How many missiles does Iran stilll have?

During the 12-day war, I estimated Iran’s missile stockpile at around 20,000, based on the number of different models and the years they entered production. Of that total, I calculated approximately 7,000 to 8,000 ballistic missiles and 12,000 to 13,000 cruise missiles, including both units in service and those in reserve.

Iran began mass-producing ballistic missiles in the early 1990s, starting with the Shahab-2, which was produced for about 15 years, and the Shahab-3, manufactured from 2004 to 2008 before being replaced by more modern systems.

These were lower-precision missiles, which is why, in 2015, Iran launched a major refurbishment and modernization program for these old stocks, replacing guidance systems and warheads.

Today, there are certainly still a few thousand of these older missiles in reserve, and I do count them.
Around 2010, Iran was already producing about 12 different models of ballistic and cruise missiles.

If we assume a conservative average production rate of roughly 100 units per model per year, taking into account multiple parallel production lines, that alone would give Iran, over the last 15 years, an arsenal exceeding 17,000 missiles.

The picture becomes even clearer when we look at 2015 onward. At that time, Iranian production lines were operating with at least 8 to 12 models with ranges over 1,000 km. Cruise missiles like the Soumar and Meshkat already had ranges exceeding 2,000 km, as did about 7 to 10 variants of two-stage solid-fuel ballistic missiles such as the Emad, Sejjil, and others.

In other words, Iran spent at least 10 years producing on a significant scale 8 to 12 models of ballistic and cruise missiles capable of reaching Israel.

Russia, even while fighting a full-scale war in Ukraine, produces around 2,500 precision missiles per year. There is simply no logic in claiming that Iran, after more than 30 years of dedicated missile production with multiple active lines, had only 2,500 missiles in stockpile as of February, as many Western think tanks claim.
These estimates consistently understate Iran’s real industrial capacity.

Iran has an entire ecosystem of public companies, private firms, and startups, with more than 300 companies dedicated to the missiles sector, out of a total of another 6,500 that support the country’s defense in various areas.

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open.substack.com/pub/global21/p… To give you an idea of what I’m talking about, on August 4, 2024, North Korea held an official commissioning ceremony for 250 mobile launchers of the KN-24 short-range tactical ballistic missile.

Since each launcher carries 4 missiles, this represented exactly 1,000 new missiles in a single event.

The Iranian industry is three times the size of North Korea’s, which does not involve private companies or startups.

thediplomat.com/2024/08/commis…

The possible nuclear dimension of the war cannot be overlooked

And if Iran had not yet produced a weapon by February, after that it would have every reason to do so, and with the technology it possesses and North Korean assistance, it would be a relatively quick.

I recently wrote about the possibility of Iran already possessing a nuclear weapon and the risks that this could lead to various outcomes.

One of them: ‘That would completely upend the Middle East board, starting with Saudi launching its own program, as it has repeatedly said it would do if Iran ever developed a nuclear weapon.’

But if Iran already has a nuclear weapon, why hasn’t it revealed it? The answer might lie in the fact that they are uncertain about the reactions from Israel and the U.S., who could claim the necessity of a preemptive nuclear strike.

Based on various lines of evidence, I have a strong intuition that Iran already possesses this weapon. Furthermore, the intensity of U.S. and Israeli operations, marked by nearly 900 strikes on the Natanz and Fordow complexes, suggests a deliberate attempt to trigger a nuclear disaster.

This is further evidenced by four hits on the Bushehr nuclear power plant, as well as attacks on a heavy water reactor associated with plutonium production and a uranium facility in Yazd.

Iran knows it occupies a privileged strategic position, and bombs will not reverse this situation. The U.S. and Israel have few options left on this board, while political and economic pressure increases daily.

This lack of alternatives may be creating a scenario where it is becoming increasingly likely that a nuclear disaster will occur.

IF that happens, Iran will likely respond by attacking the Dimona reactor in Israel, which will trigger a nuclear war, with Israel fulfilling its ‘dream’ of nuking Iran. The outcome is that this could trigger the same response from Iran, and I will explain how this would occur.

Iran’s nuclear program began in the 1950s but took on a military dimension in the 1980s-2000s through the AMAD project. U.S. intelligence assessed a formal suspension in 2003, yet in the two decades since, Iran has had more than enough time to make steady investments, longer than it took Pakistan (10-15 years).

After the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran sharply accelerated its efforts, and by 2025 it had the capability to produce a weapon in days or weeks.

Read the full article:
open.substack.com/pub/global21/p… We are on the way

https://twitter.com/nstrike1231/status/2041243500029657567

Iranian Technology Goes Far Beyond Missiles

The country rank in the global 5 in six critical technologies

Iran has established itself as a major power in missiles, but this is only the tip of the iceberg. The country also competes with global powers in several other technological markets.

Although it still faces historical bottlenecks in investment in basic sectors, resulting in critical deficits in electricity generation and potable water supply, the situation is changing. Iran has woken up to these vulnerabilities and is now directing billions of dollars toward restructuring its essential infrastructure.

However, it still needs to prove that domestic infrastructure is a higher priority than funding militias in foreign territories.
The most impressive phenomenon, however, is occurring in the field of knowledge.

