Thread by @ekat_kittycat

I will be offline again for some period, but I wanted to make a few comments/opinions, in a short thread:

1. On the upcoming "spring offensive". What offensive? There will very likely not be one by then, sorry. This hallucination exists mainly in media and twitter.

2. The currently pledged (insufficient) battalions will barely be ready by May (at earliest), not to mention it is a mess of barely compatible systems. Everything else pledged drags years deep, into 2024/2025. This also assumes no "fading pledges" and bullshit promises.

3. Russians have immense reserves and prepared positions, of which are yet to be tested, and are built in great depth. Even 2-3 western mechanized brigades is not enough to "turn the tide" - for this it's needed 5x more, at minimum.

4. Offensive actions don't happen in a vacuum, you need primary and supporting offensives, etc. There is no "rush" into a narrow pocket towards Melitopol... The enemy can quickly react to such nonsense.

5. Ammunition is a much bigger problem for the ZSU than for RU. Much of the RU "shell hunger" narrative is simply used to explain away their slow progress, but for us, it's a severe issue.

6. RU will likely lose offensive potential in June/July, and will revert to defensive postures, while attempting to regnerate force as before. I have mention I think they will eventually mobilize 1.2mil inside UA. This is not ending soon.

7. It's very possible for the war to last many years of oscillating defensive/offensive lulls, before ending as suddenly as it started in 2014. Any predictions past a few months is futile, including association football analogies...

8. High risk "surprises" like forcing the Dnipro are not impossible (among other things), unlike believed widely. How effective they would be, is another question.

9. Expect important news in Bakhmut soon.