For those seeking a greater understanding of the russian soldier's perspective on the war, motivation, and attitudes, I recommend reading this thread, as I decided to compile and generalize some materials.
2/ I was hesitant to publish this thread as I cannot provide the original evidence until the war is over. However, I feel it is important to share the information and allow readers to form their own opinions.
3/ The materials primarily consist of over a hundred conversations obtained from chat applications on the devices of deceased russian soldiers and confessions from some prisoners of war. While it may not be a representative sample, I want to discuss some noticeable commonalities.
4/ It may be surprising, but discussions among soldiers about topics such as the perceived NATO threat, denazification, world war, or other forms of patriotic propaganda frequently promoted on Russian television are not as prevalent as one might assume.
5/ It appears that for many soldiers and officers, this war is solely a source of financial gain, with little regard for the immoral acts they commit. In light of this, I have assembled a list, in no specific order, of subjects that Russian soldiers regularly converse about:
6/ - Upgrading their apartments with their spouses, making plans to trade an apartment and add more rooms.
- Buying cars for themselves or their spouses
- Paying off mortgages, car payments, or similar debts
- Paying off child support debts
- Getting a combat veteran ID to receive state benefits for the rest of the life
- Saving money to take their families on vacation by the sea.
- Getting new furniture, home electronics, smartphones
8/ It appears that a significant number of soldiers view the war as an opportunity to earn money, and frequently engage in casual conversations about their expected financial gains from the war. The following is a slightly edited conversation, which highlights this attitude:
09/ "We have been shelling the kho**ols (ethnic slur for Ukrainians) in the town for three days. If we finish them off soon, I hope that our commander will let me go home by the summer. With my salary, I should have enough savings so we can buy a new car and drive to the sea."
10/ Interestingly, these conversations sometimes intertwine with discussions about salary issues, as soldiers try to understand why they haven't received their compensation or why they received less than expected. However, the topic of payment deserves a separate conversation.
11/ It is misleading to claim that mobilized soldiers are victims of the war and had no choice. Conversations among soldiers suggest that few express criticism of the war itself. Instead, criticisms tend to focus on the perceived incompetence of the command
12/ or the perceived insufficient use of force to win. Some believe that they should "stop playing around" and just raze entire cities or conduct nuclear strikes so they can go home earlier. Keep that in mind when they will tell you about the "we just followed the orders" story.
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There’s been a lot of discussion about the potential threat FPV drones could pose to US forces on the ground, with some going as far as claiming that American troops would suffer heavy casualties from FPV drones. That’s possible, but it’s also worth questioning the assumptions:
2/ First, it’s not clear to what extent Iran has actually trained and prepared its ground forces for large-scale use of small drones. Even relatively decentralized militaries still operate within ORBAT and logistics. So far, there isn’t strong evidence of systemic changes within the Iranian army to support widespread FPV deployment.
3/ Second, we’ve seen relatively little FPV usage from Iran-supported groups like Hamas or Hezbollah, despite continuous war with Israel. A few examples have emerged from Iraq, but we’re talking about a handful of videos at most. That’s not a level of a large-scale implementation
With an uncertain battlefield position, Russia has intensified hybrid operations to shape European public opinion. A key element is the spread of narratives portraying Ukraine as using “energy blackmail” against Europe, often echoed by politically sympathetic actors. 🧵Thread:
2/ Since the full-scale invasion began, Russian missile and drone strikes have targeted Ukraine’s energy system, damaging power plants, gas facilities, and transmission networks nationwide. Ukraine has lost about 11.5 GW of capacity, with damage reportedly exceeding $24.8 billion
3/ The war has also affected energy transport infrastructure. Ukrainian oil facilities have been attacked more than 400 times since the invasion began. On 27 January 2026, a strike damaged equipment working for the Druzhba pipeline near Brody in western Ukraine.
Leaked internal files from Moscow reveal that Russia’s ruling party, United Russia, keeps intelligence-style dossiers on its own politicians. They document corruption facts, criminal ties, and personal vulnerabilities, information used to manage Russia’s politics
Thread 🧵:
2/ United Russia is the political party that dominates Russia’s parliament and regional governments and serves as the main political vehicle of Putin.
Leaked documents from the party, published by @dallasparkua and @256CyberAssault, reveal details of an internal vetting process
3/ Meet Evgeniy Gnedov, who oversees the vetting of candidates for various lawmaking bodies - from local assemblies to the federal parliament.
A longtime security official, he spent decades inside the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia, eventually rising to a senior role
Russia’s war in Ukraine has increasingly become a war of drones, but artillery still plays a key role on the battlefield. Newly obtained documents from 2014 to 2025 show that Russia continues to modernize its artillery production using industrial machinery from Europe. 🧵Thread:
2/ In a joint analysis, Frontelligence Insight and the @dallasparkua company reviewed hundreds of internal documents from Russian defense contractor Zenit-Investprom and found that Plant No. 9, a maker of artillery barrels and tank guns, went through major upgrades in 2025
3/ Six facilities within the Uralmash industrial zone were found to be undergoing modernization, including planned delivery of industrial machinery from several European countries. Several workshops were dedicated to work on the Armata project and the Koalitsiya SPG.
As we approach a point marking the beginning of the war’s 5th year, it is time to discuss how we assess the war’s overall dynamics, strictly from a military standpoint. One method many analysts use is the pace of territory capture. However, this methodology has a serious issue🧵:
2/ Generally, this is not a bad method of analyzing battlefield dynamics, as the history of wars shows far more cases of states advancing along frontlines or into enemy territory before a war ends in their favor than the opposite. The devil, however, lies in the details
3/ Putting aside other domains of war, such as economics and socio-politics, battlefield dynamics are often judged by metrics like casualty rates and square kilometers of controlled territory. This can produce a distorted picture, a problem I informally term the “Sahara Fallacy”