We are short Arbor Realty Trust ($ABR), a Mortgage REIT focused on real estate bridge financing. We believe $ABR hid debt off-balance, faked revenue and hundreds of millions of dollars are missing. We think the stock is downside up to 67%, read our report: ningiresearch.com
$ABR owns a toxic and worthless portfolio of mobile homes called Lexford/Empirian, loaded with $582m of debt. Arbor secretly invested millions into wholly-owned Lexford but shareholders only received 4.1% of total profits. More than $159m is missing.
By hiding Lexford Arbor Realty Trust saved itself from technical insolvency in the past. Till 2017 $ABR’s book value was negative. Viewed in isolation, consolidating #Lexford leads to a 24% lower BVPS, read our report: ningiresearch.com
$ABR claims to generate revenue from escrow accounts. We believe the revenue is fake and the billions in escrows as well. Otherwise, $599m of escrows disappeared overnight. Adding up single items leads to hundreds of millions of delta in Arbor’s escrow accounts.
Fundamental information about $ABR repo facilities is not disclosed. This leads to an Archegos-like situation because nobody has basic about the parties, conditions, agreements, and risks involved in the repurchase facilities. $2.5bn of repos are subject to margin call provisions
$ABR’s net income is severely overstated. We believe Arbor understated its allowance for credit losses by $119.5m for 2022. For $13bn in loans, $ABR recorded $37m, but $4.4bn loans are assigned a “Special Mention” or “Substandard” rating.
$ABR recorded zero allowance for its $1bn in single-family rental loans despite 94% of SFR loans being downgraded since origination. The SFR loans are construction loans and riskier in nature than regular bridge loans.
$ABR’s revenue, net income and EPS adjusted for its fake escrow revenue and missing CECL allowance is significantly lower for $ABR, For 2022 Non-GAAP metric distributable EPS (which skewed positively re CECL allowance) is still $0.27 lower, past years are lower as well.
Most of Arbor’s peers trade at a discount to book value. Arbor trades at 1.2x of common book value per share. We think, $ABR's stock is significantly overvalued and median downside is 55%, at worst it’s 69%. Read our report: ningiresearch.com
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We are short Merchants Bancorp, $MBIN, because, our investigation uncovered that MBIN has been aggressively expanding its loan book by lending money to bad actors that have a history of:
fraud,
housing code violations, and
running properties into the ground.
The most significant expansion has taken place in $MBIN's multifamily and healthcare loan book, growing from $529 million in 2017 to $6.6bn in Mid-2024.
Multiplying its bridge loan portfolio by a factor of eleven in less than seven years.
(2/n)
$MBIN claims to be different from other banks facing over-exposure to risky commercial property, at 411%, MBIN actually has one of the highest CRE concentration ratios in the US.
We are short ODDITY TECH, $ODD, is hyped as an AI-powered online-only company selling cosmetics. In a 3-month investigation, we uncovered that it misled investors about every critical aspect of its business, Some highlights below. Find the detailed report: ningiresearch.com/?p=650
$ODD's competitive strengths were described as a: “differentiated online-only strategy powered by AI-optimized product personalization.”
We discovered that ODDITY Tech's true business is the exact opposite: simple one-size-fits-all quizzes and brick-and-mortar stores.
#ODDITY's product-matching AI is akin to “a normal questionnaire,” which a former executive “wouldn’t necessarily call AI.” In an interview, $ODD's current Chief Product Officer described the product quizzes as “simple questions with four possible answers,” with no mention of AI.
We are short $WMT and $SYM. $WMTcontracted $SYM to retrofit its supply chain. It's a cornerstone of $WMT's omnichannel strategy. But $SYM outsourced its duties to third-party contractors. We see significant downside for both stocks, read our report: https://t.co/rRHneloDsvningiresearch.com
$WMT relies on Symbotic’s automation systems to achieve its strategic goals. But all products are still in prototype status, $SYM’s management acknowledged that. $SYM products lack innovation, while competitors introduced similar solutions decades ago.
$SYM self-claimed innovative breakpack system is a #farce. The system is heavily reliant on manual labor. On its Investor day, $SYM's CTO wanted to skip the video clip showcasing the breakpack solution. We believe so investors don’t see that it’s not as innovative as claimed.
#NorthernData published several press releases since the BOY, but omitted most of the relevant information.
The company missed its already lowered guidance, is sued by $RIOT for $114m and auditors issued a going concern warning
$NB2 guided 100k ASIC miners for 2022, 200m to 250m revenue and adj EBITDA (excl. trading losses) of up to 75m. They missed all of them. Only the mined BTC were slightly above the lower end of the guidance
Partners cut ties with #NorthernData which leads to a revenue decline of at least $25m. On top, $RIOT is suing Northern Data for $114m, the #Bafin and public prosecutors are investigating the company.
We are short $PVBC, a small #bank with massive crypto loan exposure. The loans are already #defaulting and share price is #rapidly declining. We think it’s a zero. Read our report: bit.ly/3OisAKH
$PVBC expanded its #crypto lending business to $138m within 18 months and yesterday impaired more than half of it. A 200yr old #bank went tits-up in a matter of months. Read our report: bit.ly/3OisAKH
The $PVBC crypto lending business was led by Paul #Mansfield, who we think, is an immediate family member of the bank’s CEO David Mansfield. Read our report: bit.ly/3OisAKH