The most important single factor in feeding the Ukraine war is the supply of artillery ammunition (nb 152mm and 122mm for RU, those plus 155mm and 105mm for UA). I am now thinking Ukraine will get what it needs. The figures are mind boggling... 1/
In the run up to EU meetings this week @oleksiireznikov told European ministers Ukraine needs 350,000 rounds a month to sustain operations, of which 120k are rounds of 155mm needed for western supplied artillery (1.44m a year). Without that things slow right down. Now we know 2/
That EU ministers have agreed an 'ambition' to provide 1m rounds of 155mm in the next 12 months, with some combination of stripping their existing stocks (frankly I didn't think they had 1m...) and making new ones 3/
While there are some doubts about the exact sequencing of this EU supply, ie how much will be got to Ukraine in the next 2-3 key months, we also now know that a package announced by the US on 24/2 involves an additional 1 million 155mm rounds 4/
The US already sent 1.1m during the first year of the war &, since it can't scale up production fast enough, is having to run down stocks pre-positioned in places like Israel & South Korea (a risk, clearly). The other 230k needed each month includes mortars, rockets etc 5/
So what about Russia? Early on in the war I heard estimates they had a stockpile of 16m artillery rounds & rockets. Usage in the first year may have been 6-7m but despite the apparent surplus western officials are cagey about what RU has left 6/
One western expert told me 'we don't know, because the Russians themselves don't know' how many million shells are still in storage. He added that many of their stocks may be decades old and unusable. What seems clear is that... 7/
Russian hopes of buying large amounts of artillery ammo from North Korea or China have not (yet) materialised. "We don't see evidence" of Chinese weapons supply, one western official said today. And we know Wagner & others have grumbled about low supply of ammo 8/
But I think the salient conclusion is that while Russia *may well* have enough shells for the months ahead, we have sufficient transparency on the western picture to know that the US and EU are gearing up to send huge stocks incl 2m 155mm shells to Ukraine this year 9/END
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So Putin's mobilisation is underway - and it's a major change in this conflict, so it merits a thread 👇. A lot of the social media coverage focuses on the tragicomic aspects - drunkenness, the wrong people getting called up, you name it 1/
Many bloggers point out it marks the abandonment of Putin's social contract with Russians that if they stay out of politics, they'll be left alone. Evidently there's every possibility the mobilisation order sparking disorder, even resistance 2/
Much depends on the nature and scale of the call up. Def Min Shoigu initially suggested it would be limited to 300k people, and experts immediately pointed to the issues involved in training, equipping, and fielding this number 3/
Of the many variables at play on the Ukrainian battlefield, could it be that the side that runs low on artillery ammunition first will have to sue for peace? This gained greater prominence after the UA general staff suggested they were in difficulties 1/ theguardian.com/world/2022/jun…
There's been some push back of late to this idea, with suggestions that the Ukrainian shortages have been rectified 2/
And the Nato cell supplying weapons to Ukraine has also said that ammo will not run low, and noted that it's already sent 260,000 155mm Nato-standard rounds 3/ bbc.co.uk/news/world-eur…
It seems the sting of defeat, at least in the first phase of their operation, has registered with Russian elite opinion. It is producing fear & loathing, so it would be unwise to assume that it will either undermine Putin or strengthen peace hopes. A thread ... 1/
Some of the reaction like the ideologist Timofei Sergeitsev on RIA-Novosti translated here by @francska1 has adopted genocidal rhetoric and suggested the erasure of Ukrainian identity 2/
There is anger and bewilderment, after all Kremlin messaging for the best part 20 years has emphasised Russia's role as inheritor of the USSR's victory over Naziism and its status today as a great power resting on military might. How to explain the setback? 3/
I've had an uneasy feeling this week with this discussion about chemical weapons and possible Nato responses. So here's a thread. The US has been suggesting for some time now that Putin might be considering using CW in Ukraine. But what capability does Russia have? 1/
We know from the Skripal and Navalny poisonings that Russia retained Novichok type agents in small quantities, possibly made to order in military & FSB labs but certainly not the hundreds of kilos or indeed tonnes you'd need for battlefield use in air dropped bombs or rockets 2/
As Russia often reminds us @OPCW certified the elimination of their war stocks of CW was completed 5 years ago. If US intel believes a large scale Russian chemical warfare capability has been re-built now would be a good time to tell us 3/ opcw.org/media-centre/n…
Russia's main objective now is securing the Donbas, says Gen Sergei Rudskoy, operations chief of the general staff. Quite an important interview, combining a mixture of insight & post-rationalisation of the campaign's failures interfax-russia.ru/main/genshtab-…
He says that while an assault on Kharkiv or Kyiv can't be ruled out, it's now about securing Donbas. Ops during the last two weeks appear to confirm this - big efforts to take Mariupol + some areas north of there, not much movement NW of Kyiv or near Kharkiv
General Rudskoy talked about 'complete liberation of the Donbas' which confirms an ambition to carve out all of Donetsk and Luhansk districts including Mariupol, where Putin's party today opened an office. All of this is about staking out RU position in peace talks
The Pentagon judges that 90% of the Russian force concentrated on Ukraine's borders ten days ago has now entered the country. The first phase of their operation has happened and they are stalled. So what do they do now? 1/
There are clearly efforts going on to scrape up more combat units from Russian garrisons, and we've seen footage of kit moving west, but the invasion force already used most of their regular battalion combat groups, there's not so much left. So... 2/
If assessments like those we've heard from France today, that Putin plans to occupy all of Ukraine are right, coming up with another 15 or 20 battalion groups will be inadequate anyway. As the Ukrainians estimated a few weeks ago, that's a job for 500k troops 3/