🧵1/7
How Putin's premature ambitions just Sabotaged the RU Defense Modernization program:
Russian armed forces were in mid of a modernization program when Putin decided to invade Ukraine.
The problem was that Ukraine also had a modernization program runing fast since 2014.
2/7 The Program was focused on smaller and modern ground force, reducing the active tanks from 23.000 to less than 5.000;
The IFVs from 23.000 to 12.000 and the Airborne from 1500 to 1300 vehicles.
In 2020, RU had modernized les than 1/3 of its smaller forces. In 2022 maybe +15%
3/7
The investment in Navy, specially about New projects and restructuring were enough to keep the forces growing and more modern, in contrast with the land forces.
The shipyard capacity also grew considerably to attend this program.
I'd like to invite @CovertShores to comment.
4/7 The air force was another successful program with more than 70% of modernization lvl, retiring the Su24 and 2/3 of Mig29 fleet.
The attack Rotatory units were also reduced to near 400.
It was the concept of a superpower army: small and modern army, specially on ground forces.
5/7 The MLRS modernization didn't reach the expectations.
The Tornado program just advanced on BM21 with a good upgrade rate to Tornado G, and built two long range missiles, to be used by Smerch launchers.
The production of Iskander misiles and it's brigades were also increased
6/7 The artilleries were the most critical russian equipment: Obsoletes and with a low range. From more than 6.000, the new inventory in 2020 had only 2000 in service.
Rocket launchers were reduced from 4.000 to less than 1.000. Nobody know how many were modernized until 2020
7/7 Opinion:
RU had probably the most important modernization program from its history and a war destroyed it
If less than 1/3 of the land forces were modernized, what's the sense of an invasion?
A wrong decision can destroy years of work.
Now they run to repair old units.
These numbers X loses, put the RU army at a fragile position regarding the land forces. Still able to fight, but I have a feeling about some panic there, specially because RU don't know how the new UKR weapon packet will behave on battlefield and their equipment repair rate.
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Billions in Arms, Training, and Diplomacy: How China and U.S Bought Pol Pot's Impunity for the Deadliest Genocide of the Century
The Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot, ruled Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, imposing one of the most brutal dictatorships in modern history.
The result was a genocide that killed between 1.7 and 2 million people, approximately 21–25% of the country’s population of 7.5-8 million, through executions, starvation, disease, and forced labor.
The violence was systematic and ideological. Immediately after seizing power, the Khmer Rouge forcibly evacuated cities, marching millions into the countryside in what became known as death marches. Any sign of education, wearing glasses, speaking foreign languages, or having a professional occupation, was grounds for investigation and summary execution.
Specific ethnic and religious groups were targeted, including ethnic Vietnamese, Cham Muslims, ethnic Chinese, and Buddhist monks.
Torture centers like Tuol Sleng (S-21) in Phnom Penh became symbols of the regime’s terror: between 14,000 and 20,000 prisoners passed through it, with only about a dozen survivors.
Torture methods, as whips, electric shocks, waterboarding, nail extraction, and starvation were used to extract absurd “confessions” of treason, often claiming victims were CIA or KGB agents.
After producing detailed and fabricated confessions, prisoners were executed with blows to the neck to conserve bullets.
The regime finally collapsed when Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979 and overthrew the Khmer Rouge.
Yet, in an absurd twist, after being driven from power, the Khmer Rouge survived as a guerrilla force for nearly two decades and received substantial international support.
China was the primary backer, providing billions of dollars in weapons, tanks, military training, and advisors.
The United States, providing financial aid to the Khmer Rouge itself, also imposed sanctions on Vietnam, and supported keeping the Pol Pot coalition’s diplomatic seat at the United Nations until 1993.
Other countries also contributed:
the United Kingdom trained some Pol Pot guerrilla, Singapore supplied arms, and Thailand provided border bases, training camps, and facilitated illegal trade in timber and gems that generated millions for the guerrillas.
European nations were divided but generally voted in line with the U.S. at the UN.
Romania was the only Warsaw Pact country to condemn the Vietnamese invasion and openly support the Khmer Rouge guerrilla. Other ASEAN members offered logistical assistance to the Pol Pot coalition.
The guerrilla war dragged on until the late 1990s, allowing Pol Pot, the century’s most prolific genocida, to die in 1998 without ever facing trial.
Nearly 40,000 Vietnamese soldiers and civilians died fighting the Khmer Rouge remnants, which were financed and armed primarily by China and indirectly sustained by U.S. policy.
Frustrated by the fall of its ally, China launched a brief punitive invasion of Vietnam in 1979 but was repelled and forced to withdraw.
Today, sites like Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek serve as memorials to ensure the horror is never forgotten.
