An atmosphere has been setting in Israel that expects the broad opposition to the coalition's judicial reform to succeed or force significant concessions. But I'm lost as to whether this assessment is correct, because I struggle to distinguish between reality and propaganda. /1
There is growing talk on the center-left that since the economic & military elite largely opposes the reforms, if the coalition passes it then the Supreme Court will strike it down - and the everyone who matters will side with the Supreme Court rather than the coalition. /2
Thus, there is growing expectation that the coalition will significantly water down the reform package in order to make it tolerable enough to the relevant elites and unelected institutions to prevent the Supreme Court from being entitled/compelled to do so. /3
Although this is far from the dominant discourse on the right, even some right-wing intellectuals and public personalities who support the government contemplate this scenario now, for example @Roy_Iddan and @Yonatan_Jaku. (I started taking such talk seriously when they did.) /4
Why do I nonetheless have grave doubts? Because I think the center-left engages in heavy-duty psychological warfare, which reminds me of how I felt about the never-ending stream of news in the first days and weeks of the Russia-Ukraine war. Reading news feels a lot like that. /5
The psychological warfare began with "warnings" by opposition politicians and ex-generals that the reform package could push Israel into civil war. The coalition interpreted these warnings as thinly veiled threats, and correctly so. Nobody spoke of civil war before that. /6
It continued with an economic gevalt campaign that "warned" of capital flight, emigration & divestment, especially in the high-tech sector. The coalition quickly dubbed this as "BDS", not entirely wrongly; as @ReinceNiebuhr summed up the warnings: "nice economy you got there". /7
@ReinceNiebuhr And now the prediction that the Supreme Court will strike down the laws and that there will be widespread non-cooperation with government policies based on the struck-down judicial reform. These "predictions" are also, obviously, encouragement: they aim to implant the idea. /8
@ReinceNiebuhr It also doesn't help that Israeli media isn't an impartial reporters of the reforms. Channel 14 is a right-wing channel, widely seen (rightly) as mostly just regurgitating government propaganda. The other TV channels are most subtle, but they aren't neutral either. A lot has /9
@ReinceNiebuhr been written about this, but there was no group minor enough for its opposition to the reforms to be left unreported (one highlight I remember was a protest by marzipan makers, if memory serves well). In some instances maps showing how to get to the protests were presented. /10
The significance of this is that it's somewhat hard to know how united and how determined opposition to the reform is in the unelected institutions that have the power to effectively choke it in the event of a constitutional crisis. The media certainly reports many dramatic /11
cases of wall-to-wall opposition, like that of the elite fighter pilots a few days ago. But a media that clearly took a side in this struggle is expected to report on every event that bodes ill for the reforms and stay quiet on events that point to a more complex picture. /12
Just as with the case of the "civil war" rhetoric and the "economic scare", a powerful narrative can create the reality. If everybody who matters thinks that everyone else who matters will side with the SC, then it will be likely that everyone will indeed side with the SC. /13
I mentioned my feelings over the first few days of the Ukraine war. But another helpful analogy may be military coups. When and how do military coups succeed? Why is it important for military coups to occupy major TV channels and read out dramatic announcements? Because it's /14
key to the success of military coups to rapidly create a feeling of inevitability: that no matter what happens, the coup will succeed, and that the prudent thing is therefore to not dare oppose it. This is an analogy; a constitutional crisis isn't the same thing as a coup. /15
But the logic of psychological warfare is the same. If the protests and the public reporting on them create a widespread feeling of inevitability, that eventually Levin's reforms (in their present formulation) are bound to fail, then it's much more likely they *will* fail. /16
That's why I sit on the fence about what's going to happen. I hope Levin's reforms will be moderated. But I can't determine if the people who are confident that this will happen have a good insight or are (often faultlessly) just caught up in the propaganda machine. /17-end
