U.S. shouldn't put its bets on China's demographics leading to near/medium-term decline.
I'm not an economist but was exchanging notes with someone who is a very good one. Some key points on this. 1/
A declining working-age population generally portends slower economic growth, as observed in Japan and Europe over the past decade.
But while demographic headwinds will eventually catch-up with China, internal migration should push the day of reckoning far into the future. 2/
Most of the growth in China’s effective labor force over the past 20 years has come from urbanization, with more than 270 million people leaving the countryside for employment opportunities in cities over this period. Even after this massive influx...3/
37.5% of China’s population (530 million people) still lived on farms at the end of 2021, roughly 2x the rural share of the population in the U.S. (17.1%) and OECD (18.8%). If China’s population were as urbanized as that of the typical high-income economy...4/
its labor force would be approximately 30% larger and roughly equivalent in size to the entire OECD’s. At current trends, China’s urban population will grow by more than 215 million people by 2035, increasing the pool of available labor in these productive regions even ...5/
as the overall population dips by roughly 20 million. Just as inward migration has allowed the U.S. to avoid the deceleration implied by waning fertility rates, ongoing Chinese urbanization will largely offset the slowdown one might expect by focusing solely on demographics. 6/
There is a reason the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reports nonfarm payrolls and nonfarm productivity. It is this pool of labor – rather than undifferentiated population stats – that provides the best measure of an economy’s performance and potential. 7/
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"...and Mr. Scholz has struggled to invest any extra in the depleted military."
It's insane that Washington is not heavily and insistently pressing Berlin to live up to its most basic NATO commitments. This policy is 180 from what US and NATO interests require. 2/
"The country has 180,000 active soldiers and just over 300 tanks, half of them not roadworthy, down from 500,000 troops and 5,000 tanks at the height of the Cold War." 3/
"A renewed and brutal Russian offensive is making incremental progress along the front, and Moscow may be poised to receive assistance from China..." 2/
Truly incredible: "But Scholz’s chief of staff, acknowledged this week that a budget crunch was likely to prevent Berlin from fulfilling last year’s promise of an increased defense spending.
“We must be honest about this. Ambition and reality are diverging.” 3/
Some Twitter friends asked for a strategy-related reading list. Here are some thoughts. I've focused on books that may be a bit off the beaten path. Clausewitz, Politics Among Nations, etc. should be on any good list!
Here goes...1/
Robert Komer.
Komer is an underappreciated strategist. Exceptionally lucid and penetrating. Very sensible. "Blowtorch" mind.
"Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense" really helped my thinking in the Pentagon. Remains very relevant. 2/
His study on Vietnam "Bureaucracy Does Its Thing" is also masterful. I remember reading it when I returned from my stint as a civilian in Iraq and thinking: Wow. This nailed what happened. Eerie. 3/
"The fundamental job of any leader is to identify priorities — challenges and opportunities — communicate them, and then make the hard choices necessary to make progress against these priorities." 1/
"The most pressing threat the PLA poses is a vast missile program designed to hold the U.S. military at arm’s length, now outnumbering the U.S. in launch capacity and possessing technical advantage in the form of hypersonic missiles designed to outmaneuver defenses. " 2/
"But the U.S. does have a few people in leadership positions who correctly identify a rising China as not only a top rhetorical priority but one that merits difficult and sometimes unpopular decisions, [namely]: Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall and Gen. David Berger." 3/
I'm delighted to contribute to the important American Sea Power Project series in Proceedings @USNINews@USNIBooks. In it I lay out what I think a strategy of denial means for the sea services. 1/
BLUF: A strategy of denial requires a Navy and Marine Corps focused on denial defense along the first island chain in Asia. It does NOT mean "policing the sea lanes" or focusing on horizontal escalation. 2/
"The U.S. military’s role in a strategy of denial is central...Washington needs to ensure an effective denial defense along the first island chain, one that includes Taiwan within its perimeter." 3/
The factor of *time* must be front and center in thinking about Ukraine, Taiwan, Russia, and China. *Time* is of the essence.
There is a awakening among our allies. But it will take years come to fruition.
Yet China may have the ability to seize Taiwan in just a few years. 1/
It is great that we have awakened to our problems, for instance with the defense industrial base or European/Japanese defense spending. But these problems are far from solved. In fact in some cases, like the DIB, they are actually getting *worse.* 2/
At the same time Xi Jinping has made clear he wants the ability to seize Taiwan by 2027. And China is undertaking a historic military buildup to do it. No one knows if or when Beijing might move; I certainly don't. But very credible evidence indicates they may be able to soon. 3/