China Intensifies Support for Iran and Could Change the Game

After sending a Type 055 destroyer and a Type 052 to the Sea of Oman region to escort the Ocean No. 1 intelligence ship, the Chinese are stepping up intelligence support to Iran.

The Ocean No. 1 is likely monitoring all movements of U.S. Navy ships and submarines and passing the information to Iran. But in an increasingly bold move, the Chinese are photographing U.S. bases and making the photos public, and this time they photographed a newly installed THAAD battery and posted the images with location data online.

Many people, including me, see this as a sign that the Chinese will not hesitate to provide full support to Iran, which appears to have turned to the Chinese after realizing that Russia’s ties with Israel were limiting the desired support.

With two modern destroyers and the Ocean No. 1 in the region providing data to Iran, there is no chance of a surprise attack, making a zero-casualty strike even more difficult for US-Israel.

Today alone, multiple Iranian facilities were hit by explosions, bringing the total to more than ten successful sabotage operations against the Iranian government in just the last ten days, including military targets.

Yes, I’m raising the hypothesis that the Chinese are giving Iran something similar to what they gave Pakistan in the last conflict with India, even though they deny it.

The Chinese support obviously goes beyond radars, which they know were easy targets last June. Those flights from China to Iran in the last two months, sometimes multiple times a day, didn’t have the capacity to carry anti-aircraft batteries, but they certainly had the capacity to carry a lot of integration equipment, including for ground BeiDou stations.

It seems to me that after Iran migrated almost its entire arsenal to BeiDou and acquired more Chinese radas, they are either already operating or planning to operate something similar to Pakistan’s Link 17.
If this happens, it would mean the Chinese are directly involved in target acquisition for the Iranians, completely preventing the kind of blackout that occurred last June.

That would be a game-changer almost impossible to overcome at this moment.

Iran’s C4ISR capabilities have received major investment in the last seven months, and China’s release of photos of U.S. bases clearly shows they intend to supply Iran with as much intelligence as possible. The Ocean No. 1 is China's first modern, comprehensive oceanographic research vessel, launched for deep-sea scientific exploration.

It is equipped with advanced seabed imaging and mapping systems, as well as extensive capabilities for collecting environmental data over wide ranges.

Here, I’ll put forward my own hypothesis: the ship is also capable of functioning in a way very similar to the American RC-135 aircraft.

With the sensors the Chinese have at their disposal, it can capture electronic emissions (RF, radar, communications) from nearby ships and aircraft, including COMINT (communications intelligence) and ELINT (electronic intelligence on non-communication signals).

This vessel is much more than a research platform, and the proof is that it has been sent to an area of imminent conflict, closely monitoring U.S. naval forces in the Arabian Sea.

Both the positions of the American fleet, including submarines, and their communications could be intercepted and relayed to Iran.

Billions in Arms, Training, and Diplomacy: How China and U.S Bought Pol Pot's Impunity for the Deadliest Genocide of the Century

The Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot, ruled Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, imposing one of the most brutal dictatorships in modern history.
The result was a genocide that killed between 1.7 and 2 million people, approximately 21–25% of the country’s population of 7.5-8 million, through executions, starvation, disease, and forced labor.

The violence was systematic and ideological. Immediately after seizing power, the Khmer Rouge forcibly evacuated cities, marching millions into the countryside in what became known as death marches. Any sign of education, wearing glasses, speaking foreign languages, or having a professional occupation, was grounds for investigation and summary execution.

Specific ethnic and religious groups were targeted, including ethnic Vietnamese, Cham Muslims, ethnic Chinese, and Buddhist monks.

Torture centers like Tuol Sleng (S-21) in Phnom Penh became symbols of the regime’s terror: between 14,000 and 20,000 prisoners passed through it, with only about a dozen survivors.

Torture methods, as whips, electric shocks, waterboarding, nail extraction, and starvation were used to extract absurd “confessions” of treason, often claiming victims were CIA or KGB agents.

After producing detailed and fabricated confessions, prisoners were executed with blows to the neck to conserve bullets.

The regime finally collapsed when Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979 and overthrew the Khmer Rouge.

