For those seeking a greater understanding of the russian soldier's perspective on the war, motivation, and attitudes, I recommend reading this thread, as I decided to compile and generalize some materials.
2/ I was hesitant to publish this thread as I cannot provide the original evidence until the war is over. However, I feel it is important to share the information and allow readers to form their own opinions.
3/ The materials primarily consist of over a hundred conversations obtained from chat applications on the devices of deceased russian soldiers and confessions from some prisoners of war. While it may not be a representative sample, I want to discuss some noticeable commonalities.
4/ It may be surprising, but discussions among soldiers about topics such as the perceived NATO threat, denazification, world war, or other forms of patriotic propaganda frequently promoted on Russian television are not as prevalent as one might assume.
5/ It appears that for many soldiers and officers, this war is solely a source of financial gain, with little regard for the immoral acts they commit. In light of this, I have assembled a list, in no specific order, of subjects that Russian soldiers regularly converse about:
6/ - Upgrading their apartments with their spouses, making plans to trade an apartment and add more rooms.
- Buying cars for themselves or their spouses
- Paying off mortgages, car payments, or similar debts
- Paying off child support debts
- Getting a combat veteran ID to receive state benefits for the rest of the life
- Saving money to take their families on vacation by the sea.
- Getting new furniture, home electronics, smartphones
8/ It appears that a significant number of soldiers view the war as an opportunity to earn money, and frequently engage in casual conversations about their expected financial gains from the war. The following is a slightly edited conversation, which highlights this attitude:
09/ "We have been shelling the kho**ols (ethnic slur for Ukrainians) in the town for three days. If we finish them off soon, I hope that our commander will let me go home by the summer. With my salary, I should have enough savings so we can buy a new car and drive to the sea."
10/ Interestingly, these conversations sometimes intertwine with discussions about salary issues, as soldiers try to understand why they haven't received their compensation or why they received less than expected. However, the topic of payment deserves a separate conversation.
11/ It is misleading to claim that mobilized soldiers are victims of the war and had no choice. Conversations among soldiers suggest that few express criticism of the war itself. Instead, criticisms tend to focus on the perceived incompetence of the command
12/ or the perceived insufficient use of force to win. Some believe that they should "stop playing around" and just raze entire cities or conduct nuclear strikes so they can go home earlier. Keep that in mind when they will tell you about the "we just followed the orders" story.
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Ukrainian drone strikes in Izhevsk: Russia’s arms heart, and Luhansk using rocket-drone "Peklo" demonstrates Kyiv’s growing technological abilities. The message to Putin is clear: Ukraine’s strike range and warhead size will only continue to expand as the war continues:
2/ Air defense drones are emerging as a promising counter to Russia’s expanding Shahed (Geran) drone output - no longer just a concept, but an increasingly likely solution that could help offset Moscow’s production surge with scalable and relatively cheap response
3/ Russia’s consistent failure to break Ukrainian front, despite a manpower edge, and mounting economic issues, admitted even by Putin, nullify their bravado shown during the latest Istanbul. Achieving Moscow’s stated goals would require far more resources than it's deploying
Our team has been tracking Russia’s recruitment efforts abroad, with a focus on West Africa and Cuba. Some revealing insights follow in this short thread🧵:
1. While some foreign POWs claim they were misled, documents suggest they joined Russia’s military knowingly
2. The reality is quite prosaic: Moscow offers steady pay that far surpasses local wages, along with the lure of adventure - an exciting offer for young men in economically strained countries. In some cases, recruits receive upfront bonuses as high as $20,000 and more
3. The contracts - often written in languages such as Spanish or French - clearly outline terms, including compensation for injury or death, and explicitly mention “Special Military Operation” zone. This makes claims of recruits being unaware highly implausible
Stories of undercover operatives who stay behind enemy lines and later fight in special ops units, through some of the war’s toughest battles, are usually found in movies or games. But this isn’t fiction. Here are key points from our interview with Artem "Skhidnyi" Karyakin 🧵:
2/ Artem, a native of Donbas, says he witnessed signs of Russian influence long before 2014. In his hometown of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov), a mining city in Luhansk Oblast with no historical ties to the Don Cossacks, a so-called “Don Cossack” group appeared in the early 2000s
3/ By 2014, the same “Cossacks” were seizing government buildings in Kadiivka - this time armed and operating under Russian flags. Many weren’t local; they had come from the Russian Federation, as had others who helped take control by force during the spring occupation efforts.
Bohdan Krotevych, former Chief of Staff of the 12th Brigade, notes that in some areas, a unit is spread across a stretch of more than five kilometers with just 10 to 12 soldiers. Only 25% of the battalion's original personnel remain.
🧵Few important points to add here:
2/ One of the first things people assume is that Ukraine isn’t recruiting or mobilizing, but this isn’t true. We estimate that 17,000 to 24,000 people are being called up each month. That’s still below Russia’s numbers, but far above what Russians want people to think
3/ At the tactical level, some units with capable leadership have adapted to the situation, partially offsetting personnel shortages through the effective use of drones, well-prepared positions, and, if possible, minefields. Yet, these are not the result of a systematic effort
You might find this picture morbid or eerie- odd in its own way, with unsettling details. Why is there a body on a door? Why is there no casket? And why is this happening in a lawn? It's a short story - one that makes the distant, abstract feeling of war suddenly tangible:
2/ Another summer in the Shakhtarskyi District of Pokrovsk. But things have changed. The air...
The heavy, putrid air of decomposing flesh punches you right in your nose, says Yana - a young Ukrainian volunteer who is trying to help those in city. Pure Nightmare - she adds
3/ “You feel it in many apartment blocks the moment you step into the stairwell,” she adds
That day, a small portable drone scanner kept alerting to the presence of Russian drones, ominously circling above the town. It didn’t take long before a dull thud echoed on the streets
I have yet to meet a single soldier who served on the front lines and agrees with General Syrski's opinion on this. His stance has been widely criticized by service members. Yet somehow, it's being presented as a success to English-speaking audiences.
No, foxholes are not some kind of tactical advantage to brag about. Quite often, they’re the result of poor organization and the failure of both civil and military administrations to coordinate and build proper defenses, as well as shortage of functional engineering equipment
To elaborate: foxholes are not effective protection against drones. The downsizing of fortifications is driven by a lack of personnel, the inability to dig near the front lines due to drone threats, and the failure to construct proper defenses in the rear due to poor organization