Just a few years ago, anyone who predicted that Iran would surpass powers such as Germany, Japan, and India in frontier areas like nanotechnology would have been laughed at. Today, the data confirms that this is the new geopolitical reality of science.

When we examine indicators such as SCImago Journal & Country Rank, StatNano, Web of Science, Nature Index, and the ASPI Critical Technology Tracker, Iran ranks among the world’s top ten scientific powers in several fields.
Global Research Ranking – Iran (Top 10 Worldwide)

According to consolidated indicators of scientific output and academic impact, Iran belongs to the global elite in the following disciplines:

•Nanotechnology: 4th to 6th place

•Artificial Neural Networks: 6th place

•Industrial Engineering: 7th place

•Aerospace Engineering: 8th place

•Mechanical Engineering: 9th place

•Analytical Chemistry: 9th place

•Surface Science: 9th place

•Energy Engineering: 10th place

(These positions come from a compilation the rankings of SCImago Journal & Country Rank, StatNano, Web of Science, Nature Index, and the ASPI Critical Technology Tracker.)
Strategic Breakdown (ASPI Critical Technology Tracker – 2025 Update)

The ASPI report shows that Iran not only publishes in large volume but also with high impact.

The country ranks in the global top 5 in six critical technologies, including:

Aircraft engines and hypersonics, where it competes directly with major global powers

Biofuels and smart materials, areas in which Iranian scientific production is considered world-class;

Nanomaterials and advanced coatings, directly linking basic science to defense and heavy industry

Smart materials;

All of this has been achieved despite international sanctions, which have ironically helped Iran become one of the fastest-growing nations in technology worldwide.

This progress is driven by an internal ecosystem of elite universities, such as Sharif and Tehran, that have turned isolation into a powerful engine of technical self-sufficiency.

Iran has reached a technological level where, even if it abandoned its current nuclear project, it could restart and complete it in just a few years.

This gives the country the ability to make its own choices and chart its own path.
The West needs to recognize the technological advances Iran has made over the past three decades.

Which Western nation possesses hypersonic missiles with short, medium, and intermediate range? Not even the United States has this capability with fully domestic technology, something Iran has already achieved.

In addition, Iran belongs to the select group of nations capable of manufacturing its own satellites and placing them into orbit using indigenous launch vehicles. However, Iranian technology goes far beyond aerospace. The country has one of the most vertically integrated automotive supply chains in the world. It does not merely assemble vehicles; it designs and manufactures the majority of their critical components.

In the medical field, Behyar Sanat Sepahan produces linear accelerators for cancer treatment, a technology mastered by very few countries. Iran is also self-sufficient in the production of dialysis machines and filters, which it exports to neighboring countries through the Medisa Consortium.

In surgical robotics, it developed the Sina robot, a remote surgery system similar to the American Da Vinci.

In life support, companies such as Pooyandegan-e-Raho Saadat manufacture ICU ventilators and vital signs monitors exported to more than 40 countries, along with the entire ecosystem of bedside monitors and sensors for coronary and intensive care units

The country produces about 97% of the medicines it consumes, including complex biosimilars for cancer and multiple sclerosis, through major groups such as the Barkat Group.

I do not see how bombings or the wave of assassinations, which has already killed nearly 30 scientists, engineers, and top specialists, could destroy this accumulated knowledge. At most, they can delay progress in various dual-use areas.

During the 12-day war, Iranian universities and research centers were attacked, prompting a missile response against the Weizmann Institute, the IIBR (Ness Ziona), a biological research center linked to the Israeli Ministry of Defense, and the universities of Tel Aviv, Technion, and Ben-Gurion.

No one wins in this kind of confrontation. In a more prolonged escalation, both countries could mutually destroy their scientific infrastructures.

It is essential to stop the war, negotiate with Iran, and begin a long-term project of rapprochement and openness, similar to the West’s historical approach with Turkey.

War was the worst path chosen. The United States has never engaged in an armed conflict against a nation of Iran’s size and technological sophistication.

However, Iran must also take responsibility and mature politically, especially regarding its policy of interference and its relations with its neighbors.

The war shows every sign that these tensions will only deepen in the coming years, particularly in the event of a ground invasion.

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My recent Interview

1- t.co/TzuDZn03Lt your analysis of the Strait of Hormuz, you argue that Iran’s geographic and military positioning makes the strait almost impenetrable in the current configuration. From a purely military standpoint, what are the specific capabilities, missiles, mines, drones or terrain advantages, that give Iran such leverage over this chokepoint?

The first point to highlight is the local geography and how effectively Iran exploits it. If you look at a photo of the Strait of Hormuz from the Iranian side, you’ll see the strait is flanked by mountains.

Coupled with this, bathymetric data shows an average depth of 50–70 meters. This makes large vessels and submarines highly vulnerable, while favoring Iranian midget submarines, fast attack crafts (FACs), mines, USVs, and UUVs.