Yet, in an absurd twist, after being driven from power, the Khmer Rouge survived as a guerrilla force for nearly two decades and received substantial international support.

China was the primary backer, providing billions of dollars in weapons, tanks, military training, and advisors.

The United States, providing financial aid to the Khmer Rouge itself, also imposed sanctions on Vietnam, and supported keeping the Pol Pot coalition’s diplomatic seat at the United Nations until 1993.

Other countries also contributed:
the United Kingdom trained some Pol Pot guerrilla, Singapore supplied arms, and Thailand provided border bases, training camps, and facilitated illegal trade in timber and gems that generated millions for the guerrillas.
European nations were divided but generally voted in line with the U.S. at the UN.

Romania was the only Warsaw Pact country to condemn the Vietnamese invasion and openly support the Khmer Rouge guerrilla. Other ASEAN members offered logistical assistance to the Pol Pot coalition.

The guerrilla war dragged on until the late 1990s, allowing Pol Pot, the century’s most prolific genocida, to die in 1998 without ever facing trial.

Nearly 40,000 Vietnamese soldiers and civilians died fighting the Khmer Rouge remnants, which were financed and armed primarily by China and indirectly sustained by U.S. policy.

Frustrated by the fall of its ally, China launched a brief punitive invasion of Vietnam in 1979 but was repelled and forced to withdraw.

Today, sites like Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek serve as memorials to ensure the horror is never forgotten. .)macmillan.yale.edu/gsp/us-involve…

Solid-State Batteries: Wolfpacks of Small UUVs Will Dominate the Seas

UUVs are currently the most dangerous threat to submarines and military surface ships. Their development is accelerating rapidly, and I would argue that the smallest ones are the most dangerous.

This week, the first solid-state battery ready for mass production was announced, with an energy density of 400 Wh/kg. By 2028, several companies are promising to reach 600 Wh/kg , roughly 3–4 times the density of today’s lithium-ion batteries.

This will completely transform naval warfare.  
It not only renders conventional diesel-electric submarines obsolete but also creates an entirely new category of UUVs: small, mini, and extremely fast.

I’m talking about UUVs in the 250–350 kg weight, capable of sprint speeds of 45–50 knots.

They would carry a compact 50 kg warhead using modern explosives, including CL-20-based mixtures, inside a fuselage largely composed of solid-state battery cells, supplemented by a small 2.5 kVA gasoline generator with a snorkel for recharging.

These UUVs could be air-dropped, ships, submarines, from aircraft or larger drones, and operate in Wolfpack, sprinting up to 35 km to engage targets.

If the target pulls out of range, the onboard AI calculates that interception is no longer feasible and switches to recharge mode, surfacing discreetly, running the generator, and continuing to track the target via periscope or mast-mounted sensors. It analyzes surface images, estimates target course and speed, and calculates the exact energy needed for a new high-speed intercept, also getting data from satellites or drones, composing a versatile kill web.

A true high-tech wolfpack: persistent, autonomous, and capable of engaging both surface ships and submerged submarines (by forcing them to surface or detecting them when they snorkel).

Warhead design is evolving toward combined shaped charge + blast configurations: an initial shaped charge penetrates the outer hull or Kevlar spall liners (creating a breach and injecting energy), followed immediately by the main high-explosive blast that causes flooding, shock damage to equipment, and internal compartment failure. 

This mirrors the mechanism of modern lightweight torpedoes.

A UUV carrying just 50 kg of advanced explosive in such a warhead would be capable of breaching the pressure hull of a Virginia-class submarine or the hull of an Arleigh Burke-class or Type 055 destroyers, causing serious flooding and likely achieving at least a mission kill. In successive impacts from a wolfpack, the damage would be catastrophic, comparable to that inflicted by an Mk 54 or MU90 torpedo.

Another key development is the refinement of UUV AI to prioritize initial strikes against propulsion systems (shafts, propellers, reduction gears, or waterjets), maximizing the chance of immobilizing the target early.

These are fully autonomous units that can loiter for weeks, hunting targets, making independent decisions, and even receiving software updates while recharging on the surface.

