Hey, if you're currently teaching micro (time for some game theory), macro (bank runs!) or even finance (maturity transformation!) you may want to add a bit about the Silicon Valley bank run.
Lemme try to give you a quick couple of slides you can insert into class. #TeachEcon
Here's the Diamond-Dybvig model, written down as a simple 2x2. Have the students solve for the *multiple* equilibria! (Pure strategies is enough for today's class.)
[I use the "check mark method" to find the Nash equilibrium]
Next, explain what deposit insurance is.
Now have the students pair off. Together they should: 1. Revise the payoff matrix now that deposit insurance means folks no longer lose $ in a bank run. 2. Solve for the new equilibrium.
Viola! They just solved the problem of bank runs.
Your students just solved bank runs -- in theory... Does it work in practice?
Pretty much perfectly: Bank runs have almost been eradicated since the adoption of deposit insurance.
(Aside: The 2008 financial crisis was a run on shadow banks which don't have deposit insurance.)
Okay, so what's up with Silicon Valley bank?
FDIC insures only the first $250k of your savings. (Aside: When you get rich, open multiple accounts.)
Silicon Valley Bank was different: Its customers were businesses with $$$, so 97% of its deposits were uninsured!
A huge outlier.
This insight helps explain why markets are worried about some banks (but not most banks).
Basically they're looking for other SVB-like banks where customers are uninsured. In fact, as @AliHortacsu shows, these are the banks markets are worried about.
@AliHortacsu All of this explains the government's response.
It's effectively promising to insure everyone's deposits. And then (if our analysis is correct!) this implies that Treasury's actions will put an end to this round of bank runs.
There's *a lot* more to be said about SVB. But this is a barebones structure for what I think will yield a useful class discussion, drawing on a lot of the concepts we teach in introductory econ.
[Paid ad: These notes / graphs come from the Stevenson-Wolfers intro econ textbook]
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A mixed bag on inflation, but at least not a big surprise:
- Headline inflation at 0.4% in Feb is a tick below expectations (of 0.5%)
- Core inflation at 0.5% m/m is a tick above expectations (0.4%)
The latter is bigger news than the former.
Definitely not terrible; not great.
If you want to look backwards, you'll celebrate the fact that year-ended inflation is still trending down, from a peak of 8.9% in June [core: 6.6% in September] to 6.0% [and 5.5% for the core].
But whether inflation is trending down now looks to be a stickier question (ha! pun intended...)
Over the past three months, core CPI has run at an annualized rate of 5.2%, compared with 5.0% over the prior three months (and 6.1% before that).
The economic stakes in the SVB bailout are whether it was worth a (relatively) small amount of money to prevent a small chance of a broader financial crisis. Folks can easily have different views.
The emotional stakes are about fairness, and nearly everyone I know feels enraged.
There's a lotta bad takes about the stakes in the SVB bailout. Even without divine intervention depositors were going to get
a) Their first $250k
b) Plus (guesstimating) 90-100 cents of each $ above that
c) FDIC would have tried to get some (half?) of this out within a few days
Point is, most startups could have still made payroll. Those who couldn't, but were good credit risks, could have gotten an advance elsewhere. And workers would definitely have gotten paid eventually.
Once again it's privatize the gains and nationalize the losses.
They're not using taxpayer funds. Just taxing banks, then using the proceeds of a tax — which are definitely not to be thought of as taxpayer funds that could be used for other purposes — to pay for the bailout.
The Treasury statement appears to claim that they've discovered spending that involves no opportunity cost. It's a miracle, if true!
There are serious arguments to be had about whether the benefits of the SVB bailout exceed the costs, but pretending there are no costs ain't it.
Our dude here is not just a creeper, he’s also a terrible economist. He thinks his experiment reveals that his seat-mate has an absurd valuation of the right to wear a mask. But he’s forgotten about this thing called adverse selection…
Think about it. Among the population of dudes willing to offer you $100k to drop your mask. Are they:
a) Guys who talk a big game, but don’t mind lying and can’t or won’t give you a penny.
b) Concerned citizens who think this the best use of their funds.
Or even just focus on those who will actually pay you $100k to drop your mask. Are they:
a) Genuinely concerned for you, and trying to show you the true way to freedom;
b) Expressing some weird kind of fetish or power trip, and so they’re trying to buy what you don’t wanna sell.
Early (premature) thoughts on the Silicon Valley Bank collapse.
It looks like a classic Diamond-Dybvig bank run, when each customer withdraws their money because they want to get their funds out while there's still money in the vault.
SVB might have been especially vulnerable because its customers were a tight-knit community. Often if you have worries, I might not hear about them. But if you have worries, and you share them with your VC, they then tell me to withdraw, and it cascades.
We've sort of solved the problem of bank runs: Deposit insurance means folks don't need to respond to dodgy rumors (you'll get paid!), which stops the cascade. (Insured accounts are getting FDIC checks on Monday)
Over the past three months, we've recorded job gains of +239k (in Dec), +504k (in Jan), and now +311k (in Feb) for an average rate of a smoking hot +351k.
Extraordinary that this occurred through a period of naysayers screaming "recession"!