A quick thread on the wartime pettiness of Russia’s senior military leadership – Defense Minister Shoygu, and possibly CGS Gerasimov. As I noted before, they continue to find the time for petty personnel squabbles amid catastrophic losses for their military. /1
A bit of background and then a few examples. Shoygu and Putin are friends. They go on vacations to Siberia and hunt, fish, grill. At least once Bortnikov (FSB) came too. Shoygu is loyal and knows the rules. A highly valued characteristic in a system like this. /2
As DefMin for 10 years, Shoygu ensured money flowed to the military, and I suspect, largely left war planning and operational matters for the first invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and Syria in 2015 to the General Staff. /3
However, for “Operation Z”, he and Gerasimov agreed to (or did not refuse) execute a flawed war plan largely cooked up in secret and with heavy Kremlin and intel service interference. /4 washingtonpost.com/world/interact…
Shoygu is said to hold grudges, has a high opinion of himself, understands PR, and is an experienced bureaucratic operator, since he’s been in Moscow for decades. He has a finely honed preservation instinct. /5
Prewar, Gerasimov did not present publicly as a petty or vindictive person, nor is he a political actor. That being said, his public persona is nondescript and he could be different behind the scenes. I suspect he is now changed, given the trajectory of their operation. /6
One year in, nearly all operational commanders have been relieved, moved to Syria, or possibly retired. From military district commanders on down the line. Gerasimov and Shoygu who bear responsibility the most of all are spared, for larger political reasons /7
Petty incident #1: remember back in October when Surovikin was made to give public speeches and then this bizarre video explaining the withdrawal from Kherson and asking permission to proceed in an orchestrated way? Very suspicious because…
..no other commander before or after Surovikin has had to make such a public case for big operational decisions. In that vein, was this done to lay responsibility on Surovikin, in case it went poorly? But the retreat didn’t go poorly… /9
…and VDV units that were relocated from Kherson are now fighting along the front line. Surovikin was not blamed and remained in command. If this video was an attempt to discredit or embarrass him by Shoygu/Gerasimov, i don't think it worked. /10
2: In December, I thought the MOD telegram account was being shady by not featuring Surovikin’s award from Putin more prominently, and generally not really talking about him. and turns out it was... /11.
..within a few weeks, he was subordinated to Gerasimov. Because to the Kremlin, a poorly designed offensive was preferable to a defensive stance. Gerasimov ordered the force to go on an offensive that they clearly were not prepared for. /12
3. December, Shoygu complained about his predecessor, Serdyukov, removing too many repair and maintenance facilities from 2008-2012. Shoygu has been the job for 10 years surely he could have fixed this before the war. telegra.ph/Tezisy-vystupl…
This is not the first time either: in 2019 a Russian journalist, Ilya Kramnik, was dismissed from his job at Izvestiya after being critical of Shoygu’s self-aggrandizing interview in MK. Shoygu credited himself for reforms that his predecessors executed svoboda.org/a/30182745.html
4. Shoygu also likes to look like he goes to the front , as was claimed in this video. It was geolocated that he was near the Crimean border, 80KM from the front at the time.
6.Jan-March After Prigozhin lobbed multiple personal insults at Shoygu, his family, and Gerasimov, MOD brass has worked to undercut Prigozhin. Denying him recruiting privileges from prisons, and Prigozhin accuses them of deliberately cutting off ammo and artillery for Bakhmut.
7. This week: Prigozhin claims that his representative to the operational HQ (likely a ref to Rostov) had his building pass cancelled and couldn’t get in the building. reuters.com/world/europe/r…
Gerasimov is in Rostov running the operation. It is highly likely that he or Shoygu made this petty call to yank a badge. The Russian military is facing losses of the hundreds per day, its offensives at Vuhledar were a debacle of repeatedly driving into minefields, yet somehow…
…Gerasimov or Shoygu found the time to tell someone to pull building access for a Wagner rep’s badge. Of all the reasons to waste a bunch of staff officers' time at a moment like this.
there are probably more examples. I don't think this petty squabbling puts Shoygu at any risk from Putin. Gerasimov doesn't come off great either for more reasons than I can list. What a mess. Fish rots from the head. /end
I am hearing mixed things lately about ammo supply and other support to them, so not sure about that claim, but… blocking phone calls and pulling more badge passes? Seems like a other entry for the pettiness thread.