The Iranian arsenal is tailor-made for this type of warfare: ambushing enemies in the strait using midget subs, missile-armed fast boats, surface drones, undersea drones, and anti-ship missiles. Specifically regarding underwater drones, we are talking about modern assets up to 8 meters long, powered by lithium batteries and featuring high-stealth capabilities, such as the Azhdar.

In the last five years alone, the Persians have commissioned between 250 and 300 fast boats equipped with missiles ranging from 25 to 300 km, such as the Ghadir missiles found on modern Zulfiqar-class boats.

Furthermore, Iran appears to have already mined the strait, leaving only a narrow corridor close to its own territory, rendering any transiting vessel extremely vulnerable. Many of these missile and drone positions are housed in 'mini-bunkers' embedded within the mountain ranges flanking the strait. Imagine everything described above supported by aerial drones and anti-ship missiles.

To top it off, in January 2026, the IRGCN revealed a network of undersea missile tunnels and coastal bases designed to deploy fast boats and naval drones from protected shelters.
I do not believe any commander would force entry into that strait.

2 - t.co/spHUGxxMr9 suggest that Iran has been able to dictate the tempo of the conflict while continuing to export oil and influence global markets. Do you believe Tehran is deliberately managing escalation to weaponize uncertainty in energy markets without triggering a full closure of Hormuz?

Yes, and they do so strategically, planning for a protracted war of attrition. With market volatility and surging oil prices, Iran is ramping up political pressure on Trump, who is also facing pushback from Gulf nations suffering billions in losses and a stifled energy industry.

Companies like QatarEnergy have completely halted LNG production, Aramco is operating at half capacity, and Abu Dhabi’s ADNOC has significantly scaled back operations. This is not to mention Big Tech and the financial sector, which have also reduced their footprint in the Gulf following Iranian threats.

The Persians are waging an asymmetric war of external and internal politico-economic pressure against their adversaries, to the point where their success is becoming evident. They are managing the generated chaos, biding their time to announce the closure of the other strategic chokepoint, Bab el-Mandeb, via the Houthis. t.co/IBgUC6qxHl referenced the U.S. military exercise Millennium Challenge 2002 and the tactics used by Paul Van Riper’s “Red Team.” To what extent do you think the Iranian military doctrine today is directly inspired by that kind of asymmetric warfare model?

The Iranian Armed Forces were forged for this very conflict. Today, Iran does not operate medium or long-range radars, lacks intact airbases, and its military is deployed in highly fragmented and camouflaged formations across the territory.
How does Iran operate?

Aircraft take off and land from improvised hangars and airstrips hidden within mountain bases, which also house the bulk of their military hardware. Iran downs drones using its 358 loitering surface-to-air missile, which offers high mobility via small trucks, alongside short-range air defense units (SHORAD) like the Tor-M1 and Dezful. These are deployed selectively, signaling a strategy for a protracted war.

By keeping radars offline, Iran allows the US-Israel coalition to establish air superiority, which I assume is expected within Iranian war planning,focusing on preventing this from escalating into total air supremacy.

Another striking feature of the Iranian asymmetric model is the decentralization of C2 (Command and Control), enabling faster and more resilient response actions against any 'decapitation' strikes.

This model creates a checkmate for the coalition; the US Navy was built to project power through large surface vessels. Against Iran, the US fleet is forced to rely primarily on Tomahawks, stationed at least 700km off the coast, leaving F-18s without the necessary range to strike Iran's central cities.

4. Several Gulf states appear increasingly uncertain about Washington’s security guarantees. Based on what you are observing, do you think the war is accelerating a strategic shift in the region toward China as an alternative security and economic partner?

The region's major powers are already customers of the Chinese arms market, with the exception of Bahrain. Saudi Arabia has elevated its relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and has not only purchased Chinese missiles but also secured a technology transfer agreement with Beijing in this sector.

The UAE operates a vast fleet of Chinese drones, and its leading defense conglomerate, EDGE Group, maintains cooperation agreements with China's Norinco. While I believe the U.S. will remain the dominant power in the region, these nations will increasingly turn to the Chinese as a deterrent against Iran.

The Gulf states have long been a 'honeypot' for the Western defense industry. For instance, Qatar paid over $330 million per unit for the F-15QA Ababil in 2017, while Kuwait paid a similar price for each Eurofighter Typhoon in 2016.

However, as the war broke out, the U.S. not only prioritized Israel but also failed to adequately protect its own bases within these countries, calling into question the entire model of reliance on American security guarantees.

US-Israel munitions burn: $10-16 billion in the fist 4 days alone

The Payne Institute conducted a detailed ledger study tracking the types and quantities of munitions expended during the first 96 hours of the conflict. According to their analysis, 5,197 projectiles were fired.

A few days ago, I highlighted the emerging shortages, not only of air-defense interceptors, but also of precision-guided munitions.

This concern is now strongly validated by the Payne Institute’s findings, which show that up to one-third of certain critical stockpiles were consumed in just four days.

Considering the 55-65% decline in Iranian attack intensity observed over the past week, a 17-day projection of total munitions expenditure puts the estimated cost at an average of $22-30 billion for offensive and defensive weapons combined.

For defensive systems specifically, I applied the Hudson Institute’s estimate of a roughly 75% reduction in Iranian missile and drone launches.

