1/ It is my belief that NATO and the US have not fully committed to stop russia in Ukraine. However, there are areas within our own military that require attention. As discussed in Part I, I will reference an article by Glen Grant to discuss these issues
2/ Glen suggests that a priority policy should be implemented to replace all military personnel who are not performing frontline tasks with civilians who have comparable or better related skills. Additionally, the use of TrO volunteers should be considered.
3/ In some cases, commanders have been selected through nepotism or connections rather than their performance and results. This is a concerning issue that needs to be addressed immediately to ensure that the most qualified individuals are appointed to leadership positions.
4/ It is imperative to establish a policy that streamlines the identification process of potential commanders for promotion and simultaneously identifies those who are unsuitable for command.
5/ A fundamental area that requires urgent action is collective training. It is crucial for units to receive collective training to improve their skills and ensure that they can work effectively as a team.
6/ In larger NATO countries, collective training is regularly conducted at battalion and brigade levels and even at the division level during major exercises. Lessons learned from the front line should be passed on to every soldier and instructor to improve their training.
7/ Staff appointments such as Chief J7 (Training) should not make command decisions about training requirements. Commanders should only be appointed to command operations or to command the creation and training of units for operations.
8/ The lack of standardization across the Ukrainian army is a significant problem that hinders successful operations. The mix of the Soviet system, NATO standards, and improvisation has led to chaos. It is essential to establish a unified system.
9/ The reliance on Ukroboronprom to produce defence weapons has resulted in a monopolistic system that is not perfectly suitable for war. It has proven to be slow in delivering the necessary weapons and equipment.
10/ The military medical system has major weaknesses. Uncoordinated training for soldiers in battlefield medicine, and poor policies at the national level for supporting and funding the seriously injured or those needing basic medical drugs.
11/ It is crucial to have an officer in each unit who is not in the battle space and can assist with necessary documentation for families when a partner dies or is critically injured.
12/ In order to ensure a streamlined logistics process, each area must have a dedicated logistics hub, that ensures that no brigade has to reach back more than one hour's drive to obtain what they require.
13/ In instances where extreme distances are involved, the logistics "socket" should be extended to bring the required supplies closer to the unit. The logistics power socket should encompass the essential elements of combat supply
14/ including medical supply and evacuation, unit combat supplies such as food, fuel, ammunition, batteries, vehicle spares, and drones, personal equipment of all types through digital registration
15/ reach-back ability for technical equipment for replacement and repair such as phones, computers, and radios, and forward maintenance of all soft-skin and armored vehicles up to engine and barrel changes, and minor body repair,
16/ In addition to the insightful observations made by Glen Grant, I would like to contribute my own observations regarding the current state of Ukraine's military organization. It is important to note that Ukraine's highest organizational unit is the brigade,
17/ as it does not have standing armies or divisions. However, there exist de facto "territorial" organizational units that coordinate the actions of multiple brigades. While these units may function like divisions in some ways, they lack a proper division structure
18/ and their assigned officers are typically temporary. In comparison, division or an army has a clearly defined structure that operates as a single mechanism with clearly defined duties and responsibilities.
19/ In my forthcoming conclusion thread, I intend to provide a summary of the pressing concerns that require attention. In my view, merely seeking assistance from our allies is insufficient; it is imperative that we undertake internal changes to preserve the lives of our soldiers
The frontline situation remains challenging. Russian forces intensified attacks in the Bakhmut area and advanced tactically in the Kharnohorivka and Kharkiv areas. Despite this, the frontline remains relatively stable
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2/ Chasiv Yar
Despite initial successes in the assault on Chasiv Yar, including reaching and occasionally crossing the canal with small groups, the Russians failed to establish a foothold. Lately, they've increased the use of armored fighting vehicles to advance.
3/ The situation south of Bakhmut is more complex. Russians attempted to advance toward Klischiivka with frequent and large assaults. While most of these attacks have been repelled, it's unlikely that these attempts will cease soon, posing a continued risk to Klishchiivka
Frontelligence Insight conducted an initial Battle Damage Assessment of strikes on Belbek Airfield in Crimea on May 15th and 16th. This analysis is based on mid-resolution images taken on May 16th
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2/Three large scorch marks are visible in the central part of the airfield: two on the military jet apron and one in the fuel depot area. The exact diameter of these marks cannot be determined due to low resolution, but they appear to be approximately over 30m in size.
3/ The imagery from July 2023 confirms that the apron was used to host military jets. Due to the resolution limitations, we cannot determine whether any aircraft were hit or destroyed, nor can we assess the level of damage, but we can conclude that missiles did reach the apron.
There has been a controversy surrounding the situation in the northern area of Kharkiv Oblast, invaded on May 10th. One of the primary points of contention has been the alleged absence of fortifications. But is it so? 🧵Thread:
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2/ Given that many of these areas are now under Russian control, sharing some satellite images is appropriate. From these images, you can see fortified and communication trenches in areas near Krasne. Some of these are older Russian positions, while others were built in 2023
3/ While it's true that the placement of some of these trenches might appear unconventional at first glance, I refrain from making comments without knowledge of the defense plan for the area. Trenches can serve various purposes - distraction, communication, defenses, etc.
Overnight, Russian infantry, backed by armored vehicles, entered Kharkiv oblast from Belgorod area, using small tactical units. Frontelligence Insight had previously cautioned about this scenario. Here's what we know about it🧵:
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2/ The capture of border villages like Strilecha, Krasne, Pylne, and Borysivka isn't unexpected. It's an anticipated maneuver to divert Ukrainian resources from the main Russian offensive in Donbas. Considering manpower shortages, Ukraine will be forced to redeploy some personnel
3/ Many question how Russian forces crossed the border so quickly. The answer is simple — the border is a grey zone heavily surveilled and, hence doesn't have defensive structures. Instead, the defensive lines are positioned deeper within Ukrainian territory.
May 2nd updates on frontline developments from the Frontelligence Insight, including the information about a potential Russian offensive in the Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts
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2/ After successes in the Ocheretyne area, Russian forces now have slightly more than 10 kilometers of ground between them and the T0504 highway, which connects Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk. However, another potential threat is emerging from the northward-leading road.
3/ The Russian expansion into Arkhangel's'ke widens their range of possibilities and complicates Ukrainian efforts to establish a cohesive defensive system across such a broad area, particularly given the understaffing of many brigades.
Russian forces have gained tactically near Ocheretyne and Chasiv Yar, and have attempted a large assault towards Sivers'k. Frontelligence Insight provides a concise analysis of the current situation in this 🧵thread
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2/ According to on-the-ground reports, occasional Russian groups have temporarily crossed the canal at Chasiv Yar but didn't establish a bridgehead. A geolocated video by @giK1893 shows that Russians tried to set a position in the south of Chasiv Yar at the landbridge crossing
3/ Considering that Russians gathered superior means and forces in the area, it's a point of concern. It opens an opportunity to advance into the forest on the west side of the canal. If successful, this would provide them with the freedom to choose further assault directions.