Because when the US Military is talking heavy fuel trucks. It is talking about these.⬇️
It's talking M978 HEMTT fuel trucks with tank rack modules. @battle_order has a nice video explaining moving fuel with them.
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There is also the possibility that the palletized loading truck variant of the HEMETT might be used with just tank rack based modular fuel system.
I doubt it, because the older M978 HEMTT fuel trucks with shorter service life are available for shipment to Ukraine.
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What is really interesting for me is that possibilities of the M978 fuel truck combined with AMX-10RC. Which has twice the road speed and well over two times the road range of a Leopard 2A4 or a Challenger 2 tank.
See the Task & Purpose YouTube⬇️ 4/
If Ukraine can use it's new Western tanks to open a hole in the Russian line to tactical depths.
The presence of AMX-10RC & Strykers means they can push through an operational maneuver group deep into the Russian operational depths in hours.
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Now before people make all the usual harrumph's about Ukrainian combined arms tactics and lack of recon.
I'm going to point them to these puppies used by Ukrainian Special Forces for deep recce, partisan support and GMLRS spotting.
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Strategy page -dot- com had a really nice May 2022 article titled "Special Operations: Cossack Revival" giving a deep history of ATV use in Western Special forces that Ukrainian 'neo-Cossacks' picked up and ran with.
And just as these light motorized recon units will had local partisan "road watchers" as guides to assist with their movements during the Kharkiv offensive in Sept 2022.
Any future Ukrainian offensives will have similar support.
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And Kharkiv wasn't the first time the Ukrainians pulled this off.
In the dark days of March 2022, the Ukrainians slipped company-sized BTR-3 & BTR-4 based raiding forces into the Russians’ rear areas to take out the bridges required to supply the Russian set-piece attacks
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...being prepared for Kyiv.
It didn't stop the Russians then, but it did force them to garrison bridges and do escorted truck convoys on main supply routes and abandon the occupation of secondary roads for Ukrainian 'road watchers' to provide those raiding companies
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...'steers' onto routes that avoided Russian forces.
An AMX-10RC plus Stryker column supported 122mm Grad launchers, M978 fuel trucks, AN/TVK-1/M1097 Avenger and
...maybe a "Crotale NG" is going to be an operationally mobile force versus Russian VKS force interdiction attempts for the first three days of an exploitation.
Given 'neo-Cossack ATV intel', such a force can ravage Russian artillery logistics 13/
...laterally within the GMLRS range foot print of the Ukrainian front lines.
Thus unhinging long sections of Russian front line fortifications due to the extermination of the logistics providing Russian artillery support.
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Even more important, such lateral exploitations movement can also exterminate a large area of Russian S-300/Buk SAM coverage behind Russian lines via those 122mm Grad rockets I mentioned this column would be motoring along with them.
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The ability of a AMX-10RC to exploit a breakthrough with a thermal site equipped 105mm gun far exceeds something like a armored Humvee with a pintle .50 caliber HMG and a few AT-4 rockets like was seen during Ukraine's Kharkiv offensive.
" However, the first three M26s that were rushed to Korea from the Tokyo Ordnance Depot had chronic problems, especially overheating engines and defective fan belts."
The following link gives a specific for what happened.
3/9
Senior Lieutenant Andriy Rudykof the Center for the Research of Trophy and Prospective Weapons and Military Equipment of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Presented this briefing:
"TANK T-90M - FAILURE INSTEAD OF A BREAKTHROUGH"
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The people over at 4Chan provided a summary translation, which I will drop over the next several tweets
1. Big focus on propaganda – especially “high-tech” factor 2. Even official specifications for the tank (3:40) bring the Russian claims in questions 2/ boards.4channel.org/k/thread/57514…
3. T-90M is de facto an extensive modernization of T-72B obr. 1989 with some design solutions borrowed from NATO tanks (including “Nakidka”)
4. AFU got a chance to analyze a T-90M captured in September 2022
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I've been hearing from various people of this Russian officer operational pattern of taking a a hundred or so Mobiks to the front line and abandoning them (Mobik description - "F--king off") as they attack Ukrainian positions since November 2022.
This is a customer review of the cataract surgical practice that I was supposed to get my left eye cataract removed by today.
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DO NOT GO HERE. Masks are a contentious issue, but a business should be upfront about their policies.
I made VERY clear, every time... 1/5
I came here (3 appointments) that I would need to wear an n95 mask during my cataract surgery. The anesthesiologist said this would be fine, and even offered to mask themselves, but didn't know if they still had enough n95's. I offered to supply them, and they said ok.
2/5
When I got to the surgical center, they said I would only be allowed to wear a surgical mask.
They refused the masks we brought (sealed, individually packaged n95's).
>>we'll call it a win by throwing copium and cyber lightning bolts at the problem while hand-waving away all the thorny details."
I disagree.
There are a lot of new Ukrainian weapon, logistical & Russian vehicle & force design reasons to
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@maphumanintent ...think the Russian Army currently lacks the communications and mobility to stop a Ukrainian breakthrough attack.
Looking at the vehicle/force design reasons, the statement:
"The firepower of the Russian Army is in it's vehicles," pretty much covers it.
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@maphumanintent All the best Russian digital spread-spectrum & frequency hopping radios were in its newest vehicles. Most of whom have been destroyed in the last year of fighting.
This leaves Russian artillery with older Cold War generation radios, 3G cell phones or Chinese commercial...
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