We are short Arbor Realty Trust ($ABR), a Mortgage REIT focused on real estate bridge financing. We believe $ABR hid debt off-balance, faked revenue and hundreds of millions of dollars are missing. We think the stock is downside up to 67%, read our report: ningiresearch.com
$ABR owns a toxic and worthless portfolio of mobile homes called Lexford/Empirian, loaded with $582m of debt. Arbor secretly invested millions into wholly-owned Lexford but shareholders only received 4.1% of total profits. More than $159m is missing.
By hiding Lexford Arbor Realty Trust saved itself from technical insolvency in the past. Till 2017 $ABR’s book value was negative. Viewed in isolation, consolidating #Lexford leads to a 24% lower BVPS, read our report: ningiresearch.com
$ABR claims to generate revenue from escrow accounts. We believe the revenue is fake and the billions in escrows as well. Otherwise, $599m of escrows disappeared overnight. Adding up single items leads to hundreds of millions of delta in Arbor’s escrow accounts.
Fundamental information about $ABR repo facilities is not disclosed. This leads to an Archegos-like situation because nobody has basic about the parties, conditions, agreements, and risks involved in the repurchase facilities. $2.5bn of repos are subject to margin call provisions
$ABR’s net income is severely overstated. We believe Arbor understated its allowance for credit losses by $119.5m for 2022. For $13bn in loans, $ABR recorded $37m, but $4.4bn loans are assigned a “Special Mention” or “Substandard” rating.
$ABR recorded zero allowance for its $1bn in single-family rental loans despite 94% of SFR loans being downgraded since origination. The SFR loans are construction loans and riskier in nature than regular bridge loans.
$ABR’s revenue, net income and EPS adjusted for its fake escrow revenue and missing CECL allowance is significantly lower for $ABR, For 2022 Non-GAAP metric distributable EPS (which skewed positively re CECL allowance) is still $0.27 lower, past years are lower as well.
Most of Arbor’s peers trade at a discount to book value. Arbor trades at 1.2x of common book value per share. We think, $ABR's stock is significantly overvalued and median downside is 55%, at worst it’s 69%. Read our report: ningiresearch.com
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We are short CCC S.A. (WSE: CCC). Our investigation has uncovered evidence that CCC’s celebrated turnaround is an illusion, engineered through a classic channel stuffing scheme, brazen self-dealing by insiders, and accounting games to hide a rotting core. A thread on $CCC.WA 1/x
At the heart of the deception is a channel stuffing scheme. $CCC.WA is fabricating growth by "selling" hundreds of millions in unwanted inventory to a captive, insolvent franchisee called MKRI. The clearest footprint of this scheme is CCC’s exploding trade receivables. (2/x)
Since 2024, MKRI has been undergoing a PZU restructuring. Despite sales falling by 32%, MKRI increased its inventory massively (+138% YoY) and funded it through short-term credit (+232% YoY). MKRI even tripled warehouse space due to $CCC.WA inventory dump. (3/x)
The $GRND Buyout Bid Is One of the Messiest We’ve Ever Seen.
One of the supposed buyers — who also happens to be the current board chairman — is being margin called on his pledged $GRND shares.
1/x
That $GRND margin call should’ve been disclosed in a Form 4.
Form 4 requires a two-day filing deadline for reporting changes in a company insider's beneficial ownership.
But the filing for the Oct 10 sale? Delayed. Conveniently. 2/x
30 minutes before the first buyout rumors hit the news on Monday, someone snapped up 2,500 call options.
We are short Marex Group $MRX. Our research concludes it's a financial house of cards built on a multi-year scheme of accounting manipulation, intercompany transactions, and fake profits. This thread breaks down our findings.
The scheme starts with an opaque fund structure in Luxembourg. In 2020, we believe $MRX bailed out a failing volatility fund (VPF) to conceal a ~$27M loss. This crucial decision was never approved by the board's acquisition committee—a major governance failure.
After the bailout, $MRX created a new, off-balance-sheet vehicle: the "Marex Fund." It holds at least ~$930M in derivatives, with Marex as the sole counterparty. Strikingly, group auditor Deloitte resigned from this specific entity, a material event Marex never disclosed.
$COCO's supply chain, touted as a competitive advantage, is a mess. Inventory shortages have upset retailers, with Walmart downgrading shelf placement & reducing SKUs, leading to double-digit sales declines.
$COCO's private-label story is cracking. Investors expect small customer losses in 2025, but we found Costco, representing ~25% of net sales, is terminating their partnership due to supply chain failures.
We are short Merchants Bancorp, $MBIN, because, our investigation uncovered that MBIN has been aggressively expanding its loan book by lending money to bad actors that have a history of:
fraud,
housing code violations, and
running properties into the ground.
The most significant expansion has taken place in $MBIN's multifamily and healthcare loan book, growing from $529 million in 2017 to $6.6bn in Mid-2024.
Multiplying its bridge loan portfolio by a factor of eleven in less than seven years.
(2/n)
$MBIN claims to be different from other banks facing over-exposure to risky commercial property, at 411%, MBIN actually has one of the highest CRE concentration ratios in the US.