The Pew survey has diagnosed mental illness, has a battery of questions about mental health (anxiety, deepression, happiness, worry, loneliness, etc), and has ideology.
We can ask, of respondents who have THE SAME REPORTED MENTAL HEALTH, do rates of DIAGNOSIS differ by ideology?
I include controls for age, race, and sex.
Here's rates of diagnosis by ideology and intensity of mental health symptoms.
As you can see, among bad-mental-health-symptomatic people, conservatives have the SAME diagnosis rate as liberals.
In fact, "very conservative" people who are in the upper-third most sad, lonely, worried, anxious people have HIGHER rates of being diagnosed than liberals!
So when it comes to people with the "highest third" of bad mental health symptoms (i.e. plausibly mentally ill people), there is NO DIFFERENCE is dignosis by ideology.
There IS a difference among people with low-to-moderate symptoms of poor mental health.
But.... that proves the point of conservative resiliency!
Liberals have higher rates of mental illness because liberals who are NOT objectively experiencing bad mental health nonetheless PURSUE DIAGNOSES.
In other words, the difference in diagnosed mental illness between conservatives and liberals has two factors:
1) Conservatives are actually happier, less worried, less anxious 2) Objectively fairly-mentally-well liberals nonetheless pursue diagnoses of mental illness
If you want to say conservatives are just "undiagnosed mentally ill," then prove it. Shoe me evidence that conservatives have worse mental health in terms of symptoms, and show me evidence that poor-mental-health conservatives go undiagnosed. It's not there.
This is the argument you have to retreat to to defend the "conservatives just stigmatize bad health" argument, but it's philosophical nonsense.
Yes, conservatives probably observe emergent negative affect and respond in the healthy way, that is, not identifying with that negative affect.
If we assume all people experience emergent episodes of negative affect at similar rates, we must ask why for some people it...
... seems to metastasize so much. Many factors, external, genetic, social, etc matter. Among those many factors, one contributor however is exactly what @JonHaidt flags: how you cognitively respond to emergent negative affect. CBT gives one particular healthy script.
CBT is not the only possible healthy script for responding to emergent negative affect. But the point is, we do know some very UNHEALTHY scripts, which CBT helps name, that basically boil down to dwelling on negativity all the time.
So the argument that conservatives actually are experiencing unhappiness, but just not reporting them, is dubious, because it presupposes that people experiencing emergent unhappiness SHOULD preserve that mental state long enough to report it.
But that argument.... is itself arguing IN FAVOR OF cognitive scripts that we know lead to poor mental health! It's an ouroboros!
Now, I am not arguing FOR repression. But I am saying that in principle if you start to feel sad for no super strong reason it is not unreasonable to try to focus on happier things and to not give the sadness power over your life by identifying with it.
Notice, acknowledge, move on, and when you take a survey the next day, ask yourself what defined the day, not what happened for 3 minutes before you moved on.
Good question. Including a control variable for metropolitan status has no effect on estimated results.
I think circulating this study so much is harmful, people don't realize the figure there is not actual data but is a simulation model, and they don't realize the simulation model was built on entirely different kinds of data than the empirical estimates in the paper.
Annual tax returns for labor income 2004-2018 (note: NOT income from self-employment, capital returns, public transfers, etc)
Data used for model calibration:
Monthly payslips and contract hours for contracted permanent workers 2010-2018 (excluding many public workers and before 2012 with lots of incompleteness)
So we're taking annual income from "all labor income" to estimate parameters we then fit to a relatively narrower slice of monthly contract hours.
And then for the graph, we just assume wage shocks are always permanent!
I would love to be able to assume that a year where my income goes up 5% means my income is now permanently 5% higher but friends that is not a reasonable model of how labor market actors operate, and I regret to inform you that studying fertility and work arrangements while excluding the kinds of work moms shift into when they have kids (flexible, entrepreneurial, gig, public sector, temporary) is perhaps not producing the world's most valid estimate!
okay, i see what @DrEmmaZang is arguing, but i think this is not a case of some kind of clever problem design but just a lexical problem.
the problem clearly asks what the ratio will "eventually" become. that is, towards what number is it converging. and it is converging to 0.5, asymptotically. hence the 0.5 answer everyone is giving. the question is literally asking the asymptote.
the correct answer to "what will eventually happen to the fraction of girls" is "it will trend towards 0.5"
now, at any given time, it can be above or below 0.5. @DrEmmaZang seems to believe (and FWIW Grok agrees) that it will always asymptotically converge from above, so any "real" society with these rules will be >0.5
but i trivially falsified this. across a bunch of simulations of n=500,000, much bigger than any "primitive" society we might imagine from the question prompt, i had tons of cases where the realized proportion was <0.5. i think the average of the simulations was probably around 0.5002 or something-- but even at numbers much bigger than is plausible for the question text, the simple fact is that you can't even guarantee convergence from above. so the answer "the share of girls will be somewhere asymptotically above 0.5" is not correct; it's easy to generate simulations where this isn't the case.
FWIW, i've literally seen a version of this problem (tho for boys instead of girls) in demo homework, and the correct answer was indeed 0.5
so I think what's going on here is 1) @DrEmmaZang misread the question and didn't notice it's actually asking about the asymptote ("eventually...") and 2) given the "primitive society" part the notion that we should assume large numbers apply isn't even correct to begin with
the correct answer is clearly "it will generally be about 0.5 girls with an asymptote at 0.5." the fact that the expected value at any specific finite number may be 0.500001 is irrelevant since, for any finite number in a primitive society, the variance will be comparatively enormous.
for reference, here's 30 simulations of 100k families. you can see that there are plenty under 0.5. for the 30 100k simulations the average is actually 0.500034, which is below the expected approximation of 0.508. nor was it even converging anywhere close to 0.508 actually.
Me and @bobbyfijan have argued that to get more families in America, you need family-friendly housing.
Today at @FamStudies , I show further evidence: first, from a new study showing how house size shapes fertility; second, in the YIMBY case study of the Chicago Loop.
A new study uses data on movers and fertility to estimate how housing costs and home sizes influence fertility. The takeaway is: they both matter!
This is what we've argued at IFS: YIMBYs tend to be laser-focused on boosting supply to reduce cost, while ignoring the size issue.
What's striking is the new study shows that although "YIMBY for family-friendly units" actually reduces prices by less than "YIMBY for small apartments," it actually increases fertility by twice as much.
A few years ago I was chewing on a graphs like these ones.
Apartment-dwelling is rising over time. But the evidence suggests that apartment-life is not great for family formation. It's hard to add SFH given land constraints, commute times, etc. So what to do about housing? 1/🧵
The first and most obvious step is just: remove any obstacles that do exist for more dense, young-family-friendly SFH. We wrote a big report on that topic at @FamStudies back in March. We tackled affordability, how to get more dense starter-home neighborhoods, crime, etc.
But as I was chewing on this topic back in early 2024, I had a chance to meet @bobbyfijan at an event organized by Steve Teles supported by @Arnold_Ventures about housing. We realized that we had a common interest: solving the "family apartment problem."
Are you online? Then you've probably seen the takes: rich men should just marry a pretty, submissive Applebee's waitress. There's a whole genre of tweet that seems to fantasize about highly available food service workers.
I decided, at my peril, to take it seriously and test it
Who is right? The online Waffle House Fantasists, or @CartoonsHateHer 's pro-girlboss takes?
In today's post at @FamStudies , I argue.... kind of neither!
To start with, credit where it's due: the pro-girlboss take from @CartoonsHateHer stands on a solid foundation of decades of work on assortative mating, which I replicate. The richer you are, the more you assortatively you mate!