1/ It is my belief that NATO and the US have not fully committed to stop russia in Ukraine. However, there are areas within our own military that require attention. As discussed in Part I, I will reference an article by Glen Grant to discuss these issues
2/ Glen suggests that a priority policy should be implemented to replace all military personnel who are not performing frontline tasks with civilians who have comparable or better related skills. Additionally, the use of TrO volunteers should be considered.
3/ In some cases, commanders have been selected through nepotism or connections rather than their performance and results. This is a concerning issue that needs to be addressed immediately to ensure that the most qualified individuals are appointed to leadership positions.
4/ It is imperative to establish a policy that streamlines the identification process of potential commanders for promotion and simultaneously identifies those who are unsuitable for command.
5/ A fundamental area that requires urgent action is collective training. It is crucial for units to receive collective training to improve their skills and ensure that they can work effectively as a team.
6/ In larger NATO countries, collective training is regularly conducted at battalion and brigade levels and even at the division level during major exercises. Lessons learned from the front line should be passed on to every soldier and instructor to improve their training.
7/ Staff appointments such as Chief J7 (Training) should not make command decisions about training requirements. Commanders should only be appointed to command operations or to command the creation and training of units for operations.
8/ The lack of standardization across the Ukrainian army is a significant problem that hinders successful operations. The mix of the Soviet system, NATO standards, and improvisation has led to chaos. It is essential to establish a unified system.
9/ The reliance on Ukroboronprom to produce defence weapons has resulted in a monopolistic system that is not perfectly suitable for war. It has proven to be slow in delivering the necessary weapons and equipment.
10/ The military medical system has major weaknesses. Uncoordinated training for soldiers in battlefield medicine, and poor policies at the national level for supporting and funding the seriously injured or those needing basic medical drugs.
11/ It is crucial to have an officer in each unit who is not in the battle space and can assist with necessary documentation for families when a partner dies or is critically injured.
12/ In order to ensure a streamlined logistics process, each area must have a dedicated logistics hub, that ensures that no brigade has to reach back more than one hour's drive to obtain what they require.
13/ In instances where extreme distances are involved, the logistics "socket" should be extended to bring the required supplies closer to the unit. The logistics power socket should encompass the essential elements of combat supply
14/ including medical supply and evacuation, unit combat supplies such as food, fuel, ammunition, batteries, vehicle spares, and drones, personal equipment of all types through digital registration
15/ reach-back ability for technical equipment for replacement and repair such as phones, computers, and radios, and forward maintenance of all soft-skin and armored vehicles up to engine and barrel changes, and minor body repair,
16/ In addition to the insightful observations made by Glen Grant, I would like to contribute my own observations regarding the current state of Ukraine's military organization. It is important to note that Ukraine's highest organizational unit is the brigade,
17/ as it does not have standing armies or divisions. However, there exist de facto "territorial" organizational units that coordinate the actions of multiple brigades. While these units may function like divisions in some ways, they lack a proper division structure
18/ and their assigned officers are typically temporary. In comparison, division or an army has a clearly defined structure that operates as a single mechanism with clearly defined duties and responsibilities.
19/ In my forthcoming conclusion thread, I intend to provide a summary of the pressing concerns that require attention. In my view, merely seeking assistance from our allies is insufficient; it is imperative that we undertake internal changes to preserve the lives of our soldiers
A multi-day analysis of battlefield dynamics and internal Russian data: both public and non-public, points to multiple trends and key points which we summarized. 🧵Thread:
2/ Ukraine’s deep strike drone campaign has inflicted significant direct and secondary damage across Russia, contributing to a perceptible shift in perceptions of the war’s trajectory and its cost benefit among both military command and law enforcement senior leadership.
3/ According to analyzed communications from dozens of senior Russian officers in Moscow and in the field, there is a growing perception that the war has effectively reached a strategic and political dead end - sustained primarily by President Putin’s personal insistence
SLB, the world’s largest offshore drilling company headquartered in Texas, continues to operate in Russia despite international sanctions, according to documents published by the analytical firm @dallasparkua. 🧵Thread:
2/ In March 2022, SLB publicly announced that it would suspend all new investments in the Russian market in response to international sanctions. This was in the statement from Chief Executive Officer Olivier Le Peuch, issued from the company’s Houston headquarter
3/ In October 2022, the company underwent a global rebranding, changing its name from Schlumberger to SLB. The Russian subsidiary retained the name Schlumberger Technology Company. However, leaked correspondence point that it continues to be integrated into SLB’s global framework
Breaking: On October 13, Russia’s Government Legislative Commission backed a Defense Ministry bill allowing the use of reservists for defense-related tasks in peacetime. The measure expands the military’s authority to call up reservists for wartime needs. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to the draft law, “special assemblies” are military call-ups for specific defense missions during armed conflicts, counterterrorism operations, or when forces are deployed abroad. Only reservists will be subject to these special assemblies.
3/ Russia’s mobilization reserve consists of individuals who have voluntarily signed contracts to remain in reserve. Putin established the country’s mobilization manpower reserve in 2015 through an executive decree.
Our report on Russia’s tank production and expansion plans has, predictably, drawn significant attention and generated many questions. Rather than replying individually, we decided to answer the most common ones - and even address questions about the Armata. 🧵Thread:
Russia’s T-90 tank production in 2024 reached around 240 units, including both new and modernized tanks. But internal planning papers analyzed by Frontelligence Insight show Moscow’s plan to lift output by 80% and launch production of a new T90 variant. 🧵Our Special Report:
2/ Our investigation began with what appeared to be a routine document: Uralvagonzavod requested “IS-445” engine RPM sensors from Zagorsk Optical-Mechanical Plant (ZOMZ) for a project listed as “Product 188M2.” This single line became the starting point of a larger discovery
3/ Digging deeper, we identified “Product 188M2” as the T-90M2, the latest variant of the T-90M (Product 188M). A careless online bio from a Russian engineer posted on Russian Scientific and Engineering Union revealed its name: “Ryvok-1", which roughly can be translated as Dash-1
Recently, @CITeam_en has raised some good and bad points about verifying the authenticity of RU mil documents. I’ll start with a pushback: the notion that the legitimacy of Russian documents can be judged by whether they have all the formal characteristics is outdated:
2/ While it is true that all classified documents follow strict protocols, the reality of war is far messier. Most documents are produced internally, shared outside of formal chains: in Excel, Word, or PDF formats and shared through messengers, email, or other convenient channels
3/ I have personally reviewed hundreds, if not thousands, of pages of Russian documents: leaks, data from captured phones or submissions to our team, that contained sensitive information. Yet only a tiny fraction carried any formal classification stamps, despite being valuable