The most alarming finding is that this calculation points to the near-exhaustion of Israel’s Arrow interceptors and places several other systems in critically low stock levels. It also indicates that stocks of key precision-guided munitions are rapidly approaching depletion.

This is a serious problem because both advanced interceptors and precision munitions have relatively slow production cycles.

This situation once again highlights what experts call America’s “industrial resilience gap”, especially when it comes to the rare minerals and raw materials needed to produce more advanced missiles and munitions.

We already saw the same weakness during the Ukraine war in 2023–2024.

Even before the Iran conflict began, the United States had started slowing down arms deliveries to Europe. The truth is that replacing spent ammunition is not something you can solve overnight with extra money or a presidential order.

It depends on a long, fragile supply chain that starts with mining critical minerals and explosive chemicals, passes through specialized component suppliers, and only ends at certified factories that simply cannot be switched to full speed on demand because U.S isn’t a war economy.

This is not solely an American problem, it affects the entire Western alliance. There is insufficient control over the strategic supply chains required for a prolonged high-intensity conflict.

We may be seeing a clear example of something very important: in a high-intensity war against a serious opponent, the weapons and ammunition you start with are basically all you’re going to have for a very long time.

This is happening because neither side can produce new supplies fast enough. The coalition’s factories are limited by how quickly they can work and by shortages of key raw materials. At the same time, Iran’s hidden underground production lines face the same constraints, even planned for this situation, they simply can’t keep up either.

From a functional perspective, a stalemate appears almost inevitable. When combined with mounting political-economic pressure, this dynamic will likely force a negotiated settlement, placing significantly heavier pressure on the United States than on other actors.

Join my Substack: substack.com/@global21?r=7k… Weapons launched against Iran according to Payne institute

Iran’s Post-War Air Defense: Changes in System Integration and Deployment Tactics

The 12-Day War, marked by Israeli air superiority, prompted accelerated reforms in mobility, autonomy, and hybrid integration in Iranian air defenses, particularly in their long-range battery, the Bavar-373.

1. Hardware Changes

- Miniaturization and Autonomy (TELAR): The Babar-373-II now integrates AESA radars into each launcher, eliminating cables and vulnerable central radars, enabling independent operations. The range is 300-400 km for large targets and about 85-150 km for stealth fighters.

- New Sayyad-4B+ Missiles:
Featuring dual seekers (active radar and IR), extended range (300-400 km), and a focus on counter-stealth, Iran believes these new missiles can overcome jamming and past failures against drones heavy drones.

- Integration of the Arman System:
This is Iran's equivalent to AEGIS, covering medium-range defense (up to 120 km) in self-sufficient vehicles. Investments improved setup agility to just 3 minutes; moreover, if links fail due to satellite disruptions like last year, both the Bavar-373-II and the 15th Khordad can continue operating autonomously. This was a major issue for Iran that caused blackouts in their air defenses.

- Surveillance Drones as "Flying Radars":
Models like the Mohajer-10 and Karrar conduct patrols and transmit data via satellites (BeiDou), allowing passive detection and keeping radars off until engagement.

2. Tactical Changes

- Radar Ambush (Passive Tracking):
The implementation of modern sensors was another shift. Now, optical/IRST sensors and drones detect targets; radars activate only for seconds to lock on, reducing exposure to counter-attacks.

- Geographic Dispersion:
This autonomy allows units to spread across 10-15 km² in tunnels and civilian sheds, emerging only after drone alerts and integrating with smaller systems for layers resistant to saturation. It seems Iran is attempting an interesting tactic that could work if cyber elements don't cause issues.

- Radical "Shoot-and-Scoot" Mobility: I've never seen this tactic with long-range air systems before, but Iran claims repositioning in under 4 minutes, with logistics for remote reloads, transforming this system tactically like MLRS or artillery.

3. Post-War Comparative (2025 vs. 2026)

Comparing configurations before and after the war, in 2025 connections relied on physical cables and centralized infrastructure, while in 2026 it adopts wireless datalinks with independent launchers, seemingly built with Chinese assistance. Dependency evolved from a giant, vulnerable search radar to a hybrid sensor network incorporating drones, IRST systems, and satellites. Reaction time, which previously took a long time to move the entire battery, is now reduced to under 4 minutes for the first vehicle to depart. Finally, the target focus shifted from conventional missiles and aircraft to advanced threats, such as counter-stealth, counter-drones, and, according to them, even hypersonic missiles.

4. Persistent Fragilities

- Slow Reload Logistics: Missile reloading takes 30-60 minutes with cranes, exposing them to orbital surveillance. However, all heavy batteries are like this.

- Datalink Vulnerability:
Although Iran has strong link protection technology as seen in drone, it has limits against interference, and the number of American assets dedicated to this indicates that jamming or hacking loads won't be small.

- Massive Thermal Signature:
Heat from the chassis detectable by LEO satellites is another vulnerability that would also nullify camouflage, but it's the same with every system.

