Last night, I tweeted that I had been assessing & considering the challenges Ukraine's Army (UA) Commanders were facing in preparing for the “spring offensives.
I said I'd share some thoughts on what I would be thinking if I were among them.
This is that 🧵 1/
First, there were people who thanked me for this, but There were dozens who said "don't give secrets to the Russians!"
Trust me, this 🧵: 1. Will not help RU 2. May help civilians better understand & manage expectation 3. Is based on what most militaries already know. 2/
Oh...one guy responded "do it, but don't make it too long."
To that guy I would say "this is it...deal with the length and try to stay focused!" 3/
1st, comments on the state of the 2 armies.
Russian Army (RU): Forces depleted, mauled on many fronts, equipment less capable than when they started
...BUT, they've had time to harden their defensive positions since Oct. 4/
RU morale remains low, but they've learned things:
-Better use of electronic warfare (helps in defeating UA drones)
-revetting ammo & supplies
-placing recon cameras to notify of UA assaults
-digging deeper & better camouflaging.
-hardening defenses 5/ theverge.com/2022/8/1/23287…
And while media has focused on RU (& Prigozhin's) actions at Bakhmut, that's just 1 of MANY areas - Kremmina, Kupyanks, Adviivka, Vuhledar, etc - of tough fighting.
While UA contends that over 200k RUs have been killed, w/ more wounded, UA has also suffered massive casualties.
And what concerns me...the casualties were part of the "transformed army" that the US & NATO helped create between 2011-2022. 7/ washingtonpost.com/world/2023/03/…
This is personal for me. These are soldiers & leaders I trained with at both Yavoriv, UKR & Grafenwoehr, Germany.
These are soldiers & leaders who - by their presence - transformed the UA.
Many of them now gone, sacrificed for their country.
I'm concerned about that. 8/
Just like RU had to regenerate their forces back in April after early defeats, UA also must regenerate.
That's hard.
And Ukraine's force -mostly new recruits- will now have to fight OFFENSIVE vs defensive battles, w/ new equipment. That's harder still.
While RU defends. 9/
It will be unpopular to say this, but I will:
The UA is good & is combat savvy. But like RU at the beginning of the war, they're not 10 feet tall.
They must now execute large scale missions: Deliberate attacks & combined arms breaches.
As a Bde Cdr, as Operations Group Cdr at @NTC_UPDATE, & as the CG at @7thATC, units that hadn't prepared for the toughest of missions -combined arms breaches vs a prepared defense- were humbled. 11/
As stated earlier, RU has been building defenses on the eastern bank of the Dnieper R. since November. This @ISW 🧵 doesn't show the details, but I would suspect they are formidable.
UA has to breach those AFTER a river crossing operations. 12/
In the offense, UA's army will be both terrain (regaining lost ground) & force (killing Russians) oriented, depending on *where* they strike.
They will need to execute very tough offensive missions, coordinate with territorial & SOF forces to target key locations/forces...13/
...retake & secure lost territory, penetrate & cause chaos & destruction in Russian security zones & rear areas, WHILE ALSO keeping nascent supply lines for new types of equipment secure & operational.
Really tough tasks for a force that's already been fighting a year+. 14/
Meanwhile, RU will defend in depth from prepared positions, willingly sacrifice soldiers, reorient artillery from civilians to UA troops, use EW to thwart drones, use reconnaissance tools to thwart penetration.
Bottom line:
Russia will try & hold as much land as possible, adding to "frozen conflict" they have in Europe (Transnistria, Abkahzia/S. Ossetia & Nagorno-Karabakh)...and then perhaps Putin sues for peace.
Ukraine will try to regain as much of their sovereign lands. 16/
While I have additional thoughts about what the specifics of the Ukrainian fight would need to look like for them to be successful...I ain't sharing.
UA's will regain additional ground, but the spring offensive won't be a "war winner."
UKR will need more support. 16/16
17/
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Woke up early to Putin's "State of the Russian Federation" remarks. It's mostly being reported due to his comments about him deciding to end the New Start Treaty agreements.
While that was significant, there was MUCH more. 1/
Putin "vowed" to "systemically" continue the offensive in Ukraine.
As I said in this @washingtonpost piece published yesterday, Putin's military has failed, in all 5 phases of this war, in achieving his strategic objectives. 2/ wapo.st/3YRnCcs.
Putin was bold enough to say:
"Ukraine is not just a neighboring country. It is an inalienable part of our own history, culture & spiritual space. These are our comrades, those dearest to us."
There are various estimates of how many "soldiers" (& criminals) RU has mobilized & sent to the front. I'd guess it's equal to or slightly greater than the initial invasion force (190K).
But as I've said many times, these are untrained forces. 3/
The @GOP is debating on condemning @potus actions on the China Balloon at the SOTU. If they do condemn, after the gang of eight and then other members it will only show how unserious they are about national security.
As I said on Friday, as a former Cavalryman I learned that unless there is an immediate threat, a smart person spends time observing, reporting, and analyzing.
While the immediate reaction may be "shoot it down," experts may provide a more prudent approach.
That happened. 2/
We'll learn @NORADCommand tracked across the Bering Sea, Aleutians, Alaska & then Canada.
Based on experience, there was constant tracking, as has been reported, and immediate risk mitigation (jamming, spoofing, following).
2. It's isn't "learning the tank" I'm concerned about:
--can they quickly learn the capability of the Abrams (& Leopard II) the way it is designed to operate. That's training w/ other tanks, infantry, scouts, drones,artillery, engineers, intel...all more than crew training. 2/
--when the tank - or small critical parts in the tank - break (which they do), & when those small & large replacement parts need replacing, & when it requires daily/weekly/monthly echelon maintenance, will Ukraine have also trained those who do these things. 3/
Woke up this morning to find a thread from someone claiming I posted things that are "100% untrue" about the "M1."
I hesitate to respond to @secretsqrl123 - especially since he posted an insulting tweet (violating my rule #1) - but providing tank insight is important to me. 1/20
"David" is a "former ADA 16/14R & 96B/P (an air defense soldier & intel analyst w/ airborne experience). He is a "master driver & a 22 yr combat vet." To which I say "thanks for ur service."
Don't know how much tank experience he has, but he gets some things right in his 🧵2/
He also gets things wrong.
Since he gives his creds, here are mine:
-37 years in armor.
-served on M60, M60A1, M60A2,M1, M1A1, M1A2
-tank platoon leader, company commander (x2), cav sqdn S3 (in combat), cav squadron Cdr at Armor School (teaching M1 Tank Commanders Course) 3/