Dara Massicot Profile picture
Mar 7, 2023 25 tweets 7 min read Read on X
A quick thread on the wartime pettiness of Russia’s senior military leadership – Defense Minister Shoygu, and possibly CGS Gerasimov. As I noted before, they continue to find the time for petty personnel squabbles amid catastrophic losses for their military. /1
A bit of background and then a few examples. Shoygu and Putin are friends. They go on vacations to Siberia and hunt, fish, grill. At least once Bortnikov (FSB) came too. Shoygu is loyal and knows the rules. A highly valued characteristic in a system like this. /2



As DefMin for 10 years, Shoygu ensured money flowed to the military, and I suspect, largely left war planning and operational matters for the first invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and Syria in 2015 to the General Staff. /3
However, for “Operation Z”, he and Gerasimov agreed to (or did not refuse) execute a flawed war plan largely cooked up in secret and with heavy Kremlin and intel service interference. /4 washingtonpost.com/world/interact…
Shoygu is said to hold grudges, has a high opinion of himself, understands PR, and is an experienced bureaucratic operator, since he’s been in Moscow for decades. He has a finely honed preservation instinct. /5
Prewar, Gerasimov did not present publicly as a petty or vindictive person, nor is he a political actor. That being said, his public persona is nondescript and he could be different behind the scenes. I suspect he is now changed, given the trajectory of their operation. /6
One year in, nearly all operational commanders have been relieved, moved to Syria, or possibly retired. From military district commanders on down the line. Gerasimov and Shoygu who bear responsibility the most of all are spared, for larger political reasons /7
Petty incident #1: remember back in October when Surovikin was made to give public speeches and then this bizarre video explaining the withdrawal from Kherson and asking permission to proceed in an orchestrated way? Very suspicious because…
..no other commander before or after Surovikin has had to make such a public case for big operational decisions. In that vein, was this done to lay responsibility on Surovikin, in case it went poorly? But the retreat didn’t go poorly… /9
…and VDV units that were relocated from Kherson are now fighting along the front line. Surovikin was not blamed and remained in command. If this video was an attempt to discredit or embarrass him by Shoygu/Gerasimov, i don't think it worked. /10
2: In December, I thought the MOD telegram account was being shady by not featuring Surovikin’s award from Putin more prominently, and generally not really talking about him. and turns out it was... /11.
..within a few weeks, he was subordinated to Gerasimov. Because to the Kremlin, a poorly designed offensive was preferable to a defensive stance. Gerasimov ordered the force to go on an offensive that they clearly were not prepared for. /12
3. December, Shoygu complained about his predecessor, Serdyukov, removing too many repair and maintenance facilities from 2008-2012. Shoygu has been the job for 10 years surely he could have fixed this before the war. telegra.ph/Tezisy-vystupl…
This is not the first time either: in 2019 a Russian journalist, Ilya Kramnik, was dismissed from his job at Izvestiya after being critical of Shoygu’s self-aggrandizing interview in MK. Shoygu credited himself for reforms that his predecessors executed svoboda.org/a/30182745.html
4. Shoygu also likes to look like he goes to the front , as was claimed in this video. It was geolocated that he was near the Crimean border, 80KM from the front at the time.
6.Jan-March After Prigozhin lobbed multiple personal insults at Shoygu, his family, and Gerasimov, MOD brass has worked to undercut Prigozhin. Denying him recruiting privileges from prisons, and Prigozhin accuses them of deliberately cutting off ammo and artillery for Bakhmut.
7. This week: Prigozhin claims that his representative to the operational HQ (likely a ref to Rostov) had his building pass cancelled and couldn’t get in the building. reuters.com/world/europe/r…
Gerasimov is in Rostov running the operation. It is highly likely that he or Shoygu made this petty call to yank a badge. The Russian military is facing losses of the hundreds per day, its offensives at Vuhledar were a debacle of repeatedly driving into minefields, yet somehow…
…Gerasimov or Shoygu found the time to tell someone to pull building access for a Wagner rep’s badge. Of all the reasons to waste a bunch of staff officers' time at a moment like this.
there are probably more examples. I don't think this petty squabbling puts Shoygu at any risk from Putin. Gerasimov doesn't come off great either for more reasons than I can list. What a mess. Fish rots from the head. /end
I am hearing mixed things lately about ammo supply and other support to them, so not sure about that claim, but… blocking phone calls and pulling more badge passes? Seems like a other entry for the pettiness thread.
Another Shoygu pettiness entry - finding time to giving medals to those pilots. Meanwhile their offensive has been stalling in Donbas. This will probably play well at home though, since they want to distract from lack of progress. nytimes.com/live/2023/03/1…
And another…Shoygu waits until the week of the counteroffensive to announce that all PMCs must conclude contracts with the military. Naturally, he does not offer a prominent position to Prigozhin, who takes this news very poorly… rferl.org/amp/russia-pri…
Going to park this in the pettiness thread, for the choice to only show the VKS, when its commander is still missing /detained

