1/ Anna Colin Lebedev (@colinlebedev) has written an important thread in French on the social and political implications of the latest wave of videos from unhappy mobilised Russians. Here's an English translation. (See below for the videos.) ⬇️
2/ "Videos of complaints from mobilised Russians, most often addressed to regional governors and Putin, are proliferating on social media. They are systematically recorded by investigative journalists and volunteers, for example from @CITeam_en.
3/ The media outlet Verstka notes a sudden rise in the number of such videos. The content is always the same: 5 to 10 (hooded) men identify their military unit and their region of origin, and make complaints, while affirming their patriotism. verstka.media/%D0%BC%D0%BE%D…
4/ While videos by the wives and mothers of the mobilised focus on their material conditions and military unpreparedness, the men dispute their commanders and complain of being used as cannon fodder.
5/ It is possible that these videos are just the tip of the iceberg. We do not know much about insubordination and conflict among the Russian forces on the front line. It is therefore difficult to draw firm conclusions about the mood of the troops.
6/ What the videos highlight, however, is the risk that the Russian state has exposed itself to by choosing to mobilise: the mobilised are civilians, attached to their former lives and above all connected. Some of them find the resources to speak out.
7/ These men's stories are already frequently about military operations that "don't make sense". On their return to civilian life, they will convey an image of the war that is different from that of the media, and from that of the pro-regime "war correspondents".
8/ Even though Vladimir Putin recently promised mobilised men leave every six months of service, it is certain that the return of these men will be a source of difficulties. However, many will not return, and others will be strongly encouraged to keep quiet.
9/ We should however monitor this practice of video complaints, which seems to be circulating and spreading. This type of practice is in line with the way Russians deal with their conflicts with authority, and may have more impact than an open street protest.
10/ The Russian regime is good at controlling demonstrations and political opposition. It is not good at controlling what circulates on the Internet, nor at controlling images in general in this war. "Loyal" and connected protest can be difficult to manage." /end
1/ Could Yevgeny Prigozhin have become Russia's equivalent of Ukraine's Robert 'Madyar' Brovdi if he had been allowed to live? A provocative Russian commentary suggests that Wagner's 'civilian-controlled military' operating model could have been applied more widely by Russia. ⬇️
2/ 'Russian Engineer' writes:
"The answers to the questions are about what changes allowed the enemy to halt the downward trend in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which was clearly evident throughout 2025."
3/ "And now they're striking along the Novorossiya highway, and simultaneously in Moscow and Sevastopol.
1/ Ukraine's massive penetration of Moscow's air defences is sparking a great deal of gloomy and angry commentary from Russian warbloggers. The military-technical Telegram channel 'Atomic Cherry' warns of an escalating trend of Ukrainian capabilities. ⬇️
2/ "As an interim observation, I will note that the Armed Forces of Ukraine, for the first time in years of the conflict, have succeeded in destroying a number of targets in the Moscow region:
There are a number of statements and testimonies about hits on other targets as well, but listing them all makes no sense. The trend is clear without this.
1/ The Russian government is warning that the Ukrainians are trying to buy Russian Telegram channels that are now unprofitable after the government's blocking of the app. Russian commentators say it's an inevitable result of the government's restrictive policies. ⬇️
2/ Russia has been severely restricting Telegram since the start of April, as well as making it retrospectively illegal to use Telegram for advertising. This has been a disaster for Russian businesses, for which Telegram was an essential marketing tool.
3/ Individual Telegram bloggers have also faced a collapse in their income from Telegram, both because of the advertising ban and due to the blocking reducing their user bases (though many Russians continue to access it through VPNs). Some are now trying to sell their channels.
1/ Russia's anti-drone defences are said to be severely hampered by bureaucracy, such as bans on interceptor drones with explosive warheads, and legal liability, which makes mobile fire teams liable for damage caused by shot-down enemy drones. ⬇️
2/ Russian drone developer Alexey Chadayev looks for answers to the eternal question of "where air defence?". He highlights legal and bureaucratic obstacles that he says are major obstacles to the effective protection of facilities that are being targeted by Ukrainian drones:
3/ "A few thoughts on counter-drone defence of rear-area facilities.
1. The very fact that we have legally limited the ability to use explosives to combat drones in the rear leads to an increase, not a decrease, in collateral losses.
1/ The Poseidon intercontinental nuclear torpedo is a very stupid idea, says Russian writer and blogger Maxim Kalashnikov. He lambasts it as a huge waste of Russia's resources which is likely to be highly vulnerable to interception and wholly ineffective in practice. ⬇️
2/ Recent reports that the much-hyped Poseidon will soon be undergoing sea trials on a purpose-built carrier submarine have attracted a scathing response from Kalashnikov. He bluntly dismisses it as a very expensive and militarily pointless propaganda exercise:
3/ "I look upon the cult of the “Poseidon” torpedo with disdain. Is it aimed at complete idiots whose minds have been shaped by Hollywood and who’ve forgotten their high school physics? Or at impressionable retirees?
1/ Russia's shrunken Victory Day parade in Moscow on 9th May has been a TV ratings flop, reflecting a lack of public interest and its exceptionally short duration. Russian broadcasters report 25% fewer people tuning in this year. ⬇️
2/ The Russian news outlet 'We can explain' reports that the combined rating for the Victory Day Parade broadcast across the three main broadcasters (Channel One, Rossiya 1, and NTV) this year was only 16%. This is a near-25% drop from the 20.5% rating recorded in 2025.
3/ The parade was overtaken in the ratings by the wreath-laying ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. 'We can explain' suggests that this "may be due to the show's shortening and watering down."