It's probably time to write a requiem for the stock-'net liquidity' correlation.
Why? He dying, if not dead.
1/
To clarify, I'm referring to the Fed's total assets, minus the Treasury General Account and the Reverse Repo Agreements.
It's supposed to have been driving stock market prices since the Covid Crash. You can see the correlation using weekly data here.
2/
However, the correlation between the two hasn't been perfect.
It held from the second half of 2020 through the first half of 2021, but then faltered, before reestablishing itself in 2022.
Recently it has been faltering again.
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You can see this pattern here by looking at the 26-week Pearson correlation coefficient between the S&P500 and 'net liquidity'. It has fallen rapidly and is now almost negative.
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If you zoom out, moreover, the correlation looks shaky in the longer term.
Both have tended to go up over time, but their fluctuations haven't exactly been in sink.
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There has also been a surprising increase in the number of black-footed ferrets in the Northern Great Plains over the past 20 years, but they probably didn't inflate the stock market.
If you look at the 26-week Pearson correlation coefficient since 2004, you can see the problem more clearly.
There have been periods in which the 'net liquidity'-S&P500 correlation has been negative, and others in which it was non-existent. Overall, it looks fairly random.
7/
I'm not saying that liquidity isn't important. But perhaps this isn't the best way to measure it.
8/
One way to get a better correlation is to look at 'net liquidity' but also subtract the Fed's loans from its balance sheet.
The correlation still isn't perfect, and flips negative from around 2018 up to the Covid Crash. Nonetheless, it is better.
9/
Notably, with loans subtracted, the positive correlation can be seen for the 2007-09 bear market.
Two things strike me.
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First, there was a withdrawal of liquidity during the 2007-08 crash phase, which you don't see in the 'net liquidity' measure.
Second, the Fed had to provide A LOT of liquidity to get even a moderate recovery in stocks (assuming there was causality).
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These are just observations from historical statistics, of course, and you might be better off counting ferrets to predict what will happen next in the stock market.
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This is probably my favourite US Embassy cable. It’s from March 22, 1976, and describes a meeting in which Peronist union leaders conspired with the military to purge the labour movement. 1/
I had to go through a lengthy FOIA request to get this document, but it is now available here: .
Above all, the Americans wanted to avoid a Communist takeover. The problem was that European currencies were massively overvalued: as you can see in the table, their official exchange rates were significantly above their PPP exchange rates. 2/
Devaluations would, however, have been risky because they would have inflated food prices, causing unrest. The Communists would then have had the opportunity they needed to foment revolution. 3/
Here’s a video on “Milei and the Maddison Project: Tracking Argentina’s Decline”.
I describe my preliminary estimate of Argentina’s GDP per capita relative to the United States. It suggests that Argentina hasn’t experienced a century of continuous decline. 1/
Instead, there was one big structural break during the Second World War. I was surprised to find this, and it is making me reevaluate Argentina’s history, as I describe in the video. 2/
My blog has a bit more on the technicalities of the new estimate: . For the early years, I draw on new consumer price indices by Martín Cuesta and @clanatab. 3/open.substack.com/pub/thepoorric…
In my PhD dissertation, I thought I had refuted the “golden age myth” that Argentina was once “one of the richest countries in the world”.
In retrospect, however, I actually showed that it wasn’t one of the most developed countries. 1/ etheses.lse.ac.uk/918/
In Chapter 5, I showed that according to various variables – political institutions, health, education, purchasing power of wages – Argentina lagged behind the most developed countries circa 1913.
It wasn’t, therefore, one of the most developed countries in the world. 2/
My mistake was to confuse development with wealth.
Subsequently, I looked at Argentina’s level of wealth circa 1913, and I discovered to my surprise that it was one of the richest countries in terms of wealth per capita. 3/
The Total History Initiative is my new project. It's just a little seed, but my dream is for it to grow into something bigger. It has a website () and its own Twitter account (@totalhistoryin).
The project has grown out of my book on slavery and the making of American capitalism, which is tentatively titled ‘King Cotton and the Whale’, and should be out in fall 2024.
While writing the book, I have been surprised by how American historians tend to be so obviously politicized.
I’m a ‘left-libertarian’, so I share a lot of their politics. But as an economic historian, I still believe in the ideal of objectivity.
How did the institutionalist paradigm come to dominate the study of economic history? In short, it was because the institutionalists won the American Civil War of 1860-1865. 1/🧵
Before the Civil War, there were two schools of thought on the origins of the United States' development, which we can call the institutionalists and the structuralists. 2/
The institutionalist school dominated in the North. Abraham Lincoln became its most famous proponent. He summarised the school's point of view in a speech from 1859, in which he outlined how it was the country's republican institutions that made it prosper. /3