New RUSI report on preliminary lessons from Russia's unconventional warfare (mostly intelligence service led operations) in Ukraine. Authors "have in many instances checked the conclusions with non-Ukrainian agencies", it says. static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"in the autumn of 2021 Russian agents in Ukraine began to go on brief holidays at short notice to resorts in Turkey, Cyprus and Egypt where, coincidentally, they would meet with their handlers." static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"the Russian Orthodox Church...Beyond its efforts to support Russian information operations, its priests were widely recruited and run by the Russian special services and their monasteries and churches used as safe houses for equipment and personnel." static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"Russia’s belief that it understood Ukrainian politics may have been bolstered by the number of senior former Ukrainian officials resident in Moscow who had a clear motive in telling the Kremlin to proceed." static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
Agent network fragility: "the full-scale invasion fundamentally altered the context within which their unwitting agents or agents recruited under false flags who lacked any ideological commitment...were judging the harms of operating under Russian control" static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"A large portion of the middle echelon of [Ukrainian] officials that were Russian agents simply stopped responding to [Russian] messages early in the invasion or else abandoned their posts, severing chains of command" static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
Clever info ops. "the Russians started messages on Ukrainian social media calling for citizens to report suspicious markings on buildings. The result was a deluge of false positives swamping the capacity of Ukrainian law enforcement." static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"One of the foremost causes of inaccuracy in pre-war military assessments of the likely trajectory of the fighting – both in NATO countries & in the Ukrainian mil.– stems from the assumption that the Ru forces would conduct a deliberate military offensive" static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"relatively small level of infiltration & sabotage against military sites attempted in the opening phase [per] Russian doctrine...Instead most Spetsnaz deployed in conventional reconnaissance roles ahead of the [BTGs] while special forces were largely intended to sweep in behind"
"The Russians were so confident that they would succeed in hours that their support apparatus had rented apartments around the key sites from which their special forces were supposed to operate in Kyiv" static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"The population was divided into five core categories". Number one was "Those deemed leaders of Ukrainian nationalism who were specified for physical liquidation on a high-priority target list, or for capture to enable show trials." static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"fact that layout of these facilities is consistent throughout the country & the equipment used in torture chambers incl specialised electrocution machines were same across multiple oblasts demonstrates this was a systematic plan & not improvised sadism." static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"Of the 800 Russian agents identified in the occupied parts of Kharkiv oblast...majority were junior officials in local government including in departments such as the forestry commission. Fewer than 100 local law enforcement officers collaborated." static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"Based on its experiences in Chechnya, [Rus] planning assumption was that 8% of the population needed to collaborate, whether proactively or under coercion, to enable the counterintelligence regime to be effective". Ukr assessed "FSB was broadly correct" static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
The digitised gulag archipelago. "By the time these datasets reached the TOG at the oblast level, there is evidence that data was ingested into ‘Spectrum’. Spectrum is the FSB’s digital architecture for its security and counterintelligence work..." static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
This could certainly make the work of war crimes investigators much easier.
Collective punishment. "Even in...areas [w/] no strikes...acts of resistance wd often lead to apparently random people being lifted for interrogation in numbers. In some communities this essentially led many residents not to go out except for essentials" static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
SF cannibalising regular infantry. "the expansion of Spetsnaz units had contributed to a shortage of competent contract infantry for the wider Russian military – as most competent infantry had been pushed toward Spetsnaz and airborne units." static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
Prigozhin: GRU's conduit to Putin. "the GRU has often routed political recommendations to Putin through Prigozhyn rather than its own official chain of command. Instead, it would be fairer to say that the GRU and Wagner are strongly intertwined." static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"Despite transcending the GRU’s chain of command, the supply of weapons and military equipment to Wagner is carried out by the structures of the [Russian MoD] through the 78th Special Reconnaissance Centre and the 22nd Special Forces Brigade of the GRU" static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"the persistent [HUMINT] network held together by the resistance movement has been critical to the accurate targeting of Russian command & control and logistics infrastructure using long-range precision fires" static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco… [though Ukr has incentive to mislead here]
"details of how the resistance movement is run is clearly operationally sensitive...skills...are primarily those of [HUMINT] handling & covert communications and...personnel best suited to this activity are mainly drawn from the special services" static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
