1/ Anna Colin Lebedev (@colinlebedev) has written an important thread in French on the social and political implications of the latest wave of videos from unhappy mobilised Russians. Here's an English translation. (See below for the videos.) ⬇️
2/ "Videos of complaints from mobilised Russians, most often addressed to regional governors and Putin, are proliferating on social media. They are systematically recorded by investigative journalists and volunteers, for example from @CITeam_en.
3/ The media outlet Verstka notes a sudden rise in the number of such videos. The content is always the same: 5 to 10 (hooded) men identify their military unit and their region of origin, and make complaints, while affirming their patriotism. verstka.media/%D0%BC%D0%BE%D…
4/ While videos by the wives and mothers of the mobilised focus on their material conditions and military unpreparedness, the men dispute their commanders and complain of being used as cannon fodder.
5/ It is possible that these videos are just the tip of the iceberg. We do not know much about insubordination and conflict among the Russian forces on the front line. It is therefore difficult to draw firm conclusions about the mood of the troops.
6/ What the videos highlight, however, is the risk that the Russian state has exposed itself to by choosing to mobilise: the mobilised are civilians, attached to their former lives and above all connected. Some of them find the resources to speak out.
7/ These men's stories are already frequently about military operations that "don't make sense". On their return to civilian life, they will convey an image of the war that is different from that of the media, and from that of the pro-regime "war correspondents".
8/ Even though Vladimir Putin recently promised mobilised men leave every six months of service, it is certain that the return of these men will be a source of difficulties. However, many will not return, and others will be strongly encouraged to keep quiet.
9/ We should however monitor this practice of video complaints, which seems to be circulating and spreading. This type of practice is in line with the way Russians deal with their conflicts with authority, and may have more impact than an open street protest.
10/ The Russian regime is good at controlling demonstrations and political opposition. It is not good at controlling what circulates on the Internet, nor at controlling images in general in this war. "Loyal" and connected protest can be difficult to manage." /end
1/ Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov recently said (very wrongly) that "It's difficult, if not impossible, to imagine ... frontline communications being provided via Telegram or any other messenger." Warblogger Nikita Tretyakov has a list of other 'unimaginables'. ⬇️
2/ "What else is unimaginable?
It's unimaginable that just a week ago, our troops' communications relied on an enemy country's satellite constellation.
3/ "It's unimaginable that soldiers still obtain many essential items for war and military life (anti-thermal blankets, radios, gasoline-powered and electric tools, inverter generators, etc.) almost exclusively from their salaries or from volunteers.
1/ Russian warbloggers are outraged at being told by a journalist that it's their own fault that the Russian government is restricting Telegram. They argue that if not for the warblogger community, the military's lies would have gone unchallenged – which is exactly the point. ⬇️
2/ Komsomolskaya Pravda journalist Ivan Pankin has prompted fury with his claim that "endless nameless insiders, all those endless bloggers, the smartest people on earth who know everything and who have been spreading all sorts of nonsense" have annoyed the Russian government.
3/ He is almost certainly correct, but the warbloggers aren't having any of it and have responded angrily. They claim they have been consistently right in warning about the failures of the Russian military, to the overall benefit of the war effort and Russian population.
1/ In January 2026, Ukraine reported killing 34,000 Russian soldiers – on average 1,096 a day, or 7,846 per week. Thousands of Ukrainians have likely died in the same period. Last month in Ukraine was much bloodier than the average monthly death toll at Auschwitz. ⬇️
2/ The extraordinary lethality of the Ukraine war stands out in comparison to recent wars and mass killings:
🔺 At least 7,000 people are reported to have been killed in the recent Iranian uprising. More have died in Ukraine in each week of last month.
3/🔺 At least 84,000 people died in the Gaza war between 7 October 2023 and 10 October 2025 – an average of 3,500 per week. The number of weekly fatalities in the Ukraine war last month alone was more than twice Gaza's monthly average.
1/ Six months ago, the newly built Russian Navy tugboat Kapitan Ushakov capsized at its moorings during its final outfitting, when it was 97% complete. It's still there today, resting on its side, leading to some hard questions for the Northern Fleet. ⬇️
2/ The only thing that seems to have changed after six months is that the boat is now encased in ice at the Baltic Shipyard pier in St. Petersburg. It's an "endless disgrace", 'Military Informant' complains. But how and why has it not been raised?
3/ The shipyard's owner, Yaroslavl Shipyard (YaSZ), says that because the vessel "is being built under a state defence contract ... there is no permission to disclose this information or comment on it."
1/ Russian ultra-nationalist ideologue Alexander Dugin predicts that Western civilization will collapse due to the Epstein files, clearing the way for Russia and China to take over. He calls for all-out opposition to the West, and for Russia to save Iran from Donald Trump. ⬇️
2/ Dugin writes:
"The West, thanks to Epstein's lists, is beginning to crumble before our eyes. Russia and China have a historic opportunity to become the beneficiaries of the total collapse of the entire Western system.
3/ "Now it's no longer a matter of right or left, if they have a "right" like Epstein Island (or a left). It's time to end the West.
1/ Russian unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) have become another casualty of the Starlink shutdown. A Russian warblogger highlights UGV operators' reliance on embedded Starlink terminals for their vehicles' navigation. ⬇️
2/ 'Southern Front' writes:
"Significant progress in the use of the UGV was achieved by installing Starlinks onboard. The minimum equipment required was a laptop and a TX-12 remote control.
Now, after Elon sided with evil, the use of Starlinks on the UGV is no longer possible."
3/ "Therefore, the use of the UGV has once again become difficult. Unfortunately, I'll repeat the already well-worn argument: "We don't have even close analogues." Why is this? I think everyone knows everything.