If you're looking for the TL;DR on Xi's visit with Putin, it is this: China's domination of Russia is complete.
(a 🧵)
/1
I'm generally skeptical about official statements from summits -- especially between unaccountable autocrats -- but even so, the statements coming from the Xi-Putin summit in Moscow are remarkable, mostly because they are so one-sided.
First things first: The Chinese "peace plan" is a nothing-burger. Putin said it's a good place to start, "when the West and Kyiv are ready", knowing full well that a plan that leaves Ukrainian territory in Russian hands is a non-starter.
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Unless something surprising happens when Xi calls Zelensky, this is a gift to Putin -- essentially permission from Beijing to keep fighting.
It is, though, Xi's only gift to Putin.
/4
Xi praised Putin, touted strong relations with Russia, unity in the UNSC, and promised coordination on IT and natural resources trade.
And that's it.
/5
Putin, by contrast, was almost obscenely generous -- and not just with his praise.
Let's start with energy: he pledged completion of the Strength of Siberia 2 pipeline and more throughout to come for "uninterrupted" oil and gas deliveries to China.
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While that might sound like a boon for Russia -- export revenue! -- it replaces structural dependence on Europe with structural dependence on China, at a time when Russia is a price taker for hydrocarbons. That's a strategic win for China.
/7
Further, Putin announced a reorientation of agricultural trade towards China and a strategic role for China in developing Russia's far east and high north -- a move Putin's own security apparatus has long resisted (for obvious reasons). Again, strategic wins for China.
/8
Further still, Russia offered to begin using Yuan in transactions with non-Western countries. I'm not convinced this will ever happen, but if it does, it strengthens the Yuan while undermining the Ruble. Note Xi didn't offer to start using Rubles.
/9
And Russia offered Chinese companies first dibs on the assets of departing Western companies -- again strengthening China's presence in Russia, with no reciprocal strengthening of Russia's presence in China.
/10
To be clear, there are situational benefits for Moscow in each of these things, and in others. But I'm struggling to come up with something that Xi wants from Putin that he didn't get -- and the list of things Putin wants from Xi and didn't get is considerable.
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While there were undoubtedly agreements we are not meant to know about, there is no indication here of a significant increase in military support for Russia -- nor even of a willingness on Xi's part to ramp up diplomatic support. A swing and a miss for Putin.
/12
While Putin offered privileged positions and subsidies, Xi didn't exactly come bearing investment. The most he put on the table economically was trade facilitation.
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Rhetorically, too, the summit was lopsided. Putin praised Xi's successes in China and its leading role in the world. Xi said that Putin was a reliable partner.
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Even Xi's endorsement of Putin's electoral chances in 2024 was, frankly, humiliating (coming from a man who doesn't even have to pretend to win an election).
Putin greeted Xi with a rhetorical bear hug. Xi gave Putin a pat on the head and told him to run along now and play.
/15
This summit, then, brings home exactly how much Putin has lost. Prior to the war -- even after 2014 -- Putin occupied a position of strategic maneuverability. He could arbitrage between east and west, reaping windfalls for his regime along the way.
That's all gone now.
/16
Putin tells his people he's fighting for Russia's sovereignty. In truth, he's mortgaged the Kremlin to Beijing.
The question now is one for Xi: What will he do with his newest acquisition?
/END
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My two kopecks on the ICC's indictment of Putin:
For policymakers in Europe, the “global south” and Russia’s own commanding heights, the inescapable new reality is this: there is no future with Putin.
The decision puts paid to conversations about returning to the status quo ante for as long as Putin reigns. That should have an immediate impact on the approach to the war: with no prospect of doing business with Putin, there is no reason to hedge. Putin has no face left to save.
At home, Putin has managed elite dissatisfaction by incentivizing nervous elites to wait things out. Putin’s new, formal status as an indicted war criminal, with all its attendant political consequences in Europe and beyond, means there’s no longer anything for which to wait.
"You remind us that freedom is priceless," @POTUS said when he went to Kyiv this week. "It’s worth fighting for for as long as it takes."
I agree with that -- and I don't.
(A 🧵)
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Before I get started, a note: I'm breaking with tradition and summarizing here this morning's TL;DRussia Weekend Roundup. For the full argument, context, readings and more, see the (free) newsletter here: tldrussia.substack.com/p/tldrussia-we…
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“As long as it takes” is now the common Western refrain, and rightly. Ukraine should know, as should Moscow, that Western resolve will not wane. But “as long as it takes” might also be read to mean that we’re not in a hurry — and that would be a mistake.
/3
He could have laid out an agenda for a wartime economy and social solidarity, but he didn’t. He could have clarified his war aims, but he didn’t. He could have made explicit escalatory threats, but he didn’t.
(A short 🧵)
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As I’ve said before, Putin’s speeches are designed to do three things: provide rhetorical room for maneuver, galvanize domestic audiences, and disorient foreign audiences. They are not designed to be actually informative.
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This speech fits that mold: it justifies continuing the war without specifying strategic aims, it stokes an amorphous fear of the US/NATO among Russians, and it tries — vaguely — to make Washington worry about nuclear arms control.
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Better late than never, Navalny’s political manifesto. Hits a lot of crucial notes — especially on Ukraine. meduza.io/feature/2023/0…
Ukraine, he says, must be restored to its 1991 borders, and thereafter “left in peace to develop how its people desire”. Further, after withdrawing entirely, Russia must work with Ukraine and the west to provide due compensation and reparations. War crimes must be prosecuted.
On the domestic front, Navalny re-ups his call for constitutional reform and the creation of a parliamentary republic. He rejects the idea of an inescapable Russian imperialism, argues for the possibility of a democratic future.
Time for another encounter between my head and a brick wall.
The problem with arguments like these about the potential of a breakup of the Russian Federation is that they substitute imagination and emotion for analysis.
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The author is right that we should be prepared for a multiplicity of plausible scenarios, and that among those should be Russian disintegration. But saying “Russia might fall apart” over and over again does not make us more prepared.
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Preparation requires understanding what the mechanisms and outcomes of such disintegration might look like — and it’s there that the disintegration argument founders.
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I'm not one for making predictions, so no previews of 2023 from me (not that anyone was waiting with bated breath). Nor do I have much to offer in the way of reviewing the year gone by.
I do, however, have some questions for the coming year, and some resolutions.
(A 🧵)
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The best summary of 2022 I can muster is a few sentences I wrote for @gridnews back in December:
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Other, however, have done better. I'd direct your attention in particular to @ruth_deyermond...