They fit into a broader ecosystem of UUVs,  primarily propeller-driven, torpedo-shaped vehicles weighing 250–350 kg with warheads of 50–100 kg,  but the range of designs and capabilities is expanding fast.

Their cost is orders of magnitude lower than any manned ship or submarine, and effective countermeasures do not yet exist. We are talking about a technology that could put billions of dollars in naval investments at risk.

The trend is clear: UUVs will continue to get cheaper, faster, longer-ranging, and smarter, while traditional platforms (surface ships and submarines) only become more expensive and vulnerable.

These wolfpacks will be supported and coordinated by drones, satellites, and motherships.

Just as drones have reshaped land warfare, UUV swarms are doing the same at sea. @podernaval @NavyLookout want to hear you.

The era of monsters like AUKUS is over.

When the AUKUS program – which I will discuss in the coming days – was designed, it was already obsolete. Its most likely future is cancellation as many US programs during the last years.

Just as drones in Ukraine dominated the battlefield in Ukraine, and proved that anything big and slow becomes vulnerable and almost useless, the same fate now reaches submarines.

Hundreds of underwater drones will hunt submarines for hours or days until they find them, and China leads these breakthrough technologies.

Two stand out:

- Magnetic Wake Detection: developed by Northwestern Polytechnical University (NPU), it tracks magnetic disturbances left by moving submarines, even stealth Seawolf-class ones. Chinese UUVs already integrate this with existing MAD systems, mapping persistent wakes in real time. In 2025 tests, it merged with acoustic networks and AI to form a vast detection grid.

- CPT Atomic Magnetometer (quantum sensor): the most promising, it eliminates low-latitude blind spots with extreme precision. Initially tested on tethered aerial drones, it is now being adapted for submerged UUVs using rubidium for omnidirectional anomaly detection. CASC researchers are miniaturising and mass-producing it; in simulations, AI-equipped UUVs distinguished real targets from false positives (e.g. whales) with 95% accuracy.

None of this is theoretical – it is already part of China’s Underwater Great Wall, a mobile sensor network fusing magnetic, passive sonar and AI data.

This is exactly why Japan’s new submarine - using lithium batteries- program draws so much attention: excellent cost, real innovation, and units entering service before 2032 will also be modern long-range (1,000-3,000km) missile platforms even for hypersonic missiles.

They are cheap enough that the AUKUS budget could hypothetically buy hundreds of them.

The future lies in smaller, cheaper, more numerous units – never the opposite. Modern warfare is entering the age of decentralisation, and programs like AUKUS are its exact antithesis. So someone comes along and says: “The era of submarines is over because drones will now hunt them down?”

No. Just as the era of armored vehicles didn’t end. But you’re no longer going to sink hundreds of billions into a submarine program or pay billions for a single boat, because every day the odds of losing it being lost in combat grow higher.

The logic of warfare hasn’t changed: it has to be cheap, mass-produced, easily replaceable, and simple to maintain. Today’s nuclear submarines are none of those things. This is why the Japanese show a new horizon.

The Russians pay half the amount for a 152mm shell compared to what the Germans pay for a 30mm ammo.

A while back, I wrote a post about Rheinmetall selling their Caracal 4x4 to the German government for over $600,000. Recently, I've been looking into the variations in ammunition costs among Western companies.

Rheinmetall is asking for over $600 for a Gepaed 35mm round, which is the same price the Russians are paying for a 152mm artillery round. But it doesn't stop there. Rheinmetall also sold 600,000 30mm rounds to be used in the PUMA IFV for $1,000 each.

In all three of these overpriced sales, the client was the German government. To put it in perspective, the US ordered and paid $108 for each round back in 2017. Obviously, costs vary depending on the type of ammo, but $1,000 for a single 30mm round? This puts a burden on the German taxpayers.

There's a concern that Europe wouldn't be able to sustain a war with these prices. They could bankrupt any country before troops are even prepared for combat. The focus here is not on the quality, but rather the sustainable cost during a real war.
A single medium Cal cannon can fire 5,000 rounds in less than one minute. How can pay that bill?