- Radar Horizon vs. Cruise Missiles:
The truck-embedded radar has a short tracking radius of 35-45 km, with a brief reaction against low-altitude or terrain-masking threats, which in certain situations could favor Tomahawks. Overall, the Bavar-373-II, which had already been launched before the 12-Day War, received further modifications and became more resilient in 2026, thanks to Iranian innovations and partnerships (Russia/China), but it still needs to prove itself in the field. Now with many of its launchers autonomous and in guerrilla mode, we're talking about a real threat that's hard to contain due to its stealth capabilities. It's very likely that Iran would position other defenses like S-200 and their Hawk-23 analogs first and use the Bavar-373-II for shoot-and-scoot. The efficiency of all this will depend on the degree of EW employed by the Americans and its effectiveness.

American Debt and the Attack on Iran

The main concern for the American people should not be an attack on Iran, which would be just one of many in recent years, but rather the possibility of it escalating into a real regional war requiring enormous resources and generating even more debt.

Wars have been the primary historical driver of spikes in U.S. public debt, financed mainly through loans, taxes, and currency issuance, which generates inflation and prolonged costs in operations, equipment, veteran care, and interest.

Historically, conflicts such as the Civil War increased debt by 4,000% (from US$ 65 million to US$ 3 billion); World War I raised it from US$ 1 billion to US$ 25 billion; World War II cost US$ 4 trillion adjusted, pushing debt to 106% of GDP in 1946; the Korean War (1950-1953) cost about US$ 675 billion adjusted for 2025 (including direct and long-term costs), with defense spending reaching 13-14% of GDP; and the Vietnam War (1955-1975) totaled approximately US$ 2.27 trillion adjusted for 2025 (including operations, veterans, and other indirect costs), financed by higher taxes and inflation.

In recent wars, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and the "War on Terror" (2001-2022), total costs reached US$ 8 trillion, financed through debt without tax increases, including US$ 2.3 trillion in direct operations and US$ 2.2 trillion for veterans, with projected interest of US$ 2 trillion by 2030.

What would be the cost of a prolonged conflict with Iran?

What I can say is that, combining operational and reconstruction expenses, each day of war cost Israel $1.8-2.4 billion per day. If we imagine this situation amplified by American involvement, we could estimate something like $4 billion daily, assuming no losses.

In the scenario of it dragging on for 3 months, it would generate a direct cost of $360 billion, not including human and material losses. A conflict with Iran would certainly involve losses, and this number could easily be multiplied several times.

Then someone will say: "But the U.S. and Israel will carry out a surprise and overwhelming attack to prevent Iran from using its missiles."

Impressive, but the issue is that Israel, even with a fantastic ground operation and successive bombings, did not achieve this in the last war, and to complicate matters further, the U.S. did not achieve it in Iraq, when Saddam continued using his Scuds, nor in Yemen area ruled by Houthis, which is tiny.

Why would this happen now with Iran? There's no way to say:
"I'll just go over there and neutralize a missile powerhouse with 90 million inhabitants and be right back."

In this fragile moment, any attack on Iran becomes a war. The regime can no longer pre-arrange mutual and fake attacks because it is fragile. Any attack will turn into a war, and there are no short or cheap wars with a nation of 90 million people, especially one that could drag in an entire region. Some people will argue that this opportunity they have to overthrow the Iranian government, or that waiting for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon, will be much more costly and dangerous in the long run.

The attacks will not prevent either of those things. The Iranian facilities containing the 440 kg of uranium are very well protected, and it became clear in 2025 that they will not be destroyed with bombs.

Similarly, even with dozens of cells operating, Mossad and the CIA do not have the resources capable of overthrowing a government with more than a million troops, and even in a guerrilla warfare scenario, they could mobilize their proxies, totaling certainly more than 100,000 fighters.

I see no other path to dealing with Iran except the negotiation table.

China Intensifies Support for Iran and Could Change the Game

After sending a Type 055 destroyer and a Type 052 to the Sea of Oman region to escort the Ocean No. 1 intelligence ship, the Chinese are stepping up intelligence support to Iran.

The Ocean No. 1 is likely monitoring all movements of U.S. Navy ships and submarines and passing the information to Iran. But in an increasingly bold move, the Chinese are photographing U.S. bases and making the photos public, and this time they photographed a newly installed THAAD battery and posted the images with location data online.

Many people, including me, see this as a sign that the Chinese will not hesitate to provide full support to Iran, which appears to have turned to the Chinese after realizing that Russia’s ties with Israel were limiting the desired support.

With two modern destroyers and the Ocean No. 1 in the region providing data to Iran, there is no chance of a surprise attack, making a zero-casualty strike even more difficult for US-Israel.

Today alone, multiple Iranian facilities were hit by explosions, bringing the total to more than ten successful sabotage operations against the Iranian government in just the last ten days, including military targets.

Yes, I’m raising the hypothesis that the Chinese are giving Iran something similar to what they gave Pakistan in the last conflict with India, even though they deny it.

The Chinese support obviously goes beyond radars, which they know were easy targets last June. Those flights from China to Iran in the last two months, sometimes multiple times a day, didn’t have the capacity to carry anti-aircraft batteries, but they certainly had the capacity to carry a lot of integration equipment, including for ground BeiDou stations.

