Ending #isa2023 w panel on “getting Russia Right: do we need to adjust our frameworks for studying Russia yet again? With set of Russia experts different disciplines Starting w Steven Hanson of @williamandmary and fellow board member at Pamela Harriman Foreign Service Fellowships
Steve highlighted (quickly) shift in how western scholars studied Russian policy making- through Soviet novels and memoirs to “transitology” focus on transit to new (perhaps more liberal), then to seeing it as “normal” authoritarian country to facilitate causal identification
Steve Hanson: throughout the last several decades, learned from all the different methods to study Russia but lack a regime theory change. Focus too much on democracy vs autocracy tradeoff.
Olga Oliker: Not sure we got Russia wrong, some did better than others - centralized decision making, gendered power domestic, colonialist views renear abroad etc. What many got wrong was Russian military.
One challenge - Russia is closing, losing important tools (survey, data)
Brian Taylor: US academic work on Russia: challenge: disciplinary standards dominate ->underemphasize area studies work. Eg focus on larger n civil war studies. Many transitions ->
economic transition, state building, national building, return to International system
Sinikukka Saari: the war highlights importance of area studies and country specificities. Notes the heterogeneity of post-soviet space (as do other panelists), Focus now shifting to security w less focus on culture, but hard to understand strategic culture w/out language, lit
Kim Marten: What we know: Putin decided virtually alone, foreign ministry surprised, did not believe intelligence. Inability to admit mistake has led to worse outcomes for Russia than expected. Brain drain and demographic crisis worsening. Clearly cost a decade plus of innovation
Kim Marten: Russia less resilient to future attacks, militarization of budget. risks rise of Wagner group, return of foreign fighter.
post Putin? Elites favor jointly management, but hard to see evolution amid personalist, unlikely liberal democracy. Risk of Egy scenario.
Kim Marten: need more research on public humiliation and rage, and perception thereof to understand new order and risks. Role of national humiliation and believes it has been mistreated. Gap in research on How rage ends?
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Black Sea grain deal extended, as hoped + signalled a few days ago, but w some ambiguity about length of rollover as Russia pointed to 60days vs the 120 signalled by other signatories/guarantors. No public signs of new sanctions relief but details may come ft.com/content/4dcc5a…
Russia signal of a shorter time may increase risk of a suspension/review. But too short a time horizon adds to transport risks, along with ongoing issues. No sign of concessions on ammonia exports but will watch for any derogations or exemptions
Also no concessions for Belarus. While not subject to US sanctions, egress issues for fertilizer still significant
Next up more sanctions papers #isa2023 Dursun Peksen on how sanctions impact elections. Finds that sanctions have more effect if shortly before elections vs long-standing and where election is in contest. Logical results. Implication: may be a window for concessions
But of course many sanctions targets do not have competitive elections. But overall, part of useful attempt to track more closely the near-term political dynamics and builds on his prior work on political/econ consolidation
Next @AndreaCharron@DrClaraPortela interrogating the many sanctions databases that have popped up. Some sanctions databases struggle to code how comprehensive measures are (targeted - a few people or major sectoral measures). They find new databases not much of an improvement
Good panel on Russia sanctions #isa2023
How is really unprecedented? Scale of sanctions less than some (Iran)
What’s new @B_R_Early combo of sanctions +private sector pressure, @DrClaraPortela rolling sets of sanctions vswaiting to see what works, much more enforcement focus
.@HanaSaadAttia willingness of senders to take on more costs sender (esp EU) @FraGiumelli larger country targeted. Preparation/pre-negotiation among sending countries.
Thomas Biersteker: innovations on tools, immediate freezing of govt assets etc.
Plus - use of all the tools
Most of answers reflect interplay between sanctions and war dynamics including role of Ukrainian message in social and broadcast media. And scale of conflict issue which exposed issues in enforcement.
Russia announced plans to ‘suspend’ grain deal w Ukraine (brokered by Turkey) not long before it was set to expire, as chances of renewal were looking more dire. military situation and recent threats, this had looked more likely but bad sign for food but broader escalation.
Russia had been preparing ground domestically for a potential exit/non-renewal for months almost since time of signing but is using excuse of Crimea attacks to suspend. Raises imp q if it’s withdrawal or negotiating tactic (last time targeted ag trade related sanctions relief)
Can’t imagine that this will go over well with Turkey or with some of the middle eastern countries relying on grain or which had been willing to operate in grey areas of trade. Also likely reflects recent increase in security issues that were already challenging trade