Yesterday, a video was released on some Russian channels, supposedly recorded in Omsk.

Omsktransmash doesn't work with any MLRS except the TOS-1.

Since June, they haven't been producing new batches of tanks anymore.
Is it now KBTM refurbishing Uragans? Highly unlikely.

These… https://t.co/HZHNgaJR7atwitter.com/i/web/status/1…
This potential military collaboration between former Soviet republics and Russia holds significant importance for the outcome of war.

These nations possess a wide range of armored vehicles, hundreds of artillery systems, and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS).

They boast a… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

Omsktransmash has finished the modernization of a batch of T-80BVM tanks, which are now on their way to Ukraine.

This marks the second batch of tanks in less than 30 days. The previous batch consisted of T90M tanks.

The frequency and size of these batches confirm my previous… https://t.co/xJsMfYHqvHtwitter.com/i/web/status/1…
The mass production of SOSNA-U devices has indeed put an end to the previous bottleneck in Russia's tank production.

Some months ago, I had discussed the projected waiting time of 2-5 months for these devices. Regrettably, it appears that the allies have missed this window of… https://t.co/spOEBt16jOtwitter.com/i/web/status/1…

It appears that The time windows for an attrition war against Russia was missed.

Months ago, I wrote about the three biggest Russian factories idling their production due to a shortage of electronics.

()

Now, the situation is just the opposite. The… https://t.co/GUxFlOOGte https://t.co/XMV8tDch3k

https://twitter.com/pati_marins64/status/1638913309217898500?t=leSAzHlybtz3d5PvGgYMNw&s=19

twitter.com/i/web/status/1…


Recent Govt visit to Omsktransmash.

🧵1/11
Patriot still has the same failures as 30y ago.
This thread is specially about the American tax payer, who deserve to spend their money on something that works and a transparent company. These systems cost billions.

Well, to understand this, we must come back to 1991. 2/11
During the 1991 Gulf War, the public was led to believe the that the Patriot had near-perfect performance, intercepting 45 of 47 Scud missiles.
The truth was a system w failures and only 9% of successful interceptions.
The company blamed a software

washingtonpost.com/archive/politi…

1/3
Apparently the US want to test some aspects of IBCS in Ukraine.

The Pentagon sent an
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), Battle Command System (IBCS) and an Engagement Operations Center (EOC) for Ukraine.
If it works, would mean huge advance.

breakingdefense.com/2023/04/pentag… 2/3
The IBCS will integrate multiple sensors and weapon systems into a single network, enabling faster decision-making and more efficient engagement of targets in multi-domain battle operations.
A completely independent Fire Control system operating on a powerful radar network.

🧵1/9
Kinzhal and Iskander missiles, something similar, but different.

Both missiles reach hypersonic speed, it means above mach 5.
The Kinzhal is air launched, while the Iskander has ground launchers.

But there is a big difference between them: the flight altitude.

2/9
While the Kinzhal is launched at 20km altitude and keep it's flight maneuvering at that zone, the Iskander fly at 40-50km altitude. It makes the missiles completely different and in distinct levels of interceptions.
E.g the Pac-3 has 35km altitude range; Pac-2 (24km) alt.

🧵1/6
NATO have no other way of not a cobtroled and progressive escalation.

During May (today 29), the Ukrainian air command announced that were intercepted around 530 threats.
The Ukr ADs works with missiles and Self-propelled cannons, but only the Gepard had an efficient radar 2/6
These ADs have some standard engagements. For example if the threat is detected at a short distance e/or a high speed, the engagement is double by standard. Some slower ADs have this rule for every target.

Can 530 interceptions means 1060 missiles? No, it's not so simple.

🧵1/7
Saudi Arabia is investing high to have it's own defense industry.

KSA has made a lot of progress in building up its domestic arms industry, developing land weapons systems, electronics, and smart bombs.
They were the the world’s 2nd largest arms importer in 2018–22. 2/7
I did watch their development in many expos around the world. Their way is very similar to the EDGE group.