It seems to me that after Iran migrated almost its entire arsenal to BeiDou and acquired more Chinese radas, they are either already operating or planning to operate something similar to Pakistan’s Link 17.
If this happens, it would mean the Chinese are directly involved in target acquisition for the Iranians, completely preventing the kind of blackout that occurred last June.

That would be a game-changer almost impossible to overcome at this moment.

Iran’s C4ISR capabilities have received major investment in the last seven months, and China’s release of photos of U.S. bases clearly shows they intend to supply Iran with as much intelligence as possible. The Ocean No. 1 is China's first modern, comprehensive oceanographic research vessel, launched for deep-sea scientific exploration.

It is equipped with advanced seabed imaging and mapping systems, as well as extensive capabilities for collecting environmental data over wide ranges.

Here, I’ll put forward my own hypothesis: the ship is also capable of functioning in a way very similar to the American RC-135 aircraft.

With the sensors the Chinese have at their disposal, it can capture electronic emissions (RF, radar, communications) from nearby ships and aircraft, including COMINT (communications intelligence) and ELINT (electronic intelligence on non-communication signals).

This vessel is much more than a research platform, and the proof is that it has been sent to an area of imminent conflict, closely monitoring U.S. naval forces in the Arabian Sea.

Both the positions of the American fleet, including submarines, and their communications could be intercepted and relayed to Iran.

Billions in Arms, Training, and Diplomacy: How China and U.S Bought Pol Pot's Impunity for the Deadliest Genocide of the Century

The Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot, ruled Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, imposing one of the most brutal dictatorships in modern history.
The result was a genocide that killed between 1.7 and 2 million people, approximately 21–25% of the country’s population of 7.5-8 million, through executions, starvation, disease, and forced labor.

The violence was systematic and ideological. Immediately after seizing power, the Khmer Rouge forcibly evacuated cities, marching millions into the countryside in what became known as death marches. Any sign of education, wearing glasses, speaking foreign languages, or having a professional occupation, was grounds for investigation and summary execution.

Specific ethnic and religious groups were targeted, including ethnic Vietnamese, Cham Muslims, ethnic Chinese, and Buddhist monks.

Torture centers like Tuol Sleng (S-21) in Phnom Penh became symbols of the regime’s terror: between 14,000 and 20,000 prisoners passed through it, with only about a dozen survivors.

Torture methods, as whips, electric shocks, waterboarding, nail extraction, and starvation were used to extract absurd “confessions” of treason, often claiming victims were CIA or KGB agents.

After producing detailed and fabricated confessions, prisoners were executed with blows to the neck to conserve bullets.

The regime finally collapsed when Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979 and overthrew the Khmer Rouge.

Yet, in an absurd twist, after being driven from power, the Khmer Rouge survived as a guerrilla force for nearly two decades and received substantial international support.

China was the primary backer, providing billions of dollars in weapons, tanks, military training, and advisors.

The United States, providing financial aid to the Khmer Rouge itself, also imposed sanctions on Vietnam, and supported keeping the Pol Pot coalition’s diplomatic seat at the United Nations until 1993.

Other countries also contributed:
the United Kingdom trained some Pol Pot guerrilla, Singapore supplied arms, and Thailand provided border bases, training camps, and facilitated illegal trade in timber and gems that generated millions for the guerrillas.
European nations were divided but generally voted in line with the U.S. at the UN.

Romania was the only Warsaw Pact country to condemn the Vietnamese invasion and openly support the Khmer Rouge guerrilla. Other ASEAN members offered logistical assistance to the Pol Pot coalition.

The guerrilla war dragged on until the late 1990s, allowing Pol Pot, the century’s most prolific genocida, to die in 1998 without ever facing trial.

Nearly 40,000 Vietnamese soldiers and civilians died fighting the Khmer Rouge remnants, which were financed and armed primarily by China and indirectly sustained by U.S. policy.

Frustrated by the fall of its ally, China launched a brief punitive invasion of Vietnam in 1979 but was repelled and forced to withdraw.

Today, sites like Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek serve as memorials to ensure the horror is never forgotten. .)macmillan.yale.edu/gsp/us-involve…

Solid-State Batteries: Wolfpacks of Small UUVs Will Dominate the Seas

UUVs are currently the most dangerous threat to submarines and military surface ships. Their development is accelerating rapidly, and I would argue that the smallest ones are the most dangerous.

This week, the first solid-state battery ready for mass production was announced, with an energy density of 400 Wh/kg. By 2028, several companies are promising to reach 600 Wh/kg , roughly 3–4 times the density of today’s lithium-ion batteries.

This will completely transform naval warfare.  
It not only renders conventional diesel-electric submarines obsolete but also creates an entirely new category of UUVs: small, mini, and extremely fast.

I’m talking about UUVs in the 250–350 kg weight, capable of sprint speeds of 45–50 knots.

They would carry a compact 50 kg warhead using modern explosives, including CL-20-based mixtures, inside a fuselage largely composed of solid-state battery cells, supplemented by a small 2.5 kVA gasoline generator with a snorkel for recharging.

These UUVs could be air-dropped, ships, submarines, from aircraft or larger drones, and operate in Wolfpack, sprinting up to 35 km to engage targets.