Goodbye Salisbury, hello Kherson. "some officers of [GRU's] Unit 29155, who were exposed and can no longer be used undercover, are now involved in remote recruitment and management of agent networks on the territory of Ukraine" static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"fact that [GRU] have consistently found targets and have the means to strike them means that how to identify & break up these human reconnaissance networks is a key question for the rear area security of NATO conventional forces in the event of conflict." static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"Although crude and violent – having a terrible effect on the economy and quality of life in targeted areas – [Ru repression] does appear to be an effective method of constraining resistance activities to a manageable level and maintaining control." static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"For NATO forces ... partnered resistance operations need to be calibrated towards reconnaissance rather than direct action...Those interfacing with these networks need to prioritise skills in handling human agents and in covert communications" static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
Deterring the deluded: "this lack of self-awareness in the Russian services...is far from comforting as it leads to a situation in which the Russians are difficult to deter because they have an unrealistic estimation of the likelihood of their success." static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"once a particular [Russian] form or method is exposed it tends to have been widely replicated allowing for the rapid detection of a wide range of unconnected activities. The Russian system does not appear to encourage treating each operation as bespoke." static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
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Good account of a KGB "dangle" to the CIA in the cold war. "GTPROLOGUE exemplifies CIA’s troubled experience with hostile double agents during the 1980s, when a few select services—particularly the Soviets, East Germans & Cubans—badly burned the agency." cia.gov/resources/csi/…
"The ‘85–86 losses [due to Ames], as they became colloquially known within CIA, also signaled the need for a major KGB undertaking to deceive CIA as to the real reason for these losses. A multichannel KGB disinformation campaign, which operated from at least 1986, was launched" cia.gov/resources/csi/…
"Within the KGB, the Soviet preoccupation with secrecy fostered an institutional bias against release of the sort of valid feed typically required to establish the credibility of a deception channel." cia.gov/resources/csi/…
Important. "The US military strikes on three of Iran’s nuclear facilities last weekend did not destroy the core components of the country’s nuclear program and likely only set it back by months, according to an early US [DIA] intelligence assessment" edition.cnn.com/2025/06/24/pol…
Wow. 'Two of the people familiar w/ the assessment said Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium was not destroyed. One of the people said the centrifuges are largely “intact.” “...the (DIA) assessment is that the US set them back maybe a few months, tops”...' edition.cnn.com/2025/06/24/pol…
And a caveat. "It is still early for the US to have a comprehensive picture of the impact of the strikes, and none of the sources described how the DIA assessment compares to the view of other agencies in the intelligence community." edition.cnn.com/2025/06/24/pol…
Pentagon briefing: “I know that battle damage is of great interest. Final battle damage will take some time, but initial battle damage assessments indicate that all three sites sustained extremely severe damage and destruction.”
Pentagon briefing: “In total, US forces employed approximately 75 precision guided weapons during this operation. This included, as the President stated last night, 14 30,000 pound GBU-57 Massive Ordnance penetrators, marking the first ever operational use of this weapon.”
Pentagon briefing: “our initial assessment… is that all of our precision munitions struck where we wanted them to strike and had the desired effect, which means especially in Fordo, which was the primary target here, we believe we achieved destruction of capabilities there”
1. Useful details here. “While some American officials find the Israeli estimate credible, others emphasized that the U.S. intelligence assessment remained unchanged” nytimes.com/2025/06/19/us/…
2. “American spy agencies believe that it could take several months, and up to a year, for Iran to make a weapon.” nytimes.com/2025/06/19/us/…
3. “new [White House] assessments echoed material provided by Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, which believes that Iran can achieve a nuclear weapon in 15 days.”
But: “None of the new assessments on the timeline to get a bomb are based on newly collected intelligence”
1. British Army CGS speaking at RUSI Land Warfare Conference: Today "nearly 100%" of army lethality comes from highly sophisticated crewed platforms. 100% of equip budget on sustaining that or buying next. But says army would los/e w these: "on the wrong side of the cost curve"
2. CGS says army will always need these sophisticated platforms at heart of land power. Aways need boots on ground &won't put them on ground without proper protected vehicles. But need to "layer around them a series of attritable platforms" to sense more & launch more munitions.
3. CGS argues that for price of two attack helicopters the army could instead “layer” disposable “mule drones” and “one way effectors” (attack drones) to go from 16 kills at 16km standoff to 200+ kills at 50+km standoff. That gets to 2x-3x “lethality” he argues.
'To reach even [Natanz] all the weapons available to the Israeli Air Force, and all except the 30,000 lbs GBU-57/B and the 5,000 lbs GBU 72/B available to the United States, would likely require several impacts into the same crater to ‘burrow’ down...' rusi.org/explore-our-re…
"For the FFEP [Fordow] and new facility at Natanz at an estimated 80-100 meters, possibly with layers of reinforced concrete, even the GBU-57/B [carried by B2/B21] would likely require multiple impacts at the same aiming point to have a good chance of penetrating the facility."
"Strikes with lesser penetrating weapons could still collapse entry and exit tunnels...However, unless a longer-term campaign were mounted with regular follow-up strikes, efforts to dig down...to re-establish access and supplies would likely begin almost immediately."