For those seeking a greater understanding of the russian soldier's perspective on the war, motivation, and attitudes, I recommend reading this thread, as I decided to compile and generalize some materials.
2/ I was hesitant to publish this thread as I cannot provide the original evidence until the war is over. However, I feel it is important to share the information and allow readers to form their own opinions.
3/ The materials primarily consist of over a hundred conversations obtained from chat applications on the devices of deceased russian soldiers and confessions from some prisoners of war. While it may not be a representative sample, I want to discuss some noticeable commonalities.
4/ It may be surprising, but discussions among soldiers about topics such as the perceived NATO threat, denazification, world war, or other forms of patriotic propaganda frequently promoted on Russian television are not as prevalent as one might assume.
5/ It appears that for many soldiers and officers, this war is solely a source of financial gain, with little regard for the immoral acts they commit. In light of this, I have assembled a list, in no specific order, of subjects that Russian soldiers regularly converse about:
6/ - Upgrading their apartments with their spouses, making plans to trade an apartment and add more rooms.
- Buying cars for themselves or their spouses
- Paying off mortgages, car payments, or similar debts
- Paying off child support debts
- Getting a combat veteran ID to receive state benefits for the rest of the life
- Saving money to take their families on vacation by the sea.
- Getting new furniture, home electronics, smartphones
8/ It appears that a significant number of soldiers view the war as an opportunity to earn money, and frequently engage in casual conversations about their expected financial gains from the war. The following is a slightly edited conversation, which highlights this attitude:
09/ "We have been shelling the kho**ols (ethnic slur for Ukrainians) in the town for three days. If we finish them off soon, I hope that our commander will let me go home by the summer. With my salary, I should have enough savings so we can buy a new car and drive to the sea."
10/ Interestingly, these conversations sometimes intertwine with discussions about salary issues, as soldiers try to understand why they haven't received their compensation or why they received less than expected. However, the topic of payment deserves a separate conversation.
11/ It is misleading to claim that mobilized soldiers are victims of the war and had no choice. Conversations among soldiers suggest that few express criticism of the war itself. Instead, criticisms tend to focus on the perceived incompetence of the command
12/ or the perceived insufficient use of force to win. Some believe that they should "stop playing around" and just raze entire cities or conduct nuclear strikes so they can go home earlier. Keep that in mind when they will tell you about the "we just followed the orders" story.
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Exclusive Report: Shipments of engines, cylinders, pistons, and electronics are pouring from China into Alabuga, fueling Russia’s Shahed production. Frontelligence Insight analyzed export data, closed reports, and open sources, revealing the scale of support. 🧵Thread:
2/ Russia has sharply ramped up its use of Shahed (Geran), Garpia, and Gerbera UAVs, from dozens of launches in 2022 to tens of thousands per month by 2025. While Iran played a key role early on, it became clear that the only country that could scale the production was China.
3/ One of the biggest production bottlenecks was engines and electronics, without which large-scale Shahed production would be impossible. To address this, Russia set up multiple LLCs and intermediaries to streamline industrial-scale purchases and deliveries from China
Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence has posted a 3D model of an unidentified Russian UAV on its WarSanctions platform, complete with detailed descriptions and an interactive view. Key details on the drone, in 🧵thread:
2/ It can serve as a reconnaissance drone, loitering munition, or a decoy meant to overload Ukraine’s air defenses. Structurally, the drone features a delta-wing fuselage, similar to the Geran-1 (Shahed-131) but slightly smaller.
3/ The unidentified drone is powered by a two-stroke gasoline DLE engine produced by China’s Mile Haoxiang Technology Co.
The DLE engine is mounted in the nose of the fuselage, making the drone most similar to the “Italmas” loitering munition produced by Russia’s Zala Group
If we focus on the bigger picture today, the overall situation is not that bad. We went from Russia’s 2022 demands: military downsizing, government changes, the secession of multiple regions, and other demands: to a much shorter list of demands today:
2/ Notably, Ukraine has also stepped back from its maximalist demands for a de facto return to its 1991 borders and the full withdrawal of Russian forces. Clearly, its stance against direct negotiations has been abandoned as well.
3/ Whether this will work or not is beyond the scope of this message, but interestingly, if you read some of the more-or-less “semi-independent” Russian “Z” channels, not just those that repeat state propaganda, you can see that this realization is starting to take hold
So far, Russia has failed to achieve any of its stated strategic goals in this war:
Demilitarization – failed.
Regime change in Kyiv – failed.
Full control over Donbas – failed.
Preventing NATO enlargement – failed.
🧵Short thread:
2/ Demilitarization of Ukraine. The Ukrainian military is now larger, better armed, and far more experienced than before the war. It is more technologically advanced and capable than ever before.
3/ Russia failed to remove Zelenskyy or his government. Kyiv remains fully under Ukrainian control. The chances of a pro-Russian party winning the next election are slim to none
1/ As I noted from the outset, based on the limited information then available, there was no “operational breakthrough”. The penetration was tactical, involving roughly a battalion-sized force. Still, it is too soon for celebration
2/ Initially, the situation was especially risky, as Russian units managed to break east of Dobropillia. I would not describe this as a DRG (sabotage group) operation or a simple raid, since neither term accurately reflects the size of the force or its mission in the context
3/ It is positive that Ukrainian forces contained the threat and prevented it from developing into an operational breakthrough. However, the scale of reinforcements required was significant. According to Deep State, the following units were involved in the reinforcement effort:
Missing Targeting Pods, Inflated Bills: An Exclusive Investigation into the Su-57 Procurement Problems by Frontelligence Insight. 🧵Thread:
1/ Newly obtained classified documents, show that Russia purchased its 5-generation Su-57 fighters for more than 3 billion rubles each;
2/ Data provided by Analytical Company "Dallas" (@dallasparkua) shows that in 2021 & 2022, Su-57 fighter jets were delivered without targeting pods, leaving them short of their advertised capabilities. At the time, the cost of a single Su-57 was roughly $42.1 million in USD terms
3/ The documents show that in 2021, a year before the war, the Russian Defense Ministry formally accepted Su-57 aircraft without the 101KS-N, an electro-optical targeting subsystem. This was allowed under Additional Agreement No. 8.