forget about SBV liabilities for a second, the real bailout story is the regime-change in the Fed's treatment of collateral:
par value goes against every risk management commandment of the past 30 years.
it turbocharges the monetary power of collateral
with 1990s shift in open market operations from outright purchases (of sovereign bonds) to repo loans against collateral (sovereign or other), central banks adopted 'modern' collateral valuation:
- collateral at market price rather than par
- haircut on market price
the logic was intuitive (and pleased German lawyers/monetarists greatly):
central banks' collateral framework must be conservative - with strict focus on high haircuts and collateral quality - to minimise moral hazard
until yesterday, in my 15 years of researching central banks collateral I have never heard one single central banker contesting this common wisdom: never, ever par value
we in Europe know painfully well how systemic haircuts can be - both for banks and for the sovereign issuers of bond collateral.
ECB used 50% haircuts on Greek sovereign bonds as a fiscal disciplinary device
imagine, for a second, that Trichet told every Greek bank tapping its LOLR in 2011 that it could get par value for its Greek government bond collateral, instead of 50% of market value.
the Euroarea would be in a very different place right now
had ECB done what Fed did yesterday, farewell my scholarship on #shadowmoney examining how pro-cyclical collateral treatment forced central banks to reinforce LOLR with market-maker of last resort
it is not yet clear to me whether the Bank Term Funding Program will mark collateral to market daily - in which case, this is a partial regime change, but wow.
Dan is right - this is a subsidy, this is why I called it the real bailout
the Fed's new collateral regime:
- all collateral owned before March 12 eligible
- fixed 1yOIS+10bp interest rate
- banks can unwind at any time without penalty (hi my mortgage lender)
Nothing on:
- collateral valuation
- no 25bn limit!
the US Treasury providing a USD 25bn 'credit protection' to the Fed is not the same as the Fed limiting the BTFP at 25bn.
It's just a 'hush the Germans' handwave.
increasingly convinced that Fed wouldnt accept par value for collateral on day 1 of BTFP loan, then mark to market on day 2 - it would automatically exacerbate bank funding pressures
So either Fed suspended collateral valuation permanently or reduced mark-to-market frequency
but then what would be the new frequency if not daily?
do you mark to market once a month and abandon the 'par value' collateral regime? any frequency threatens cliff effects
as @alexandrascaggs points out, some stressed US bank may not have enough BTFP eligible collateral - but am unclear what's the overall par value size of the eligible universe
@Lagarde you know what #CreditSuisse is really asking is Buy the Fu... Papers (especially since SNB accepts foreign collateral too - EUR, USD, GBP, everything HQLA)
why would you sell securities you can monetise at the Fed for par value?
Jay Powell/ Fed have quietly caved to Trump. US central bank independence is now a smokescreen.
not because the Fed lowered interest rates yesterday, as Trump demanded.
Less publicised, but more important, is the Fed decision to purchase USD 40bn of Treasury bills monthly.
The Fed calls this Reserve Management Purchases but it's central bank support for government debt (and for Trump's policies more broadly), a form of monetary-fiscal coordination pervasive in the age of fiscal dominance after WW2.
How much is USD 40bn? Recall the recent hype around stablecoin issuers - the companies that Bessent claimed would strengthen US Treasury demand.
These bought USD 40 bn Treasuries over June 2024-June 2025. The Fed would buy in a month what Tether + Circle buy in a year.
Rentoul doesnt know it but his 'good grief' reflects a monetarist choice of Bank - government relationship.
popularised by Milton Fridman, monetarism wants central banks FULLY independent from democratic decisions.
before 2008, this divorce was fully operational
the monetarist divorce unravelled during the 2008 global financial crisis.
central banks HAD TO buy government bonds and stabilise the financial system because these bonds are the arteries of modern finance, without them, booom.
#WallStreetConsensus & its failure to mobilise trillions in @FT
4 things missing:
a) hegemonic dominance of 'mobilising private finance' in development/climate
b) asking why hegemony
c) mushrooming scaling up initiatives
d) do we want success?
a) Mobilising private finance remains global game - (Bridgetown, Biodiversity COP16, 4th Financing for Development conf) & national game (UK Labour gov, Brazil/Colombia/Chile decarbonisation).
*The world's most powerful political narrative that doesnt deliver
b) hegemonic not (just) because Big Finance is powerful, but postneoliberal, transformative state cant get rid of neoliberal macro - independent central bank dominating fiscal.
without macroinstitutional change- How do we pay for transformation- only one answer: private finance
when Big Finance occupies the state and takes over the social contract, nurses struggle, grandparents struggle, parents struggle, renters struggle, private equity flourishes.
no punches pulled on the Commission's Net Zero Industrial Act, the 2022 attempt to respond to Biden's Inflation Reduction Act with a lot of derisking talk but no money (ahem, European Sovereignty Fund)
Climate policy is industrial policy, and the other way around.
An important reminder that EU's climate policy was once ambitious, state-driven decarbonisation.
the Clean Energy Finance Authority would subsidize foreign demand for US cleantech - or derisk BlackRock renewable assets in say, Kenya with subsidies/guarantees.
nothing in this proposal from a top Kamala Harris advisor suggests US should enable technology transfers to countries wishing to pursue their own domestic cleantech capabilities.
in #WallStreetConsensus, Global South are consumers of American cleantech, with American dollars.