to the "Patriotic" Bloc and is suspected of illegal financing (no final court decision has been made). Whether the Central Electoral Commission will decide to exclude the entire Bloc remains to be seen. However, by doing so, PAS risks facing adverse assessments from international observers, which could affect the legitimacy of the elections;⤵️

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Dionis Cenușa

@DionisCenusa

Jul 4

https://twitter.com/DionisCenusa/status/1940844087562981603

#EU_Enlargement: It was back in 2023, when I argued that Hungary was pursuing a strategy of "blockades and unconditional support" within the framework of the EU's eastern enlargement policy: ⤵️

https://twitter.com/DionisCenusa/status/1940844087562981603

1) Orbán wielded his veto power over Ukraine. He even organized a multi-week referendum (accompanied by a powerful propaganda) to cement the Hungarian public's negative vote on Ukraine's EU accession (anti-Ukraine legitimacy among the Hungarians); ⤵️

2) Initially, Orbán spoke out against alleged violations of the Hungarian minority's rights and then warned that Ukraine was too large and problematic to be absorbed into the EU. ⤵️

Read 8 tweets

Dionis Cenușa

@DionisCenusa

May 19

#EU: The outcome of the Romanian elections highlighted several risks for the EU: 1) Both exponents of the US-based MAGA movement and Russia have supported, in one way or another, the far-right candidate, George Simion; ⤵️

2) Fear and revenge are two key emotional factors that can have a tremendous impact on voter behavior within EU member states, using all big platforms (but mainly X, Facebook and TikTok); ⤵️

3) Disinformation and propaganda were present in the Romanian elections, used both to mobilize voters and to fuel speculation about interference by external state actors in favor of one of the candidates (either Russia or France and Moldova); ⤵️

Read 7 tweets

Dionis Cenușa

@DionisCenusa

Feb 26

#Ukraine: Russian goals following a peace deal are more ambitious than many in the West had anticipated: 1) Russia does not merely aim to retain the territories it currently occupies. Its interests lie in influencing policy-making within post-war Ukraine; 2) The war as a means of radical political transformation in Ukraine has failed, which is why Russia seeks to utilise the peace talks to establish favourable conditions on the ground; ⤵️

3) Russia's objective is to create a Ukrainian reality that favours the Russian language and a Russian-friendly religious and cultural environment, sustained not only by local guarantees but also by international commitments. Russia is demanding the restoration and consolidation of post-2014 policies regarding language, religion, and culture in Ukraine.⤵️

In short, Russia's intentions should be understood by those who try to comfort its intentions through peace. Accepting Russian conditions would mean undermining Ukrainian sovereignty.

Read 4 tweets

Dionis Cenușa

@DionisCenusa

Jan 8

#FrozenConflict: The geopolitical competition around the solution of the Transnistria conflict may get a breath of fresh air now that the breakaway region is facing one of the most serious crises since the collapse of the USSR. A 🧵:⤵️

1) The EU suggests that Tiraspol coordinate with Chisinau to find a way out of the current energy crisis. If this happens before the war in Ukraine ends, Moldova’s reintegration could gain further ground through Chisinau’s involvement in managing the energy crisis in Transnistria, only with EU support;⤵️

2) Russia is not willing to change the status quo, which is one of the reasons why it did not propose to supply gas to the Moldova/Transnistria region via Turkish Stream. Still, Moscow might change the approach after seeing Trump’s peace plans in Ukraine translated into practice after the inauguration on Jan 20. However, Trump seems to be more occupied with redrawing the balance of power in the Arctic (through control over Canada and Greenland) while Russia is busy in/with Ukraine;⤵️

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