3-ish years ago, I put up this thread on the growth of the Chinese PLA Navy, calculating the total tonnage of warships launched during a 5-year period & comparing it to the numbers for the USN & allied/partner navies.
Looks to me like it's about time for an update.
The previous thread covered the warships China launched from 2015-2019. This update will cover 2018-2022. The PLA Navy took a bit of a breather in its destroyer and frigate construction for a couple of years, so the numbers could be interesting. Did they still outbuild the USN?
In terms of hull count, the total launched dropped to 75 from 86 in the previous count.
Note: these numbers are from open source data for ship launches, which China doesn't always publicize like the USN, so don't @ me if you have a niggle with them. It's the best I could find. 🤷♂️
By my count, the USN launched 35 warships during the same timeframe. 😐
"Ah", you say, "but Chinese warships are on average much smaller, so the USN probably outbuilt them on a tonnage basis this time!"
Not so much. The PLA Navy again outbuilt the USN by tonnage, about 580K tonnes compared to about 430K for the USN, or about 1/3 more.
Let's consider, too, the USN has worldwide responsibilities, with roughly 60% of forces allocated to the Pacific—unlike (for now) the PLAN. By that measure, new US warships available for the Pacific would be closer to 260,000 tons, or less than 1/2 what the PLAN built.
But what about US allies and partners (e.g., "the Quad") across the Indo-Pacific. Surely our combined maritime power will continue to dwarf the PLAN!
The Quad's shipbuilding tonnage (w/ the US Pacific Fleet's allocation)? A bit under 430K tons
And once again, as seaborne-trade-dependent ally/partner nation policymakers consider the rise of the PLAN and what it could mean to them, they might want to consider this: the combined tonnage launched by the main non-US Indo-Pacific navies? About 230K tons.
As I said last time, given that the PLAN is a unitary force & that coalitions introduce inefficiencies, what seems clear to me is that were the US to be driven from the region, or to reduce its commitments due to lack of regional support, well...
None of this data captures the recent resurgence in PLA destroyer building, with at least 7 likely to launch in 2023...
I’m excited to share that @ChinaMaritime has just released a short paper I co-wrote with Mike Dahm titled “Flooding the Zone: The Use of Civilian Landing Craft (LCTs) in PLA Amphibious Operations”.
This paper follows the surprising observation last year that the PLA appears to be using civilian “LCTs” - a civilian derivative of WWII landing craft - to go straight to the beach in practice landing exercises.
...first up, China's nuclear warhead totals. This year's report says that warhead production has slowed, with a total in the low 600s, but that the PLA is still on track to have 1000+ warheads by 2030.
Regarding China's early warning capability, we get a lot more specificity than I've seen before: that China now has IR warning satellites that can detect and warn of an incoming ICBM within minutes.
Last week saw the release of the 2025 China Military Power Report (CMPR). For those not familiar, this is DoD’s Congressionally-mandated unclassified update on the Chinese military. It’s an annual feast of open-source data.
So, here are few thoughts (Part 1) on the report:
I'll focus on those things that I thought were most noteworthy: significant changes from previous reports, reveals of information not previously seen in the open-source world, etc.
Where there is a point of comparison I'll have the new report on the left, older on the right.
The new report is fairly different: for one thing, it clocks in at 100 pages to the previous report's 182.
From the top, the preface differs: the 2024 report's reads mostly like an intel product, where there's more proclamation of administration policy in the new one.
PRC SEALIFT UPDATE: based on a review of satellite imagery & AIS data from recent landing exercises, it appears China is practicing using dual-use civil-military landing craft for direct beach assault.
Of note, while info is sparse, these ships appear to exist in large numbers.
To the details: for a few years now, we've seen what've been known as "deck cargo ships" being used in PLA military transport exercises.
This has been making the rounds—another article calling for U.S. conventional submarines—so I suppose it's time to weigh in. In this case, the article is written by someone personally knowledgeable of submarine operations—a U.S. submariner.
...the article seems to be missing consideration of two key factors that IMO continue to make the idea of U.S. (manned) diesel-electric submarines a bad idea: advances in autonomy, and the PLA Rocket Force.
First, autonomy: he explicitly calls for these diesel boats as cruise missile platforms (SSGs), making a point to separate them from the multi-mission capabilities of U.S. SSNs.
No need for ISR, ASW, or torpedo capability. Ok, great—this sounds like a perfect job for an XXLUUV.
She's pretty clear about how we got where we are: close to a US-PRC war, that the problem started with Taiwan.
She says the situation is not pre-ordained, and that the best way to avoid a war is to restrain US military posture in the region and tell Taiwan they may be on their own.
(I'd say she's half-right: it didn't have to be this way; but I'd place the blame elsewhere.)