🧵 1/ This is part two of the "Assault Units" thread, which focuses on suggestions for russian assault units in urban combat, gleaned from captured documents. The section provides general recommendations on tactics that assault units can employ in urban warfare scenarios.
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Main provisions from the document regarding urban warfare:
- To ensure safe passage, holes should be made by tanks or explosives in fences and buildings.
- The route of movement of assault companies, if possible, should exclude movement along roads and straight streets
3/ - Placing observation points on the roofs of buildings is prohibited in urban environment.
4/ - As a military tactics, it is recommended to assign new names to streets and buildings in towns that are being assaulted. This is done to confuse defenders and exploit open coms channels. In the present case, the attackers named the streets Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev
5/ - The assault begins with artillery fire on the front line of defense. The transfer of artillery fire to the next line is carried out by the commander
6/ - If the multi-store building is well fortified and can't be easily assaulted, then the "Squeezing" method should be used: instead of blocking the building, the assaulters should take cover in nearby buildings.
7/ - Meanwhile, artillery (or AGS) and firesupport teams should proceed with engaging the target. This way the enemy gets a chance to leave the building while taking losses from artillery, providing an opportunity for the assault team to advance
8/ When an assault platoon tries to clear the multi-store or multi-entrance building, it is recommended to act in the following order:
-One person is set at the entrance, with the task of preventing an enemy attack from the basement or the street.
9/ - The platoon begins to move along the staircase in small groups (3 people) to the upper floors, while soldiers cover each other.
- Clearing is carried out on an apartment basis on each floor, based on the number of rooms in the apartment (one-room, two-room, etc.).
10/ - Three people are enough for a one-room apartment.
- When clearing common corridor on a floor, a cover group (1-2 people) is set with the task of preventing an enemy attack from an uncleaned apartment or stairs from the upper floors.
11/ - The common corridors on the upper floors are mined to exclude the penetration of the enemy into the rear. The clearing of the rest of the building happens in the same method
12/ - After securing all floors, the wall of the apartment on the second floor is broken with TNT or C-4 to get access to the rest of the building.
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As the war progresses, russians aim to modernize and become more flexible by implementing changes. However, most instructions are still top-down and blindly applied across the battlefield based on a few successful examples, resembling a cargo cult.
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Becoming proficient in urban warfare tactics requires extensive training and proper logistics, including training grounds, qualified instructors, and adequate communication equipment. Even with intensive training, it still takes time for a team to become effective
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Does Russia have the necessary capabilities, including sufficient trained officers and NCOs with coms, leadership, teamwork skills to conduct such operations? In my third section, I'll address these questions and examine disparities between manuals and observed practices
16/ I invite you to follow me to stay updated, as social media algorithms may not prioritize war-related content.
Here's the link to access the scanned version of the original Russian manual, published by Ukrainian journalist Yuri Butusov, in case you wish to review it:
У США спалахнув гучний скандал після того, як Конгресовий комітет опублікував переписку Джеффрі Епштейна, відомого організатора зустрічей із неповнолітніми та впливовими людьми. Серед тих, хто згадується у листах - Дональд Трамп. Крім того, у документах не обійшлось без росіян:
2/ Зокрема, у листі Джеффрі Епштейна до Торб’єрна Ягланда від 24.06.2018 р. він зазначав: «Чуркін був чудовим. Після наших розмов він зрозумів Трампа. Це не складно - йому потрібно лише побачити щось, щоб зрозуміти, усе дуже просто». (Чуркін на той час був постпердом РФ при ООН)
3/ Його наступна відповідь звучала так: "Я думаю, ви могли б запропонувати Путіну, щоб Лавров поспілкувався зі мною і отримав необхідне розуміння. Віталій Чуркін раніше це робив, але він помер. ? !"
На той час, Торб'єрн був Генеральним секретарем Ради Європи
A few broad observations on the course of war, based on observations, discussions with officers, soldiers, and analysts, data, and other relevant sources. I will begin with a high-level sociopolitical overview before gradually moving toward operational-tactical level. 🧵Thread:
2/ Overall, the situation for Ukraine has not improved since last year. Ukraine has markedly increased its long-range strike capabilities, which have very tangible effects across Russian society. However, the battlefield initiative remains with Russia, much as it did most of 2024
3/ A plausible Ukrainian "victory" approach can be summarized as: disrupt logistics, degrade the Russian economy, and avoid catastrophic operational collapses. Russia’s apparent approach is simpler: keep pressing until Ukraine exhausts its will or physical capacity to resist.
According to Russian milblogger Fighterbomber, who has a wide network within the Russian Air Force, an Il-76 was shot down in Sudan on November 4 by the Rapid Support Forces. According to him, the aircraft had been purchased in Kyrgyzstan a month and a half ago for $12 million
2/ A video showing a burning object falling from the sky, likely the claimed Il-76, has also been recorded and published
3/ While I do not have solid sources in Sudan, one of my contacts located there has confirmed that reports about a downed Il-76 have been circulating within the RSF since yesterday. Government forces are actively using the Air Force to supply besieged cities
Some observers have described the fall of Pokrovsk as “sudden.” That may be true if one followed the wrong analysts. In reality, the defense deterioration was apparent as early as 2024 and became unmistakable by 2025, as the underlying dynamics made the outcome nearly inevitable:
2/ That the city continued to hold out until November is, in itself, an achievement. Still, the rapid loss of positions in summer/fall 2024, which left logistics vulnerable and exposed the flanks, combined with manpower shortages, largely dictated the outcome now unfolding
3/ Launching a counteroffensive capable of retaking the city and securing its flanks, or even holding for another year, would have required diverting significant resources from other sectors of the front, a tradeoff that would result in disastrous situation elsewhere.
North Korea and Russia are rapidly building their first road bridge to enhance logistics and expand military and economic ties. Frontelligence Insight has analyzed satellite imagery and project documents to estimate its completion and potential impact. 🧵Thread:
2/ Today, Russia and North Korea have no direct road connection. The only land crossing is the 1950s-era Korea - Russia Friendship Railroad Bridge. Air and maritime routes, via Pyongyang Airport and ports like Rajin, exist, but their capacity and costs are often suboptimal.
3/ In the summer of 2024, Russia confirmed plans to build a road bridge over the Tumen River, with construction led by Russia’s TunnelYuzhStroy. The project is budgeted at ~9 billion rubles (~$110M), spanning 4.7 km in total, with the bridge itself about 1 km long
A multi-day analysis of battlefield dynamics and internal Russian data: both public and non-public, points to multiple trends and key points which we summarized. 🧵Thread:
2/ Ukraine’s deep strike drone campaign has inflicted significant direct and secondary damage across Russia, contributing to a perceptible shift in perceptions of the war’s trajectory and its cost benefit among both military command and law enforcement senior leadership.
3/ According to analyzed communications from dozens of senior Russian officers in Moscow and in the field, there is a growing perception that the war has effectively reached a strategic and political dead end - sustained primarily by President Putin’s personal insistence