" However, the first three M26s that were rushed to Korea from the Tokyo Ordnance Depot had chronic problems, especially overheating engines and defective fan belts."
The following link gives a specific for what happened.
3/9
"Three M26 Pershing tanks founded in an ordnance depot in Japan were hurriedly rebuilt & sent to Korea. In their first engagement around Chinji on July 28, all three of the Pershing tanks were abandoned after overheating due to incorrect fan belts" 4/9 mikesresearch.com/2019/11/30/us-…
The Ford engine on the M26 Pershing was the same as the Sherman for a tank weighing 10 tons more.
A new M26 ran very hot and ate new fan belts at a far higher rate than the Sherman as a result of dealing with the extra heat of a redlined 500hp engine.
4/9
The engines on these 1950 M26's were not new and their rubber fan belts had dry rotted in the 5-years since WW2.
The Tokyo Ordinance Depot did its best to kludge fan belts for these tanks.
The problem is kludges are not as good as new fan belts and there were no spares.
5/9
So three M26 tanks were lost not only for the lack of fan belts.
But also for the lack of trained drivers who knew enough to nurse these tanks to preserved the life of the fan belts they did have.
6/9
There is no way that the Russian T-55's heading for Ukraine in 2023 are going to be in any better shape in terms of consumable rubber seals & fan belt spares or trained crew skills than those M26 Perishing's were in 1950.
If the American M3 Grant tank was the "Coffin for seven brothers."
The Russian T-55 being sent to Ukraine will be the "Immobile coffin for four Mobiks."
8/9
If only because T-55's are facing a completely different threat environment that needs daily relocating & thermal camouflage nets without the spares to move, the camouflage to use & Mobik crews who lack the skills to use them even if they had them
The statistical comparison in the FBI data from pre-1961 is invalid as the underlying medical systems have so changed as to utterly pollute the "murders per 100,000" data.
Violent crime data pre-1961 and post 1961 are apples to oranges comparisons.
2/
-Trauma care centers (1961),
-Standardized trauma procedures (1978),
-Adoption of military Korea/Vietnam medical emergency treatment & air transport procedures,
-Improved triage (1986)
-And (since 2011) widespread adoption and use of blood clotting bandages...
3/
Chairman Xi suffers from the traditional dictator's trap of believing his own sh*t because he has made it too dangerous for his cronies and underlings to tell him the truth.
Thanks to that, Chairman Xi's Regime has pretty much no resilience in adversity because it's so kleptocratic and it's all about what the guy in charge can do for his next set of corrupt cronies today.
2/
This 1970's comment about the Shah of Iran is so historically on point in 2026 because it shows how Xi's regime is failing "The dictator on the wall test."
This map of 124 Russian railway electric traction stations and the 40K OWA drone fired in 2025 demonstrates the political-military leadership failure of the Zelinskyy government.
Like Stalin's failed winter 1941-1942 counter offensives against Nazi Army Group Center,
...Ukraine is penny packing OWA drones everywhere to no great effect based on which military "Union" faction was last in the room with President Zelenskyy before a decision
Even Ukraine's vaunted oil offensive is a bare plurality of total drone strikes 2/
The latest @RyanO_ChosenCoy thread detailing the bureaucratic issues of Ukraine's military in targeting Russian logistics makes clear Ukraine's military has inter-service and intra-service union/factional disputes that are positively American in scale.
If the target of a US "rapid strike" was either the Kharg Island oil export facility or Iran's banking/financial system with a combination of explosives and non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse munitions, the Mullahs will fall.
There are two real courses of action (COA) for an American air campaign if Regime Change is the goal.
The Schwerpunkt - political center of gravity - of the Mullah regime is its ability to pay for the use Regime Security Forces & foreign hired mercenaries.
This is one of the 3 major strategic mistakes of the Zelenskyy Government.⬇️
Putin has shown better, more consistent, and more effective leadership in the strategic bombing of Ukrainian electrical infrastructure than Zelinskyy has in striking Russia's railways.
Russia remains uniquely vulnerable to a focused drone strike campaign on it's electrical railway traction step down transformers.
Zelenskyy's leadership not only ignored hitting that unique Russian vulnerability since Feb. 2022.
See the figure below⬇️
2/
To give you an idea of the abject political-military failure of the Zelenskyy government in this regard one has to look at the industrial supply chain for those traction substations.
The Soviet Union had two major transformer factories: Tolyatti and Zaporozhye.
3/