🧵 1/ This is part two of the "Assault Units" thread, which focuses on suggestions for russian assault units in urban combat, gleaned from captured documents. The section provides general recommendations on tactics that assault units can employ in urban warfare scenarios.
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Main provisions from the document regarding urban warfare:
- To ensure safe passage, holes should be made by tanks or explosives in fences and buildings.
- The route of movement of assault companies, if possible, should exclude movement along roads and straight streets
3/ - Placing observation points on the roofs of buildings is prohibited in urban environment.
4/ - As a military tactics, it is recommended to assign new names to streets and buildings in towns that are being assaulted. This is done to confuse defenders and exploit open coms channels. In the present case, the attackers named the streets Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev
5/ - The assault begins with artillery fire on the front line of defense. The transfer of artillery fire to the next line is carried out by the commander
6/ - If the multi-store building is well fortified and can't be easily assaulted, then the "Squeezing" method should be used: instead of blocking the building, the assaulters should take cover in nearby buildings.
7/ - Meanwhile, artillery (or AGS) and firesupport teams should proceed with engaging the target. This way the enemy gets a chance to leave the building while taking losses from artillery, providing an opportunity for the assault team to advance
8/ When an assault platoon tries to clear the multi-store or multi-entrance building, it is recommended to act in the following order:
-One person is set at the entrance, with the task of preventing an enemy attack from the basement or the street.
9/ - The platoon begins to move along the staircase in small groups (3 people) to the upper floors, while soldiers cover each other.
- Clearing is carried out on an apartment basis on each floor, based on the number of rooms in the apartment (one-room, two-room, etc.).
10/ - Three people are enough for a one-room apartment.
- When clearing common corridor on a floor, a cover group (1-2 people) is set with the task of preventing an enemy attack from an uncleaned apartment or stairs from the upper floors.
11/ - The common corridors on the upper floors are mined to exclude the penetration of the enemy into the rear. The clearing of the rest of the building happens in the same method
12/ - After securing all floors, the wall of the apartment on the second floor is broken with TNT or C-4 to get access to the rest of the building.
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As the war progresses, russians aim to modernize and become more flexible by implementing changes. However, most instructions are still top-down and blindly applied across the battlefield based on a few successful examples, resembling a cargo cult.
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Becoming proficient in urban warfare tactics requires extensive training and proper logistics, including training grounds, qualified instructors, and adequate communication equipment. Even with intensive training, it still takes time for a team to become effective
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Does Russia have the necessary capabilities, including sufficient trained officers and NCOs with coms, leadership, teamwork skills to conduct such operations? In my third section, I'll address these questions and examine disparities between manuals and observed practices
16/ I invite you to follow me to stay updated, as social media algorithms may not prioritize war-related content.
Here's the link to access the scanned version of the original Russian manual, published by Ukrainian journalist Yuri Butusov, in case you wish to review it:
Bohdan Krotevych, former Chief of Staff of the 12th Brigade, notes that in some areas, a unit is spread across a stretch of more than five kilometers with just 10 to 12 soldiers. Only 25% of the battalion's original personnel remain.
🧵Few important points to add here:
2/ One of the first things people assume is that Ukraine isn’t recruiting or mobilizing, but this isn’t true. We estimate that 17,000 to 24,000 people are being called up each month. That’s still below Russia’s numbers, but far above what Russians want people to think
3/ At the tactical level, some units with capable leadership have adapted to the situation, partially offsetting personnel shortages through the effective use of drones, well-prepared positions, and, if possible, minefields. Yet, these are not the result of a systematic effort
You might find this picture morbid or eerie- odd in its own way, with unsettling details. Why is there a body on a door? Why is there no casket? And why is this happening in a lawn? It's a short story - one that makes the distant, abstract feeling of war suddenly tangible:
2/ Another summer in the Shakhtarskyi District of Pokrovsk. But things have changed. The air...
The heavy, putrid air of decomposing flesh punches you right in your nose, says Yana - a young Ukrainian volunteer who is trying to help those in city. Pure Nightmare - she adds
3/ “You feel it in many apartment blocks the moment you step into the stairwell,” she adds
That day, a small portable drone scanner kept alerting to the presence of Russian drones, ominously circling above the town. It didn’t take long before a dull thud echoed on the streets
I have yet to meet a single soldier who served on the front lines and agrees with General Syrski's opinion on this. His stance has been widely criticized by service members. Yet somehow, it's being presented as a success to English-speaking audiences.
No, foxholes are not some kind of tactical advantage to brag about. Quite often, they’re the result of poor organization and the failure of both civil and military administrations to coordinate and build proper defenses, as well as shortage of functional engineering equipment
To elaborate: foxholes are not effective protection against drones. The downsizing of fortifications is driven by a lack of personnel, the inability to dig near the front lines due to drone threats, and the failure to construct proper defenses in the rear due to poor organization
🧵Thread with key findings from Frontelligence Insight analysis on Russia’s Motorcycle Assault Groups: structure, tactics, training, equipment, battlefield performance, and the conditions that enabled them
2/ Though called “assault” groups, Motorcycle Assault Groups serve diverse roles beyond direct assaults - handling diversion, reconnaissance, behind-the-lines infiltration, logistics, and flanking support in larger operations.
3/ More importantly, motorcycles act mainly as rapid transport, ferrying troops to their objectives rather than acting as combat platforms. As analysts @KofmanMichael and B.A. Friedman note, a better analogy is “dragoons” - mounted infantry who rode into battle but fought on foot
Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT), a respected investigative group that has tracked Russian military affairs for over a decade, has published a new report on the production of T-90 tanks. 🧵Thread about their key findings on Russia’s tank production and expansion efforts:
2/ By early 2022, just before the invasion, Uralvagonzavod had started mass production of the upgraded T-90M "Proryv." The army had received 66–85 tanks, plus 10 sent to the Kazan Tank School. In total, Russia had about 65–85 T-90Ms and 370–380 older T-90s around February 2022
3/ CIT estimates that Uralvagonzavod built 60–70 T-90Ms in 2022. Production reportedly rose to 140–180 tanks in 2023. In 2024, output may have reached 250–300 tanks. All current T-90Ms are newly built, and hull production does not appear to be a limiting factor.
Nearly every week, headlines, X threads, and opinion pieces tout drones as the new defining technology of modern and future warfare. While there is certainly truth to that, it’s worth stepping back and examining this "now-mainstream" idea. 🧵Thread:
2/ Ukraine has become the first battleground where drones have fundamentally reshaped the battlefield. By estimates, over 70% of battlefield losses are from the drones. Even if the exact figure varies depending on the source or methodology, most assessments place it above 50%
3/ In many ways, Ukraine has done for drones what "Operation Desert Storm", and later the "Shock and Awe" campaign in Iraq did for modern warfare: reshaping assumptions and demonstrating the transformative role of air supremacy and advanced technology across all levels of combat