For those seeking a greater understanding of the russian soldier's perspective on the war, motivation, and attitudes, I recommend reading this thread, as I decided to compile and generalize some materials.
2/ I was hesitant to publish this thread as I cannot provide the original evidence until the war is over. However, I feel it is important to share the information and allow readers to form their own opinions.
3/ The materials primarily consist of over a hundred conversations obtained from chat applications on the devices of deceased russian soldiers and confessions from some prisoners of war. While it may not be a representative sample, I want to discuss some noticeable commonalities.
4/ It may be surprising, but discussions among soldiers about topics such as the perceived NATO threat, denazification, world war, or other forms of patriotic propaganda frequently promoted on Russian television are not as prevalent as one might assume.
5/ It appears that for many soldiers and officers, this war is solely a source of financial gain, with little regard for the immoral acts they commit. In light of this, I have assembled a list, in no specific order, of subjects that Russian soldiers regularly converse about:
6/ - Upgrading their apartments with their spouses, making plans to trade an apartment and add more rooms.
- Buying cars for themselves or their spouses
- Paying off mortgages, car payments, or similar debts
- Paying off child support debts
- Getting a combat veteran ID to receive state benefits for the rest of the life
- Saving money to take their families on vacation by the sea.
- Getting new furniture, home electronics, smartphones
8/ It appears that a significant number of soldiers view the war as an opportunity to earn money, and frequently engage in casual conversations about their expected financial gains from the war. The following is a slightly edited conversation, which highlights this attitude:
09/ "We have been shelling the kho**ols (ethnic slur for Ukrainians) in the town for three days. If we finish them off soon, I hope that our commander will let me go home by the summer. With my salary, I should have enough savings so we can buy a new car and drive to the sea."
10/ Interestingly, these conversations sometimes intertwine with discussions about salary issues, as soldiers try to understand why they haven't received their compensation or why they received less than expected. However, the topic of payment deserves a separate conversation.
11/ It is misleading to claim that mobilized soldiers are victims of the war and had no choice. Conversations among soldiers suggest that few express criticism of the war itself. Instead, criticisms tend to focus on the perceived incompetence of the command
12/ or the perceived insufficient use of force to win. Some believe that they should "stop playing around" and just raze entire cities or conduct nuclear strikes so they can go home earlier. Keep that in mind when they will tell you about the "we just followed the orders" story.
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A year and a half ago, in April 2024, I warned (the section is highlighted in the auto-translated text) that aid to Ukraine would continue to dwindle, and that without proper changes we would find ourselves in a poor position. What we’re seeing now was set in motion a while ago.
2/ Besides Europe, which I was mostly addressing in that post, Ukraine has also fallen short, mainly in strategic-level organization, despite several successes such as expanding and deploying unmanned forces and improving long-range strikes that have hurt the Russian economy.
3/ The winning strategy, as my team outlined after the 2023 counteroffensive, can be summed up as “stall the enemy while destroying the rear,” meaning inflict maximum socio-economic damage while preventing the enemy from making real gains and making the war plainly too costly.
Russia aim to manufacture up to 120,000 glide bombs this year, including 500 of a new, longer-range version capable of flying up to 200 km from the point of release, according to a representative of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence. 🧵Thread with data mentioned in the interview:
2/ Major General Vadym Skibitskyi, deputy head of Ukraine's Defence Intelligence, disclosed that Russian forces are firing between 200 and 250 glide bombs every day. Last month, the daily average was about 170, according to data from the defence ministry quoted by Reuters.
3/ He added that Russia is working on modifications that would allow glide bombs to fly up to 400 km, enabling Russia to strike deep without using missiles. Skibitskyi provided estimates for Russian drone production: Russia is expected to produce around 70,000 long-range drones
У США спалахнув гучний скандал після того, як Конгресовий комітет опублікував переписку Джеффрі Епштейна, відомого організатора зустрічей із неповнолітніми та впливовими людьми. Серед тих, хто згадується у листах - Дональд Трамп. Крім того, у документах не обійшлось без росіян:
2/ Зокрема, у листі Джеффрі Епштейна до Торб’єрна Ягланда від 24.06.2018 р. він зазначав: «Чуркін був чудовим. Після наших розмов він зрозумів Трампа. Це не складно - йому потрібно лише побачити щось, щоб зрозуміти, усе дуже просто». (Чуркін на той час був постпердом РФ при ООН)
3/ Його наступна відповідь звучала так: "Я думаю, ви могли б запропонувати Путіну, щоб Лавров поспілкувався зі мною і отримав необхідне розуміння. Віталій Чуркін раніше це робив, але він помер. ? !"
На той час, Торб'єрн був Генеральним секретарем Ради Європи
A few broad observations on the course of war, based on observations, discussions with officers, soldiers, and analysts, data, and other relevant sources. I will begin with a high-level sociopolitical overview before gradually moving toward operational-tactical level. 🧵Thread:
2/ Overall, the situation for Ukraine has not improved since last year. Ukraine has markedly increased its long-range strike capabilities, which have very tangible effects across Russian society. However, the battlefield initiative remains with Russia, much as it did most of 2024
3/ A plausible Ukrainian "victory" approach can be summarized as: disrupt logistics, degrade the Russian economy, and avoid catastrophic operational collapses. Russia’s apparent approach is simpler: keep pressing until Ukraine exhausts its will or physical capacity to resist.
According to Russian milblogger Fighterbomber, who has a wide network within the Russian Air Force, an Il-76 was shot down in Sudan on November 4 by the Rapid Support Forces. According to him, the aircraft had been purchased in Kyrgyzstan a month and a half ago for $12 million
2/ A video showing a burning object falling from the sky, likely the claimed Il-76, has also been recorded and published
3/ While I do not have solid sources in Sudan, one of my contacts located there has confirmed that reports about a downed Il-76 have been circulating within the RSF since yesterday. Government forces are actively using the Air Force to supply besieged cities
Some observers have described the fall of Pokrovsk as “sudden.” That may be true if one followed the wrong analysts. In reality, the defense deterioration was apparent as early as 2024 and became unmistakable by 2025, as the underlying dynamics made the outcome nearly inevitable:
2/ That the city continued to hold out until November is, in itself, an achievement. Still, the rapid loss of positions in summer/fall 2024, which left logistics vulnerable and exposed the flanks, combined with manpower shortages, largely dictated the outcome now unfolding
3/ Launching a counteroffensive capable of retaking the city and securing its flanks, or even holding for another year, would have required diverting significant resources from other sectors of the front, a tradeoff that would result in disastrous situation elsewhere.