I got a lot of replies and counterarguments to this, so I'm just going to add a few crucial points, on why you should NOT buy this type of insurance plan (in fact ANY kind of life insurance, except term insurance.
First, flexibility. In insurance you sign up for a multi-year payment plan. Next year you could lose your job or you have some stress in your finances. Your agent will still ask for the premium. Surrendering a plan attracts huge charges. This is a major issue in insurance.
In fact if you look at something called the 5 year persistency ratio for the industry on average it is below 50%. Meaning half of the customers have dropped out of paying premiums by this time. In #mutualfunds you get FULL flexibility. Invest when you want, withdraw when you want
Second, interest rates are STILL going up. If they rise from here, buying this insurance policy will lock you into a lower rate. That's it. Done. Lost out. In a #mutualfund, you can do an SIP. If rates (and bond yields) go up, well an SIP will average it out. You'd be hedged.
Third, there is talk about getting life cover as a 'free bonus.' But many of us already have term insurance or we do not need cover - there are no financial dependents. Also, nothing in life is free, especially insurance
If insurance is a car, lift the hood. How is the insurer generating these 'fantastic' yields? By investing in government bonds. Well, you can buy the same bonds yourself through the RBI portal or at low cost through a debt (target maturity) fund. You don't need a policy. Period.
I don't generally ask anyone to share or retweet my threads - I feel that if a thread is good, people will do so on its merits. But given the history of insurance mis-selling in India, I think an exception needs to be made. Please retweet this thread for maximum reach.
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3 year ago, I wrote about Bank of India Credit Risk Fund's terrible performance. What I didn't know was the Sebi was investigating its head of operations for withdrawing his own investments in the scheme, before the NAV crashed. Sebi's order was released yesterday
Essentially, this scheme launched in Feb 2015. It's risky bets had done well till Aug 2018 when the CAGR was 9.5% and it had an AUM of about Rs 1,700 crore. After IL&FS crisis erupted, things started looking shaky. It seems the ops head had redeemed his investments by March 2019
The big drop came in April 2020. The starting NAV of Rs 10 became Rs 3.65 at the lowest point (1st May 2020). The scheme had exposures to IL&FS, Kwality ltd and RKV, which went sour. The scheme later recovered, but after 8 yrs NAV is closed to Rs 10 implying near-zero return.
What would you do when your annual income crosses Rs 1 crore? Shipra Singh spoke to young Indian professionals who actually have an annual income above Rs 1 crore, to find out.
Middle class habits do not change overnight. Bengaluru based Rohan Chandrashekhar still drives a hatchback worth Rs 7 lakh and shops online from mid-segment clothes brands. Ghaziabad based Shubham Garg said he upgraded to a bigger home, but his lifestyle hasn't changed much.
Even basic portfolio choices - active and passive mutual funds and stocks remain the same. Akash Sethia, a management consultant says he experiments with alternatives like P2P lending and fractional real estate investing. He can afford to.
Amit makes some excellent points. Unfortunately lack of a proper central database forced us to rely on PMS Bazaar, which has a fairly decent reputation in the market. APMI, the PMS body is supposed to get this sorted. Until then, we used the best available info in the market.
I respectfully disagree with the timing issue and PMS having more exposure to small cap. We have focused on 3 and 5 yr - long enough and the best we can do with the patchy data out there (ideally we would've liked rolling returns
Yes, post tax PMS will do worse. A point I highlighted in my tweet. On regular v direct, we uses returns of regular funds so not an unfair comparison
We have a SPIVA report for #mutualfunds, but what about PMS? Using data from PMS Bazaar, Mint has done a similar study. In most categories, less than 50% of PMS strategies beat their corresponding #mutualfund category. To that, add the unfavourable taxation(tax on booked profits)
There isn't much of an argument for investing in Portfolio Management Services. They have largely grown over the past few years on the back of hefty fees and expenses. This is slowly changing. #Sebi banned upfront commissions in PMS and introduced direct plans only in 2020.
There's much talk about the mushrooming of #mutualfund schemes, but the same has happened with PMS - a vast thicket of strategies offered by each manager. Some portfolio managers have done well, but finding them a priori is very difficult. Better to stick with a simple index fund
Apparently there was a feeder fund investing in US debt launched by Franklin in 2003 and shut in 2010. Its mandate was to invest in Government National Mortgage Assn (Ginnie Mae) pass through securities. According to Value Research its return wasn't great
Does that mean the new IDFC Fund will also meet the same fate? I don't know. It was a different time, a different AMC and different securities. We cannot draw parallels, simply based on one commonality - US bond market.
Why am I excited about the IDFC fund? It is because the fund opens up a new market to Indians. It allows you to act on a view that US treasuries in rupee terms will go up or that USD will go up. It sets a precedent. We might get funds tracking 10 yr US bonds or other markets
Yesterday's #Sebi paper highlights a troubling trend with REIT and InVITs. Quick recap, a REIT pools money to invest in commercial prop. InVIT does same for infra projects. Problem? The sponsors can take long term debt on these entities while selling their own stake after 3 years
REITs can raise debt up to 49% of their assets (70% for InVITs). This debt is generally used to buy assets from the sponsor only. So, say builder A creates a REIT, sells the REIT its projects (by loading up debt on the REIT) and then quietly makes an exit. Entirely possible.
Much of this debt is long term (10 years or more) and this debt structure gets created before listing the REIT/InVIT. Does the sponsor have to live with the debt it took? The sponsor must hold at least 25% of units till 3 years after listing. See the mismatch?