In fact, the US had been secretly funding Pol Pot in exile since January 1980. The extent of this support – $85m from 1980 to 1986 – was revealed in correspondence to a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. On the Thai border with Cambodia, the CIA and other intelligence agencies set up the Kampuchea Emergency Group, which ensured that humanitarian aid went to Khmer Rouge enclaves in the refugee camps and across the border. Two American aid workers, Linda Mason and Roger Brown, later wrote: “The US government insisted that the Khmer Rouge be fed . . . the US preferred that the Khmer Rouge operation benefit from the credibility of an internationally known relief operation.”
Solid-State Batteries: Wolfpacks of Small UUVs Will Dominate the Seas
UUVs are currently the most dangerous threat to submarines and military surface ships. Their development is accelerating rapidly, and I would argue that the smallest ones are the most dangerous.
This week, the first solid-state battery ready for mass production was announced, with an energy density of 400 Wh/kg. By 2028, several companies are promising to reach 600 Wh/kg , roughly 3–4 times the density of today’s lithium-ion batteries.
This will completely transform naval warfare.
It not only renders conventional diesel-electric submarines obsolete but also creates an entirely new category of UUVs: small, mini, and extremely fast.
I’m talking about UUVs in the 250–350 kg weight, capable of sprint speeds of 45–50 knots.
They would carry a compact 50 kg warhead using modern explosives, including CL-20-based mixtures, inside a fuselage largely composed of solid-state battery cells, supplemented by a small 2.5 kVA gasoline generator with a snorkel for recharging.
These UUVs could be air-dropped, ships, submarines, from aircraft or larger drones, and operate in Wolfpack, sprinting up to 35 km to engage targets.
If the target pulls out of range, the onboard AI calculates that interception is no longer feasible and switches to recharge mode, surfacing discreetly, running the generator, and continuing to track the target via periscope or mast-mounted sensors. It analyzes surface images, estimates target course and speed, and calculates the exact energy needed for a new high-speed intercept, also getting data from satellites or drones, composing a versatile kill web.
A true high-tech wolfpack: persistent, autonomous, and capable of engaging both surface ships and submerged submarines (by forcing them to surface or detecting them when they snorkel).
Warhead design is evolving toward combined shaped charge + blast configurations: an initial shaped charge penetrates the outer hull or Kevlar spall liners (creating a breach and injecting energy), followed immediately by the main high-explosive blast that causes flooding, shock damage to equipment, and internal compartment failure.
This mirrors the mechanism of modern lightweight torpedoes.
A UUV carrying just 50 kg of advanced explosive in such a warhead would be capable of breaching the pressure hull of a Virginia-class submarine or the hull of an Arleigh Burke-class or Type 055 destroyers, causing serious flooding and likely achieving at least a mission kill. In successive impacts from a wolfpack, the damage would be catastrophic, comparable to that inflicted by an Mk 54 or MU90 torpedo.
Another key development is the refinement of UUV AI to prioritize initial strikes against propulsion systems (shafts, propellers, reduction gears, or waterjets), maximizing the chance of immobilizing the target early.
These are fully autonomous units that can loiter for weeks, hunting targets, making independent decisions, and even receiving software updates while recharging on the surface.
They fit into a broader ecosystem of UUVs, primarily propeller-driven, torpedo-shaped vehicles weighing 250–350 kg with warheads of 50–100 kg, but the range of designs and capabilities is expanding fast.
Their cost is orders of magnitude lower than any manned ship or submarine, and effective countermeasures do not yet exist. We are talking about a technology that could put billions of dollars in naval investments at risk.
The trend is clear: UUVs will continue to get cheaper, faster, longer-ranging, and smarter, while traditional platforms (surface ships and submarines) only become more expensive and vulnerable.
These wolfpacks will be supported and coordinated by drones, satellites, and motherships.
Just as drones have reshaped land warfare, UUV swarms are doing the same at sea.
@podernaval @NavyLookout want to hear you.
One major issue when I write about new technologies is that there is a group of people, who often claim to be experts but don’t actually keep up with technological progress, who immediately say things like “That’s impossible” or “That’s nonsense.”
The reason is simple: these people are decades out of date and seem incapable of studying or learning anything new. These days, they just follow whatever trend is popular. Sometimes I only need to read one of them to know exactly what all the others are going to say.
But not all, I know really good and updated analysts here and I’m proud to have them in my circle.
It’s regrettable that these individuals, sometimes already older, end up reflecting the same problems we see in Western youth. And then they demand: “Show me the proof.”
I don’t pull anyone out of ignorance. It’s up to each person to study, stay updated, and avoid embarrassing themselves.
When the AUKUS program – which I will discuss in the coming days – was designed, it was already obsolete. Its most likely future is cancellation as many US programs during the last years.
