Tom Shugart Profile picture
Mar 21, 2023 12 tweets 4 min read Read on X
3-ish years ago, I put up this thread on the growth of the Chinese PLA Navy, calculating the total tonnage of warships launched during a 5-year period & comparing it to the numbers for the USN & allied/partner navies.
Looks to me like it's about time for an update.
The previous thread covered the warships China launched from 2015-2019. This update will cover 2018-2022. The PLA Navy took a bit of a breather in its destroyer and frigate construction for a couple of years, so the numbers could be interesting. Did they still outbuild the USN?
In terms of hull count, the total launched dropped to 75 from 86 in the previous count.
Note: these numbers are from open source data for ship launches, which China doesn't always publicize like the USN, so don't @ me if you have a niggle with them. It's the best I could find. 🤷‍♂️
By my count, the USN launched 35 warships during the same timeframe. 😐
"Ah", you say, "but Chinese warships are on average much smaller, so the USN probably outbuilt them on a tonnage basis this time!"
Not so much. The PLA Navy again outbuilt the USN by tonnage, about 580K tonnes compared to about 430K for the USN, or about 1/3 more.
Let's consider, too, the USN has worldwide responsibilities, with roughly 60% of forces allocated to the Pacific—unlike (for now) the PLAN. By that measure, new US warships available for the Pacific would be closer to 260,000 tons, or less than 1/2 what the PLAN built.
But what about US allies and partners (e.g., "the Quad") across the Indo-Pacific. Surely our combined maritime power will continue to dwarf the PLAN!

The Quad's shipbuilding tonnage (w/ the US Pacific Fleet's allocation)? A bit under 430K tons
And once again, as seaborne-trade-dependent ally/partner nation policymakers consider the rise of the PLAN and what it could mean to them, they might want to consider this: the combined tonnage launched by the main non-US Indo-Pacific navies? About 230K tons.
As I said last time, given that the PLAN is a unitary force & that coalitions introduce inefficiencies, what seems clear to me is that were the US to be driven from the region, or to reduce its commitments due to lack of regional support, well...
None of this data captures the recent resurgence in PLA destroyer building, with at least 7 likely to launch in 2023...
Or the apparent commencement of construction of a new, larger class of Type 054B frigate. navalnews.com/naval-news/202…
So as I said 3 years ago to close things out, I'll say again that unless we change the trajectory of things...

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More from @tshugart3

Apr 20
In the "you can't make this stuff up" category, in this 16 Apr image of COMEC's Longxue shipyard in Guangzhou you can see 5 of China's new Shuiqiao-class "invasion barges", whose only apparent purpose is to invade Taiwan, as well as... Image
...based on AIS data, what also appears to be a container ship under construction for a TAIWANESE Company, Evergreen Lines.

(and a couple of Zubr-class assault hovercraft, PLA Navy auxiliaries, and more.) Image
Image
To be clear, this sort of thing has been talked about before, even in Taiwan: taipeitimes.com/News/front/arc…
Read 8 tweets
Apr 18
A few interesting tidbits from INDOPACOM Commander Admiral Paparo's recent testimony. First, he puts China's warship production at a ratio of "6-to-1.8" to ours, or about 3.3 to 1. Image
This exceeds any of my estimates, which usually run a bit over 2-to-1 in hull count, and about 1.5-1 in tonnage.
Makes me wonder if there are PLAN ships I missed, or perhaps he's counting only surface combatants? Not sure.
On the topic of SLCM-N, he gives a full-throated endorsement. Of note, this is not the STRATCOM commander, but the theater commander that might actually need to use something like this (or have it to deter the other side's use of something similar). Image
Read 13 tweets
Mar 20
Hot off the presses: I'm pleased to announce the release of this @ChinaMaritime Note covering China's new Shuiqiao landing barges, which I co-authored with Michael Dahm. I hope that folks find it a useful source of info on this important new development. digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/14/
@ChinaMaritime Some highlights: first, our key takeaways. Image
@ChinaMaritime Next, we found patents for these or similar barges in filings from several years ago. In other words, this project has been in the works for a while now - not a reaction to the 2022 Pelosi visit, or the DPP's election win, etc. (not that I ever thought it was). Image
Image
Read 9 tweets
Mar 13
UPDATE: three of the PRC's new landing ships (I called them T-LPTs) have left the GSI Longxue shipyard. 🚨🚨🚨
In this 9 March image, we can see that three of the LPTs have left (numbers 6, 2, and 1 from the previous thread).

As such, one 4-, one 6-, and one 8-pillar LPT have departed, with one of each still under construction. Image
Image
Image
After seeing the departure of these vessels, I went back & observed AIS data to see if the vessels were using AIS.
What I saw was indications of tugs getting these ships underway, but no AIS from the ships themselves, unlike other commercial vessels.
marinetraffic.com/en/ais/home/ce…
Read 10 tweets
Feb 13
@rand recently published this piece by Dr. Timothy Heath, in which he voiced substantial doubts about the PLA's combat readiness. It's received a fair bit of attention since then.

Having read it & examined the evidence he cites, I have some thoughts: Image
NOTE: if this thread looks familiar, it's because I put it up yesterday with a link to the article at the top. I'm re-upping it today as ab experiment to see if there's a difference in reach from not putting the link at the top (plus I'll fix some typos).
rand.org/pubs/perspecti…
Anyway, let's look at his key takeaways:
- the PLA is focused on upholding CCP rule rather than preparing for war
- PLA modernization is mostly to bolster CCP credibility
- over the PLA’s history it's prioritized political loyalty & CCP rule over combat readiness
- As China declines, the PLA’s mission of upholding CCP rule will become more important, combat readiness less so
- large-scale, high-intensity US-PRC war is improbable. If US-PRC tensions escalate, China will face strong incentives to favor indirect methods
- US defense planning elevate a broader array of threats versus remote possibility of war w/ ChinaImage
Read 40 tweets
Feb 12
@rand recently published this piece by Dr. Timothy Heath, in which he voiced substantial doubts about the PLA's combat readiness. It's received a fair bit of attention since then.

Having read it & examined the evidence he cites, I have some thoughts:
rand.org/pubs/perspecti…
First, let's look at his key takeaways:
- the PLA is focused on upholding CCP rule rather than preparing for war
- PLA modernization gains are designed first/foremost to bolster the credibility of the CCP
- over the PLA’s history, it's prioritized political loyalty and CCP rule over combat readiness
- As China declines, the PLA’s mission of upholding CCP rule will become more important, its combat readiness less so
- large-scale, high-intensity US-PRC war is improbable. If US-PRC tensions escalate, China will face strong incentives to favor indirect methods
- US defense planning should consider a threat framework that elevates a broader array of threats versus the remote possibility of war with ChinaImage
It will surprise no one who follows me that, while some of his points on the history of the PLA and CCP are valid, I disagree with his larger overall conclusion: that the threat of military aggression from the PLA in the future is remote due to a lack of combat readiness.
Read 37 tweets

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