(SAMI) is the commercial entity charged with developing Def industry in the kingdom; it has an ambitious goal of producing 50 percent of defense matériel by 2030.

1/3
Ukr got like 60-70 Aircrafts during the last 12 months and had others 40-60 operating after Feb/22.
Even with Harm missiles it didn't change the the air status during the war and most of these were lost.
Everything flying over 200fts die in days/weeks.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/… 2/3
The whole territory is satured by air defenses. I'm skeptical.

Some people argue that aircrafts like the A-29 and the At-6 wolverine would be much cheaper, able to operate on dirty roads and with a faster maintenance. Maybe better choice.

US/allies have around 120 of these.

🧵1/5
Continuing the question about the RU sattelites and it's fail in provide images about the war.

During the last years RU launched many sattelites. Specially we are talking about the Bars-M/M4 with upgrades.
Nothing justify the absence of images.
space.com/russia-soyuz-l… 2/5
The Russian space program regularly launched sattelites even for the US and other countries.
Since 2015 were launched 4 Bars-M high resolution sattelites. Why they didn't release anything when propaganda is important? Something isn't working.

thehindu.com/sci-tech/scien…

🧵1/6
If Russia destroyed 5 Patriot Batteries, why they didn't released the sattelite images?

I don't care about how many batteries were destroyed, but I want to talk about the failures of Russian sattelites over Ukraine.

What happened with the Russian space program? 2/6
Today, RU military satellites orbiting the Earth include 25 GLONASS satellites, 47 communications satellites, 6 satellites of the ECS missile warning system, 7 satellites of the Liana marine electronic reconnaissance system, some topographic, radar-location...
How many work?

🧵1/9
New players emerging in arms market.

Sometime ago I wrote about how expensive the western equipment became and, how new countries are emerging as defense exporters.
For example, I was explaining about some Turkish equipment costing just 35-50% of western equivalent. 2/9
From almost one decade RU is losing global market share of defense export.

In 2009-2013 RU had 27% of the global market;
In 2014-2018 this number was 21%;
And in 2017-2021 it reached just 18.6%;
My opnion? The quality isn't a problem for their equipment, but the post sales.

🧵1/9
From last years, 6 countries emerged as competitive players in this market: India, Iran, Turkey, North Korea, China and Sweden. These countries have a variety of weapons and capacity to research, develop and manufacture.
But one even under sanctions, grew considerably:Iran. 2/9
Among them, the Iran deserve a deep analysis.
Iran didn't just bought it's technology from other countries. Their development involve some reverse engineering, but specially a heavy investment in research.
Second the ASPII TECH tracking, Iran is top 4 on some fields

1/3
Recently I was talking to someone from an Arab defense company, who told me about the recent improvements in Iranian Air Defense systems. In fact Iran alone has more ADs than all EU together.

Differently from what people think, it's not just based on Russian technology. 2/3
The Iranian air defenses took the best from US Navy AD systems and the best from RU missiles to build their own systems.

I'm not sure but I think their radars are working with GaN. It's very similar to the AN/TPY 2 long range radar.

🧵1/5
The new deliveries can give new capabilities for Ukraine.

During the entire war, Ukraine received mostly taxis for its troops. Were more than 4.500 APCs, MRAPs, Infantry Mobile Vehicles and others light vehicles. (like 75%)

Now it's different. Ukraine has combined arms. 2/5
Ukraine is getting near 100 heavy Tanks and 250 relatively modern Infantry Fight Vehicles.
Before Ukraine was receiving mostly outdated vehicles.

For the first time after exhausting it's tochka-u, the Ukrainian army can employ combined weapons, including 300km missiles.

🧵1/9
Semiconductors for military proposes aren't a limitation for any country.

From many months the western media keep spreading the idea about semiconductors shortage being responsable for Russian low production.

This is just partially true.

Let see some examples: 2/9
A bit about RU chips:

"Marking this new era in Russia are recent manufacturing process implementations in: 130 nm and 90 nm, and eventually 65 nm; project announcements for 45 nm technology, dramatic escalation of Russia’s nanotechnology industry"

semi.org/en/About/SEMIG…