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In the wake of the November election results, Israelis are talking about demographics more than at any time in the past that I can remember. Why am I, a secular and (milquetoast) liberal Jew, cautiously optimistic about Haredi demographics in Israel? (Very long) thread. /1
Secular Israelis are worried about Haredi demographics mostly for two reasons: 1) eventually the Haredim will become a majority and will turn Israel into a halachic state; 2) chronic Haredi dependence on state transfers will crush Israel’s economy. /2
I will cover Haredi demographics, its influence on Israeli politics, and in turn the latter's effect on the prospects of a halachic state and of economic collapse. I think the danger of a halakhic state is the greater one, but neither is cast in stone, for several reasons. /3
A few thoughts about Yariv Levin's proposed judicial reform. I'm writing this thread primarily for my Anglophone followers. My main goal isn't a detailed legal analysis, but an assessment of the present situation's political upshot. Tl;dr however it ends, it won't end well. /1
I think that in this case as in many others, the Israeli right correctly diagnosed a problem but its is now pushing for an overly abstract, simplistic, short-sighted solution. I think the Israeli right is *correct* that Israel's justice system requires a major overhaul. /2
The right is also correct that Israel's judicial revolution in the '90s had legal basis. The Supreme Court simply began to interpret the Basic Laws as a kind of constitution and to strike down laws on its basis. The legislative branch has never given it this right. /3
טוב, אני אהיה הטרול הזה. אני מבין את החששות מפסקת התגברות ברוב פשוט. גם אני לא אוהב את זה. אבל יש לי שאלה לפיד מרכז-ימין שלא הצביע לגוש ביבי. עזבו לשניה את השאלה האבסטרקטית לגבי הפרדת הרשויות: על איזה החלטת בג׳׳צ אתם חוששים שהכנסת תתגבר? /1
1. בטח שהקטע הוא לא גיוס חרדים. זה שהחרדים לא מתגייסים בושה וחרפה בעיניי, אבל גם כיום בג׳׳צ לא יכול להכריח אותם להתגייס. אם יהיה רוב בכנסת לגיוס, ממשלה עתידית עדיין תוכל לגייס אותם. /2
2. גם לא דברים שקשורים לבטחון, למחבלים וכו׳. אם אתם מרכז-ימין, אז אני מניח שבנושאים האלה אתם לא מצדדים עם בג׳׳צ. כנ׳׳ל לגבי מהגרים בלתי חוקיים. /3
I noticed that this article by Hillel Halkin has been making the rounds on Twitter. It's one of the more doomer articles about the November elections in Israel in English-speaking media. I think it's terrible. Take a deep breath, long thread to follow. /1 jewishreviewofbooks.com/contemporary-i…
I stopped commenting on Israel commentary a while ago, but this article is so bad in so many ways that I'll make an exception. Let it be clear that I oppose this government, and I think it's bad for Israel. But Halkin's article is hyperbolic, naive, and detached from reality. /2
Halkin lives in Israel for more than 50 years, but this article amazingly exemplifies most of what's wrong with the genre of "concerned American Jewish/Zionist Israel commentary". /3
I promised a thread on the success of Religious Zionism in this year's Israeli elections. One-sentence summary: the mainstream narrative is oversimplified. RZ is no longer properly described as a sectorial party; it has measurable support in all segments of Jewish society. /1
The mainstream take is something like this: 2021 Yamina voters didn't forgive Bennett's betrayal and overwhelmingly voted for RZ, for lack of a better option. The numbers superficially back this claim: RZ and Yamina together got 11.3%; RZ now gets 10.83%. /2
Extract the (supposedly) small number of Yamina voters who couldn't stomach Ben Gvir, add a few Likud voters and former non-voters, and you get to this number. I think there's reason to think that this narrative isn't quite right, though; I'll use electoral maps to show why. /3
One of my more niche opinions is that the Israel should invest into the formation of a positive Israeli Arab identity that is decoupled from Palestinianism, at the very least makes peace with Zionism and which can serve as a blueprint for full integration and communal dignity. /1
The sense one gets is that the Israeli right opposes the Palestinization of Israeli Arabs, the far-left cheers it, and the moderate left (but also much of the moderate right) pretends that it isn't real or is restricted to a "radical minority". /2
This isn't good enough: Israel's Arab minority should be reminded at every turn that there is a route to complete, sincere and *warm* social acceptance, and that this route is paved through at the very least the passive acceptance of Israel as a Jewish state. /3