If the target pulls out of range, the onboard AI calculates that interception is no longer feasible and switches to recharge mode, surfacing discreetly, running the generator, and continuing to track the target via periscope or mast-mounted sensors. It analyzes surface images, estimates target course and speed, and calculates the exact energy needed for a new high-speed intercept, also getting data from satellites or drones, composing a versatile kill web.

A true high-tech wolfpack: persistent, autonomous, and capable of engaging both surface ships and submerged submarines (by forcing them to surface or detecting them when they snorkel).

Warhead design is evolving toward combined shaped charge + blast configurations: an initial shaped charge penetrates the outer hull or Kevlar spall liners (creating a breach and injecting energy), followed immediately by the main high-explosive blast that causes flooding, shock damage to equipment, and internal compartment failure. 

This mirrors the mechanism of modern lightweight torpedoes.

A UUV carrying just 50 kg of advanced explosive in such a warhead would be capable of breaching the pressure hull of a Virginia-class submarine or the hull of an Arleigh Burke-class or Type 055 destroyers, causing serious flooding and likely achieving at least a mission kill. In successive impacts from a wolfpack, the damage would be catastrophic, comparable to that inflicted by an Mk 54 or MU90 torpedo.

Another key development is the refinement of UUV AI to prioritize initial strikes against propulsion systems (shafts, propellers, reduction gears, or waterjets), maximizing the chance of immobilizing the target early.

These are fully autonomous units that can loiter for weeks, hunting targets, making independent decisions, and even receiving software updates while recharging on the surface.

They fit into a broader ecosystem of UUVs,  primarily propeller-driven, torpedo-shaped vehicles weighing 250–350 kg with warheads of 50–100 kg,  but the range of designs and capabilities is expanding fast.

Their cost is orders of magnitude lower than any manned ship or submarine, and effective countermeasures do not yet exist. We are talking about a technology that could put billions of dollars in naval investments at risk.

The trend is clear: UUVs will continue to get cheaper, faster, longer-ranging, and smarter, while traditional platforms (surface ships and submarines) only become more expensive and vulnerable.

These wolfpacks will be supported and coordinated by drones, satellites, and motherships.

Just as drones have reshaped land warfare, UUV swarms are doing the same at sea. @podernaval @NavyLookout want to hear you.

The era of monsters like AUKUS is over.

When the AUKUS program – which I will discuss in the coming days – was designed, it was already obsolete. Its most likely future is cancellation as many US programs during the last years.

Just as drones in Ukraine dominated the battlefield in Ukraine, and proved that anything big and slow becomes vulnerable and almost useless, the same fate now reaches submarines.

Hundreds of underwater drones will hunt submarines for hours or days until they find them, and China leads these breakthrough technologies.

Two stand out:

- Magnetic Wake Detection: developed by Northwestern Polytechnical University (NPU), it tracks magnetic disturbances left by moving submarines, even stealth Seawolf-class ones. Chinese UUVs already integrate this with existing MAD systems, mapping persistent wakes in real time. In 2025 tests, it merged with acoustic networks and AI to form a vast detection grid.

- CPT Atomic Magnetometer (quantum sensor): the most promising, it eliminates low-latitude blind spots with extreme precision. Initially tested on tethered aerial drones, it is now being adapted for submerged UUVs using rubidium for omnidirectional anomaly detection. CASC researchers are miniaturising and mass-producing it; in simulations, AI-equipped UUVs distinguished real targets from false positives (e.g. whales) with 95% accuracy.

None of this is theoretical – it is already part of China’s Underwater Great Wall, a mobile sensor network fusing magnetic, passive sonar and AI data.

This is exactly why Japan’s new submarine - using lithium batteries- program draws so much attention: excellent cost, real innovation, and units entering service before 2032 will also be modern long-range (1,000-3,000km) missile platforms even for hypersonic missiles.

They are cheap enough that the AUKUS budget could hypothetically buy hundreds of them.

The future lies in smaller, cheaper, more numerous units – never the opposite. Modern warfare is entering the age of decentralisation, and programs like AUKUS are its exact antithesis. So someone comes along and says: “The era of submarines is over because drones will now hunt them down?”

No. Just as the era of armored vehicles didn’t end. But you’re no longer going to sink hundreds of billions into a submarine program or pay billions for a single boat, because every day the odds of losing it being lost in combat grow higher.

The logic of warfare hasn’t changed: it has to be cheap, mass-produced, easily replaceable, and simple to maintain. Today’s nuclear submarines are none of those things. This is why the Japanese show a new horizon.

The Russians pay half the amount for a 152mm shell compared to what the Germans pay for a 30mm ammo.

A while back, I wrote a post about Rheinmetall selling their Caracal 4x4 to the German government for over $600,000. Recently, I've been looking into the variations in ammunition costs among Western companies.

Rheinmetall is asking for over $600 for a Gepaed 35mm round, which is the same price the Russians are paying for a 152mm artillery round. But it doesn't stop there. Rheinmetall also sold 600,000 30mm rounds to be used in the PUMA IFV for $1,000 each.