Another Shoygu pettiness entry - finding time to giving medals to those pilots. Meanwhile their offensive has been stalling in Donbas. This will probably play well at home though, since they want to distract from lack of progress. nytimes.com/live/2023/03/1…
And another…Shoygu waits until the week of the counteroffensive to announce that all PMCs must conclude contracts with the military. Naturally, he does not offer a prominent position to Prigozhin, who takes this news very poorly… rferl.org/amp/russia-pri…
Going to park this in the pettiness thread, for the choice to only show the VKS, when its commander is still missing /detained
Russia did not call off a large drone attack last night within ten minutes of the presidents’ call, and 100+ drones were launched last night from 1900 (when call ended) until after midnight Moscow time. We can step through this with basic timelines and calculations. /1
We know Shaheds speeds, launch sites thanks to various monitors, we know general routes, and what time they impacted cities last night. (Older image below for reference). /2
Ukraine said the attacks began at 1900, close to when the call ended, until 0200+. So some Shaheds were probably already airborne by 1800 Moscow time, but Russia continued to launch fresh waves up to 5-6 hours after the call ended. /3
On the operational impact of US aid suspension to Ukraine: frontline stability for the AFU rests on effective drone and artillery use. The timeline below is a gradual degradation and not off/on switch. The suspension will have other problems for soldier morale and operations. /1
Morale: Ukrainian forces are undermanned already, and this problem is unresolved. Desertions, recruiting, soldiers going AWOL for a few weeks to recover, are known problems. Suspension of aid and simultaneous rapprochement with Russia worsens these problems /2
Will to fight: Ukrainian forces continued to fight through wavering US support in 2024 when aid was paused in Congress for over six months. They are tough. Too soon to assess impact of this situation but there are negative potentials here and I will watch closely. /3
Pausing to reflect, I've now worked 20 years in DC. 20 years on the Russian military. 5 U.S. administrations and 4 Russian wars. What a time it has been. A brief thread of gratitude to those I've met on the way. /1
To friends and colleagues from the Pentagon and the shadows: as we said back then, if they made a movie about things we've seen with our own eyes, no one would believe it. Pacing the Pentagon courtyard at dawn and late night, windows all lit up, I was proud to be part of it. /2
To our 🇺🇸servicemen and women that I've met, from our most senior officers to our junior enlisted, it has always been one of my greatest privileges to support you, work with you, study with you, and understand the adventures and sacrifices of a military life. I'm proud of you. /3
There are many rumors that Russia is evacuating its bases at Tartus and Khmeimim in Syria, but most assets remain there. If evacuation happens, it will be obvious. A brief thread on what is happening now and what future moves would look like. 🧵
As of 7 December, most of Russia’s ships are in or near port in Tartus. Follow @KaptainLOMA for updates on their presence.
These ships cannot return to the Black Sea while Turkey has closed the straits under the Montreux Convention so they would have to attempt a very long journey to the Baltic Fleet, or try to find a temporary accommodation nearby at a limited number of ports (Libya, Sudan, Algeria)
One of Russia’s top priorities in Syria is maintaining base access. Syria is a critical waypoint for Russian activities elsewhere in the region. Watch for signs that PMCs are redeploying to Syria. By now, Russia probably has made its assessments and is executing plans. (1/3)
Z channels lament the loss of experienced commanders like Surovikin/Prigozhin. Surovikin has been tapped before to address hard problems like this and received awards for his Syrian command (old photo). There are politics involved now, Gerasimov tapped in Chaiko. Let’s see. (2/3)
Russia has some tactical aviation bandwidth it could surge, limited by base capacities (+ base protection capacity which has never been robust), and spare PMCs not in Ukraine. Long range strike options limited by Ukraine ops and on hand/resupply capacity to ships at Tartus. 3/3
I've returned from a research trip to Ukraine, where I met many people in Kyiv and along the frontlines. They are brave and kind in ways that words fail to capture. The situation is serious and urgent for many reasons. I share my thoughts in the thread below. /1
As officials and others have already said publicly, Ukraine is facing a shortage of manpower - infantry in particular. Mobilization has not brought relief for many reasons. More impacts in the story below. /2 ft.com/content/adbef9…
Manpower and force employment issues are challenges right now, and manpower is stretched across the front. A shortage of western weapons was not the most critical issue during this particular snapshot in time, although it has been in the past. /3