Just as drones in Ukraine dominated the battlefield in Ukraine, and proved that anything big and slow becomes vulnerable and almost useless, the same fate now reaches submarines.
Hundreds of underwater drones will hunt submarines for hours or days until they find them, and China leads these breakthrough technologies.
Two stand out:
- Magnetic Wake Detection: developed by Northwestern Polytechnical University (NPU), it tracks magnetic disturbances left by moving submarines, even stealth Seawolf-class ones. Chinese UUVs already integrate this with existing MAD systems, mapping persistent wakes in real time. In 2025 tests, it merged with acoustic networks and AI to form a vast detection grid.
- CPT Atomic Magnetometer (quantum sensor): the most promising, it eliminates low-latitude blind spots with extreme precision. Initially tested on tethered aerial drones, it is now being adapted for submerged UUVs using rubidium for omnidirectional anomaly detection. CASC researchers are miniaturising and mass-producing it; in simulations, AI-equipped UUVs distinguished real targets from false positives (e.g. whales) with 95% accuracy.
None of this is theoretical – it is already part of China’s Underwater Great Wall, a mobile sensor network fusing magnetic, passive sonar and AI data.
This is exactly why Japan’s new submarine - using lithium batteries- program draws so much attention: excellent cost, real innovation, and units entering service before 2032 will also be modern long-range (1,000-3,000km) missile platforms even for hypersonic missiles.
They are cheap enough that the AUKUS budget could hypothetically buy hundreds of them.
The future lies in smaller, cheaper, more numerous units – never the opposite. Modern warfare is entering the age of decentralisation, and programs like AUKUS are its exact antithesis.
So someone comes along and says: “The era of submarines is over because drones will now hunt them down?”
No. Just as the era of armored vehicles didn’t end. But you’re no longer going to sink hundreds of billions into a submarine program or pay billions for a single boat, because every day the odds of losing it being lost in combat grow higher.
The logic of warfare hasn’t changed: it has to be cheap, mass-produced, easily replaceable, and simple to maintain. Today’s nuclear submarines are none of those things. This is why the Japanese show a new horizon.
China’s new technologies are a trend that will soon spread. They pose a serious threat to submarines and will quickly enter the arsenals of many nations.
1. The future belongs to hybrid designs with micro-reactors charging batteries – cheap, modular, extremely quiet, and far easier to maintain.
2. Large ICBM-carrying platforms will struggle to operate near coasts but will still have a role when hidden far offshore, away from regular routes.
3. Smaller, cheaper submarines will inevitably dominate the market. Any nation that ignores this logic will become obsolete – spending fortunes on few, hard-to-replace hulls while adversaries spend little and field far more efficient forces.
The Russians pay half the amount for a 152mm shell compared to what the Germans pay for a 30mm ammo.
A while back, I wrote a post about Rheinmetall selling their Caracal 4x4 to the German government for over $600,000. Recently, I've been looking into the variations in ammunition costs among Western companies.
Rheinmetall is asking for over $600 for a Gepaed 35mm round, which is the same price the Russians are paying for a 152mm artillery round. But it doesn't stop there. Rheinmetall also sold 600,000 30mm rounds to be used in the PUMA IFV for $1,000 each.
In all three of these overpriced sales, the client was the German government. To put it in perspective, the US ordered and paid $108 for each round back in 2017. Obviously, costs vary depending on the type of ammo, but $1,000 for a single 30mm round? This puts a burden on the German taxpayers.
There's a concern that Europe wouldn't be able to sustain a war with these prices. They could bankrupt any country before troops are even prepared for combat. The focus here is not on the quality, but rather the sustainable cost during a real war.
A single medium Cal cannon can fire 5,000 rounds in less than one minute. How can pay that bill?
Just s personal feeling.
Countries with a smaller industry, mainly light armored vehicles, like the Baltics, had no chance to sell anything. The big sharks just eat the EU budget with high costs, collaborating to a higher concentrated market.
Omsktransmash has finished the modernization of a batch of T-80BVM tanks, which are now on their way to Ukraine.
This marks the second batch of tanks in less than 30 days. The previous batch consisted of T90M tanks.
The frequency and size of these batches confirm my previous… https://t.co/xJsMfYHqvHtwitter.com/i/web/status/1…
The mass production of SOSNA-U devices has indeed put an end to the previous bottleneck in Russia's tank production.
Some months ago, I had discussed the projected waiting time of 2-5 months for these devices. Regrettably, it appears that the allies have missed this window of… https://t.co/spOEBt16jOtwitter.com/i/web/status/1…
Actually, the lack of equipment for Ukraine resulted from serious mistakes. It's a political will, but we need to look a bit earlier.
The Ukrainian Malyshev tank factory was indeed a reputable facility with the capacity to produce hundreds of tanks yearly.