In all three of these overpriced sales, the client was the German government. To put it in perspective, the US ordered and paid $108 for each round back in 2017. Obviously, costs vary depending on the type of ammo, but $1,000 for a single 30mm round? This puts a burden on the German taxpayers.

There's a concern that Europe wouldn't be able to sustain a war with these prices. They could bankrupt any country before troops are even prepared for combat. The focus here is not on the quality, but rather the sustainable cost during a real war.
A single medium Cal cannon can fire 5,000 rounds in less than one minute. How can pay that bill?

Yesterday, a video was released on some Russian channels, supposedly recorded in Omsk.

Omsktransmash doesn't work with any MLRS except the TOS-1.

Since June, they haven't been producing new batches of tanks anymore.
Is it now KBTM refurbishing Uragans? Highly unlikely.

These… https://t.co/HZHNgaJR7atwitter.com/i/web/status/1…
This potential military collaboration between former Soviet republics and Russia holds significant importance for the outcome of war.

These nations possess a wide range of armored vehicles, hundreds of artillery systems, and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS).

They boast a… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

Omsktransmash has finished the modernization of a batch of T-80BVM tanks, which are now on their way to Ukraine.

This marks the second batch of tanks in less than 30 days. The previous batch consisted of T90M tanks.

The frequency and size of these batches confirm my previous… https://t.co/xJsMfYHqvHtwitter.com/i/web/status/1…
The mass production of SOSNA-U devices has indeed put an end to the previous bottleneck in Russia's tank production.

Some months ago, I had discussed the projected waiting time of 2-5 months for these devices. Regrettably, it appears that the allies have missed this window of… https://t.co/spOEBt16jOtwitter.com/i/web/status/1…

It appears that The time windows for an attrition war against Russia was missed.

Months ago, I wrote about the three biggest Russian factories idling their production due to a shortage of electronics.

()

Now, the situation is just the opposite. The… https://t.co/GUxFlOOGte https://t.co/XMV8tDch3k

https://twitter.com/pati_marins64/status/1638913309217898500?t=leSAzHlybtz3d5PvGgYMNw&s=19

twitter.com/i/web/status/1…


Recent Govt visit to Omsktransmash.

🧵1/11
Patriot still has the same failures as 30y ago.
This thread is specially about the American tax payer, who deserve to spend their money on something that works and a transparent company. These systems cost billions.

Well, to understand this, we must come back to 1991. 2/11
During the 1991 Gulf War, the public was led to believe the that the Patriot had near-perfect performance, intercepting 45 of 47 Scud missiles.
The truth was a system w failures and only 9% of successful interceptions.
The company blamed a software

washingtonpost.com/archive/politi…

1/3
Apparently the US want to test some aspects of IBCS in Ukraine.

The Pentagon sent an
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), Battle Command System (IBCS) and an Engagement Operations Center (EOC) for Ukraine.
If it works, would mean huge advance.

breakingdefense.com/2023/04/pentag… 2/3
The IBCS will integrate multiple sensors and weapon systems into a single network, enabling faster decision-making and more efficient engagement of targets in multi-domain battle operations.
A completely independent Fire Control system operating on a powerful radar network.

🧵1/9
Kinzhal and Iskander missiles, something similar, but different.

Both missiles reach hypersonic speed, it means above mach 5.
The Kinzhal is air launched, while the Iskander has ground launchers.

But there is a big difference between them: the flight altitude.

2/9
While the Kinzhal is launched at 20km altitude and keep it's flight maneuvering at that zone, the Iskander fly at 40-50km altitude. It makes the missiles completely different and in distinct levels of interceptions.
E.g the Pac-3 has 35km altitude range; Pac-2 (24km) alt.

🧵1/6
NATO have no other way of not a cobtroled and progressive escalation.

During May (today 29), the Ukrainian air command announced that were intercepted around 530 threats.
The Ukr ADs works with missiles and Self-propelled cannons, but only the Gepard had an efficient radar 2/6
These ADs have some standard engagements. For example if the threat is detected at a short distance e/or a high speed, the engagement is double by standard. Some slower ADs have this rule for every target.

Can 530 interceptions means 1060 missiles? No, it's not so simple.

🧵1/7
Saudi Arabia is investing high to have it's own defense industry.

KSA has made a lot of progress in building up its domestic arms industry, developing land weapons systems, electronics, and smart bombs.
They were the the world’s 2nd largest arms importer in 2018–22. 2/7
I did watch their development in many expos around the world. Their way is very similar to the EDGE group.

(SAMI) is the commercial entity charged with developing Def industry in the kingdom; it has an ambitious goal of producing 50 percent of defense matériel by 2030.

1/3
Ukr got like 60-70 Aircrafts during the last 12 months and had others 40-60 operating after Feb/22.
Even with Harm missiles it didn't change the the air status during the war and most of these were lost.
Everything flying over 200fts die in days/weeks.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/… 2/3
The whole territory is satured by air defenses. I'm skeptical.

Some people argue that aircrafts like the A-29 and the At-6 wolverine would be much cheaper, able to operate on dirty roads and with a faster maintenance. Maybe better choice.

US/allies have around 120 of these.