The stories these residents told about their program were jarring.
They were working almost unlimited hours for meager pay. But since they’d been assigned their position by a match, they’d accepted their contract sight unseen, without any chance to negotiate salary or hours.
“This can’t be legal,” Marek thought. “There must be something I’m missing.”
Even after the residents’ case was over, Marek kept thinking about it.
And the more he thought about it, the more convinced he became that the match WASN’T legal.
It was a violation of antitrust law.
On May 7, 2002, Marek filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in Washington, DC, alleging that the actions of the AAMC, ACGME, and NRMP effectuated an anti-competitive conspiracy that suppressed resident wages below their true market value.
The suit went off like a bombshell in academic medicine - in part because the stakes were so high.
This was a class action suit. If the plaintiffs could prove that resident salaries had been suppressed by just $15,000/y, the defendants could be liable for damages of $9 BILLION.
Damages like that would bankrupt the AAMC, ACGME, and NRMP a hundred times over.
So to ensure any judgment snared the defendants with pockets deep enough to pay the damages, the suit also named 29 individual hospitals - including some of the biggest names in all of medicine.
Naming these institutional defendants was also logical - after all, it was ultimately the hospitals who benefitted from cheap resident labor.
But deep pockets can buy powerful allies.
And soon, the decision to include the hospitals in the suit would prove ominous.
The defendants mounted an aggressive technical legal defense - but ultimately, the court’s preliminary rulings refused to dismiss the key defendants from the suit.
The plaintiffs were gonna get their day in court - where legal scholars felt they had a strong chance of winning.
Soon, rumors began to spread that the defendants were going to attempt an end-run.
Rather than fight in court, they were going to ask Congress to change the laws.
The NYT article included this gem of a quote by the then-president of the AAMC.
(Because surely that’s what any of us would do if we were facing a frivolous lawsuit - we wouldn’t seize an easy courtroom victory, we’d call upon our powerful buddies in Congress to change the law!)
This lobbying received an especially favorable reception from Senators Hillary Clinton (D-NY) and Ted Kennedy (D-MA) - whose districts were home to many of the named hospitals.
Four other senators sent a letter warning them not to try to get around the usual legislative process.
For a while, things were quiet.
Then, in April 2004, the Senate considered the Pension Funding Equity Act.
It was a dreary, mundane piece of legislation - but it had to be passed before Congress recessed, or else employers couldn’t calculate interest on their pension plans.
But when the bill came to the floor for a vote, some senators noticed that the bill was different.
There had been a new amendment tacked on to the end.
This amendment gave the NRMP and other matching services a legislative exemption from current or future antitrust litigation.
Several senators - including Russ Feingold (D-WI), Herb Kohl (D-WI), and Jeff Bingaman (D-NM), argued eloquently against including this last-minute provision.
But it was too late. Congress had to pass the bill’s major provisions, and it passed, 78-19.
Noting that Congress had spoken, Judge Paul Friedman dismissed the lawsuit.
The Match was legal. At least, it was now.
The hospitals avoided a devastating financial blow.
The plaintiffs received an painful civics lesson.
And not much changed for residents - or their salaries.
Some good emerged from Jung v. AAMC.
Amidst the lawsuit, the ACGME announced new duty hour restrictions for residents (the “80 hour workweek” that went into effect in 2003).
Of course, officially, this had nothing to do with the court case: the ACGME had been studying duty hour limits for nearly 2 decades.
But the final push over the finish line seemed to occur very rapidly - and it’s easy to imagine that certain pending litigation might’ve helped.
Also, although residents still can’t really negotiate their contracts, the NRMP now requires programs to at least provide a copy of the contract that applicants will be required to sign before they Match.
If you made it this far, thanks for reading.
And if you want to read more: there’s more detail and links to some of the primary source material mentioned above on my site:
For those following along as we continue the countdown to #MatchDay2023, it’s now time for Part 4 in our six-part series.
Yesterday, I described how the NRMP did their best to ignore one doctor’s fight to make the matching algorithm applicant-optimal.
Today, I’ll explain why.
We’ll cover why outside-the-match offers threaten the existence of the match; how the GI fellowship match failed; and why the NRMP fought so hard for their “All In” policy.
At least say something like, “In response to student concerns that the existing algorithm advantaged programs [Williams reference], the NRMP Board commissioned a study…”
At least honor the man’s courage and perseverance with a single superscript notation of his work!
It wouldn’t diminish the thrust of the article in the least.
In fact, it would provide tangible evidence of the NRMP acting upon concerns from the community, rather than pretending as if the infallible wisdom of their Board simply prevailed and led them to do the right thing.
As we countdown to Match Day, I want you to meet Dr. Kevin Jon Williams.
For nearly 20 years, he fought for - and eventually won - a student-optimal matching algorithm.
It’s one of the great stories of advocacy in Match history… and the NRMP refuses to acknowledge it.
(a 🧵)
Lemme explain.
In 1962, mathematicians David Gale and Lloyd Shapley solved the “Stable Marriage Problem.”
By using a deferred acceptance algorithm, you could pair up a set of men and women who each wanted to be married, but had varying preferences among the potential partners.
Importantly, Gale & Shapley’s solution resulted in STABLE pairings - meaning that there was no pair of man/woman who *both* wanted to be married to someone other than the partner that the algorithm assigned.
The issue is the so-called “80/20 rule” of the Affordable Care Act.
The goal was to keep insurance companies from taking excessive profit margins by requiring them to spend at least $0.80 of every premium dollar on paying for health care.
The ACGME guidelines stop short of *requiring* patient caps… but the fact that “programs are encouraged” to limit the number of patients a resident can care for at a given time sets the stage for them to make this an accreditation standard in the future.
LOSER: Implicit bias.
Look, the devil is always in the details - and how, exactly, programs will mitigate implicit bias in residency evaluation is unclear. But for the first time, they’ll have to at least *try* to do that as part of their ACGME program evaluation.
The ACGME just released new program requirements for pediatrics - some of which may significantly change the way we train future pediatricians.
So who wins - and who loses - under the new requirements?
You guessed it - it’s time to break it down, Winners & Losers™️ style.
🧵
LOSER: Procedural training.
Gone are the requirements for residents to learn specific procedures like bag-mask ventilation or UAC/UVC placement.
Instead, residents need only be able to perform procedures “considered essential for their area of practice.”
LOSER: Pediatric specialists.
In the old days, you couldn’t have a pediatric residency program without certain specialty faculty (in NICU, PICU, EM, adolescent medicine, developmental, and at least five other specialties). Those prescriptive requirements are now gone.