Reflects the broad spectrum #spyware harms happen.
But *also* and critically, situations where vendors should expect that their product, once sold, will inevitably be abused.
#Pegasus factor: Ouch. NSO again would get dinged.
7/ I initially expected #SpywareEO to look like a allow/deny aka "blacklist" of spyware sellers..
But the EO's conduct based definitions = constant shell game of vendors corporate identities is blunted.
Even applies to companies that haven't been formed yet.
Probably better.
8/ Lots of spyware companies absolutely know what they are doing.
What's especially interesting is the term "remove" to describe risks.
Not the milquetoast & unverifiable "mitigate."
#SpywareEO is saying: cancel the contracts & more.
And you may still be toast. Do it now.
9/ Reports in the past that USG entities may have occasionally facilitated spyware purchases / acquisition by other governments.
If the #SpywareEO abuse/natsec/counterintelligence triggers are met... that door now closes.
10/ How does the USG know if #spyware vendors hit the #SpywareEO's triggers?
The EO contains a robust set of reporting requirements around misuses from the Intel community & procurement reporting.
Seems intended to prevent vendors from slipping through the cracks.
11/ Use of the "operational use" term is interesting.
And creates carve outs for things like testing & analysis.
Analogy: USG can buy an anti-tank missile from a shady entity to test it against armor, but can't reward the vendor by equipping the whole military with them.
12/ Takeaway: The #SpywareEO is the first comprehensive action by any government on #spyware.
It was clearly drafted to pump the breaks on proliferation & is written with a good understanding the slippery nature of the industry.
It closes many loopholes.
13/ Whenever the USG regulates there's always temptation to speculate about protectionism for American companies.
But reading the #SpywareEO...these provisions hit US-based spyware companies just as hard if they meet the triggers / contribute to proliferation.
Good.
14/ Every government wants to not tie their hands too tightly, so there is a waiver provision.
But what's interesting is how restricted this is. This is a very high bar.
The #SpywareEO is not designed to be easily circumvented by someone in a corner of the USG bureaucracy.
15/ I've spent over a decade researching commercial spyware.
The #spywareEO is one of the most consequential actions to blunt proliferation that I've seen a government take.
So, where do we go from here?
16/ While the #SpywareEO addresses federal procurement, it doesn't hit state & local agencies.
And we know these are targets for sales by NSO Group & others.
This is going to be a really important area in coming years.
NEW: Researchers find microplastics in human brains.
Moreover, shards of microplastics in autopsied brain tissue increased between samples collected in 2016 vs. 2024.
Frontal cortex tissue (executive function, learning & memory, judgement...) concentrations were 7-30x those previously found in livers & kidneys.
Incredibly alarming potential implications for #AlzheimersDisease, dementia, blood brain barrier health etc.
Caveats: early days in methodology for spotting & characterizing these particle loads & understanding their impacts on brain health.
And that's just focusing on the physical particles.
There's a whole second disturbing tier of questions around what potentially toxic compounds like plasticizers will leach from #microplastics, especially as the particle size gets smaller.
2/ There doesn't appear to be a place on earth that hasn't got a microplastics load.
Dust in the atmosphere? Yep. The ocean? Yep. Creatures in it? Yep. Ocean breezes by the seashore? Yep.
Now our brains.
It's like the radioisotopes from atmospheric nuclear testing. Only there's no test ban in sight, and more are pouring into the ecosystem with every moment.
But the impact on us and our world are shockingly ill- understood.