It's striking just how quickly Moscow's authority in Central Asia has collapsed. A thread, spinning off the claim by National Anti-Corruption Committee (NAC) Kirill Kabanov chair that "there is no respect for Russia in Central Asia" 1/ mk.ru/politics/2023/…
Kabanov claims that, despite close economic ties and direct aid from Moscow, "the people and elites of these countries do not extend their love to Russia. On the contrary, a common history is being destroyed or rewritten from the positions of colonialism and oppression" 2/
Of course, there is a sinister threat: Kabanov claims that after the visits of US officials, state sponsored "anti-Russian rhetoric has moved to a new level" in the region 3/
To this end, Kabanov wants Moscow to expect more friendship for its assistance, “Otherwise, why should we throw away huge amounts of money on potential pro-American traitors-Russophobes? As has already happened in Ukraine" 4/
Putting aside the question of whether the Ukrainians actually felt greatly supported by Moscow, it is interesting how Moscow is waking up to the sudden shift in opinion in CA. Kazakhstan even closed a trade mission while PM Mishustin was in Almaty! 5/ euractiv.com/section/centra…
Yes, there are close economic ties, not least with all the migrant labourers still in Russia, despite a record outflow because of the war and economic contraction. However, this has always been a transactional relationship, no more 6/ themoscowtimes.com/2023/01/19/rus…
For a long time, Russia's real strength in CA was as a security guarantor: they looked to Beijing for money, to Moscow for muscle. Indeed, Russia actually was quite effective and reliable, recently evident also in its quick and effective mobilisation of CSTO forces in Jan 22 7/
(Supporting Tokayev in Kazakhstan, who is now perhaps the sharpest CA thorn in Putin's side - there is no loyalty among opportunist strongmen) Of course, it is v dubious Moscow could repeat that op today, and that's the point as forces are also being drawn down from Tajikistan 8/
This is not so much about 'decolonising CA history' or the like, even if it may sometimes take that idiom. This is rather about hard-nosed politics. 9/
As in the South Caucasus, as it becomes clear that Russian political authority is on the wane and its military capacity overstretched, then local leaderships have less reason to case what Moscow thinks or to regard it as a useful patron, so they look elsewhere. 10/
It's not just that Putin has conclusively 'lost' Ukraine, his catastrophic bid to reassert authority there is also breaking the rest of Moscow's informal empire, and it's a process I don't think he can reverse. (Even if he understands it, which I doubt) 11/end
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Prigozhin’s increasingly vitriolic war of words with the Russian MOD over ammo supplies suggests chickens are coming home to roost after he thought he was able to prosecute multiple vendettas 1/
Shoigu is an extremely deft political operator, and one of his defining characteristics is that you rarely see him working at it. He sets things up behind the scenes and then they seem just to happen. The very antithesis of Prigozhin’s bluster 2/
Is the MOD withholding ammo? Quite possibly, for all their denials, but in the context of growing ammo rationing, this is both unsurprising and justifiable. 3/
#Prigozhin of Wagner (in)fame and Girkin of #Strelkov nom de guerre, are at dagger’s drawn now, a feud beginning to seep into the media. A few observations 1/
Girkin has emerged as an unexpectedly trenchant critic of the conduct of the war (and even an occasional satirist). So long as he was slamming ‘Plywood Marshal’ Shoigu, Gerasimov and ‘Our Unique Strategic Advantage’ Putin, all was fine 2/ spectator.co.uk/article/putins…
He has, after all, a degree of protection because he does channel the views of a substantial fraction of the security apparatus, and the Kremlin appears to accept it’s safer to let him grumble than make him a martyr 3/ buzzsprout.com/1026985/109337…
For a reminder of Putin's amateurish and personalistic approach, assuming that everything can be fixed magically off-stage, see his berating Manturov for not conjuring an aero engine industry out of nowhere. Gerasimov take heed. 1/ bbc.com/news/world-eur…
This is Putin's approach - if things are not instantly fixed, it's not because of intractable structural issues, usually exacerbated by Kremlin incompetence and corruption, it's because someone isn't trying. Do better! 2/ clip.cafe/the-death-of-s…
Surovikin, one of the most able officers they have, not fixing the Russian military's flaws in 3 months (including issues above his pay grade like taming Wagner), not acceptable. 3/
Putin's decision to appoint Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov as new overall commander of Ukraine op is significant. A quick thread 1/
Is it a demotion for former joint commander Surovikin? Implicitly, yes, of course - even if being framed simply as a response to the increased 'status' of the op. 2/
What did Surovikin do wrong? Nothing, really (in context - this is not about his morality...). Yes, there were all kinds of reversals, including the recent Makiivka strike, but there is a limit to what one new commander can do in 3 months 3/
We've heard from the Ukrainians than the tempo of artillery attacks around Bakhmut has slackened, implying logistics issues +/or conservation of ammo, and this confirms it. 2/
That could simply because stocks are low or being conserved for another op, but the Wagner response speaks to the suspicion and tension between different forces in theatre 3/
So Kudrin has taken his 'internal escape route' from the Accounts Chamber to Yandex (or what will be left of it). A short thread 1/ rg.ru/2022/11/29/pre…
Kudrin has long been something of an anomaly an economic liberal who was once in Putin's inner circle yet who has been distanced from him over time. Nonetheless, Putin is loyal to his own. Kudrin no longer had traction, but did have a certain latitude denied others 2/
His trajectory, from 'Finance Minister of the Year 2010' to academe and then in 2018 to chair of the Accounts Chamber in part reflected the way he was Putin's, not Medvedev's man, but also the perceived needs of the time 3/