One little aspect of the Iran-Saudi deal really struck me: Iran's continuing missile strikes against civilian targets in Saudi Arabia really seem to have exerted coercive leverage over Riyadh. That's probably not a great precedent.
A reminder: Iran has been rocketing the sh*t out of KSA (nominally through proxies in Yemen) since ~2017. The more recent number I could find, from way back in December 2021, was "430 ballistic missiles and 851 drones ... killing 59 Saudi civilians." reuters.com/world/middle-e…
The highest profile strikes included a couple of missile shots at the Riyadh Airport and a missile/drone strike on Aramco facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais. *Just imagine if Iran fired ONE missile at JFK airport.* reuters.com/article/us-sau…
I used to make fun of Trump and the Saudis for talking so tough while continuing to just take the beating that Iran was giving out (largely but not solely through proxies in Yemen.) Talk is cheap. And don't get me started on #swagger.
Saudi Arabia has a substantial missile force imported at great expense to deter threats like this. And they ... just couldn't use it. I understand why not, but then again I am a professor who constantly points out that deterrence is much more complicated than most admit.
Now, US officials seem to be saying that a central component in Saudi thinking was that they just wanted the strikes to stop. Here is what US officials told reporters from the @washingtonpost, @WSJ, and the @nytimes.
The argument from US officials implies the Iranian missile/drone campaign exerted significant coercive pressure on Saudi Arabia. Also notable: The campaign succeeded despite Saudi Arabia investments missile defenses. govconwire.com/2022/08/state-…
(Although, as my colleagues and I at the @JamesMartinCNS pointed out, those defenses were likely not intercepting many missiles despite official claims to the contrary.) nytimes.com/interactive/20…
Any firm conclusions about this require a much more careful examination that can only come with time, but at first blush it seems Iranian missile strikes created coercive leverage and the combination Saudi offensive capabilities and Western-supplied defenses didn't matter.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Does North Korea have a stockpile of 70 kg of plutonium? Probably. A short thread.
The new ROK Defense White Paper says that North Korea has about 70 kg of plutonium. Not everyone agrees with this estimate. I find it plausible, however. mnd.go.kr/user/mnd/uploa…
There are a bunch of things that go into an estimate like this, including: 1. When did North Korea stop and start the reactor each time it produced Pu. 2. What was the reactor's power level? 3. How often was the reactor "down" during the operating period?
This is the easy part!
The report contains two separate, though seemingly related, issues that resulted in noncompliance determinations. First, Russia has refused to permit inspections citing the ongoing pandemic. Second, Russia refused to schedule and attend a BCC meeting as required by the treaty.
There has been a discussion for some time about how long Russia could use the pandemic as an excuse to stall on resuming inspections. @james_acton32 wrote a nice thread on this in August.
Here's a fun one. I came across a declassified report referencing North Korea's first known facility to produce liquid propellants, near Manpo-up. Analysts judged the plant produced hydrogen peroxide.
I downloaded a declassified KH-9 satellite image of the place toward the end of construction in 1974 -- although there is a cloud over part of the facility. Still, what a lovely image.
Hydrogen peroxide has its uses in rocketry, but it's not part of common propellant combinations today. North Korea eventually imported Scuds that use RP-1/RFNA, then moved on to using UDMH/NTO. So I wondered whether this site is, or ever was, relevant. hydrogen-peroxide.us/history-US-Gen…
This article by @DaslYoon is bad. We've seen lots of testing of this system and its components over the past two years. While I am sure the HS-17 has shortcomings as any new missile would, you do not want a bunch of them fired at your house. wsj.com/articles/north…
There are several factual statements in the article that are either confused or false. @aaronstein1 and I walked through the modeling that @DuitsmanMS and I have been doing on the Hwasong-17 in the more recent @ACWPodcast so I won't repeat all that here. patreon.com/posts/how-stin…
As I have pointed out previously, some of the shorter-range tests out of Sunan identified by the USG as being related to ICBM development were probably tests of attitude control systems for a post-boost vehicle that carries multiple warheads.
This chart shows the trajectories, as announced by the Government of Japan, of North Korea's Hwasong-15 ICBM launch in March 2022 and the launch conducted yesterday. The similarity is why I suspect North Korea tested a Hwasong-15 variant yesterday.
To be clear, the Hwasong-15 is an ICBM capable of delivering a nuclear weapon anywhere in the continental United States. This was first tested in 2017. It's got a monument and a postage stamp.
A couple of clarifications. North Korea claimed the March 24 launch was of an even *larger* missile, the Hwasong-17, which could deliver *multiple* warheads anywhere in the continental US. They released an awesomely bad video showing the launch.