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Dara Massicot

Dara Massicot Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @MassDara

May 2
Ukraine recently hit a Russian training site with ATACMs. Russia says it destroyed HIMARs launchers that were moving into concealed positions. Russian recon-strike has been getting faster & more lethal in the last few months & will require TTP changes. I'll show you what I see./1
Image
Recently, Ukraine hit a training area in Luhansk w/ ATACMs. The article in the 1st tweet of this thread lays this out. If the goal was to neutralize a force grouping, the strike was successful. Only half of these missiles hit their marks; extra are used to ensure hits, but still.
Here's what I see: 1 ATACM failed (dud), 1 ATACM missed a fixed command post (jamming, or coordinates slightly off?), 2 ATACMs hit a force grouping and probably another vehicle or CP/bivouac in the trees. /3


Image
Image
Image
Image
Read 9 tweets
Apr 29
The U.S. supplemental has passed and aid is on the way to Ukrainian frontlines. But months of delay for ammo and manpower have come at a cost. Problems cannot easily be undone, especially in Donetsk. A brief thread on what Russian decisions say about their summer plans. 🧵
First, Russia’s efforts suggest their priority remains advancing to the borders of Donetsk, where they add reserve units, the VKS operates intensely, and where improved recon-strike (40-100km behind Ukrainian lines + SS-26 SRBM) is hitting high value assets / 2
The situation is now critical in Chasiv Yar and this thread from @Tatarigami_UA is very useful to describe why: /3
Read 17 tweets
Mar 29
More strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure last night. Russian forces are trying to destroy power in cities like Kharkiv, Dnipro, and elsewhere. The goal is to create “secondary effects”— to make these cities unlivable and force residents to leave at a large scale./1
“Secondary effects” of critical infrastructure strikes have been discussed in Russian military science for many years. Their strike patterns in Ukraine are consistent in many ways and different in others (for example they are not prioritizing attacking leadership locations)/2
Some power plants are critically damaged. Ukrainian authorities are warning it could be a very long time until power is restored in Kharkiv. A threat to the Kharkiv region (and prospective steps Moscow will take) is starting to come into focus for me. /3 pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/…
Read 5 tweets
Mar 21
I want to add context to Russian announcements of new units. Shoigu has periodically announced these types of changes in peacetime and then not staffed them (like in 2016). This is wartime, so it’s different. Keep an eye on it, but don’t take it at face value. A few thoughts 1/
In 2016, Shoigu said 10 new divisions would be stood up, mostly IVO Ukraine. We tracked them. They were based on existing brigades, not new units. They didn’t add overall billets to the army (red flag). They were undermanned until fall 2021 when some received BARS personnel. /2
Shoigu said last year they would create a combined arms army for Ukraine, and they did that. But then they basically lost that unit’s equivalent equipment at Avdiivka over five months. /3
Read 7 tweets
Mar 19
Delays in U.S. lethal aid have already negatively impacted the battlefield in Ukraine. These new graphics outline signposts of degrading combat conditions— where things stand now and what may come next. These will be updated as conditions change. @CarnegieEndow 1/4
Image
Image
These graphics are designed to inform the debate on how the battlefield could degrade if current challenges are not addressed soon.

They are not traditional warning products, but can be used to inform that process. (2/4)
In the accompanying @CarnegieEndow video below, I explain how ongoing ammunition and manpower shortages, and persistent Russian attacks are create compounding pressures on the Ukrainian frontline, and what to expect if resources are not made available. (3/4)
Read 4 tweets
Mar 8
If Ukrainian ammunition and manpower needs are not met, its battlefield position will continue to worsen before reaching a tipping point, possibly by this summer. This is no time for despair; it’s time for urgent action. My latest below⁩ and a brief 🧵 foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/time-r…
To create an effective strategy that capitalizes on Russia’s weaknesses, Western policymakers + observers need to see the Russian military for what it is: not the hapless, broken, depleted force that many wished it would be by now but a dangerous organization advancing in Ukraine
Kyiv now finds itself in a sustainment crisis similar to what Moscow experienced by August 2022. Unlike Russia, Kyiv cannot mobilize its defense industry and quickly scale up production; it must rely on Western military assistance. Ukraine also has a smaller population. /3
Read 8 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us!

:(